




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Simon Bolívar
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SIMON BOLIVAR

∴ “EL LIBERTADOR” ∴

A LIFE OF THE CHIEF LEADER IN
THE REVOLT AGAINST SPAIN IN
VENEZUELA NEW GRANADA & PERU
BY F. LORAINÉ PETRE ❧ ❧ ❧
WITH A PHOTOGRAVURE FRONTIS-
PIECE AND A MAP ❧ ❧ ❧ ❧

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A.361205

Turnbull & Spears, Printers, Edinburgh

PREFACE

SOME apology may be thought necessary for this attempt to revive interest in a man whose name was extremely well known in Europe less than a century ago. He then enjoyed a reputation above his merits, being described as the Washington or the Napoleon of South America. Since then, in Europe, he has fallen into a still more undeserved oblivion, a fact which is, perhaps, largely due to the constant turmoil of revolution and civil war which has existed since his death in those countries, in the liberation of which from the dominion of Spain he played so great a part.¹

The names of most of the Spanish American Republics have come to be looked upon as connoting revolution, civil war, and financial repudiation. It is only quite recently that European interest in them has begun to revive, with the promise of a more settled era. Mexico, under the able rule of Porfirio Díaz; Argentina, now covered with a network of railways and recognised as a granary of the world; to a lesser extent, Chile, Peru, and Colombia have all begun to attract European capital and industries. The immense possibilities of development and trade in these countries, provided a stable and honest government can be assured, are forcing themselves on the attention of Europe and North America. The German trader, ever in the forefront of enterprise, is to be found all over them. Unlike his British rival, he is careful to

¹ For a discussion of the reasons why Bolivar has been almost forgotten in Europe, see article in the *Times* of August 8th, 1883, dealing with the celebration in South America of the centenary of his birth.

offer to the still half-civilised lower classes the precise kind of goods they desire, instead of attempting to force on them what he happens to have in stock.

As an outlet for the surplus populations of the more settled countries of the world, South America is rapidly coming to the fore, especially Argentina; and the completion of the Panama Canal within the next few years can hardly fail to bring the states of the West coast into closer touch with Europe.

It seems, even, not impossible that the southern continent might become a serious bone of contention between the north and at least one European state.

For the correct understanding of the heterogeneous populations of South America, and of the miserable period of revolution and anarchy which has, for nearly a century, stunted their progress, there can be no better study than the revolt against Spain, in which Simon Bolivar played so great a part, and the character of the man who, starting life full of hope for his country, died reluctantly convinced of the terrible vicissitudes it was about to pass through. To Englishmen there should be some interest, in connexion with the present unrest in India, in studying the revolt of the Spanish American dominions. There is certainly no comparison possible between the colonial misrule of Spain in the beginning of the nineteenth century and the beneficent administration of India by England in the beginning of the twentieth. But there are many points of analogy between the handful of creoles who drew in their wake the ignorant masses of the Spanish-American populations and the men in India, who, like the creoles, idealists and victims of a too literary education, advocate separation from England, or, at least, a form of self-government for which their countries are even less suited than were the South American colonies of the early nineteenth century. Bolivar himself saw clearly that a federal republic was impossible. In India

the populations differ from one another still more markedly, and the proportion of illiteracy is greater. The Indian peoples have not even the tie of a single language almost universally understood, as Spanish was, and is, in South America.

If the dissolution of the Spanish dominion in South America was followed by civil war and anarchy, what would ensue on the disappearance of the British from India? There is at least one great difference—Spanish-America was left by the rest of the world to “stew in its own juice”; that would certainly not be the case with India.

Finally, there is an element of interest to Britons in the fact that Bolivar’s two decisive victories of Boyacá and Carabobo were mainly due to the valour of our countrymen fighting in the cause of liberty. Even in the “crowning mercy” of Ayacucho, English officers played a leading part, though of the 6000 volunteers who had joined the Liberator’s standard in 1819 the greater part had perished by the sword or by disease. It is hardly necessary to allude to Lord Cochrane’s immense services to the Chilean navy.

For the loan of some of the books in the following list I have to thank H. E. Dr Ignacio Gutierrez Ponce, Colombian Minister in London. Also my thanks are due Mr B. Koppel, who, in addition to lending books, has given me many hints and much information.

F. L. P.

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 Charles Turner) *facing p. 308*

GENERAL MAP OF PARTS OF COLOMBIA AND PERU—

INSETS, (a) SKETCH FOR BOLIVAR'S PASSAGE OF
 THE ANDES, 1819; (b) SKETCH FOR BOLIVAR'S

OPERATIONS IN PERU *at end of volume*

SIMON BOLIVAR

SIMON BOLIVAR

CHAPTER I

SOUTH AMERICA UNDER SPANISH RULE

BEFORE entering upon the life of Simon Bolivar,¹ it is necessary to give a brief account of the country in which the greater part of it was spent, and of the circumstances, the grievances, and the administration which led up to the Revolution in which he played the most prominent part. To give anything like a detailed account of the system of administration of her American colonies, or more accurately dominions, by Spain during the three centuries between their first conquest and their final emancipation from the rule of the mother country would require a considerable volume to itself. All that we can afford space for here is a mere outline, sufficient to serve as a guide to the motives and interests which prompted the insurrection throughout Spanish America, from Mexico to Chile and Buenos Aires.

Spain owed the acquisition of her New World kingdoms of Mexico and Guatemala, of Venezuela, New Granada, Peru, Chile, and Buenos Aires to the semi-private adventures of men like Cortés, the Pizarros, Quesada, and Benalcazar, who have been crowned with a halo of romance which, with the casual reader of history, has served to withdraw attention from the

¹ Bolívar, not Bolívar, as it is sometimes mispronounced in England.

hideous crimes which stained the annals of most of the "conquistadores." One is apt to think of Cortés or Pizarro chiefly as the hero of deeds of daring which surpassed in splendour many of those attributed by romance to its favourites. It is easy enough to learn from the delightful works of W. H. Prescott, or a dozen other sources, the history of the crimes openly perpetrated on the peaceable and comparatively defenceless peoples of the New World, to whom the invaders at first appeared as gods from a better world. But their ruthless cruelty, shameless treachery, and unbounded lust of riches soon marked the conquerors out as, what many of them were, the scum of Europe. For the conquering bands were largely recruited, not only from Spain, but from Germany, Italy, and almost every other country of Europe. These men, pushed to desperate adventures almost solely by the hope of wealth, encountered anything approaching civilisation only in Mexico and Peru; for the civilisation of the Muyscas of the highlands of New Granada was of the most elementary description.

It was impossible that men of the class of the "conquistadores" should be left permanently to rule the vast empire, twice the size of Europe, of which they had laid the foundations, and in 1542 Spain began the issue of laws for the government of her colonial empire in America and the West Indies. Had all the laws prescribed in the course of three centuries been carried out, or been even possible of execution, the lot of the aboriginal inhabitants might have been very different from what it was; for it was not due so much to want of goodwill on the part of the Spanish sovereigns as to their ignorance of how to solve the problems which, at a distance of several thousand miles, they failed to understand. There was in the government of the mother country a perpetual profession of solicitude for the welfare, not only of its Spanish, but also of its Indian subjects.

But the laws which were issued, with innumerable amendments, soon became too confused and intricate for comprehension even by administrators of the best intentions, who unfortunately were rare. The men who went out from Spain to fill the higher offices in the transatlantic kingdoms felt that they must make hay while the sun shone, and their main object was to amass a fortune as some compensation for a period of exile to uncongenial surroundings, and often to a bad climate. Moreover, in a territory so vast in area, so sparsely populated, so unprovided with means of communication, the practical control exercised by even the most well-meaning Viceroy or Captain-General must necessarily be weak. Add to this that many of the laws, especially those aiming at the protection of the aborigines, were directly opposed to the selfish interests of the immigrants, who looked upon the Indians as created only for the purpose of amassing wealth for their conquerors by their labour. Finding on the spot a people generally endowed with muscular limbs, the Spanish mine-owner saw in them excellent labourers for the extraction of the gold and silver, to which he looked as the only wealth of the country. He failed to remember, or, if he remembered, to pay any heed to the fact that such work was fatal to the health, even the life of men bred in the free upper air. What was the loss of life amongst the Indians employed in the mines none can ever know, but it is certain that it was enormous. The importation of negro slaves aimed at stopping this loss, to some extent, by the substitution of their labour in the mines; but it only succeeded at all in the lower and hotter places; for the negro was even more useless than the Indian in the high regions and the cold climates of the Andes.

But we must not fall into the error of imagining that the South American Indian, however much he may have suffered in the mines of Mexico and Peru, disappeared from

the face of the earth, or was even reduced to the same extent as his brother in the United States or Canada. The early Spaniards were only able to fasten on the coasts and favourable spots of the great continent, and they never succeeded in imposing their dominion on great multitudes of tribes on their frontiers. There there was a constant struggle, and many a Spanish settlement was wiped out by the savages. The "missions" were founded, generally as a sort of advanced guard on these frontiers, in the hope that religion might be able to effect what force could not. Even at the present day one may risk death by a poisoned blow-pipe dart at some places within twenty miles of the great waterway between Bogotá and the sea, and the explorer of the forests about the head waters of the Amazon or the La Plata may still be in some danger of putting in a post-mortem appearance as a roast at some savage banquet. The mass of the population of several of the South American republics is still Indian, or at least has a large admixture of Indian blood.

The population of Spanish South America gradually became more and more heterogeneous as time went on. The aboriginal populations were, no doubt, far from homogeneous, and there was in reality as wide a difference between the Incas of Peru and the savages who still roam the forests in the centre of the continent as there is between the cultivated Brahman of the Indian Deccan and the wildest Bhil of the Nerbadda Valley. But an invading white race is generally unable to distinguish between one coloured man and another, and to the Spaniards all these differences were invisible as a rule. It is just the same in India with the common English. The British soldier or railway employé does not realise the immense gulfs of race, of breeding, and of civilisation which separate one Indian from another. A very large proportion of stay-at-home Englishmen, and even of those whose knowledge of India is confined to what they

pick up in the course of a cold weather tour, are equally under the delusion that the Indian peoples are one nation, and not an immense number of widely different races, whose only common attribute is a dark skin.

With the Spanish conquest there commenced at once the creation of still wider racial differences, which have resulted in a population, other than the Indians, deeply divided amongst themselves.

Necessarily, the "conquistadores" carried with them very few women from their own countries, and the immigration of unmarried women was always difficult, and hampered by many restrictions. But, from the first, no prejudice was felt against unions, both legitimate and illegitimate, between Spaniards and Indians, and there soon began to spring up a mixed race (*mestizos*), the offspring of such unions. Between the extremes of the Spaniard and the Indian there intervened, as time went on, every degree of admixture of the two races. When the negro appeared upon the scene he came as a slave, a mere chattel or a beast of burden, who was sold in the public market alongside of the mule and the horse, and was described, like them, in advertisements, as "sound and free from vice." Under such circumstances, the union of the Spaniard and the negro was generally illegitimate. Its offspring became the "mulatto." Between the negro and the Indian marriage was discouraged, and generally made illegal by the Spanish laws. The conquerors had no desire to foster a combination of the two races which had suffered so grievously at their hands. Nevertheless, there sprang up a certain number of "zambos," half-breeds between the negro and the Indian. With three original colours, white, red, and black, and the three mixed races, "mestizo," "mulatto," and "zambo," added to the innumerable shades of colour introduced by the various combinations of the mixed blood, South America had probably one of the most

heterogeneous populations in the world of a century ago. This characteristic has increased since then. But there arose a distinction, not of race but of class, which far exceeded in political importance all the variations between white and black and copper coloured. It was the distinction between the two classes of pure whites, the creole and the more temporary immigrant from Spain, who looked to return to his own country when he had amassed a fortune. Many people at the present day associate the term "creole" with an admixture of dark blood, but the original meaning implied nothing of the sort.¹ To the Spaniard, coming over from Europe without any idea of changing his domicile, "criollo" signified a man of the pure blood of his own race, often of bluer blood and higher lineage than himself, who had been born and bred in the colonies, and was domiciled there. In this sense, the founders of the United States were "creoles" when considered from the point of view of the Englishman, and the half-breed between the North American Indian and the Englishman was a "mestizo."

The revolt of the British North American colonies against the dominion of the mother country was thus essentially a "creole" revolt, and the case was precisely similar in Spanish America. In both cases the aboriginal population had ceased to be of serious political importance, and, when it fought, took part on either side according to local circumstances. In both cases the "mestizo" was inclined to side with the creole, and the negro slave followed his master.

In India the creole problem, which faced England and Spain alike in America, has never cropped up, for the class practically has never come into existence. The

¹ Still the word has always implied some measure of dishonour, and has never been held to be creditable. This is perhaps to be accounted for by its alleged derivation, a corruption from the word "criadillo," the diminutive of "criado," a servant.

"mestizo," represented by the "Eurasian" of India, can never be a danger there, for he is repudiated by the native races, and driven perforce into the arms of the Englishman. Moreover, he is strong neither in numbers nor in qualities. Between Spaniard and creole in Spanish America contempt on the one side, hatred on the other, grew apace. To the Spaniard, brought up in his native country by servants and instructors of his own race, the creole seemed a contemptible creature. For the youthful creole spent the first five or six years of his life in the charge of a negro slave. After that he was generally made over to a mulatto teacher, from whom he learned no good. He acquired from his nurse only the slave's notion of duty, "which recognises little or no spontaneous effort for others, but whose rule of action is the command of the master enforced by the lash. From his teachers he acquired notions of religion which were full of Paganism, without the grace and poetry of Pagan worship. Outwardly, he adapted himself to the forms of civilised life, but his mind was full of superstitions acquired from the barbarous companions of his youth."¹ Vanity and cruelty he inherited from his forbears, and they were fostered by the influences to which he was subjected by his early guardians and instructors.

The policy of Spain kept all the good things of the administration of the country, not for the creole, but for the needy Spaniard, who came to it to acquire a fortune and a title. The creole was not by law barred from high office, but in practice he rarely got it. Of 754 Viceroys and Captains-General, only eighteen were creoles. Consequently, says Captain Basil Hall,² they suffered from "the moral degradation consequent upon the absence of all motive to

¹ Professor B. Moses, "South America on the Eve of Emancipation," p. 101.

² Hall's "Travels" (*Constable's Miscellany*, Edinburgh, 1826), vol. ii. p. 23.

generous exertion, and the utter hopelessness that any merit could lead to useful distinction." Yet many of them, especially those educated partially in Europe, were well suited for responsible employment in the service of the State. This fact was openly recognised by some of the more intelligent and disinterested Spaniards, who saw at the same time the danger threatened by the existence in the colonies of a large body of such men, discontented, not with the dominion of Spain, but with the tyranny exercised by the avaricious men whom she sent out. On the other hand, says Professor Moses, the inherent vanity of the creole and his overbearing manners led him to avoid labour and to refuse to engage in trade. The natural result was a life of idleness, often of vice.

In the correction of this the Church was not likely to do much good; for its ministers set the very worst example, as was reported by Ulloa in the "Noticias Secretas." Concubinage and luxury were rife amongst them, and it is stated that they were generally the prime movers in getting up dances, in which they and their mistresses joined.

The creole, then, was the real originator of the movement for separation from Spain, though, at first, even he was not, as a rule, for throwing off the dominion of the mother country, and might still have been conciliated by the grant of some measure of autonomy, with a fair share in the good things of office. The "mestizos" joined eventually with the creoles, but, like other mixed races, they were wanting in the spirit of initiative and the energy necessary to incite them to make a start on their own account. As we shall see presently, the revolution would have succeeded much more rapidly than it did had the spirit for it been rife in the country. But, generally speaking, owing to apathy, it was dormant, and it was only by the exertions of leaders like Bolivar that it was galvanised into spasmodic activity. The

country side was only brought over to the republican cause by success, and when defeat succeeded to victory, province after province relapsed into the tame submission to the temporarily restored supremacy of Spain.

And what was the part played by the Indians before and during this turmoil of the early nineteenth century? They had no reason to love either the Spaniard or the creole, for both alike maltreated the Indian, whom they considered as a pariah, as much created to work for the white man as was the negro. The unfortunate Indians who came under the sway of Spain never, after their final conquest, made any serious attempt to throw off the yoke.¹ At last, in 1780, Tupac Amaru II., goaded to desperation by the tyrannies of a Spanish "corregidor," raised the standard of rebellion; but even he did not aim so much at getting rid of Spanish dominion as at calling attention to, and obtaining some redress of, the grievances of his fellow-countrymen. The insurrection, powerful only in its numbers, badly armed, and led by men who had no capacity for organisation, soon collapsed, and was terribly avenged by the Spaniards and creoles. In the War of Independence, where the Indians took a hand, we shall find them serving indifferently on either side. In parts of Venezuela, in Pasto, and again in the final struggle in Peru, they displayed bitter hostility to the republican cause. In other places they equally supported it. Amongst other instances may be quoted the case of the Colombian "Rifles" battalion which, after the death of nearly all the English rank and file originally composing it, for a time consisted almost entirely of Indians under British officers.

There were many grievances, of course, besides the exclusion of the creoles from high office. Otherwise,

¹ That is, dating the final conquest from the execution, in 1571, of the first Tupac Amaru.

that alone would not have sufficed to raise the bulk of the population against Spain. In her commercial policy Spain was, after all, not so very much worse than her neighbours in her treatment of her colonies. She only did like others in treating her foreign possessions as a mere milch cow for the supply to the mother country of streams of gold and silver, and as a convenient dumping ground for her own produce. No doubt she went to greater lengths than others in this respect, and was perhaps even more short-sighted than they. She would allow no commercial competition by her colonies with herself, and they were not allowed to supply themselves with goods which could be grown or manufactured in Spain, and sent out for sale at an enormous profit to the Spanish producer and monopolist, and at a price ruinous to the American consumer. England had encouraged agriculture in her colonies, for she wanted the raw products for her own manufactures. Even agriculture was often discouraged by Spain. The growing of wheat was encouraged, since Spain herself and other colonies of hers in America required it; the culture of the vine, on the other hand, was generally prohibited, for Spain grew excellent grapes and wished to supply her colonies with wine. The manufacture of cloth was prohibited, for that could be made up in the mother country. Trade with the outside world was almost entirely prohibited, with the result of the prevalence of smuggling. Sometimes utterly ridiculous reasons were assigned for the prohibition of trades. In Peru, for instance, the growth of the coca plant was prohibited on two grounds. In the first place, the plant was sacred in the worship of the Incas, and played a considerable part in their religious ceremonies; therefore it was anathema in a Christian country! In the second place, it grew in unhealthy tracts, where the Indian cultivator would suffer or die; therefore it must not, on his

account, be cultivated. Yet such considerations did not prevent his being made to work in the mines, which was much more fatal to him. Another notable abuse in the matter of trade was the grant to the Guipuzcoa Company of the monopoly of trade with Venezuela, and the general confinement of the trade between the mother country and the colonies to the single Spanish port of Seville.

The original contract between the Spanish Government and the "conquistadores" and other early settlers provided for a sort of feudal tenure of their fiefs or "encomiendas." But the tyranny of the "encomenderos" soon became so notorious and flagrant that the Spanish sovereigns, beginning with the Emperor Charles V., found it necessary gradually to resume these fiefs, in exchange for minor compensations and patents of nobility.

From that time, the dominions in America became separate kingdoms under the rule of the Spanish king, who governed through the Viceroys and the Council of the Indies.

Whilst the European dominions were officially styled "These Kingdoms," the term "Those Kingdoms" was applied to the transmarine possessions of the Spanish Crown. Thus an enactment applicable to both Spain and the colonies was headed as being in force in "Estos y esos reinos" (these and those kingdoms). Though the natives of the colonies were solemnly declared to be subjects of the King, on the same footing as the inhabitants of Aragon and Castille, and were endowed with a regular code of laws, they were practically dependent on the officials appointed from Spain to govern them. These men, almost invariably Spaniards, could with impunity interpret the laws as they chose, or apply them just so much or so little as suited their own interests or caprices. Over an official several thousands of miles away, before the days of steam and telegraphs, the central authority in Europe could exercise practically no control.

The instrument through which the Spanish monarch governed his transatlantic possessions was the Council of the Indies, sitting in the vicinity of the Court. Its powers were legislative, judicial as the final court of appeal in the most important cases, and executive as adviser of the King in such matters.

The management of economic matters was confided to another body, the "Casa de Contratacion,"¹ whose business it was to carry out and enforce the exclusive monopoly of colonial trade which had been determined upon. It sat at Seville, which became the sole lawful port of trade between the mother country and her foreign dependencies. Later on it was transferred to Cadiz, and presently other ports were opened. Similarly, the trade of South America with Spain was strictly limited to certain ports in the colonies.

At the head of the administration in South America, at first, was the Viceroy of Peru, residing in royal state at Lima.² His unwieldy charge extended from Buenos Aires and Chile in the south to New Granada and Venezuela in the north.

Presently it was found impossible for one man at Lima to rule so vast a territory, and two new Viceroys and two Captains-General were set up.

The Viceroyalty of New Granada finally came into being in 1739. It comprised the two former Presidencies of Quito and New Granada, corresponding to the present republics of Ecuador, Colombia, and Panamá. The capital was at Santa Fé (Bogotá). The Captain-Generalcy of Venezuela (Caracas) was of older date (1550). The Viceroyalty of Buenos Aires was created in 1776. Its territory included the present republics of Argentina,

¹ Freely translated by Professor Moses "The India House." It was older in origin than the Council, but eventually became subordinate to it.

² There was another Viceroy of New Spain who concerns us less, for his jurisdiction did not extend into South America. His capital was Mexico.

Uruguay, Paraguay, and Bolivia. The Captain-Generalcy of Chile was subordinate to the Viceroy of Peru, who also directly controlled the Province of Guayaquil and the southern part of Quito. Quito itself was part of the Viceroyalty of New Granada. But the "President of Quito" enjoyed a certain amount of independence, due, no doubt, largely to the difficulties of the country intervening between his territory and the rest of New Granada. Indeed he is sometimes spoken of as the Captain-General. The Peruvian Viceroy never altogether lost some general power of supervision and control all over South America, even in the other Viceroyalties and Captain-Generalcies.

The charges of the Viceroys and Captains-General were divided into Presidencies, Intendencies, and Provinces, at the head of which were Presidents, Intendents, Governors, and "Corregidores," according to the importance of the division. These officials, like the Viceroys and Captains-General, were appointed from Spain, but were subordinate to the Viceroys or Captains-General.

The next subdivision was into Departments or Cantons, the heads of which were the delegates of the provincial chiefs.

As a rule, Viceroys and Captains-General were also commanders-in-chief of the military forces of their charge, but in some cases there was a separate military commandant.

The "Audiencia real" was an authority exercising functions on the judicial side similar to those of a Supreme Court in India or the British colonies. It was the final court of appeal in South America, and in some cases exercised original jurisdiction. Appeals from an "Audiencia" to the King of Spain only lay in the most important civil cases. But the powers of the "Audiencias" were much more than judicial, at least in the case of chief "Audiencias," such as that of Lima. The Viceroy was President of the "Audiencia," but

could not vote in it. On his death, or the occurrence otherwise of a vacancy in his office, the "Audiencia" succeeded temporarily to his powers. There was frequent friction between Viceroys or Captains-General and the "Audiencias," which thus to a certain extent acted, as they were intended to do, as a check on the head of the administration. The right of direct correspondence with Spain increased the power of the "Audiencia" as against the Viceroy or Captain-General. Frequent disputes were the result of failure clearly to distinguish by law the functions of the "Audiencia" from those of the Viceroy or Captain-General. The chief "Audiencias" established in South America were at Lima, Santa Fé (Bogotá), Quito, La Plata, Caracas, Buenos Aires, and Santiago de Chile.

The "Cabildo" or Municipal Council was a very important institution. It was often endowed with very considerable powers; sometimes it was empowered to nominate a governor in case of vacancy. In a special meeting called "cabildo abierto," held in consultation with the principal civil and ecclesiastical authorities, matters of considerable local importance were often discussed and settled. In the more remote districts the cabildo often was practically the only representative of authority. We shall presently see the authority of the cabildo frequently invoked as a starting-point for the formation of a revolutionary "junta." In them creoles figured largely as members. There was no legislative authority in the colonies, in which, according to theory, the King of Spain was the successor of the native rulers who had been conquered, just as the British Government in India is regarded as the successor of the Moghul emperors. The South American Indians were regarded as subjects of the Spanish king, entitled to the full rights of Spanish subjects. Laws were manufactured for the government of Spanish Americans and Indians

by the Council of the Indies in Spain, but they were poured out in such vast quantities, and were often so contradictory, as to be incomprehensible even to the best-intentioned and most intelligent administrators. These, indeed, were few and far between, and there was nothing in the nature of a permanent and adequately paid civil service such as exists in India. Though every administrator, on leaving office, was bound to have his conduct during his tenure of it inquired into, there was probably little fear of this process, and men openly set themselves to the making of a fortune, by illegitimate means, out of appointments the legal emoluments of which were insufficient for the bare subsistence of their holders. Corruption was rife, and appointments were freely sold. In the case of Viceroys and Captains-General, the opportunities of enrichment offered by the civil, military, and ecclesiastical patronage which they possessed were enormous.

We have said very little of the oppression of the Indians, which was the work alike of European Spaniards, of creoles, of mulattoes, and of "mestizos"—Indian grievances, as we have said, had nothing whatever to do with the rising against Spain. The revolt of Tupac Amaru was the last bolt shot by these unfortunate people who, later, became mere pawns in the struggle, when they took part in it at all. As for the "mestizos" and "mulattoes," they were, as a body, almost as incapable of concerted action as the Indians. The negroes and "zambos" counted for nothing. The revolution was entirely initiated by creoles in the sense of Spaniards of pure blood, born and bred in the country, though the "mestizos" and the others followed their lead. The chief grievances of the creoles are thus summarised by Cochrane¹:—

"1st. The arbitrary power exercised by the Viceroys

¹ i. 266.

and Captains-General, who very frequently evaded the laws, and even the orders which they received from the King.

"2nd. That the 'audiencias' were composed solely of Europeans, who interpreted the laws as they pleased.

"3rd. That, under the authority of the 'audiencias,' clandestine decrees in causes were often made; nocturnal arrests took place; persons were banished without trial, and numerous other acts of injustice were committed.

"4th. That they (the native Spanish Americans) were treated with distrust by the Government, notwithstanding the loyalty and courage which, upon several occasions, they had manifested in defence of the rights of the Crown of Spain.

"5th. That they were obliged to bear insults from the meanest of the Spaniards, who, merely on account of their European birth, considered themselves superior to, and, as it were, the masters of, the Spanish Americans. As an instance of this kind of feeling, a report is quoted, which was made to the King by his fiscal, upon the petition of the city of Merida de Maracaibo in Venezuela, to found a university; the opinion of the fiscal was that 'the petition was to be refused, because it was unsuitable to promote learning in Spanish America, where the inhabitants appeared destined by nature to work in the mines.' After a pretended solemn deliberation of the 'Consulada,' or Board of Trade in Mexico, the members informed the Cortes that 'the Indians were a race of monkeys, filled with vice and ignorance; automats unworthy of representing or being represented.'¹

"6th. That, notwithstanding the original compact made between the King and the first settlers in Spanish America, which stipulated 'that in all cases of government, justice, administration of finances, commissions,

¹ There seems to be some confusion of ideas in this instance, for the writer quoted puts forward grievances of Indians rather than of creoles.

etc., the first discoverers, then the Pacificadores, and lastly the settlers and those born in the said provinces, were to be preferred in all appointments and public employments,' the creoles were gradually shut out from all participation in local commands and dignities; that they were also prohibited from visiting the mother country without the express permission of the King, which could not be obtained but with much difficulty.

"7th. That the South Americans were prohibited from making wine or brandy, or extracting oils, and from planting vines or almond trees, except in Peru or Chile, or from cultivating more than a specified and limited number of tobacco plants; whilst the wine, almonds, etc., produced in Peru and Chile were not permitted to be sent to Mexico, New Granada, or Tierra Firma; and it was forbidden to cultivate tobacco or the sugar cane in Chile.

"8th. That, in order to check the progress of population and to keep distinct the different classes, there were many laws tending to throw obstacles in the way of marriage."

Notwithstanding all these grievances, and the open contempt with which Spaniards treated every native of South America, from the creole to the Indian, there still subsisted amongst the creoles a general feeling of respect for the royal authority, and of attachment to the mother country. The cry was never "down with Spain," but always, "down with the bad government of her delegates." Even in the revolution of the beginning of the nineteenth century, the first movements were invariably favourable to the Royal House of Spain, and the new Government was set up in the name and on behalf of Ferdinand VII. It was only as it appeared more and more clearly that all parties in Spain were hostile to reform in the colonies, that the more extreme leaders of the revolution were able to gain over public opinion to

their idea of final separation from the mother country. Why is it that, with all the grievances of the South American population, serious revolt should have been deferred till the end of the first decade of the nineteenth century? The causes must be traced partly in South America, partly in the comparative strength of Spain herself previous to the catastrophe resulting from the unscrupulous proceedings of Napoleon in 1808-9.

The Indians, as we have already said, were by far the greatest sufferers, but their intellectual inferiority, their want of proper armament, and their incapacity for concerted action on a large scale foredoomed to failure any attempt they might make to obtain redress by force. The only really serious Indian rising was that of Tupac Amaru II. in 1780, and that collapsed before the resistance incurred from Spaniards and creoles alike.

Creole apathy and inertia, combined with the narrow limits of the education allowed in the colonies, served to keep back the South American Spaniard. Teaching, which was mainly confined to religion, canon law, and literature of a carefully-selected type, tended to drive its pupils in the direction of legal studies, and to exclude from their ken scientific subjects and practical matters.¹ The strictest supervision was exercised over the class of books permitted to enter the colonies, and no press existed. What knowledge of the progress of liberal ideas reached these countries from the United States or Europe was smuggled in by those creoles who had gone abroad to complete their education, and these, under the

¹ It is curious to note the somewhat similar result produced by the strongly literary character of the educational system in India during the latter half of the nineteenth century. To that we have to attribute mainly the growth of a large body of unpractical lawyers in Bengal and elsewhere. Industrial education, it is true, has not been deliberately suppressed as it was in the Spanish colonies, but it has certainly not been encouraged as we think it should have been. In the Spanish colonies it would have been useless so long as the restrictions on trade remained.

Spanish rule, were strictly limited in numbers. It might have been thought that the revolt of the English North American colonies would have produced a great and immediate effect in the adjoining continent, but it was not so. North American ideas had to cross the Atlantic first, and it was only when they had been developed in France into the excesses of the great Revolution that they began to return to Spanish America as a powerful influence. The apathy and ignorance of the South Americans for long resisted the efforts of the men who came back from Europe imbued with the spirit of the French Revolution, or from the United States under the influence of the more moderate ideas of that country.

The dominion of Spain in South America was very far from being a military one. The Spanish contingents rarely withstood for long the trials of a bad climate in the coast ports, and these were the places where they were usually stationed. Most of the regular troops were themselves creoles, "mestizos," or mulattoes, and the local militias were generally of small fighting value, and might well have been looked to as supporters rather than opponents of a movement for freedom. It was by the close supervision exercised by Spain, through the courts of the Inquisition at Lima and Cartagena, and through the other instruments of control which she possessed, that she was able to nip in the bud such schemes of revolt as were formulated before 1808. Up to then, she generally had in reserve the power of enforcing her rule by the despatch of an expeditionary force. The dissolution of the Spanish Monarchy in that year, and the conflict with Napoleon, practically put a stop to any considerable expedition, until the return of Ferdinand VII. to Spain in 1814. It was largely due to Ferdinand's misgovernment after that that the possibility of an eventual reconquest of his American dominions finally disappeared with the mutiny in the great expedition preparing at Cadiz in

1820. The utter apathy of the creole population as a whole is constantly in evidence in the early years of the War of Independence. The bulk of the Spanish forces against which the revolutionaries had to contend was South American. In several provinces it was impossible at first to get up a serious opposition to Spanish supremacy, and in many others a general relapse to the royalist side occurred the very moment that there was a change of the fortune of war adverse to the Republican cause. Not only was the revolt, in its inception, of purely creole origin, but it had to be engineered by a comparatively few leaders, who had generally imbibed their ideas of liberty in Europe or the United States.

In considering the origin of the revolution, Tupac Amaru's insurrection in 1780 may be left entirely out of consideration, as being an Indian movement directed as much against the creole as against the European Spaniard.

The first real movement against the Spanish Government was the insurrection of Leon, a man from the Canary Islands, not a South American creole. His insurrection, in the middle of the eighteenth century, aimed at the destruction of the Guipuzcoa Company, to which the monopoly of trade with Venezuela had been made over by Spain. The plot was discovered before it was ripe, Leon was executed at Caracas, and a monument erected to perpetuate his shame!

In 1781 there was a rising at Socorro, in Central New Granada, to the cry of "Long live the King! Down with our bad Government!" This was so serious that the Viceroy was reduced to calling in the ecclesiastical arm by sending the Archbishop of Santa Fé to negotiate in full canonicals. The malcontents were induced to disperse on promises of redress in the matter of the new taxes of which they complained. As might have been expected, once the danger was past there was very little hope of fulfilment of its promises by the Government.

In 1794 a more serious scheme of revolution in Caracas was set on foot by Antonio Nariño, who afterwards played a considerable part in the revolt of New Granada and subsequent events. It seems, however, to have been very much delayed in execution ; for, in 1797, it was still not ready when it was discovered by the Government. Gual and España, the nominal leaders, fled to Curaçao, whence the latter, thinking the matter had blown over, returned, two years later, to La Guaira, only to be arrested and hanged. In June 1797 Sir Thomas Picton, Governor of Trinidad, had, with the sanction of the British Government, then at war with Spain, issued a proclamation promising help to insurrectionary movements.

Were the Spanish-American colonies ripe for revolution and independence in the early nineteenth century, when their chance of success came in the collapse of the Spanish Monarchy before the might of Napoleon? They were certainly ripe for revolt, for there was general discontent with a corrupt, tyrannical, and utterly selfish Government. Of improvement there was no hope so long as Spain ruled them. The subsequent history of Cuba and the Philippines has shown that from improvement in Spanish methods nothing was to be expected for a century to come.

But when we come to the question of readiness for independence, especially in the form of a republican government, the case is different. Look back, first on the history of the last century in the revolted colonies, and compare it with that of the United States. In the north we have a nation ready not only for revolt, but also qualified to form a true popular Government, under which internecine struggles, save for the great one in the sixties of last century, have not served to spread misery or retard progress. Then turn to the Spanish colonies, torn by factions in the midst of their revolt against Spain,

devastated by civil war long before independence had been assured, trampled on by rival tyrants, each appealing to the great principles of liberty in support of a cause which was purely personal. For the greater part of a century every one of the former Spanish colonies has been the scene of bloodshed and revolution. Their most prosperous times have in reality corresponded to those periods when some strong man, proclaiming, with his tongue in his cheek all the while, the blessings of popular government, has succeeded in imposing his own practically absolute rule. As for progress, where has there been any among the mass of the people? Primary education has been neglected, and probably there is not much more of it now than there was a century ago. There are many highly educated and cultivated men among the upper classes, but the lower classes know nothing, and still remain but pawns in the hands of every ambitious man who may aspire to be a general or a dictator. One, at least, of the leaders of the revolt, San Martin, a republican to begin with, recognised that popular government was unsuited to peoples in the backward state of those of South America early in the nineteenth century. Bolivar, indeed, professed throughout to be a republican, but this history of him will perhaps show what his conception of a suitable republic was. If he ever really believed in the possibility of the success in South America of a genuine representative government, his last ideas were very different. His opinion of the future of South America, said to have been expressed only a month before his death, is a remarkable prophecy. "These countries," it says, "will inevitably pass into the hands of an uncurbed multitude, to pass later into those of petty tyrants of all colours and all races."

It is only now, very gradually, that the South American republics are beginning to improve, and that largely thanks to the influence of European and North

American capital, and, in some cases, of European immigration.

Here it will be well to give some general description of the vast territories over which, during twenty years, Bolivar operated, whether as a general or as a civil administrator.

The total area with which he came more or less into direct contact may be roughly stated as about $18\frac{1}{2}$ times the size of Great Britain and Ireland, with a population between one-eighth and one-seventh of theirs at the present day.

Venezuela, the native country of Bolivar, having been brought of late years into somewhat undesirable notoriety by the behaviour of its late President, Don Cipriano Castro, most people are aware of its general situation, a remark which is perhaps not always applicable to some of the other South American republics. It is a country of vast plains¹ and mountain ranges, of a climate varying with the altitude above sea-level, from the extreme of tropical heat on the coasts and the great plains, through a sub-tropical temperature at 3000 feet and a temperate climate at from 4000 to 7000 feet, to an Alpine region at the higher levels up to over 15,000 feet.

The western districts, towards Merida and Trujillo, are generally mountainous, being traversed by a branch of the Andes thrown out eastwards from the eastern Cordilleras of the adjoining Republic of Colombia. Towards the coast this range falls in altitude and skirts the northern coast right along to opposite Trinidad. The range forms, as it were, a great wall, shutting out the vast plains of the Orinoco valley from the Caribbean Sea. Even in this coast range there are peaks, such as the Silla at La Guaira, which rise to over 9000 feet,

¹ According to Codazzi, nearly two-thirds of the whole area consists of plains, more than one-fourth of mountains.

though the general average is 3000 or 4000 feet lower. In the south-east, in the angle formed by the Orinoco as it changes its course from north to east, lie more mountains, forest-clad and for the most part but imperfectly known to explorers, forming the "Hinterland" of British Guayana. Roughly speaking, the agricultural portion of Venezuela corresponds with the area covered by the eastern extension of the Andes and the coast range. The pastoral portion is the vast plain between the coast range and the Orinoco, and stretching right back westward all about the Apure, the Arauca, the Meta, and the innumerable other tributaries of the Orinoco, to the foot of the great range of the Eastern Cordilleras. The forest region is that of the south-eastern mountains of Guayana. This division must not be taken as strictly correct, for there are plenty of forests in the Andean and coast ranges, whilst cultivation is to be found in Guayana and on the banks of the Orinoco. However, the division serves to indicate generally the character of the produce of the country.

The most fertile and least thinly populated tracts were in the early nineteenth century, and indeed still are, in the coast range, which is almost everywhere characterised by broad valleys of abounding fertility, watered by numerous lakes and innumerable rivers and streams. The largest of the lakes is that of Valencia or Tacarigua,¹ 30 miles long from east to west and 12 miles broad. Its eastern end is some 50 miles west of Caracas and lies 1600 feet above sea level. Into this eastern end flows the little river Aragua, in the fertile valley of which lay Bolivar's estate of San Mateo. From the other side of the watershed on which the Aragua rises flows eastward the Tuy, with a valley of equal richness. At the western end of the lake is

¹ Excepting, of course, Maracaibo, which is an inlet of the sea rather than a lake.

Valencia, which was so often the scene of fighting between the contending parties in the War of Independence.

Caracas, the capital, stands in the midst of a valley just south of the port of La Guaira, at an elevation of 3000 feet above it. From Caracas to La Guaira is, as the crow flies, but 6 or 7 miles, and in this space, shutting the capital off from its seaport, stands a gigantic natural wall, the mountain known as La Silla, rising steeply 6000 feet above the city and falling still more suddenly 9000 feet to La Guaira, which lies crushed into the narrow space between the foot of the mountain and the sea.¹ Nowadays a wonderful railway climbs painfully up 5000 feet to the lowest pass in the Silla, and then descends 2000 feet to the basin of Caracas; in Bolivar's time the journey was done on horseback in nine miles, whereas the railway requires twenty-four miles of sinuous track to cover the distance between the two places. On the west of the Captain-Generalcy of Venezuela lay the Viceroyalty of New Granada, now the Republic of Colombia. It has been described as the most mountainous country in the world, though to make that description accurate it would be necessary to leave out of consideration the vast plains between the eastern foot of the Andes and the Venezuelan border on the Upper Orinoco. In the south, the Andes are united into a single great knot of mountains, stretching from the Pacific Ocean to the plains of the Putumayo. A little farther north the mountains separate into three great ranges—the Western, Central, and Eastern Cordilleras—stretching like three great claws over the land, and the two outer ranges throwing out supplementary claws westward and eastward, the latter to form the Venezuelan Andes of Merida and Trujillo. The central

¹ La Guaira and La Silla are most graphically described in "Westward Ho!"

range alone stops short some distance south of the Caribbean Sea. There is another great mass of mountains about Santa Marta rising above the level of perpetual snow, even in that torrid climate. Between the western and the central ranges is the valley of the river Cauca, one of the richest in the world; between the Central and the Eastern Cordilleras flows the river Magdalena, with its fertile valley still largely covered by forest. The Magdalena is 1300 miles in length, a stream as long and as great as the Ganges. In the plain between the northern end of the central range and the sea the Cauca joins the Magdalena and is absorbed in it. The capital of this country, perhaps the richest in mineral wealth in South America, is Bogotá, or, as the Spaniards called it, Santa Fé de Bogotá, perched high up in the Western Cordilleras, 700 or 800 miles from the Caribbean Sea. The characteristic of this part of the range is the chain of broad, open, high-lying valleys, evidently the dry beds of ancient lakes. Bogotá itself stands on such a surface 8700 feet above sea-level, surrounded by hills varying from 200 or 300 to 4000 or 5000 feet above the plain. On the Caribbean Sea New Granada had the magnificent harbour of Cartagena, with a fortress considered, in the early nineteenth century, the strongest in South America.

In the south of New Granada lay the Presidency of Quito, now the Republic of Ecuador, with its capital, Quito, standing in the midst of what Mr Whympers has aptly described as an "avenue of volcanoes," in which are included Pichincha, Cotopaxi, Chimborazo, and many others. Here again there are great open plains like that of Bogotá, only still higher. There is a succession of these valleys, 300 miles long and 40 broad, stretching from north of Quito to Cuenca. The length is divided by transverse ranges, connecting the two chains, of which the Andes here consist, into the valleys of

Quito, 9500 feet above the sea ; Ambato, 8500 ; and Cuenca, 7800. The first, though the highest, is far the most fertile. The one decent port of the country is Guayaquil in the south-west, whence, at the present day, a railway climbs round the shoulder of Chimborazo to the great line of valleys, and reaches Quito by them.

Peru comes next to Ecuador, a very different country in some ways ; for, whilst the Ecuadorian coast at Guayaquil or Esmeraldas is moist and rich in tropical vegetation, the greater part of the Peruvian coast is dry, sandy desert, almost devoid of vegetation, save where rivers flowing from the great chain of the Andes divide one desert from the next by transverse strips of fertile land. The average width of this coast strip is about 20 miles. It generally ends on the Pacific margin in lofty cliffs.

Rain rarely falls heavily in this tract ; for the south-east trade winds, blowing across the continent from the Atlantic, have had the last drop of moisture wrung from them by the cold heights of the Andes, and reach the coast region as a cool, dry blast hurrying to regain its moisture from the Pacific.

On the eastern margin of the coast tract stands the maritime range of the Andes, between which and the central range lies the elevated and barren tract known as the Puna.

The central range is the true watershed of this part of the continent, for it is nowhere cut through by rivers flowing to the Pacific, whilst the eastern range is breached by several of the great streams which go to make up the Amazon. This region between the central and eastern Cordilleras is called the "sierra," and is the most fertile met with, so far, as one goes eastward from the coast. In this region is the fertile valley of Jauja, south of the Cerro de Pasco, which forms a transverse wall connecting the central and eastern ranges. Beyond

the eastern range are the great forest-clad slopes leading down to the almost unexplored centre of the continent.

With Chile, the continuation southwards of Peru, we need not trouble ourselves, for Bolivar's operations never extended into it. Behind Southern Peru and Northern Chile lies Bolivia, the Republic formed from the territory of what the Spaniards called Upper Peru. Its western portion lies amongst the highest regions of the Andes, and is remarkable for its mineral wealth. Agriculture only flourishes in the central portion of more moderate altitude, and in the east, where the country slopes down to the "pampas" towards Brazil, Paraguay, and Argentina.

What the population of this vast area was in the first quarter of the nineteenth century it is impossible to say ; indeed, even now, census returns are so unreliable that statements of population of the various republics cannot be accepted as better than shrewd guesses. Miller's memoirs give an estimate of the populations as follows :—

Republic of Colombia (Venezuela, New			
Granada, and Quito)	.	.	2,711,296
Republic of Peru	.	.	1,736,923
Republic of Bolivia	.	.	1,200,000
			<hr/>
			5,648,219

It may be taken for what it is worth, not very much perhaps.

Restrepo¹ gives details for Colombia alone thus—

	Venezuela.	New Granada.	Quito.	Total.
Pure whites . . .	200,000	877,000	157,000	1,234,000
Indians . . .	207,000	313,000	393,000	913,000
Free "coloured" . . .	433,000	140,000	42,000	615,000
Slaves . . .	60,000	70,000	8,000	138,000
				<hr/>
900,000 ²				1,400,000
			600,000	<hr/>
				2,900,000

¹ Introduction, p. xiv. n., edition of 1858.

² A note to the 1858 edition reduces this total to 800,000, and gives the

Miller classifies the population of Peru thus—

Whites	240,819
Indians	998,846
" Mestizos "	383,782
Free mulattoes	69,848
Slaves	43,628

1,736,923

The pure whites, according to these figures, thus constituted between one-third and one-half of the population in Colombia, less than one-seventh in Peru.

numbers of pure whites at 12,000 European Spaniards and 200,000 creoles. The other figures are—Pure Indians, 120,000 ; negro slaves, 62,000 ; mixed races of all sorts, 406,000.

CHAPTER II

BOLIVAR'S EARLY LIFE AND THE FIRST VENEZUELAN REPUBLIC, 1783-1810

THE family of Bolivar appears to have been amongst the earlier of the emigrants from Spain, after the conquest of the American dominions. In 1589 it had evidently attained considerable eminence in Venezuela, for in that year Don Simon Bolivar was sent as envoy to Philip II. to lay before him the position of affairs in the colony, and to seek to enlist for it the sovereign's interest and sympathy. Some of the concessions he obtained, notably one allowing the free import annually of a "ton" of African slaves, are of very dubious value. In 1663 Francisco Marin de Narvaez obtained, at the price of 40,000 pesos,¹ a concession of the copper mines of Cocorote and the adjoining territory of Aroa, 50 or 60 miles west of Puerto Cabello, to which was attached the privilege of appointing and removing the local magistracy. From Narvaez was descended, on his mother's side, Don Juan Vicente de Bolivar, who, towards 1780, was high in the service of the royal treasury, and later was colonel of the militia of the Aragua Valley. His wife, Doña Maria Concepcion

¹ The "peso" ought to be about equivalent in value to the American dollar, roughly four shillings. The Colombian paper "peso" of the present day is worth only about one halfpenny. Calculations are made in the nominal gold peso equal to one dollar, or about 100 (or more) paper pesos.

Palacio y Soto, of another noble family,¹ bore to him a son, Juan Vicente, and two daughters, Maria Antonina and Juana, none of whom are of much interest to us.

Her last child was born on the 24th July 1783, at the family town house, in the Plaza de San Jacinto in Caracas, a boy destined to play the chief rôle in the emancipation from Spanish rule of what are now the Republics of Venezuela, Panama, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, and Bolivia. It is said that the name to be given to the boy at his baptism, on the 30th July at the Cathedral of Caracas, was matter of dispute between his father and his maternal uncle. The latter, evidently representing the more conservative side, would have named him Santiago, after the saint on the eve of whose feast he was born. The father, preferring to seek his patron saint in the family, insisted on naming his son after the Simon Bolivar of 1589. The child's full names were Simon, José, Antonio, de la Santísima Trinidad, but the last three need never again be referred to. Before he was three Simon Bolivar lost his father, whose intention it had been to send his sons to Europe for education. Whatever the widow might have done in fulfilment of this design her father succeeded in stopping. The education of the boys was confided to the best masters Caracas could produce. In 1789 Bolivar's mother died, and he was left to the guardianship of his maternal uncle, Don Carlos Palacio, an easy-going, indolent personage, incapable of taking any great personal interest in his ward's studies, or of insisting on steady application to them. The boy, credited with a good memory, ready understanding, and quickness, was described as of open and affectionate character, but irritable and impatient of contradiction. His first tutor was Simon Rodriguez,² an

¹ The titles of Marquis de Bolivar and Count of Cocorote, conferred on the family shortly before the revolution, were never assumed by them.

² Born in Caracas, 1771. Died in Peru, 1856.

eccentric, who, besides trying without great success to teach the boy the elements of Spanish, Latin, arithmetic, and history, certainly exercised in other ways a much greater influence on his mind. Rodriguez, with his eccentricity and uncouthness, his coarse features and harsh speech, was not popular, or likely to ingratiate himself with most boys. Still, he seems to have appealed early to the young Bolivar by his philanthropic views, which he expressed freely, whilst judiciously suppressing those anti-Christian ideas which he held, but which might have frightened his pupil, to say nothing of getting himself into trouble with the authorities. He was more or less of a dreamer, and his ideas of free education were not calculated to meet with the approval of the government under which he held a post in the department of Education. He seems to have been to some extent implicated in the revolutionary plot discovered in 1797. Fear of discovery, joined perhaps to his natural tendency to rove, induced him to leave Venezuela in that year, and to resort to Europe, where, outside Spain, he could live in safety, and indulge his love of science and learning. To him succeeded, as Bolivar's tutor, Andres Bello, then a mere boy a couple of years older than his pupil.

With such tutors, and an indolent guardian, it is not surprising that young Bolivar should have given more time to gymnastics, riding, and other outdoor pursuits than to regular study. He spent much of his time at his brother's estate of San Mateo, in the Aragua Valley, at the eastern end of the lake of Valencia, and, in 1797, was appointed ensign in his father's old command, the Aragua militia. His military education in that post was probably very little, but it is all he got.

In 1799, Carlos Palacio, probably tired of having to look after a rather unruly and idle boy, relieved himself of the burden by sending his ward off to com-

plete his education in Spain. Under charge of the captain of the Spanish ship *San Ildefonso*, Bolivar embarked, in January 1799, at La Guaira. The ship made a long stay at Vera Cruz, whence Bolivar went to visit the city of Mexico. There he was hospitably received by Azanza the Viceroy and others. He ended, however, by somewhat shocking his Spanish friends with his freely expressed views on the French Revolution, views which he had doubtless imbibed from his friend Simon Rodriguez. On his return to Vera Cruz Bolivar wrote a short account of his doings to his uncle, Pedro Palacio, the spelling of which shows that he had not profited much in that respect by his studies. Altogether, it is a very ordinary boy's letter. Leaving Vera Cruz, the *San Ildefonso* touched at Havana, and finally made the port of Santana, on the shores of the Bay of Biscay, in May 1799. From Santana Bolivar went to Madrid, where he lived with another maternal uncle, Esteban Palacio, until the latter left the capital. Amongst Palacio's friends was Manuel Mallo, a native of Popayan in New Granada, who had lived for a time at Caracas, and was now sharing with Manuel Godoy the illicit affections of Charles IV.'s disreputable wife. Bolivar was taken up as a compatriot by Mallo, and witnessed some of the Queen's unworthy doings. There is a curious story told by Bolivar himself of his having been invited to play tennis with the Prince of Asturias, whom he beat. The Prince was vexed and would have stopped playing, but his mother made him go on. This Prince was afterwards Ferdinand VII., from whose grasp Bolivar wrested a large portion of his South American dominions.

A more worthy friend than Mallo was the cultivated Marquis de Ustáriz, who, amongst other things, used to discuss with the young man the idea of a separation of Spanish America from the mother country. The Marquis, whilst not disapproving generally of the idea, was so much

impressed by the difficulties of its execution as to discourage the enthusiasm of Bolivar. At the house of Ustáriz, Bolivar met and fell in love with a mere child, Maria Teresa Rodriguez de Toro, niece of the Marquis de Toro of Caracas, who reciprocated his affection. Her father, Don Bernardo de Toro, was willing to agree to the marriage, but, in view of the youth of the parties (Bolivar was but eighteen, and the girl fifteen), insisted on some delay.

Bolivar now got into trouble owing to his friend Mallo. The young man was arrested and searched, under the pretext of breach of a sumptuary regulation ; but it is surmised that the real object was to ascertain if he had letters indicating Mallo's infidelity to the jealous Queen. Bolivar consequently followed Don Bernardo and his daughter to Bilbao, and, when they returned to Madrid, betook himself to Paris, where he arrived early in 1802. In the French capital he soon became an admirer of the Republic, which he imagined to be the only good form of government. For Bonaparte he expressed the warmest admiration, which disappeared when, in later years, he found Bonaparte the Consul transformed into Napoleon the Emperor.

In the spring of 1802, Bolivar returned to Madrid, where, at the end of May, he was married to Maria Teresa de Toro. The young couple spent their honeymoon on a vessel sailing from Coruña to La Guaira, the port of Caracas.

On Bolivar's side, at any rate, the marriage was one purely of affection ; for his will shows that his wife brought no dowry, and the husband was extremely wealthy as wealth went in Caracas.¹ The poor girl had little opportunity of proving her disinterestedness, for, a few months after she had reached her husband's estates in the Aragua Valley, she died, after five days of fever,

¹ Rodriguez told him that he was worth four millions of francs (£160,000).

leaving Simon Bolivar, at the age of 19, a childless widower.

He was in despair, vowed he would never marry again, a vow which he observed,¹ and offered to make over his whole estate to his brother, reserving only sufficient to live upon. The brother refused, and Simon resolved on another prolonged visit to Europe. Bolivar himself said that his wife's death changed the whole course of his life. Had she lived, he would perhaps not have been satisfied to remain Alcalde of S. Mateo, but, unless she had died, he would not have revisited Europe, or gained the experience which he acquired there.

Landing at Cadiz about the end of 1803, he spent some time in Madrid with his father-in-law before proceeding to Paris, which he reached in May 1804.² There, according to Ducoudray-Holstein, he led a life of the wildest dissipation. Though this is not alluded to by Larrazabal, and is somewhat slurred over by O'Leary, it is probably not without foundation; for O'Leary speaks of Bolivar's giving up gambling, after he had lost and then regained a large sum, and states that his health was much broken by ten months of Paris life. Both M. de Schryver and the writer of the introduction to his work³ make no secret of the fact that Bolivar's devotion to dancing, and to the fair sex, severely tried his constitution.

Things in Paris had changed much since Bolivar had been there in 1802. Napoleon was declared Emperor about the time of his arrival, and Bolivar was so disgusted with the line taken by his former idol that he deposed him from the niche which he had formerly

¹ In the Georgian sense, "Je ne me marierai pas; j'aurai des maîtresses."

² As far as his departure from Madrid is concerned, Bolivar's movements were not voluntary. By an order of 25th March 1804, the King required all foreigners, as well as colonials, to leave the capital. The ground assigned for this order was scarcity of food.

³ "Esquisse de la vie de Bolivar," by Simon de Schryver.

occupied, and would not even go to see the sights of the coronation. Bolivar himself has recorded this sudden change in his feelings towards Napoleon.¹

He had long ago repented of his youthful idleness in study, and, during his first visit to Spain and France, as well as in the short period of his married life, had become a diligent student and a voracious reader. He was a great admirer of Hobbes, but, according to O'Leary, Spinoza was the writer who most influenced him. For Rousseau, too, he seems to have had a great admiration, and amongst his possessions mentioned in his will is a copy of the "Contrat Social," formerly in the library of Napoleon. He acquired from French translations some knowledge of Greek and Roman history, and of the heroes of antiquity. He learned to speak French and Italian fluently, and could understand English.

His friends in Paris were many. Amongst them were Eugène de Beauharnais, Delagarde, and Oudinot; whilst of the *savants* he knew Humboldt and Bonpland. With these two he discussed the question of the possible revolt of South America, a subject on which their views differed. Humboldt holding, as did Bonpland, that the Spanish colonies were ripe for separation, doubted if a man was to be found capable of leading the revolt. Bonpland, on the other hand, believed that with the occurrence of revolt the necessary leader would arise.² Neither had

¹ O'Leary, i. 15. The memoirs of General O'Leary, aide-de-camp of Bolivar, were edited by his son at the instance of Guzman Blanco, President of Venezuela, about 1880. There are 31 volumes in the British Museum, of which, 1 to 26 and 29 to 31 contain correspondence of Bolivar and all his principal generals, ministers, etc. Vols. 27, 28 are O'Leary's history of his master, based on the documents. The present writer had at his disposal vols. 27, 28 in a separate edition. The references to these in the notes are to "O'Leary i. and ii." Those to the other volumes are given as "O'Leary docs. 1, etc." There was a third volume of the history, but it was suppressed as noted later.

² With reference to these opinions O'Leary (i. 18) very sensibly writes: "However flattering this opinion may have been to the colonies, it was

any suspicion that the nervous, weakly-looking youth they addressed was to be the leader.

A propos of Bolívar's personal appearance at this time, a story is told of his meeting Eugène Beauharnais at the house of a lady,¹ a mutual friend. She mischievously asked Eugène to what bird or animal he would liken Bolívar. The reply nearly resulted in hostilities, for Bolívar was furious until it was explained that Eugène's answer had been the French word "moineau" (sparrow), and not the Spanish "mono" (monkey) as the Venezuelan had supposed. His forehead appears to have acquired premature wrinkles at a very early age, and it was perhaps this peculiarity which made him think for the moment that the more objectionable description had been applied.

In Paris, Bolívar again met his old tutor Simon Rodríguez, who, fortunately, persuaded him to leave the capital and go for an extended walking tour with his old friend. The idea of travelling on foot, which was Rodríguez's, was well calculated to restore Bolívar's shattered health. The two trudged off in May 1805 to Italy, were in Milan at the time of Napoleon's coronation as King of Italy, witnessed his mimic reproduction of Marengo, and passed on to Venice, with which Bolívar was disappointed, after having heard so much of it as the place after which his native country was named.²

fundamentally false ; because, if they had been ready for independence in 1804, many of the disasters which occurred in the course of the revolution would have been avoided, and once the struggle was over, Liberal Governments would have been established. Jefferson, a better politician than Humboldt, was less indulgent towards Spanish America, and said afterwards, 'Ignorance and fanaticism are incapable of self-government. I believe it would have been better for the colonies to attain their liberty gradually.' Few, looking to the disastrous series of revolutions and civil wars which have devastated the former colonies of Spain for the better part of a century, will hesitate to concur with O'Leary and Jefferson.

¹ Madame Dervieu de Villars, O'Leary, i. 17.

² Venezuela—"Little Venice"—so called by Amerigo Vespucci, who was reminded of Venice by the sight of the native huts on the edge of Lake Maracaibo, which, like Venetian buildings, were supported on piles.

In Rome, Bolivar declined, it is said, to kiss the cross on Pius VII.'s shoe. The Pontiff tactfully offered his ring to be kissed. When remonstrated with by the Spanish ambassador, who had presented him, Bolivar replied, "The Pope can think very little of the emblem of Christianity since he wears it on his shoes, whilst the proudest sovereigns carry it on their crowns." The reply was characteristic. As a matter of fact Bolivar then, and probably throughout his life, whilst conforming outwardly to the practices of the Catholic Church, was far from being religious. His attitude probably did not differ much from Napoleon's. At Rome, Bolivar, in a moment of enthusiasm, inspired by the surrounding monuments, vowed to Rodriguez that he would liberate his country.¹

Returning from Naples to Paris, Bolivar left again for home, *via* Holland, Hamburg, and the United States, regretfully parting from Rodriguez, who would not, or dared not, return to Caracas. When Bolivar reached Caracas in the end of 1806, Miranda's abortive attempt to raise the standard of revolt was already suppressed.²

¹ This incident is alluded to by Bolivar in a letter, dated Pativilca (Pern), 19th January 1824, in which he welcomes Rodriguez on his return to Colombia (O'Leary, ii. 348). In this letter he freely acknowledges his obligations to Rodriguez in the domain of philosophy and politics.

² Miranda had fitted out a small expedition in New York, consisting of one armed corvette and two small transports, carrying a small force, and a good supply of arms and ammunition for the expected Venezuelan recruits. He arrived off Ocumare (between La Guaira and Puerto Cabello) on the 25th March 1806, believing the Spaniards to be ignorant of his enterprise. But they had received information from the Spanish ambassador in the United States. Attacked by a superior force, Miranda lost both his transports and sixty prisoners, himself escaping in the corvette to Trinidad. He was burnt in effigy by the Spaniards, a large reward was offered for his capture, and of the sixty prisoners, ten were hanged and the rest sent to the prisons of Cartagena and Puerto Rico. At Trinidad Miranda raised fresh forces, with which he sailed on the 24th July. Landing near Coró in the face of superior forces, he captured the port and citadel, which he held from the 4th to the 8th August. Finding no sympathy in the neighbourhood, and receiving a refusal of help from Sir Eyre Coote, Governor of Jamaica, and from the British admiral, he broke up the expedition and sailed for Trinidad, and thence to London.

Once more he retired to his Aragua estates, to his studies, his reading, and an out-of-doors life.

In 1808 and 1809 came the news of decisive events in Spain, the action of Napoleon in compelling the abdication of Charles IV. and his son Ferdinand, the gift to Joseph Bonaparte of the Spanish throne, which his Imperial brother had wrested from its rightful occupants, the rising of the Spanish people against the French dominion, and the institution of the Central Junta of Aranjuez. Napoleon, having bestowed on his brother the crown of Spain, naturally desired to transfer with it Spain's transatlantic possessions; but the destruction of his naval power at Trafalgar had rendered him powerless to employ force. The French corvette *Le Serpent* safely reached La Guaira on the 15th July 1808, closely followed by the British frigate *Acasta*—Captain Beaver. The last-named officer, as well as the captain of the French ship, landed, and Beaver followed the Frenchman to Caracas, where he was received almost with insult by the Captain-General, Juan de Casas, who had already been gained over by Napoleon's emissary. The populace, however, informed by Beaver of the true state of affairs, regarded matters very differently. They would have nothing to do with the French usurper, demonstrated vigorously their loyalty to Ferdinand VII., and compelled his public proclamation. The French, in considerable danger of being torn to pieces, were got away quietly to La Guaira, whence the *Serpent* sailed. She was followed by the *Acasta*, and taken at sea.

After this, there were numerous secret meetings in Caracas, in which Bolivar and his brother, as well as many others of the Caracas aristocracy, took part. The idea of a separate Junta, similar to the provincial Juntas now being set up in Spain, was mooted for Venezuela. Nothing, however, came of this, despite the dissatisfaction aroused by the decision of the Central Junta of Spain to

give to America only twelve seats in the Cortes, against thirty-six allotted to the mother country. Even these twelve were to be nominees of the Government, not delegates of the people.

Early in 1809 there arrived at Caracas Vicente Emparán, the newly-appointed Captain-General. Larrazabal affirms that he governed with great tyranny, and that Bolivar left Caracas in order to avoid banishment, with which he was threatened by Emparán. O'Leary, whose version we prefer, says that Emparán was aware that plots were brewing for the establishment of a "Junta," and that Bolivar actually toasted, at a banquet at which Emparán was present, "the independence of America." That he was not immediately imprisoned, but was permitted to retire to his estates, certainly does not point to a tyrannical government.

On the 18th April there reached Caracas Count Carlos Montúfar and Antonio Villavicencio,¹ who had been sent to announce the installation of the Regency, and then to pass on to pacify Quito and New Granada. From them the agitators ascertained the course of events in Spain, which decided them to take immediate action. Larrazabal says Bolivar was present, but again we prefer the account of O'Leary, according to which, looking to his former friendly relations with Emparán, Bolivar honourably decided to hold aloof, and remained at his farm in the valley of the Tuy.

The 19th April 1809 was Maunday Thursday. The Municipal Council had assembled, as usual, preparatory to attending the religious office in the Cathedral opposite the Town Hall. The Captain-General, invited according to custom to join them, arrived in the council chamber.

¹ Both were natives of Quito, educated in Spain, and great friends. Both went over to the republican side, and were shot by the Spaniards as rebels, Montúfar at Popayan in September 1816, Villavicencio at Bogotá in June of the same year.

Some of the members spoke to him regarding the state of Spain, urging the necessity for a local Junta in Venezuela to protect the interests of Ferdinand VII. Even the names of the proposed members of the Junta were mentioned. After listening quietly, Empáran replied that he would consider this delicate subject after service. The astonished agitators followed him across the square, convinced by his resolute demeanour that he would order their arrest as soon as he got into the square, which was full of soldiers. But he merely returned the salute of the guards, and was passing into the Cathedral when Salias, the leader of the agitators, took him by the arm and told him that the public interest demanded his return to the Municipal Hall. The guard, seeing Salias' action, were on the point of interference when they were stopped by their commander, who knew nothing of what was going on.

Empáran's courage had failed him, and, the demand for his return being repeated by others, he meekly recrossed the square as bidden. The fact that the guard, probably taken unawares by this unexpected move, did not repeat their salute, completed his discomfiture. So completely was he overcome that, when J. G. Roscio and Felix Sosa proposed the installation of a Junta, he made no objection, and failed even to observe that neither of them was a member of the Cabildo. Yet, so great was the respect still felt for Spain, that the agitators were about to elect Empáran President of the Junta when there arrived on the scene, from the Cathedral, Dr José Cortés de la Madariaga, a Chilean-born ecclesiastic, styling himself the "Deputy of the Clergy."¹ In a

¹ He was a native of Santiago de Chile, and was sent to Spain to arrange a dispute between the ecclesiastical authorities and the "Audiencia" of Chile. Having succeeded, largely thanks to the influence of Mallo with the Queen of Spain, he started back for Chile via Caracas. He was so pleased with Caracas and its people that he decided to stay there, and exchanged his Chilean prebendary for a canonry of the cathedral of Caracas.

violent speech, which completely cowed the Captain-General, Madariaga pointed out the condition of Spain, insisted on the necessity for a truly *local* government, and demanded the deposition of Emparán. Then, going out on to the balcony, he shouted to the crowd below, asking them if they were content with the present régime. When he was answered with cries of "No! we do not love it," Emparán only said, "I love it just as little." Then the Cabildo passed a resolution laying down the principle of the "right of the provinces of America to rule themselves in the absence of a general government." Furthermore, they disclaimed the authority of the Regency, and, "in the exercise of their natural and political rights," proceeded to the establishment of a government to exercise authority in the name of Ferdinand VII.

The Junta's first acts were to proclaim equal treatment for Spaniards and Americans, to invite all Venezuelans to the union and fraternity demanded by their interests, to abolish the Indian tribute and the duties on necessities, to prohibit the importation of slaves, to organise the branches of the administration, and to order the establishment of patriotic societies for the improvement of agriculture and industry. They also sent missions to try and gain over the other Venezuelan provinces, and wrote to the Regency informing them of what had occurred. As for Emparán and his friends, they were sent out of the country, with salaries paid up to date, and enough money to take them to the United States.

Bolívar, as we have said, took no part in the events of the 19th April. As soon, however, as he heard of the establishment of the new government he proceeded to Caracas to tender his services. He was appointed lieutenant-colonel of the militia, of which he was already captain, and of which his father had been colonel.

The Spanish Regency, not in the least inclined to

recognise the new state of affairs in Venezuela, promptly decreed the blockade of her ports. England being now the ally of Spain against Napoleon, the Junta of Caracas determined to send a mission to inform the British Government of recent events, as well as to solicit its good offices with the Regency in Spain. The suggestion came from Bolivar, who with some difficulty also induced the Junta to send himself as head of the mission. He was only twenty-seven years of age, and without diplomatic experience. With him, as a make-weight, was sent Luis Lopez Mendez, a person whose name was far from popular in England in the following years, when he was financial agent of Colombia. The Secretary of the Mission was Bolivar's former tutor, Andres Bello.¹ Reaching London in July 1810, Bolivar at once obtained an interview with the Marquis Wellesley, then Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, to whom he delivered the letter for George III., with which he had been charged by the Junta. This document, after a lengthy denunciation of the misdeeds of the Central Junta of Spain, and an exposition of the impotence of the Regency, distinctly says that the special object of the provisional government in Caracas is, "to maintain the integrity of these dominions for the sovereign (Ferdinand VII.), to whom we have sworn fidelity." It goes on to implore the assistance of Great Britain against French pretensions, and her mediation with the Regency. Nor did Bolivar's instructions say a word about independence of the lawful sovereign of Spain, though, on the other hand, they said nothing of submission to the Regency whilst Ferdinand was a prisoner.

Bolivar, however, appears to have exceeded his instructions, and to have revealed to Wellesley his personal views,

¹ He remained for nearly twenty years in London, after which he served the Chilian Government with some distinction. He has a great reputation as a poet. His writings fill many volumes.

which were for breaking altogether with the mother country. Naturally, the Foreign Secretary could not encourage an idea of this sort, seeing that England was in alliance with Spain. The bases of reconciliation which he agreed to propose to Spain were :—

- (1) Cessation of hostilities between the Regency and the colonies.
- (2) A general amnesty for Americans in respect of recent events.
- (3) A larger representation, and that by popularly elected deputies, for the colonies in the Cortes.
- (4) Freedom of commerce for the colonies, with some preferential reservations in favour of Spain.
- (5) Equality of rights for Americans and Spaniards in regard to employment in the public service of the colonies.

The proposals did not satisfy the Venezuelan Government, which actually turned to Napoleon for help. That, owing to his having his hands full in Europe, and to his impotence against Great Britain at sea, the Emperor was unable to give. As for the Regency, it resented any interference, and declared war against the rebel governments in the colonies.

CHAPTER III

BOLIVAR AND MIRANDA—THE FALL OF VENEZUELA—EVENTS IN QUITO AND NEW GRANADA

ONE of Bolivar's principal objects in seeking employment in the mission was to get into touch with Miranda, then residing in London, and to induce him to take up actively the cause of the independence of the colonies.

The career of Francisco Miranda had been remarkable. Born at Caracas in 1756, he had served as an officer in the Spanish army. He next fought against the British in the struggle with the North American colonies. Thence he went back to his own country, in the hope of being able to induce a similar revolt against Spain. Failing in that, and compelled to flee the country, he proceeded to England, where he could raise no help for his schemes. Then he travelled all over Europe, including a visit to the court of Russia, whence he was "moved on" at the instance of Spain and France. He had at first been well received, and is said to have enjoyed a share of the large-hearted affections of Catherine II. Returning to England, inspired with hope by the dispute with Spain over the English settlement at Nootka Sound in 1791, he was again disappointed by the peaceful settlement. He next tried France, which was too busy with European affairs to be able to meddle in those of South America. He now took service in the French Republican armies, commanded at the siege of Maestricht in 1793, and was in command of the French left at the

disastrous defeat of Neerwinden. He endeavoured to shake himself clear of Dumouriez's treachery, but was tried by the Revolutionary tribunal, though he was fortunate enough to be acquitted. After staying some time longer in Paris at great risk, he again tried England and the United States, neither of which, however, was prepared to back fair words with substantial aid for the proposed Spanish American revolution. Returning to Paris, he was deported by Bonaparte in 1802. Again failing in England, he fitted out at his own expense the expedition of 1806, already described. Miranda, after his failure, again returned to England, where, as has been mentioned, Bolivar found him in 1810.

It will be seen from the above sketch that Miranda had been for most of his life a genuine republican, keeping his eye steadily on the definite separation from Spain of her American colonies, just as the United States had broken away from England. That was an idea which, so far, had taken little root in the colonies themselves, where loyalty to the Spanish Crown was still the prevailing note. Bolivar and others had long held views similar to Miranda's. In Bolivar's mind they had been implanted by the early teaching of Rodriguez, by what he saw in Europe, and by the course of study which he had pursued. In Miranda he recognised, not only an enthusiastic supporter, the real originator of the separation scheme, but also a tried soldier, who had had considerable experience in high command of troops whose want of training was almost as great as that of the men who would have to be raised in South America. He was not a first-rate commander, but was certainly better than any one likely to be found in Caracas. Bolivar himself had no experience of war or command.

Succeeding in enlisting the services of the veteran, Bolivar sailed with him on H.B.M. corvette *Sapphire*, placed at his disposal by the Government. According

to Ducoudray-Holstein, Miranda sailed under an assumed name, which is not at all improbable, seeing that the British Government would hardly care to be openly responsible for landing such a notorious firebrand in a colony of Spain, now allied to it. Moreover, the Junta of Caracas was not in the least anxious to see Miranda, and had warned Bolivar against encouraging his return to Venezuela. Bolivar's whole conduct in this mission is characteristic of his masterful nature, his self-reliance, and his disregard of the desires or orders of his superiors. He and Miranda landed at La Guaira on the 5th December 1810.

So different were their views from those of the Junta that Bolivar retired in disgust to his country seat, whilst Miranda was received with the utmost coldness. Nevertheless, he succeeded, finally, in obtaining a commission as lieutenant-general, and election as a deputy to the Congress which had been summoned, in June 1810, to meet on the 2nd March 1811. The Congress was summoned and met *in the name of Ferdinand VII.* Almost its first act was to place the executive power in the hands of a triumvirate (Escalona, Mendez, and Padron), who were too weak either to carry on the contest with Spain, or to curb the revolutionary tendencies of their own followers.

Though the deputies to the congress represented several provinces,¹ it must be remembered that Spanish authority remained unweakened in the provinces of Coró and Maracaibo in the north-west, and in Guayana, including the great plains of the Orinoco valley. Nor was it by any means extinct elsewhere. Consequently, in June 1811, the new Government found itself confronted by a vast reactionary conspiracy. In the terror and excitement consequent on this discovery lay the opportunity of Miranda, Bolivar, and the others, whose

¹ Caracas, Cumaná, Barinas, Margarita, Barcelona, Merida, and Trujillo.

whole object was to "cut the painter" binding Venezuela to Spain. On the 5th July 1811 the Congress crossed the Rubicon by declaring independence of Spain, whose throne, it was declared, had been shattered by Napoleon, and whose government in South America was nothing but an instrument of tyranny and oppression.

This end had been largely attained by the exertions of Bolivar and Miranda in the club called the "Sociedad Patriótica," established by them in Caracas for the purpose of fomenting the separatist movement.

Of the Deputies present in the Congress, only one refused to sign the Declaration of Independence, M. V. Maya, the clerical representative of La Grita, who held that he had no mandate to pass such a resolution. Miranda's name appears in the list of signatories, Bolivar's does not, for the very good reason that he was not a member of the Congress.

With the declaration of independence the tricolour flag had been adopted, and, on the 30th July, a manifesto was issued announcing to the world the reasons which had led to this bold action.

The declaration of independence was by no means universally accepted in Venezuela. On the 11th July there was an insurrection in the capital, designed to overthrow the Government and return to the allegiance of Spain.¹ It was forcibly put down, after a sharp fight, by Miranda, and sixteen of the leaders were executed.

A more serious revolt occurred at the important town of Valencia, seventy or eighty miles south-west of Caracas. There the leaders called in Spanish help from Coró, where, as already mentioned, the royalist power was unshaken.² The insurgents were attacked by the Marquis

¹ The rebels were principally "Islenos," men from the Canary Islands, who were the staunchest supporters of Spanish rule.

² Ducondray-Holstein says Valencia revolted because the Congress would not allow it to become a separate province.

de Toro¹ at La Cabrera, between Valencia and Maracay. At this point, which was afterwards the scene of several combats, a spur of the mountains descends to the north bank of the lake. The road from Valencia to Caracas, passing through the southern end of the spur, forms a dangerous defile. The position was a difficult one to attack whether from the east or from the west, and the Marquis was unable to take it. The repulse created the greatest alarm in Caracas, and all eyes were turned towards Miranda, the only man who could lay any claim to be a trained soldier. It is not surprising that, when invited to take command of the rabble which constituted the forces of the Republic,² he should have said: "Where are the armies which a general of my position can command without compromising his dignity and reputation?" Still, the remark was indiscreet, and not likely to add to Miranda's small popularity. The fact was that he had been so long absent from South America as to have lost touch with his compatriots, as well as recollection of their sensitive and vainglorious character. He treated them very brusquely, and made no secret of his preference for French or English officers over Venezuelans. Eventually, he accepted the command, but made a condition that Bolivar should not have a part in it. The two men had already fallen out over the question of treatment of European Spaniards residing in Venezuela. Miranda was for letting them remain in peace, provided they were not hostile to the new government; Bolivar would drive them ruthlessly from the country, till such time as the Spanish dominion should be finally overthrown and the independence of the colonies recognised by the mother country. Miranda would not allow Bolivar the command even of his own regiment of Aragua militia which was

¹ Appointed Commander-in-chief by the Junta in 1810.

² The government distrusted much of the regular army on account of the Spanish element in it.

to form part of the force. He would have had to go out as a simple soldier had not the Marquis de Toro appointed him his aide-de-camp.

The campaign was short, and, on the 12th August 1811, Valencia was taken, after a fight in which Miranda lost eight hundred men. Bolivar had distinguished himself in this his first campaign, and Miranda selected him to carry the despatch announcing to the government at Caracas the suppression of the revolt.

The Congress was now able to settle down to the discussion of the form of government to be adopted by the new republic.

A project of a constitution submitted by the deputy Francisco Javier Ustáriz, formed the basis of discussion. The general feeling in the Congress was in favour of a Federal Republic in imitation of the "magnificent example of the first and most powerful of the Republics of the world," the United States of North America.

The constitution which was eventually passed, after being discussed spasmodically in the Congress from the 2nd September to the 21st December 1811, consisted of 228 articles. We can only afford space for a brief analysis of them. Many of them dealt with elementary rights, with personal freedom, the abolition of slavery and of torture, and the like. One article abolished titles of honour and another set up a "Colombian era" in imitation of that of the French Republic.¹ What is most important to us is to realise what was meant by a "federal" republic as illustrated by this constitution.

The legislative power of the confederation (the provinces of Caracas, Cumaná, Barinas, Margarita, Barcelona, Merida, and Trujillo) was to be exercised by a Chamber

¹ Bolivar's letters, proclamations, etc., are constantly dated with the "year of independence," as well as that of the Christian era. After the 15th June 1813 until the armistice of 1820, the year of the "war to the death" was also very frequently added.

of Representatives and a Senate. The representatives were to be chosen by the electors of the capital district of each province. Nominations were submitted to them by the parochial suffrage holders, on the basis of one representative for every twenty thousand souls. The senators, elected by the provincial legislatures, each represented seventy thousand people, with the proviso that every province should elect at least one senator, even if its total population was under seventy thousand. Senators held office for six, representatives for four years, one third of the former and half the latter retiring by rotation every two years. There was to be an annual session commencing on the 15th January, lasting ordinarily for one month, but capable of prolongation indefinitely.

The executive was entrusted to a triumvirate elected for four years by the electors of capital districts.

The judicial power consisted of a Supreme Court and such subordinate tribunals as the Congress might establish for the time being.

Each of the provinces was constituted a "*state, sovereign and independent*," and in each there was to be a tripartite division of the legislative, executive, and judicial powers analogous to the division in the Federal government, for the disposal of all business not specially delegated to that government.

The constitution required sanction and ratification by the people of each province before coming into force.

In the matter of religion the constitution was anything but liberal, for it decreed that the Roman Catholic religion was that of the State, and that no other form of worship should ever be permitted either in public or in private.

This extraordinarily complicated instrument of government was evolved, after nearly four months' deliberation, by an assembly consisting largely of lawyers, almost wholly of men who had no practical experience in the art of government and whose knowledge was entirely

theoretical. They were utterly incapable of proportioning their end to their means. They failed to take account of the fact that the vast majority of the population was plunged in the blindest ignorance, that very few indeed outside the walls of the assembly knew anything whatever about constitutions in general or federation in particular. The voters who would have to elect the members of the legislature neither knew nor cared anything about the form of constitution. All they craved for was peace and a decent government, which would give them personal liberty, security of property, and the possibility of buying the necessaries of life at a reasonable price. Such a constitution as this was suited to no people whose education and political knowledge was not of the highest class. The only end it could attain would be to throw all power into the hands of the educated few.

Moreover, it was eminently calculated to produce disruption at a very early period. In a federation so loosely knit together, in which what political knowledge there was existed only in a few towns, it was almost certain that the capital of each province would be for secession on the most insignificant pretext. Every capital *cabildo*, puffed up with an undue sense of its own importance, would have been for setting up an independent republic in the "sovereign and independent state" to which it belonged. The very strength of municipal institutions like the *cabildos* would make for separation. That is why federation in South America is generally held to imply separation rather than union.¹

It is easy to imagine a congress of Bengali lawyers framing just such a constitution for the federation of the districts of Bengal, without any thought of the results which must ensue amongst a population of ignorant peasants. The result would almost inevitably be the setting up of an independent republic in Calcutta,

¹ Cf. "Cambridge Modern History," vol. x., p. 298.

another in Patna, another in Dacca, and so on *ad infinitum*, each ruled by an oligarchy of intellectuals.

Two men at least, Miranda and Bolivar, saw the utter futility of such a constitution in the existing circumstances of the country, and, whilst regarding federation as theoretically the most perfect form of republic, would have none of it as matters stood. To the end of his life Bolivar fought for a centralised as against a federal government.

The Congress, however, was quite satisfied with its bantling, and widely published and belauded it. Then they suspended their sittings to await the assembly, on the 1st March 1812, of the deputies now to be elected. They had made other mistakes besides passing this constitution. They pardoned the leaders of the late revolt at Valencia, ten of whom Miranda had condemned to death. Bolivar was especially irritated by this act of clemency. Another mistake was made in the issue of paper money supported by no metal reserve. The issue, of course, at once began to depreciate rapidly, and was the foundation of the financial disasters of Venezuela. Yet another mistake was made in deciding on Valencia as the capital and seat of government of the republic. This necessarily gave offence to Caracas, which hitherto had always been the capital of Venezuela. Looking to recent events at Valencia, it might have been supposed that the choice would have been the last to be made.

As for the constitution, it was not destined to have any great opportunity for testing its merits or demerits, for before it could come into force the infant republic was in the throes of dissolution.

The year 1812 opened ominously for the new republic. All attempts by the British Government to bring about a conciliatory attitude on the part of the Spanish Cortes, which had now succeeded the Regency, towards the colonies had failed dismally. Amidst all the dissensions then prevailing in Spain, there was one point on which

all parties were agreed—the necessity for subduing the rebellious colonies. The prevailing spirit is illustrated by some remarks of members of the Cortes. One said : “ If the Americans complain of having been tyrannised over for 300 years, they shall now experience a similar treatment for 3000.” Another, after the battle of Albuera, “ rejoiced at the advantage we have gained, because we can now send troops to reduce the insurgents.” Yet another said : “ I do not know to what class of beasts the South Americans belong.” Even in the revolted provinces the royalists were hopeful. In Coró and Maracaibo they stood in possession on the defensive ; from the banks of the Orinoco they harassed the republican provinces of Cumaná and Barcelona. The revolution had made no progress amongst the half-civilised inhabitants of the vast plains about the Orinoco, south of the belt of hilly country of the northern coast. The royalists everywhere, especially in Coró and Maracaibo, anxiously awaited reinforcements from Spain. The republican government was preparing expeditions for the subjugation of the west and of Guayana, when their enemies were suddenly aided by an ally far more awful and devastating than any force from Spain.

Maunday Thursday, the 26th March 1812, was the anniversary, in the ecclesiastical calendar, of the first establishment of the Junta in Caracas.¹ All Caracas was engaged in the preparations for the solemnities of Good Friday. The afternoon was calm and cloudless ; there was nothing to give warning of the awful visitation which was about to fall upon republican Venezuela. Suddenly, in the distant mountains of Merida, on the frontier of New Grenada, there was heard, about 4 P.M., a subterranean roaring and rumbling moving rapidly from south-west to north-east.

The awful sound, louder than any thunder, was

¹ Maunday Thursday, the 19th April 1809.

accompanied by tremendous upheavals of the earth. There appear to have been two systems of earth-waves, one from south to north, the other crossing it at right angles, the meeting of the two causing the ground to heave almost like a boiling liquid. Nothing could resist this terrible upheaval, which was repeated several times. In the space of a few minutes the towns of Merida, Barquisemeto, Caracas, La Guaira, and San Felipe were nothing but a heap of ruins. Great churches, crowded with people waiting for the starting of the procession, sank in an instant into a pile of débris a few feet in height. The barracks in the north of Caracas almost disappeared, burying in their ruins the greater part of the garrison. Everywhere in the track of the earthquake was ruin and death. Caracas was covered by a pall of dust rising from the falling buildings, but by nightfall it had settled to the earth, and nature, after her tremendous effort, seemed to sink into a tranquil sleep. There were no more shocks after the appalling few minutes between 4 and 5 P.M., and a brilliant moon shone serenely on the devastated and panic-stricken city. The scenes in the streets were heartrending. The survivors who had escaped injury wandered through the ruins, seeking relatives and friends whose fate they knew not. Poor wretches, crippled by falling masonry, dragged themselves painfully from the ruins, or struggled in vain to emerge from the mass which imprisoned them. And there was another class of scene where the sinner of yesterday saw in the dreadful visitation a warning directed by the Almighty to himself specially. Couples who had been oblivious of the marriage ceremony hastened in search of a priest to tie the nuptial knot. Children, hitherto recognised by a mother only, suddenly found themselves acknowledged by a terrified father. Men and women, in an agony of alarm at the judgment which they believed to be falling on them from heaven,

confessed openly in the streets crimes or sins of which no one suspected them, or vowed restitution of ill-gotten property. The deaths in Caracas alone have been estimated at 9000 or 10,000, exclusive of those who died later from injuries or exposure. There were 4000 or 5000 dead in La Guaira, the seaport close by, and every town and village on the track of the earth-wave had its tale of death and mutilation. The total loss of life has been estimated at as high a figure as 120,000. In Barquisemeto 1000 republican troops, on the march for Coró, were almost entirely destroyed, artillery, arms, and ammunition being buried deep amongst the ruins. What with these losses, and the havoc wrought amongst the garrison of Caracas, the slender fighting forces of the republic were seriously crippled.

In the midst of all the panic and confusion in Caracas, a few kept their heads, and some improved the occasion. The clergy, mostly adherents of the royalist party, made capital out of the earthquake, by pointing to it as the judgment of God on the rebels. They were able, as news came in, to point to the fact that it was the rebellious provinces alone which had been devastated, whilst the loyal districts in the east and south were unharmed. The revolution had begun on Maunday Thursday 1809, the punishment had fallen on the same festival of 1812. There was no need to mention the fact that similar disasters had previously befallen Lisbon, Messina, Quito, and Lima. In one church everything had fallen except, as it happened, one pillar bearing the Spanish escutcheon. Here was a fine opportunity for the preachers to point out to an ignorant population how the hand of God was in favour of the Spanish government against which they had rebelled.

Bolívar, amongst others, exerted himself in relieving the unhappy people, in making arrangements for burning the festering corpses which polluted the air, and which

there was neither time nor labour available to bury, and in suppressing the preachers who so seriously injured the cause of liberty.

But there were other dangers to be met besides those from earthquake, famine, and pestilence. Ceballos, the royalist governor of the province of Coró, had been spurred on by Andres Torellas, the parish priest of Siquisique, who succeeded in suborning Reyes Vargas, an Indian captain of the separatist force which was at Barquisemeto threatening Coró. Torellas even borrowed money and made it over to Ceballos for the costs of an advance.

At that time there happened to have arrived from Puerto Rico a Spanish naval officer, a Canarian, named Domingo Monteverde, a man of little experience or ability, but with an excellent opinion of himself. He commanded a company of marines forming part of the forces being assembled by Don J. M. Cajigal at Coró for the suppression of the revolted provinces. Monteverde offered his services to Ceballos. That officer recommended him to Miyares, the Captain-General, who sanctioned his appointment to the command of an expedition. On the 10th March 1812, Monteverde, accompanied by Torellas, with only 230 men, of whom 100 were sailors, marched on Siquisique, which he entered on the 17th. He was joined there by the traitor, Reyes Vargas, and the two together seized Carora, after a fight with 700 patriots on the 23rd. Three days later came the earthquake which destroyed the republican troops at Barquisemeto, and afforded Monteverde an opportunity to seize that point on the 2nd April. Realising the disastrous effects of the earthquake on the republicans, Monteverde demanded a reinforcement of 1000 men, proposing to march on Valencia. He had but 1000 men all told, but he succeeded in digging out of the ruins of Barquisemeto

seven guns and a great quantity of ammunition. Disregarding the timid orders of headquarters, which directed him to stop at Barquisemeto, Monteverde pushed on. On the 7th April he defeated a republican detachment. On the 18th Araure was taken by one of his subordinates. On the 25th he took and sacked San Carlos. Everywhere his advance was marked by massacres and summary executions of the enemy. The fear which he inspired, coupled with the recent terror of the earthquake, induced the country to declare generally for the king. The panic had been augmented by a recurrence of earthquake shocks on the 4th April, though they were not comparable in severity to the great tremor of the 26th March. Meanwhile, the government at Caracas, in its despair, had seen no hope save in the appointment of Miranda as commander-in-chief with dictatorial powers. He managed to get together some 7000 men, but they were largely recruits, and the morale of the whole had been rudely shaken by recent events. As for Bolivar, his relations with Miranda were still bad, and the dictator, in order to get rid of him, sent him off to command the fortress of Puerto Cabello, which at the time was full of Spanish prisoners, many of them amongst those who had recently revolted at Valencia. Bolivar left Caracas for Puerto Cabello on the 29th April. When, after a few days' rest, Monteverde again set out towards Valencia, Miranda evacuated that place, which was occupied without resistance by the Spanish commander, on the 3rd May.

The situation of Miranda became more and more desperate. The government had no money, the people were discontented, and Miranda's overbearing manner and actions made him intensely unpopular, alike with soldiers and civilians. The plains of Calabozo were ravaged by guerilla bands in the royalist interest, who behaved with a savagery which spread terror everywhere, On the

Orinoco a patriot flotilla, threatening Angostura, had been destroyed. To the east of Caracas a rising of the slaves had been fomented by the Spaniards, and the revolted negroes threatened the capital. When Monteverde had captured Valencia, he found himself opposed by Miranda, whose headquarters were ten miles on the road to Caracas, and whose forces were numerically very superior to the Spaniards. But Miranda seemed to have lost all his energy, and, instead of advancing boldly to the attack, was content with harassing the enemy in small affairs of outposts.

Monteverde, finding himself too weak to continue his advance, besought reinforcements from Coró, where, fortunately for Ceballos, a small force had arrived from Cadiz and Puerto Rico. The governor promptly marched with these to join Monteverde, who, not wishing to be superseded in the command, persuaded Ceballos to return to Coró, leaving the fresh troops under himself. Even with these reinforcements, the Spaniards had a force inferior in numbers, though superior in other respects, to that of Miranda. The latter, after being twice beaten off in attacks on Valencia, and being still more disheartened by numerous desertions amongst his troops, fell back on La Cabrera. This strong position on the Caracas road has already been described. It was now still further strengthened by the flanking defence of gunboats on the lake. Monteverde, after thrice failing with considerable loss in frontal attacks on the position, began to feel his position to be precarious, notwithstanding the facts that the province of Barinas in his rear had declared again for the royal cause, and that the Spanish general Antofianzas, whom he had detached for the purpose, had captured Calabozo and massacred its garrison.

At this juncture, a deserter from Miranda's army revealed to Monteverde a path leading round the

enemy's right. It was so difficult that little care had been taken for its defence. Monteverde succeeded in passing it and rendering untenable the position of Miranda, who at once retired and again fortified himself at La Victoria. Again Monteverde's attack was beaten off, this time so disastrously that he was forced to retire to Maracay, in order to collect his forces and await more ammunition and supplies from Coró. Had Miranda, his troops flushed with victory, boldly pursued, it is possible he might have completed the enemy's destruction. But nothing would induce the veteran to move.

At this point, Monteverde had yet another piece of good fortune. Bolivar, it will be remembered, had been sent to command at Puerto Cabello, a great magazine of supplies of all sorts, and the prison-house of many Spaniards. He was disgusted at being shelved in this way, and it is perhaps not unwarrantable to assume that he was somewhat slack in what appeared to be a simple matter, the guarding of a number of unarmed men, confined in the citadel, which was separate from the town. The prisoners found means to corrupt Francisco Vinoni, the officer in charge of them, and to induce him to take an early opportunity of setting them free.¹ On the 30th June, the commandant of the citadel, Ramon Aymerich, had gone to take orders at Bolivar's headquarters in the town. The moment was seized by Vinoni to release the prisoners, who overpowered the small garrison, proclaimed the king, raised the draw-bridge, and, after threatening an officer whom Bolivar sent to see what was happening, opened fire on the city with the guns of the citadel. Artillery fire between the citadel and Bolivar's artillery continued off and on up to the 5th July, when the city, which Bolivar had left for the fortified heights above, surrendered to the

¹ Vinoni's treachery was duly punished seven years later, as will be related in due course.

rebels. Meanwhile, many of Bolivar's men had deserted ; detachments sent out by him to meet a force despatched by Monteverde were driven in or destroyed, and he found himself threatened with destruction by pressure between Monteverde's people and the garrison of the citadel. On the 6th July, abandoning all hope, he sailed, with only seven officers, in a ship, the *Celoso*, which he had succeeded in preserving out of range of the citadel. About forty men joined him just before he sailed. According to his own report, he had lost Puerto Cabello, but was himself blameless, and had preserved his honour intact.¹ It was perhaps fortunate for Bolivar that the end was at hand. Otherwise, looking to the summary methods of the time, he might have been shot, after a drumhead court-martial, under the orders of Miranda, whether he was to blame or not. In such warfare as this the line between failure and treachery is often disregarded when it comes to dealing with a defeated commander.

The fall of Puerto Cabello practically decided the fate of the Venezuelan Republic for the time being. Miranda himself, when he heard of it, said, "Venezuela is stricken in the heart." He still had, according to O'Leary and Mitre, 5000 men, and Monteverde, with less than 3000, was considerably demoralised by his repulse from the lines of Victoria. Miranda made an attack on Monteverde's lines, but obtained only some partial successes. Then, thinking the contest hopeless, he, on the 12th July, proposed an armistice, and, finally, against the advice of some of his officers, offered to capitulate on condition of a guarantee of the lives and property of the insurgents, and the introduction of the Spanish constitution of 1812. Monteverde granted the terms, on condition of the complete submission of the patriots, and Miranda retired to Caracas, whilst his

¹ See his official report in O'Leary Documents, 13, p. 44.

troops either went over to the royalists or dispersed to their homes. From Caracas, Miranda, with some of his officers, went off to La Guaira, intending to embark on an English vessel, the captain of which had offered them a passage to a place of safety. O'Leary acquits Miranda of treachery, holding that he acted in good faith, that he had come to believe the revolution had been premature, and that, under the Spanish constitution, the colonies could attain as much liberty as was suitable for countries in their situation, and of the habits and character of their inhabitants. Restrepo's opinion is much the same as to Miranda's honesty of purpose. He absolutely disbelieves the story of his corruption by a money payment.¹ Larrazabal, a thorough-going advocate of Bolivar, and a Venezuelan himself, holds that the surrender was unnecessary and universally condemned. He even asserts that Miranda went so far as to arrange terms, through the Marquis de Casa Leon, who acted as go-between with Monteverde, under which Miranda, retiring to Europe, was to be provided with funds to enable him to live in comfort there.

Miranda's republicanism is beyond suspicion: he was the real father of the revolt of Venezuela against Spain, at which he had worked steadfastly for many years. He had, however, during years of absence, lost touch of his country, and it is quite possible that, filled with disgust at the apathy of the Venezuelan people, he may have been converted to the belief that, with the introduction of the Spanish constitution of 1812, which he had stipulated for in the capitulation, a people in the backward condition of the Venezuelans would have got as much liberty as they were yet fit to enjoy. He certainly could have made a much better fight than he did against Monteverde, but, on the whole, it seems extremely improbable that he deliberately betrayed his countrymen.

¹ II. 85, 86.

Even if he had made a better fight of it, it seems more than probable that he could only have temporarily postponed the adverse decision of the campaign. The strongest point against him is that he proposed to leave Venezuela, instead of staying on to see that Monteverde himself carried out the terms of the capitulation.

On the 26th July Monteverde occupied Victoria ; on the 30th he was in Caracas.

Bolívar, meanwhile, had landed at La Guaira on the 7th July, and was proceeding to Miranda's headquarters when he heard of that general's surrender. Strongly disapproving the capitulation, he returned to La Guaira.

Miranda reached La Guaira on the evening of the 30th July, to find Bolívar already there, with other leaders of the revolution who had very little confidence in the probability of Monteverde's observance of the terms of surrender. H.B.M. corvette *Sapphire* lay in the harbour ready to take Miranda off. Other fugitive leaders continued to arrive in the town. Captain Haynes of the *Sapphire* came ashore as soon as Miranda arrived, being anxious to take him on board at once. But Miranda, worn out with fatigue, sat down to dinner with Casas, the commandant of the place, Peña, the civil governor, and others, including Bolívar. At dinner it was proposed that Miranda should spend the night on shore and embark next morning, as it was too late to do so now. Haynes protested that there was no difficulty about the embarkation, and that Miranda would be much safer and more comfortable on the corvette, where all preparations had been made for his reception. The others, however, carried the day, and Miranda retired to bed.

As soon as he was out of the way, a secret meeting was held by the republican leaders present in La Guaira to discuss his case and what was to be done.

At this meeting the most active part was played by Bolivar. He argued that Miranda's proposed departure showed his disbelief in Monteverde's observance of the treaty, that Miranda, having signed the capitulation, was in honour bound to see it through, if he believed it to be worth the paper it was written on, and that he should be compelled to stay to the bitter end. The secret assembly soon determined upon the arrest and detention of Miranda, who was peacefully sleeping in a room, the door of which could not even be locked. Elaborate arrangements for the execution of the plot were made, and the actual arrest of the old warrior was entrusted to Bolivar, Chatillon, and Tomas Montilla. When arrested, he was to be sent to the castle, there to be guarded by Mires. At 3 A.M. the three conspirators entered Miranda's room, and, after removing his sword and pistols, awakened him. The weary old man muttered that it was not yet time to get up, and then awoke to a consciousness of what was really occurring. Resistance he saw was useless, so, after dressing, he quietly followed his captors to the castle, where, for several months, he was immured. Bolivar and others had apparently intended to shoot Miranda as a traitor, but Casas, the military commandant, saw a better way of saving himself from the vengeance of the Spaniards by betraying the dictator to them. To have shot Miranda would have been to kill the goose that laid the golden eggs.

Bolivar maintained to the end of his life that the object of Miranda's arrest was the punishment by death of his treason. O'Leary¹ quotes a letter from Colonel Belford Wilson in which he says of Bolivar: "To the last hour of his life he rejoiced in that event, which he always asserted was solely his own act, to punish the

¹ I. p. 75. Belford Wilson was son of Sir Robert Wilson, who gained some fame in the Napoleonic wars.

treachery and treason of Miranda in capitulating to an inferior force and then intending to embark, himself knowing the capitulation would not be observed. . . . General Bolivar always gloried to me in having risked his own safety, which he might have secured by embarking on board a vessel, in order to secure the punishment of Miranda for his alleged treason. His plea was not altogether ill founded, for he argued that, if Miranda believed the Spaniards would observe the treaty, he should have remained to keep them to their word; if he did not, he was a traitor to have sacrificed his army to it. General Bolivar invariably added that he wished to shoot Miranda as a traitor, but was withheld by others." That is the case for Bolivar. On the other hand, it must be remembered that his relations with Miranda at the time laid him open to suspicion, and it will be seen presently that Monteverde was clearly under the impression that Bolivar had meant to surrender Miranda to him. Looking dispassionately at the whole affair, and especially at the immediate circumstances of Miranda's arrest, it seems difficult to exonerate Bolivar.

On the morning of the 31st July an order was received by Casas from Monteverde, requiring him to prevent all embarkations from La Guaira.¹ Casas at once complied, and, though the *Sapphire* and another ship succeeded in getting off, and a few of the patriots were thus enabled to escape, the majority had perforce

¹ In 1843 the children and relations of Casas published a pamphlet of some seventy pages ("Defensa de la conducta del . . . Señor M. M. de las Casas," etc.), defending his conduct against Restrepo and others who had dubbed him a traitor on the strength of what Bolivar had said of him in 1821. We must confess to not having read the whole of this pamphlet, but the gist of the defence appears to be that Casas stopped the emigration on the ground that he thought it would be a violation by the Venezuelans of the terms of the capitulation, which would afford an excuse to Monteverde for disregarding it. The pamphlet is in the British Museum.

to remain in La Guaira, where, on the arrival of Spanish forces, they found themselves in the power of Monteverde.

As for the unfortunate Miranda, he was presently removed to Puerto Cabello, then to Puerto Rico, and finally to Cadiz, where he was confined in the arsenal in chains till, worn out by suffering and misery, he died on the 14th July 1816.

It was soon evident that the capitulation, in so far as Monteverde's observance of it went, was not worth the paper it was written on. It is not necessary to assume that he deliberately accepted it with the intention of violating it. O'Leary, who cannot be described in any way as a witness favourable to the Spanish commander, holds that he was not naturally cruel or false, but that he was weak and liable to be led astray by the evil councillors by whom he was surrounded, especially by the *Islenos* (the Canary Islanders), who were detested above all others by the republicans, and who were anxious to revenge themselves on irreconcilable enemies. Monteverde had succeeded in retaining the supreme command, notwithstanding the arrival at headquarters of Miyares the Captain-General. He finally got rid of his superior by pleading a clause in the capitulation which stipulated for Monteverde's retention of the command till the terms should be carried out.

On his first arrival in Caracas the Spaniard issued reassuring proclamations, asserting his intention of loyally observing the terms of capitulation. So clear were these terms that confidence was largely restored, and all, except the extremists, began to see that the best thing, under the circumstances, was the union of all moderate men of both sides, with the object of preventing the spread of anarchy, and combating the danger which was still threatened by the insurgent slaves to the east of Caracas.

But the suggestions put forward by the Islenos, that fresh plots were on foot amongst the republicans, soon began to work on Monteverde, and to gain predominance over the better advice of many of his followers who saw the falsity of these witnesses. From the 14th August there commenced a reign of terror for the leaders of the late revolution. In Caracas, and many other towns, the streets were patrolled by troops, whilst numerous arrests of the most prominent leaders were effected, often with great brutality and violence. Numbers of the prisoners were hurried off to the dungeons of La Guaira and Puerto Cabello. Their fate was thus described by Miranda, himself a prisoner, in a letter to the Audiencia.¹: "Now I witnessed with consternation a repetition of those same scenes of which I was an eye-witness in France; I saw arriving at La Guaira droves of the most illustrious and distinguished men, treated like criminals; I saw them buried with myself in those horrible subterranean dungeons; I saw venerable age, tender youth, the rich, the poor, the artizan, and even the priest subjected to fetters and chains, condemned to breathe a foul air in which artificial light was extinguished, and which vitiated the blood and prepared certain death."

German Roscio, a scholar and a man distinguished by his humanity, was, as well as others of the same class, exposed to the jeers and insults of the mob in the public stocks. He and seven others (amongst them Canon Cortés Madariaga) were shipped off to the dungeons of Ceuta, with a letter from Monteverde to the Regency describing them as "these eight monsters, the origin and prime cause of all the evils and novelties of America which have horrified the whole world."

Some of the leading revolutionists escaped. A few, as already mentioned, had succeeded in getting away

¹ O'Leary, Documents, 13, p. 63.

from La Guaira by sea. Casas, by his servility in stopping the embarkations and in delivering up his comrades and Miranda, had made his peace. Bolivar had left La Guaira early on the evening of the 31st July, and passed unrecognised through the Spanish posts to Caracas, where he remained in hiding with the assistance of the worthy Francisco Iturbe, a mutual friend of his and Monteverde's, and a royalist by conviction. This gentleman addressed himself to Monteverde with a view to getting a passport for Bolivar to leave the country. With some difficulty he succeeded in obtaining the promise, and Bolivar appeared before Monteverde for the purpose of getting his passport. The Spaniard at first charged him with having put himself beyond the terms of the capitulation by having shot two Spaniards at Puerto Cabello. To that Bolivar replied that they were spies, liable to their fate under the rules of war. Monteverde then said, "You have done a praiseworthy deed in arresting Miranda, and that entitles you to the king's favour." To this Bolivar replied, "Since that was not my intention in arresting Miranda, I disclaim the right and the merit which you attribute to me; my conduct had a very different motive; I saw in Miranda a traitor to my country." Monteverde, at once, on hearing these words, withdrew his promise of a passport, but it was eventually obtained by the personal intercession of Iturbe, who was present at the scene.¹ Both O'Leary and Larrazabal deny the truth of Monteverde's view of Bolivar's motives. It has also been said, though this Larrazabal again indignantly repudiates, that Bolivar owed his escape to his comparative insignificance

¹ In 1820 Bolivar showed that he had not forgotten the debt of gratitude he owed to Iturbe, who was then resident in Curaçao and had never abandoned the royalist cause, though not taking any active part in the war. The Congress was about to confiscate his property when Bolivar obtained the stoppage of the order on the ground of the great service rendered to himself by Iturbe in 1812.

at this time. Yet it seems by no means improbable that this consideration influenced Monteverde; for, except at Puerto Cabello, Bolivar had held no important command, and his relegation to that place prevented his appearance on the main scene. His subsequent acceptance of a small command under Labatut, a French soldier of fortune of no eminence, shows that his position was still not the highest.

Nevertheless, when he sailed from La Guaira on the 27th August 1812, he was about to pass very shortly from a secondary position in the revolt of the northern colonies of South America to the very foremost, which he continued to occupy for the remaining eighteen years of his life. This, therefore, seems a convenient place in which to endeavour to place before ourselves a general picture of the man as he then was. We shall not, at present, deal in detail with his character or his political and military conduct, for these will be more appropriately considered when we have before us the whole history of his career. Bolivar was just twenty-nine years old in August 1812. In stature he was small; O'Leary gives him 5 feet 6 inches, though some accounts represent him as still smaller.¹ He had a narrow chest and a spare body, with slender limbs, and hands and feet so small as to be the envy of many women. His complexion was sallow, the skin somewhat rough. His high forehead was curiously seamed, even in his youth, by wrinkles. His hair was very black, with thick eyebrows, surmounting very black and piercing eyes, which, according to Miller,² rarely looked straight in the face of the person he was speaking to. The nose was long but well shaped, the cheek-bones prominent, the cheeks hollow, the ears large. Above a mouth, which O'Leary describes as "ugly," was a very long upper lip. The teeth were

¹ Sir C. Markham ("History of Peru," p. 269) says 5 feet 4 inches.

² II. 331.

white, well formed, and scrupulously cared for. The chin was somewhat pointed, and the face and head very long.¹ His portraits often represent him as almost clean shaven, though several authorities say he had a heavy moustache and whiskers. They probably refer to campaigning days, when shaving was difficult.

The expression of his face was ordinarily calm though careworn, but his temper was impetuous and capricious, and, once it was aroused, his expression became fierce and threatening, and his language was far from measured. But these outbursts of temper, if not resented and aggravated, soon subsided and were followed by an attitude of conciliation. O'Leary, who must constantly have seen it, describes the change from Bolivar in a good humour to Bolivar in a rage as "terrible." Without vanity he would not have been a true creole, and he had perhaps rather more than the ordinary share allotted to others of his compatriots. Another creole quality, indolence of body, was not altogether absent in him, for he loved to loll about in a hammock, even when he was dictating. Sometimes he would stand to hear the reports of his secretary, with his arms folded, and the left hand tugging at the collar of his coat, whilst he rapidly dictated the order on each paper. But when he was in his hammock it was only a survival of the natural tendency of his race to indolence and apathy; for he was endowed with an appetite for hard work, and a readiness to undertake the greatest physical exertion when necessary, which was worthy of Napoleon. He was an excellent horseman, and his powers of endurance were truly remarkable in one of his apparently frail physique. That quality he doubtless owed to his early devotion to field sports and an out-of-door life.

¹ This characteristic is very marked in most portraits of Bolivar, especially in the Bogotá miniature figured at p. 123, vol. i., of Mr M. Spence's "Land of Bolivar."

He wrote well and impressively, but, to the English reader, his letters and proclamations are rendered unpalatable by the turgidity of their style, and the prevalence in them of vain self-glorification. Endowed with a powerful though somewhat harsh voice, he was an excellent and fluent speaker, fiery and eloquent, but sometimes too excitable.

His excessive admiration for the 'fair sex and his devotion to dancing have already been referred to. He was hospitable and fond of entertaining, though himself very simple in his food, so much so that he would often dine alone and only join a banquet towards the end, when, as a proposer of toasts, he was unsurpassed. He drank with the greatest moderation, and did not smoke at all, which was particularly remarkable in a country where almost everybody else lived with a cigar between his lips. In his Paris days he indulged in gambling, but, after having had to borrow of a lady to enable him to win back a large sum which he had lost, he eschewed cards entirely. O'Leary records that only once in his later life did he touch a card, and then only to humour his companions in camp during a long march.¹ He was a great reader, when he had leisure, chiefly of French, through the medium of translations into which language he acquired the knowledge of ancient history which he so frequently paraded in his letters, proclamations, and speeches.

He always professed the greatest admiration for British institutions, and some of his best friends were English or Irish. Amongst them were Moore, his doctor; O'Leary, his chief aide-de-camp for many years; Fergusson, who was killed defending him against assassins in Bogotá; and Belford Wilson, son of Sir Robert Wilson of Peninsular fame.

¹ One of them was Santander, whom Colonel Campbell describes as "an habitual gamester."

The above sketch is sufficient for the present to give some idea of Bolivar's personality. It is based mainly on the picture drawn of him by O'Leary, tempered by the naturally more unprejudiced account given by Miller, who, unlike O'Leary, was not in his personal service, though he had excellent opportunities of gauging him in Peru in 1824. Neither Larrazabal, who can see nothing but good in Bolivar, nor Ducoudray-Holstein, furiously prejudiced against him, is a safe guide, and the same may be said of many South American writers on one side or the other.

As the scene is about to change for the moment from Venezuela to New Granada, it is necessary here to recount very briefly the course of events in that Vice-royalty during the years 1809-1812, which had witnessed the temporary rise of the Venezuelan Republic, and its destruction by Monteverde.

To begin with the Presidency of Quito, the first outbreak of revolt occurred in August 1809 in Quito itself. The President, Ruiz de Castillo, was deposed, a Junta was set up, and troops were raised. The news of this revolt reached Santa Fé (Bogotá) early in September, and Amar, the Viceroy of New Granada, at once summoned a meeting of the principal authorities and inhabitants to consult as to the attitude to be taken up towards the revolutionary Junta in Quito. His real object appears to have been to discover the state of feeling in Bogotá itself. He found that there was a distinct cleavage of opinion, the creoles advocating recognition of the Quito Junta, and even the establishment of a similar assembly in their own city. The European Spaniards, on the other hand, were for prompt suppression of the movement in Quito. With them Amar concurred, and at once sent 300 men southwards to suppress the Quiteños. A larger force was sent northwards from Peru against Quito. To meet the force from Bogotá, the

Junta of Quito despatched a small force, which never got beyond Pasto. The fierce inhabitants of that ultra-royalist province fell upon and destroyed the Quiteños long before they could meet Amar's troops. A panic in Quito was the result of this mishap. Ruiz de Castillo, promising an amnesty, was reinstated. When the troops from Peru and New Granada reached Quito, the amnesty was thrown to the winds, the leaders of the late revolution being arrested and sentenced to death or imprisonment. This severity produced a futile popular émeute, which was put down by the troops with terrible severity. Castillo, who seems not to have been privy to these severities, hastened to proclaim a general pardon, and to get rid of the Peruvian and other troops.

The news of events in Quito precipitated revolt in New Granada, where the city of Cartagena broke out and set up a Junta, of which the governor was made president. He was soon found to be bitterly hostile, and was sent off to Cuba (11th June 1810).

A small insurrection in Casanare, on the borders of Venezuela, was easily suppressed from Bogotá, and the leaders were executed. At Socorro and Pamplona, in the Eastern Cordilleras north of Bogotá, Juntas were successfully set up in July 1810.

There remained Bogotá, where everything was ripe for revolt. It was precipitated by an insulting speech aimed at the Americans by a European Spaniard. The people, assembling in the great square, demanded a Junta. The Viceroy was at first for resistance, as he had a considerable force at his disposal. Then he thought better of it, and allowed the cabildo to meet openly. It at once (21st July) named a Junta, of which the Viceroy himself was to be president. The leader in this movement was Dr Camilo Torres. The revolution was at first of the mildest order, for the Junta, in drafting a constitution, recognised, not only the sovereignty of Ferdinand VII., but

even the temporary authority of the Spanish Regency during Ferdinand's imprisonment in France. The constitution provided for a federal union of the various provinces of New Granada. All this was far from satisfying Torres and the other leaders, who presently deposed the Viceroy and made use of the weak Junta as a tool. Ferdinand VII.'s sovereignty was still acknowledged, but the Junta was ordered to refuse recognition of the Regency or any similar body in Spain. Then there arrived from Spain the envoys Montúfar and Villavicencio, whom we have already seen in Caracas on the 18th April 1810.¹ Being powerless in the face of recent events, Montúfar proceeded to Quito to see what could be done there.

Most of the other provinces of New Granada, following the example of Cartagena and Bogotá, had set up their own Juntas, and it only remained to work out their federal union. But there was no union; for Bogotá and Cartagena each wanted to hold the Congress in its own territory and to unite the provinces around itself. Neither would recognise the authority of the other. Some of the other provinces, moreover, wished to set up independent republics.

Then the Bogotanos set up a "monarchical republic" with Dr Lozano as President. He was unable to succeed bringing about the desired federal union, and he was soon deposed, at the instance of Antonio Nariño, who favoured a centralised republic. Cartagena, with which Antioquia concurred, was for the federal system. A Congress of sorts had assembled in Lozano's time, but, when it attempted to inaugurate a federal republic, was driven out and forced to retire to Ibagué in the Magdalena valley. On the 11th November 1811 Cartagena declared itself an independent state, whilst the eastern provinces sought incorporation with Venezuela. The

¹ *Supra*, p. 42.

royalists still held Quito and the territory as far north as the province of Pasto in the south of New Granada, though they had been driven from the valley of the Cauca, including Popayan. They also held what is now the Republic of Panamá, and they occupied the two provinces of Santa Marta and Rio Hacha, east of the lower Magdalena, the stream of which they also commanded with their gunboats and posts on both banks. Thus Cartagena was sandwiched in between Panamá and Santa Marta, which latter, with Rio Hacha, effectually cut it off from the central and eastern provinces. These again lay between the Santa Marta-Rio Hacha wedge and Quito. The latter had meanwhile made another attempt to throw off Spanish dominion. In it the principal part was played by Montúfar, the envoy of the Spanish Regency, who had gone over to the revolutionists. He was at the bottom of the setting up of a Junta, in September 1810, with Ruiz de Castillo at its head. Presently Castillo was deposed and murdered, and Quito proclaimed its independence. We need not follow in detail the course of this revolution, which was finally put down after the storming of Quito in the latter part of 1812. Quito after that remained quiescent for eight years. At the same time, civil war was in progress in New Granada between Nariño,¹ representing the supporters of a centralised republic, and the Congress at Ibaguë, with Camilo Torres²

¹ Antonio Nariño, born in Bogotá, 1765, where he served as a youth in the royal treasury. He was imprisoned in Spain for publishing an account of the French Constituent Assembly. Escaping from Cadiz he fled to Paris and England. Returning to Bogotá, he was again arrested and imprisoned at Cartagena till released by the revolution there. His later adventures will be narrated in the text up to the date of his defeat in the contest for the vice-presidency with Santander in 1821. After that he appears to have taken no active part in politics. He died at Leiva in September 1823.

² Camilo Torres, born at Popayan in 1766. Became an advocate and public employé at Bogotá. He joined the revolution from its commencement and will be mentioned later in the text. From 1812 to 1814 he was President of the Republic in New Granada. He fled southwards before Morillo in 1816,

at its head, representing the federal party. It is unnecessary to follow the changing fortunes of this miserable contest, which ended in union of the forces of Nariño and the Congress, with the object of beating back the Spanish advance from Quito under Sámano, who had reconquered Popayan by the end of 1812. Nariño, in command of the republicans, was at first successful in driving the royalists back into the province of Pasto, the "Vendée of the Revolution of New Granada," as Mitre appropriately calls it. There he was defeated in an advance-guard skirmish by the mountaineers. His army, seized with panic, fled to Popayan, and Nariño, after wandering alone for some time in the mountains, finally surrendered himself and was shipped off in chains to Spain.

The general situation in New Granada and Quito was as follows at the time when Bolivar was approaching Cartagena. Quito was in the power of the royalists, who were advancing against the now united forces of Nariño and the Congress towards Popayan. The province of Antioquia¹ had declared itself an independent republic. Cartagena was likewise an independent state, cut off from the central states by the wedge of Spanish territory in Santa Marta and Rio Hacha, extending across the lower Magdalena. It was threatened by the forces in this wedge, and also to some extent from Panamá,² where the Spanish titular Viceroy of New Granada had established

but was captured and executed in Bogotá in October 1816. He was shot in the back, his body was then hung on the gallows, and afterwards quartered, and his head exposed to public view.

¹ This province is situated in the northern part of the Central Cordilleras and the Cauca valley south of the province of Cartagena.

² The danger of invasion by land from Panamá was slight. The country between Panamá and Cartagena is so marshy and fever stricken as to be practically impassable for troops. That the Colombians found to their cost in 1904 when, the sea route being forbidden by the United States after the Panamá revolution, they attempted to send a force by land. Three-fourths of the men perished, and the rest returned in a state of starvation.

The real danger to Cartagena in 1812 was from the sea.

himself. In view of the danger from Santa Marta, Cartagena had accepted the dictatorship of Dr Torices, a young man of twenty-four years. This move was the immediate consequence of the destruction by the Spaniards, in March 1812, of a flotilla sent from Cartagena against Santa Marta. A force was now being sent against that place under Labatut, a French adventurer who had escaped from La Guaira after Miranda's fall, before the emigration had been stopped by Casas under Spanish orders.

CHAPTER IV

BOLIVAR'S FIRST LIBERATION OF VENEZUELA— THE "WAR TO THE DEATH"

MONTEVERDE soon had good reason to regret having let Bolivar escape. The future Liberator landed at Curaçao, then in the possession of the British, on the 28th August 1812. He was almost penniless, for, owing to informalities in the papers of the ship by which he arrived, all his property on board was seized by the customs, and Monteverde had sequestered his Venezuelan possessions. He is said to have talked of going to England to seek employment in the Peninsula under Lord Wellington. Whatever his real intentions, his financial difficulties prevented any such scheme. At Curaçao he found some of his companions who had escaped from La Guaira, and others had accompanied him.

It was not long before, having succeeded in borrowing some money in Curaçao, Bolivar was again off to offer his services to the republican government at Cartagena. He arrived there in the middle of November 1812, and at once set to work at his new enterprise of inspiring energy amongst the separatists of the republic, and of acquiring a position amongst them which might hereafter enable him to come to the aid of Venezuela. For the moment, the fire of revolution in his own country had been stamped down, though it was still smouldering. In Cartagena he hoped to fan the flame into a blaze

involving all the neighbouring provinces. On the 15th December, two days after Labatut had successfully driven the Spaniards from the mouth of the Magdalena, Bolivar, with the approval of the Dictator Torices, by whom he had been well received, issued a manifesto to the inhabitants of New Granada. It is too long for quotation in full ; for, like most of Bolivar's proclamations, it is prolix and wearisome to English ears, and much too full of highflown sentiments, self-glorification, and flattery of his audience. However, he knew his people, and that this style of writing was acceptable to them, and gratifying to their vanity. The manifesto, which occupies nearly eleven pages of O'Leary,¹ may be summarised in a few words for our purpose. After explaining his own position and his desire to help New Granada, Bolivar states what to him appear to have been the main causes of the Venezuelan failure. To begin upon, there had been a deal too much leniency on the republican side ; he was thinking of his own differences with Miranda on this subject. Then there had been too much theory, and too little practical work ; "we had," he writes, "philosophers for leaders, philanthropy in place of legislation, dialectics instead of tactics, and sophists for soldiers." Instead of well-trained soldiers, the republican leaders had endeavoured to compel the service of yokels, thus raising useless bands of militia and ruining the agriculture of the country. Curiously enough, Bolivar strongly opposes, for his own country, the idea of the "nation in arms," though he admitted its success against mercenary troops in France and North America. Perhaps he was right, looking to the peculiar circumstances of his country, and recognising in his heart of hearts that the revolution, as yet, had

¹ The manifesto is given in full in O'Leary, i. 86-96. The letter to the Congress of New Granada in the same terms is in O'Leary, Documents, 13, p. 57.

little root amongst the general population, and would never have been started but for the influence of ideas imported from Europe and North America by men like Miranda and himself. Then he denounces the federal Congress, which he blames as an instrument of dissolution and civil war rather than of union, which, in his opinion, was only to be attained by a centralised republic. A federal government, with its factions and dissensions, was far too weak to succeed. He had no faith in popular elections made by ignorant rustics and the intriguers of cities. "Our own divisions," he wrote, "not the arms of Spain, have brought us back to slavery." Whilst admitting fully the effects of the earthquake, combined with ecclesiastical influence, he always harks back to his argument that, if Caracas had imposed itself on the country as the governing authority, all would have been well. Then he boldly advocates the reconquest of Caracas by New Granada. Its difficulties he admits, but urges that Venezuela, in the hands of the Spaniards, now occupies the same position in regard to South America generally as Coró had formerly occupied towards Caracas. Venezuela should be attacked in Maracaibo through Santa Marta, and in Barinas through the mountains of Cúcuta. The whole manifesto is Bolívar's first real profession of political and military faith. He appealed in similar terms to the General Congress of New Granada assembled at Tunja, and his arguments gained him many adherents, of whom the most important was Camilo Torres, the original leader of the outbreak in Bogotá in July 1810.

In the meanwhile, Bolívar was given a command under Labatut in the expedition which was to attempt the conquest of Santa Marta. The appointment was by no means acceptable to the Frenchman. By way of getting rid of his subordinate, Labatut posted him at Barranca, a small place on the western (left) bank of

the Magdalena, some fifty or sixty miles from its mouth. Bolivar had strict orders to remain there, guarding Labutut's rear in the advance on Santa Marta. Those orders he disobeyed as soon as Labatut's back was turned. He set out with 200 men for Tenerife, some thirty miles farther up the river on the opposite bank. The Spanish garrison, surprised by Bolivar's sudden arrival, evacuated the place and fell back towards Valle de Upar, south of Santa Marta. After compelling the submission of Tenerife to the republican government, Bolivar continued his march up the river, through a country of grass and marshes, to Mompox,¹ some 150 miles from the mouth of the river. On the way he cleared out all the small Spanish posts on the left bank of the great river. Mompox in those days was an important place, and in it Bolivar was received with enthusiasm, on 27th December 1812. Here he gathered in many recruits, and was able to leave for Banco, travelling by boats on the river, with 500 men. Banco,² though fortified, was evacuated by its Spanish garrison, who retired up the river Cesar towards Valle de Upar. Still pushing on, Bolivar, after defeating a royalist detachment at Chiriguana, reached Tamaleque, Puerto Real,³ and finally Ocaña, an important place well above the valley of the Magdalena in the foothills of the Eastern Cordilleras. He had gained a very considerable and important success, opening as he had nearly 300 miles of the lower Magdalena, clearing out the Spanish garrisons, and capturing their boats, as well as much

¹ Mompox was in Bolivar's time on the main stream. This has now shifted twenty miles to the west, and the branch which passes Mompox has become a minor one, only navigable for steamers when the river is in flood.

² Banco stands on a slight eminence on the right bank of the Magdalena, at the point where, now, the branch passing Mompox separates from the main stream.

³ Puerto Ocaña on the map. Now called Puerto Nacional. Up to about this point steamers can travel day and night. Above it, it is generally only safe to proceed by day.

ammunition, many muskets, and some artillery. Moreover, he had freed for the use of Cartagena all the plain to the west of the Magdalena, whence supplies of cattle and grain could be drawn.

It was now time for Bolivar to call a halt and endeavour to regularise his very irregular position. Labatut was furious at his disobedience of orders, all the more so because it had redounded to the glory of a man of whom he was jealous. He issued orders for Bolivar's immediate return to Barranca, orders to which the successful lieutenant replied by detailing his victories, without any promise of obedience. Labatut appealed to Torices at Cartagena, demanding Bolivar's trial by court martial. But Torices, appreciating the advantages gained at the cost of insubordination, refused the request, even when Labatut hastened to Cartagena to back it in person.

Bolivar, therefore, had matters all his own way, and rose immensely in the estimation of the Cartagenians.¹ He now considered himself on the high road to carrying out his greater scheme of invading Venezuela from the west.

At this time the Spanish military commander of Maracaibo, Ramon Correa, was firmly established about Cúcuta. He had marched thither from Maracaibo whilst Monteverde was subduing the central part of Venezuela.

Forcing back such republican troops as he encountered in the provinces of Trujillo and Merida, he was now in a position to threaten the Granadian towns of Pamplona and Ocaña. Had he been bold enough to press on, he

¹ According to Briceño Mendez, Bolivar had got permission from Torices for his expedition even before the capture of Tenerife. This seems more than doubtful on the whole. In any case, Bolivar's appeal to the government, behind the back of his immediate superior, would not much improve his position in the matter of insubordination. Labatut was soon afterwards arrested by order of Torices, and expelled from Cartagena territory.

could probably have easily driven out Manuel Castillo, the republican officer commanding in Pamplona. Fortunately for Castillo, who was weak in troops and hampered by factions and dissensions in the country, Correa remained inactive. The commandant of Pamplona, hearing of Bolivar's arrival in Ocaña, now appealed to him for help.

But Bolivar, however much the proposal might suit his ultimate aims, was compelled to refuse for the moment, until he could obtain permission for the expedition from Torices, and also replace the heavy losses which he had suffered from desertion and hardships. Informing Castillo of the necessity for sanction from Cartagena, and leaving his faithful lieutenant and uncle, José Felix Ribas¹ in command of the troops at Ocaña, Bolivar returned to Mompox, inspecting his posts on the river as he went, and collecting all spare arms and ammunition.

By the 9th February he was able to start back for Ocaña, armed with the sanction of Torices, and ready to march eastwards with 400 men—truly a miserable force with which to set out, but Bolivar relied upon gathering recruits after his first successes. The march from Ocaña to Cúcuta involved crossing the great eastern branch of the Colombian Cordilleras. Perhaps the feature that strikes the traveller most in the Colombian Andes is the apparent simplicity of general outline, combined with a most remarkable wildness and savagery of detail. Mountains which are seemingly rounded and easy hills, prove, on closer acquaintance, to offer the greatest difficulties to transit. Immense gorges, shut in by precipices, sometimes thousands of feet in height, traverse them in all directions, and through these, closely shut in on both sides, with no road beyond the bed of the torrent, which in the course of ages has cut its way

¹ Ribas was married to the sister of Bolivar's mother.

through the rock, Bolivar's force, for army is hardly an appropriate name for the equivalent of half a battalion, had to pass. Frequently places were met with where the invading troops, deep down in a gorge so narrow that the rays of the sun rarely reached the bottom, might easily have been stopped and destroyed by a handful of resolute men. At other times the path skirted the edge of a precipice, where a false step meant destruction. The country was uninhabited, save by a few Indians living in solitary huts, and was constantly swept by terrible storms. Such was the tract to be traversed, after the first thirty miles from Ocaña, till Salazar de las Palmas was reached. The road was difficult for mountaineers; for the men of the hot plains of Cartagena composing Bolivar's force, unaccustomed as they were to the cold, the piercing winds, and the rarefied air of these high altitudes, it was terrible. But Bolivar's enthusiasm and energy carried them along with him. At one place the way was barred by 100 royalists holding heights which, properly defended, were impregnable. It was only by stratagem that Bolivar succeeded in opening the road. He sent a countryman round by a difficult and dangerous path over the shoulder of the hill of which the Spaniards held the summit. He was, as Bolivar intended, captured by the enemy and searched. On him was found a despatch, addressed to a fictitious officer, supposed to have been sent by Castillo to attack the position in rear, in combination with Bolivar's attack in front. The Spanish commander promptly resolved to march back on Salazar, in order to surprise the detachment supposed to be marching on his rear. When he found out that the force was imaginary, and attempted to return to his old position, it was too late, for Bolivar was installed there. Thence the republicans marched without opposition to Salazar. There Bolivar stopped to rest his men, and to wait for

reinforcements from Pamplona, which were to meet him at Arboledas. Before him the Spaniards fell back, thus allowing him to reach San Cayetano, on the banks of the Zulia, a tributary of the Catatumbo, which flows into the Gulf of Maracaibo. He was now close to San José de Cúcuta, on which he marched on the 28th February.

Correa was at Mass at S. José when he heard that his outposts had been driven in. He left his prayers, and hurried off to draw up his forces against the small body which was all the republicans showed. Thinking he had to deal with only an advance guard, which he could destroy before the main body arrived, he decided to attack it in the strong position which it had occupied on some heights. The fight lasted four hours, ending in the complete defeat of the Spaniards, with heavy loss in killed, wounded, and prisoners. Correa himself, slightly wounded, narrowly escaped capture. Nevertheless, he retreated in good order unpursued by the weary enemy.¹ Next morning, Bolivar followed him as far as San Antonio on the Táchira, the boundary at this point between New Granada and Venezuela.

By this advance Bolivar had cleared this part of New Granada, and was rewarded by the capture of immense quantities of merchandise collected by the Maracaibo merchants in anticipation of a victorious advance by Correa on Bogotá. At last, Bolivar stood within the western portal of Venezuela, in the midst of plenty.

Here we must glance at what had been happening in Venezuela since Bolivar's hurried departure seven months previously. Monteverde had an excellent opportunity of conciliating the country, which, exhausted by recent events, and by the losses of the earthquake, looked only for peace and reasonably good government. This opportunity he allowed to escape him, and, by indiscriminate arrests of well to do people, and by persecu-

¹ Bolivar's report of the battle is in O'Leary, *Docts.* 13, p. 147.

tions of the poor as well as the rich, soon exasperated the whole population. He had raised some hopes by promising to introduce the Constitution of Cadiz, as stipulated in Miranda's capitulation ; but, when he at last published it, he soon made it clear that the constitution was a dead letter when it happened to run counter to his own absolute authority. Everywhere there was consternation and oppression of Americans by Spaniards, though many of the best of these latter clearly saw the mistake, and openly lamented it. Still, Monteverde had undoubtedly succeeded in reducing the rebellious provinces to subjection. He was now threatened both in the east and in the west. Bolivar, victorious at San José, set vigorously to work to enlist the sympathies and assistance of the republican government of New Granada, describing, in writing to its members, the fate of Venezuela, and pointing out to them that Monteverde's success there being once thoroughly achieved, he would turn his arms westward for the subjugation of New Granada. He painted in the rosiest colours the prospects of an invasion of Venezuela, carefully suppressing all mention of its dangers and risks. Those he reserved till it should be necessary to urge them as an argument in favour of implicit trust in himself and the supply to him of reinforcements and arms.¹

He had other difficulties to contend with ; for Castillo was by no means inclined to serve under the Venezuelan leader. Manuel de Castillo y Rada, a Cartagenian of noble family and great influence, had hitherto played an important part in the revolution, and it is not surprising to find him resenting supersession by a Venezuelan fugitive from his own country, even though that Venezuelan had saved him from a very great danger. Moreover, he commanded 1000 men, a larger force than Bolivar's. Both were men of violent and proud tempera-

¹ Letter of 19th March 1813. O'Leary, *Docts.* 13, p. 159.

ment, neither would yield, and the quarrel grew and rankled in the breasts of both in the succeeding years. The dispute was taken up by the army, and dissension spread amongst officers and men alike, the Venezuelans generally espousing the cause of Bolívar, the Granadians that of Castillo. Both commanders were in fault, but once the quarrel had started it could not be appeased. It was rare indeed to find among these republican leaders patriotism sufficient to induce them to sink their personal differences for the common good.

Bolívar had, with much difficulty, extracted from the Congress of New Granada a grudging permission for the continuation of his advance beyond the Venezuelan border into the provinces of Mérida and Trujillo. They had made him a brigadier-general, but had proposed to hamper his movements and restrain the extent of his march by attaching a commission to him. He had started long before the commissioners reached him.

The army had received some reinforcements of Granadian troops. Its vanguard was commanded by Castillo, whilst Ribas, the Venezuelan, was at the head of the other division. At La Grita, four days' march from S. José, Castillo came upon Correa, now inferior in forces, but holding a strong position. On the 13th May the Spaniard was driven from his position. Castillo then left the army, returned to Cúcuta, and, sending in his resignation of his command, retired to his native city, Cartagena. Some of his officers followed his example, and it was with great difficulty that his division was held together at all. It was reduced in numbers to 500 men.

Bolívar was glad to be rid of a troublesome subordinate, but his position was so difficult that at one time there seemed a prospect of the expedition breaking down entirely. He had, however, some devoted adherents, both Granadian and Venezuelan. One of the latter, Rafael Urdaneta, wrote to him thus: "General!

If two men are sufficient to liberate the Fatherland, I am ready to accompany you.”¹

When Bolivar reached La Grita, he found Castillo gone, but he also found that that commander had been working vigorously against the invasion of Venezuela, holding a council of war on the subject, and endeavouring to get the Government of New Granada to withhold their promised assistance. As for the leading division, it was now under the command of Francisco de Paula Santander,² a warm supporter of Castillo, and a man by no means inclined to obey Bolivar, who, however, treated him with great firmness. “March at once,” said he peremptorily to Santander; “there is no other alternative to marching. If you do not, either you will have to shoot me, or I shall infallibly shoot you.”³ The division indeed marched, but without Santander, who excused himself from rejoining it, much to Bolivar’s relief.

The Congress of New Granada was now genuinely exerting itself to help Bolivar’s project, though it was probably a good deal surprised by the rapidity of his advance. Leaving La Grita on the 17th May, he reached Merida on the 23rd, the whole population rising against the Spaniards as he progressed. At Merida he replaced in power the republican government which had been driven out by Monteverde’s people. In the midst of the rejoicings at this provincial capital came the news that Antonio Nicolas Briceño, surnamed “El Diablo,”

¹ O’Leary, i. 122. Rafael Urdaneta played a considerable part under Bolivar, and was one of his most faithful followers to the end. He was born in Maracaibo in 1789. He died in Paris, where he was Venezuelan Minister, in 1845.

Cochrane (ii. 97) describes him as “a handsome, agreeable, well-informed man, more resembling an European officer than any other I have met with in the country.”

² Santander, born at Rosario de Cúcuta in 1792, had served in the army of New Granada since the commencement of the revolution. He held in 1813 the rank of major.

³ O’Leary, i. 123.

had been captured and shot by the Spanish general Yañez, an event which is of importance, mainly, as being the immediate cause of Bolivar's declaration of the "Guerra à muerte" against the Spaniards.

Briceño was a hot-headed, enthusiastic Venezuelan who had accompanied Bolivar to Cartagena. Against the advice and wishes of his chief, he set out on an independent expedition, with an inadequate force of 143 men, breathing vengeance against the Spaniards and proclaiming loudly that he would give no quarter. He was as good as his word, for two unfortunate Spaniards who fell into his hands were promptly decapitated by his orders. It is said that he sent the heads of his victims, one to Bolivar and the other to Castillo. With them he sent letters, the first line of which was written with the blood of the victims instead of with ink. Marching for the plains of the Upper Apure, he was surprised, before reaching Guadalito, by Yañez, his force was destroyed, himself made prisoner and carried off to Barinas. Considering their treatment of the two Spaniards, it is hardly surprising that Yañez should have shot Briceño and his fellow-prisoners. This, however, gave Bolivar an excuse for proclaiming a war without mercy, which he had long contemplated. It will be remembered that he had fallen out with Miranda on account of what he considered the too great leniency of the Venezuelan commander-in-chief. He had again, in his manifesto at Cartagena, urged the employment of measures of unstinted severity. Now, on the 15th June 1813, after taking possession of Trujillo, he issued his proclamation of war to the death.¹ The gist of it is in the concluding words: "Spaniards and Canary Islanders! reckon on death, even if you are neutral, unless you work actively for the liberty of America. Americans! count on life, even if you are culpable."

¹ Given in full. O'Leary, *Docts.* 13, p. 251.

This terrible order it is difficult, notwithstanding the pleas of Bolivar's admirers, not to reckon as one of the most serious blots upon his character and humanity. Few unprejudiced persons, probably, will hold that a decision can on any grounds be excused which contemplated the wholesale massacre not only of prisoners of war, but even of Spaniards who desired to remain neutral, and which was, as will be seen later, actually carried into action in this sense. No Spaniard could hope to escape unless actively a traitor to his own party. It is true that Bolivar, in many instances, did not carry out his own decree, and, as we shall see presently, he appears to have repented of the order not very long after its issue. He finally rescinded it in 1820, in agreement with his opponent Morillo. It may be also true¹ that Tizcar, on the Spanish side, had already issued a similar order, which was the immediate cause of Bolivar's decision. Still, the misdeeds of the other side are no sufficient excuse for so barbarous a decision as Bolivar's. Restrepo (ii. 141) defends the measure on the ground that it was necessary to arouse, by violent methods, a race which, living in slavery, had sunk into inveterate apathy. "Deep-seated evils require extreme remedies." Surely a very insufficient plea.²

Before continuing the description of Bolivar's further advance into Venezuela from the west, it will be well to refer briefly to what was going on simultaneously in the east.

Amongst the fugitives from the vengeance of Monteverde in the eastern districts were a few rather notable

¹ Larrazabal, i. 173.

² That Bolivar did not hesitate to carry out his threats was soon shown. In reporting his proceedings to the Congress of New Granada (14th August 1813), he wrote: "After the battle of Tinaquillo, I marched without delay by the towns of Tocuyito, Valencia, Guayos, Guácara, San Joaquin, Maracay, Turmero, San Mateo and La Victoria, where all the Europeans and Canarians, almost without exception, have been shot" (Restrepo, ii. 169).

men. Santiago Mariño was the chief among them. Perhaps Ducoudray-Holstein is not far wrong in describing him as "a weak and ignorant but very ambitious young man."¹ Another was José Francisco Bermudez,² who played a very considerable part in subsequent events, as did Manuel Valdés.³ Antonio José de Sucre⁴ rose to much greater eminence, especially in Peru and Bolivia, and was admittedly a better commander than Bolivar himself. Manuel Piar,⁵ a mulatto native of Curaçao, was also one of the most capable commanders on the republican side, a man whom Bolivar feared as a dangerous rival, and whom he eventually caused to be shot.

All these took refuge, when Monteverde overran and crushed the eastern districts, in the British colony of Trinidad, where, according to O'Leary, they met with rather shabby treatment at the hands of the governor, Sir R. Woodford.⁶

At Port of Spain, the capital of Trinidad, the exiles

¹ Santiago Mariño was born in Margarita in 1788 of a family of some distinction. He came into his possessions on the death of his father two years before the revolution. In 1810 he was appointed captain by the Junta, and marched with Colonel Villapol against Guayana. His services gained him the rank of lieut.-colonel, and later he was appointed commandant of the coast of Guiría, where his gallant defence was rewarded with the grade of colonel. When Miranda capitulated in 1812 Marino retired to his sister's farm in Trinidad. It was there that he heard of Monteverde's violation of the capitulation, and at once assembled his fellow-refugees to decide on the invasion of Venezuela.

² Born at Areocar in Cumaná in 1782. Joined the republicans from the beginning in 1809. He will constantly appear in this history, more often as the opponent of Bolivar than as his friend. After Bolivar's death he joined Paez, then President of Venezuela. Bermudez was assassinated in December 1831.

³ Manuel Valdés. Born at Caracas 1785. Died at Angostura, 1845. He fought throughout the War of Independence, including Bolivar's campaigns in Peru, and his career will be incidentally recorded hereafter.

⁴ Sucre was born in Cumaná in 1793. His career, which was inseparably bound up with that of Bolivar, will be related hereafter.

⁵ A notice of Piar will be found when we deal with his execution.

⁶ O'Leary, i. 148.

were always in sight of their native shores, just across the Gulf of Paria ; indeed, at the north-western and south-western horn-like projections of Trinidad literally only a musket-shot intervenes between British territory and Venezuela.

In Trinidad these refugees organised an expedition to fan the smouldering flames of revolution in the Venezuelan districts of Guiria and Maturin. On the night of the 13th January 1813, the refugees, under fifty in number, and having but five muskets among them as their whole modern military stock-in-trade, sailed on their apparently desperate enterprise. Landing at Guiria, within sight of Port of Spain, they succeeded in surprising the small Spanish detachment holding it. Their arrival was the signal for the collection of many of the down-trodden inhabitants of the neighbourhood, men rendered desperate by the tyrannies of Monteverde's officers. The invaders did not allow the grass to grow under their feet, but pushed out parties in all directions against the scattered royalist detachments, who, unsuspecting of any danger, were surprised and defeated. With the arms captured from them, Mariño and his friends were able to exchange the bows and arrows, with which alone they had been for the most part armed, for muskets. The most important advance was made towards the south by a force commanded by Piar and Bermudez. They first moved on Maturin, a town lying on the northern edge of the great plain of the lower Orinoco. The inhabitants, ripe for revolt, received Bermudez and Piar with enthusiasm. Between these two commanders there was friction, which ended in Piar taking the chief command. He now had to defend himself against the forces sent by the governor of Cumaná to recover Maturin. They appear to have been dribbled up, and Piar was able to defeat them in succession, taking arms, ammunition, and even artillery. Thus, when Monteverde himself arrived with a force

which is probably very much overstated at 3000 men,¹ he also was badly beaten and forced to retire towards Caracas.

Meanwhile Mariño, gradually gaining strength at Guiria, was at length able to advance on the town of Cumaná, which, on the 3rd August, opened its gates to him.

But we are anticipating somewhat, and must now return to Bolivar, whom we left at Trujillo, towards the close of June, preparing to advance on Caracas. His force had been augmented by the enlistment of American prisoners taken from the Spaniards in the various actions. On the 28th June he marched from Trujillo, whilst Ribas started from Merida with 400 men, the objective of both being Guanare, south-east of Trujillo and north-east of Merida. Bolivar reached Guanare on the 1st July, after crushing a detachment of fifty Spaniards as he issued from the mountains on to the plains of Barinas. He had marched by a little-known and difficult pass, by which his arrival was evidently not expected.

On this same 1st July, Ribas,² who had a much longer distance to march, had reached Boconó unopposed, when he heard of a Spanish force 800 strong, under Marti, at Niquitao, between himself and Bolivar. Marti had been sent northwards by Yañez for the special purpose of cutting Bolivar's communications, and at Niquitao he was almost on them. He was in a position either to march on Bolivar's rear, as the latter moved south to meet Tizcar, who was at Barinas, or to move on Barinas, and, united with Tizcar, meet Bolivar in front. Though Ribas had only 400 men, he saw that Marti must at all hazards be destroyed. Marching promptly, he found Marti drawn up at the

¹ O'Leary, i. 151 n.

² Jose Felix Ribas, born in Caracas in 1775 of a noble family, was married to the sister of Bolivar's mother. He was a member of the Junta of Caracas of the 19th April 1810. He raised the battalion "Barlovento," of which he became colonel. In 1812 he is said to have owed a passport, to leave Caracas and accompany Bolivar, to some relationship to Monteverde.

top of a steep ascent, on a plateau much cut up with ravines. The fight lasted nearly all day, from 9 A.M., and Ribas's ammunition was almost exhausted. Then he charged with the bayonet, and completely broke up Marti's force, which was divided and hampered by the very ravines to which it looked for protection. The force was almost entirely destroyed, 450 prisoners were taken and 700 muskets, and Marti himself escaped with difficulty, accompanied by only a few men. Amongst the prisoners were 400 South Americans, whom Ribas promptly drafted into his own force. Meanwhile Bolivar, marching south from Guanare, was within ten miles of Tizcar, at Barinas, before the Spaniard was aware of his movements.

On the 6th July Bolivar entered Barinas, which Tizcar had evacuated, and captured there a quantity of arms, ammunition, supplies of all sorts, and thirteen guns abandoned by Tizcar in his hurried retreat towards the Apure. A force under Girardot, a young Granadian, who had recently beaten the Spaniards at Carache, was sent southwards in pursuit of Tizcar, who hoped to cross the Apure at Nutrias, in order to effect a junction with the Spaniards under Yañez, about Guadalito. He was aware of the destruction of Marti's force by Ribas at Niquitao, and was too weak to continue alone the advance on Merida and Trujillo. Bolivar, in fact, had been completely successful in landing himself in the very midst of the Spanish forces in Western Venezuela before they could concentrate. He had effectually separated Yañez and Tizcar from the forces in the north. Girardot's pursuit of Tizcar was very effectual. The Spanish general, closely followed, found a fresh obstacle in a rising against him of the exasperated inhabitants of Nutrias. Caught between two fires, his force was dispersed, and he himself, almost alone, had to escape by boat down the Apure to S. Fernando.

Bolivar, having disposed of Marti and Tizcar, and having little fear of Yañez for the present, now turned northwards against the two forces remaining in that direction—those of Oberto at Barquisemeto, and of Izquierdo at San Carlos. Before marching, he sent a detachment towards the plains of Calabozo to divert attention in that direction. Leaving a battalion in Barinas to guard his rear, he himself marched, on the 16th July, for San Carlos, at the same time sending Ribas against Oberto at Barquisemeto. Ribas, marching by Tocuyo, came upon Oberto on the 22d July, drawn up in a good position on the plain of Los Horcones, between Tocuyo and Barquisemeto.¹ The Spanish force was particularly strong in the fact that three-fourths of it consisted of European troops, whilst only one-fourth was American. The fight was short but sanguinary. Ribas was at first repulsed, but then, pushing in with the bayonet, completely defeated the enemy, capturing the four guns which he had. Ribas, after occupying Barquisemeto, marched eastwards to rejoin Bolivar. The latter, meanwhile, had reached San Carlos unopposed on the 28th July; for Izquierdo, who had 1500 men, hearing of the ruin of Oberto at Los Horcones, had retired on Valencia. At San Carlos Bolivar remained two days to draw in his detachments and rearguard. On the Spanish side, meanwhile, Monteverde, as already mentioned, had only just escaped capture by Piar at Maturin in the east, and had made his way to Caracas on the 6th July. Hearing of Bolivar's advance, and successively of the defeats of Marti, Tizcar, and Oberto, and of the retreat of Izquierdo, he ordered the last named to hurry to Valencia, whither Monteverde himself went.

Bolivar had apparently already begun to repent of his declaration of war to the death, for at San Carlos he

¹ About midway between Quibor and Barquisemeto.

issued a proclamation to the Spaniards and Canary Islanders offering them terms, and urging them to abandon Monteverde. Bolivar left San Carlos on the 30th July with 2300 men, taking the direction of Tinaquillo, where he heard the royalists were.

On the night of the 30th, Izquierdo camped at Los Pegones, Bolivar about fifteen miles south of him, at Las Palmas. At 2 A.M. Bolivar heard from his cavalry that the enemy was 1000 strong, and about to advance. Forcing the pace, the republican leader, on coming up with the enemy, found him already retreating. The cavalry were sent in pursuit as far as the plain of Los Taguanes, where Izquierdo formed for battle. Bolivar had now to await the arrival of his infantry for the attack. Both forces advanced simultaneously. Bolivar sent his cavalry, which was on his right, to get round Izquierdo's left on the open plain. The latter, seeing himself in danger of being cut from Valencia, began to retreat in good order, which was maintained for six hours. Then a fresh threat of the republican cavalry broke him up, and in the disordered flight which ensued he lost two hundred prisoners, many muskets, and much ammunition. Some of his infantry deserted, many were killed or wounded, and the whole force was almost annihilated. Izquierdo, mortally wounded, fell into Bolivar's hands, and died at San Carlos from his wounds.¹ Monteverde, at Valencia, had only just time to escape to the fortress of Puerto Cabello. So hurried was his flight that even his correspondence was left behind. Amongst it was a letter from Zerberiz, a subordinate commander, in which he calmly advocates leaving alive none of "those infamous creoles who foment these dissensions." On the 2nd August, Bolivar occupied Valencia, whence the road to Caracas was now open. He considered the campaign

¹ Bolivar's report to the Congress of New Granada, dated Valencia, 2nd August 1813. O'Leary, *Docts.* 13, p. 321.

practically over, except for the siege of Puerto Cabello,¹ which could hardly hold out long. Meanwhile, he sent a force under Girardot, who had greatly distinguished himself at Taguanes, to threaten the place and keep Monteverde from breaking out. Then, on the 3rd August, he set out on his march for Caracas, between which and himself there was now no hostile force.

In Caracas the utmost confusion prevailed, for Monteverde was gone to Puerto Cabello, and Fierro the governor had no idea of organising resistance. Instead, he decided to send envoys to Bolivar to treat for a capitulation. On the 4th August, Bolivar reached La Victoria, where he was met by Fierro's envoys, headed by his old friend and benefactor, Don Francisco Iturbe, the man to whom he owed his passport after the surrender of Miranda. The terms eventually agreed upon were as follows² :—

- (1) The inhabitants of Caracas to be allowed to choose their own form of government.
- (2) Security of life and property for all Spaniards, including the garrison, together with the right to a passport to leave Venezuela at any time within two months of the capitulation.
- (3) Surrender to Bolivar of Caracas itself, of La Guaira, and of all other towns in the province.
- (4) The capitulation to be sent to Monteverde at Puerto Cabello for ratification within twenty-four hours.

The envoys returned to Caracas with the capitulation, only to find that, in their absence, there had been a regular stampede of the Spanish authorities and their sympathisers, headed by Fierro himself. Altogether, it was said, some six thousand persons had followed Fierro to La Guaira, without waiting to see what terms would

¹ *Idem.*

² O'Leary, *Docts.* 13, p. 325.

be granted by the victor. Many of them had embarked there and left the country, or gone to Puerto Cabello. After all, the terms were at least as good as could be expected under the circumstances. Fierro's action in thus leaving the capital at the mercy of the mob must certainly be condemned. He had not even ratified the terms of the capitulation arranged by his emissaries. Doubtless his flight was largely due to fear of the enforcement of Bolivar's decision as to the "guerra à muerte," of which, as we have said, he had already shown signs of repentance.

On the 6th August, Bolivar and his troops entered Caracas in triumph, the commander being for the first time saluted by the populace with the title of "Liberator." On all sides he was surrounded by crowds shouting, "Long live our Liberator; Long live New Granada; Long live the Saviour of Venezuela." Wreaths of laurels and of flowers were offered in profusion, salutes were fired, bands played, and everyone treated Bolivar as a sort of tutelary deity of Venezuela. Much incense has, of course, been burnt at the shrine by Venezuelan writers in describing the events of this day. To others it may seem doubtful how far all this enthusiasm and flattery was genuine.

However sweet the plaudits may have sounded to Bolivar, he had much to do to set things in order after the disappearance of all semblance of government with Fierro and his officials. After re-establishing order, and providing for the safety of the public offices, magazines, and parks, which had been left unguarded, and in some cases had been partially pillaged, he issued the proclamation which was always made wherever he arrived under similar circumstances. In it he announced the re-incarnation of the republic under the auspices of the Congress of New Granada.¹ He invited foreigners to settle in the

¹ O'Leary, *Docts.* 13, p. 332. It is dated 8th August 1813, iii. of Independence.

country, offering them full protection and safety, which it was certainly beyond his power at this time to guarantee.¹ Then he appointed secretaries to the different departments, and drew out a scheme for the provisional government. Tomas Montilla² was Secretary for War, R. D. Merida Secretary for Justice and Police, whilst A. M. Tebar held the portfolios of the "State" department, and, temporarily, of finance. Cristóbal Mendoza was made governor of Caracas, and Ribas military commandant. Lastly, Bolivar organised a Commission, consisting largely of Spaniards, whose mission was to proceed to Puerto Cabello and demand Monteverde's ratification of the capitulation of La Victoria.

Having made all these arrangements, he issued, on the 9th August, another proclamation convoking an assembly of the chief inhabitants to discuss and settle the form of government to be instituted, and to appoint officials to carry on the administration meanwhile. It concluded with the words: "The Liberator of Venezuela renounces for ever, and formally declines to accept, any authority except that of leading our soldiers to danger, in order to save the Fatherland."³ This was Bolivar's first resignation of authority, a resignation which it is difficult to suppose was intended to be accepted. We shall find many more instances, in the course of this history, of similar resignations at critical periods, which, like the present one, were not accepted, and were probably never intended to be so.

On the 10th August the Commission to Monteverde was despatched from Valencia to Puerto Cabello, preceded by a letter to him signed by the Commissioners them-

¹ *Ibid.*, p. 342.

² A native of Caracas. Member of the Junta of 1810. Accompanied Bolivar to Cartagena, and followed him in many actions, besides gaining several himself. Died in Caracas, 1822.

³ O'Leary, *Docts.* 13, p. 343.

selves, amongst them being Salvador García de Ortigosa, a Spanish priest.

It will be remembered that Fierro had sent envoys to negotiate a capitulation, but he had certainly not authorised them to ratify it when concluded. When they returned to Caracas with it, Fierro was gone, and there was no one to approve it before it was sent to Monteverde. This was admitted in the letter, which concluded with a demand for a safe conduct for *parlementaires*. No answer was vouchsafed to this or two subsequent letters till the 12th August, when a brief reply was received from Monteverde. He denied the authority of Fierro or the Cabildo of Caracas to negotiate a capitulation,¹ and held as void all acts done under their assumed authority. He added—"and I can never assent to proposals unbefitting the character and spirit of the great and generous nation of which I am a servant." Further correspondence resulted in no change of Monteverde's defiant and uncompromising attitude, notwithstanding Bolívar's warning to him that his ratification of the capitulation was the only way to save the lives of the thousands of prisoners now in the power of the republicans. Perhaps Monteverde did not believe in a wholesale massacre of all these unhappy people, who numbered some four thousand in Caracas and La Guaira. The last-named place had surrendered after the escape from it by sea of Fierro and his friends, as Monteverde was aware from a statement in the letter of the Commissioners. He was running a fearful risk for these unfortunate people, but he was not a man to care much for such risks, and it cannot be doubted that he fully appreciated the immense importance to Bolívar of obtaining ratification of a document which practically put Monteverde out of court.

¹ When Monteverde was compelled, by Izquierdo's defeat, to make for Puerto Cabello, he had sent orders to Fierro to defend the capital (Restrepo, ii. 159).

His reply was certainly, it seems, a proper one, for Fierro had evidently exceeded any powers he could possibly pretend to have as Governor of Caracas. Had Bolivar appeared before Puerto Cabello with all his force, except so much of it as was absolutely necessary to keep order in Caracas; had he threatened to storm the fortress, backing his threat with sufficient force, Monteverde might possibly have thought otherwise. His decision was, perhaps, largely based on his knowledge that Bolivar was far away at Caracas, busy issuing proclamations and doing other things which could quite well have waited till matters were more settled. Monteverde was also expecting reinforcements, with the aid of which he would be able to drive off the weak observing force of Girardot. Larrazabal objects to Torrente's¹ criticism, on these lines, of Bolivar's action, but it seems to us justified. Bolivar, in fact, was committing the old fault of attending to minor matters before effecting the annihilation of the enemy's armed forces.

His position was none too strong. He held, it is true, Caracas, Valencia, La Guaira, and many other towns; he had so far been victorious in every action with the Spaniards since he left Cartagena; he knew of the successful advance of Mariño and Piar in the eastern districts. Nevertheless, there were many causes of anxiety on the other side. In his advance from Trujillo, Bolivar had beaten Tizcar, Marti, Oberto, and Izquierdo, but had left untouched the force of Yañez beyond the Apure; Monteverde, blockaded in Puerto Cabello by an insufficient force, was still a danger in the probable event of his receiving reinforcements from Cuba and Puerto Rico. The province of Coró was unsubdued, and still strongly royalist, and the case was the same in Maracaibo. Guayana also was untouched, and, with its opening to the sea, and continuous

¹ Torrente, i. p. 415.

water communication by the Orinoco, with its supplies of food, and its recruiting area amongst the wild cowboys of the vast plains, was a splendid base for royalist operations. Into it had escaped Cajigal, when he weakly abandoned hope before the advance of Piar on Barcelona. But one of his lieutenants, Boves, had insisted on staying behind, when Cajigal retired to Angostura, with the object of organising forces on the north bank of the Orinoco. Of him there will be much to be said shortly. Lastly, though Bolivar might expect to be aided in the common cause by the victorious republicans in the east, he soon found them a very broken reed. Whilst Bolivar was conquering western Venezuela and setting himself up as Dictator there, Mariño and Piar had been almost equally successful in the east. The former had proclaimed himself Dictator of the Eastern Provinces, and was not in the least inclined to cede the supremacy to Bolivar. After all, there was no special reason why he should do so. He and his companions had started their conquests before Bolivar left New Granada, and they had done almost as much as he had. It was not as if Bolivar had previously exercised supreme command; for in Miranda's time his position had been distinctly subordinate, and, as we have said, it is by no means improbable that it was that very fact which induced Monteverde to let him slip through his fingers in 1812.

In addition to all these dangers, it is necessary to take account of the fact that the principles of the revolution had as yet taken no deep root amongst the general population, who would probably have submitted again willingly to Spanish rule if only the Spanish officials and the Spanish Government could have made up their minds to treat bygones as bygones, and to conciliate public opinion by reasonable clemency, and the in-

roduction of decent government. Even Larrazabal writes of this period: "The well-informed party in Venezuela, the rich, the illustrious, sought independence and sacrificed themselves for liberty; but the people, no!"¹ He admits that, with the return to power of the royalists in the end of 1812, the country generally had declared emphatically for the King. The people were weary of the massacres by the royalists and the retaliations of the republicans. Peace was their great desire, and they would accept any government which could give it.

Bolívar ordered a close blockade of Puerto Cabello, and wrote to Mariño for help. Meanwhile, he freely confiscated the property of Spaniards and Canary Islanders. On the 16th August he marched, at last, for Puerto Cabello. The moment he turned his back on Caracas, the slaves and Spaniards in the valley of the Tuy broke into a revolt, which was only partially put down by Francisco Montilla. Arrived at Valencia, Bolívar thought it necessary to divide his forces. He sent Tomas Montilla with 600 men towards Calabozo, where Boves was organising a force; another 600 were sent, under Ramon García de Sena, against Reyes Vargas and the priest Torrellas, who had 1000 men towards Coró. These two detachments of republicans were presently to unite and march against Yañez, who, operating from Apure, was preparing to reconquer Barinas. Bolívar himself, marching to Puerto Cabello, succeeded in taking the outlying forts and confining Monteverde to the fortress itself. In one of these fights was captured Zuazola, a Spanish commander, whose cruelties had made him specially obnoxious to the republicans. Bolívar offered Zuazola in exchange for Jalon, one of his own officers, a captive in Monteverde's hands, but the Spaniard refused, saying he would

¹ Larrazabal, i. 237.

kill two creoles for every Spaniard executed.¹ Zuazola was hanged, in full view of the garrison of the fortress, and Jalon was spared! On the 16th September news both good and bad reached Bolivar. The good news was that Garcia de Sena had defeated Reyes Vargas, the bad that Monteverde had received, by sea from Puerto Rico, a reinforcement of 1300 men under Colonel Salomon. That commander had narrowly escaped capture at La Guaira, where he at first proposed to land, believing it to be still in Spanish hands. When he reached the port, on the 13th September, the republicans had hoisted the Spanish flag for the purpose of deceiving Salomon, who entered the port without suspicion, and was just about to disembark when he discovered the ruse. He was fortunate enough to be able to sail again for Puerto Cabello, though not without some loss in ships and men from the fire of the fortress. The means by which the republicans almost succeeded in luring Salomon to destruction, smacked somewhat of those of Murat at Prenzlau—indeed were rather worse.

On the night of the 17th September, Bolivar, raising the siege of Puerto Cabello, fell back on Valencia. Larrazabal would have us believe he did so because he could operate better in the open country, owing to his superiority in cavalry, but we need not hesitate to believe that his real motive was fear of a sortie by the reinforced garrison. Monteverde promptly issued from Puerto Cabello, leading an advance guard of 500 men of his own troops, and leaving Salomon to follow. The latter had raised objections to serving under an upstart like Monteverde,² and, as Salomon had all the best of the troops now in Puerto Cabello, Monteverde had to be content with his promise, somewhat reluctantly given, to

¹ Larrazabal, i. 215.

² Salomon was a gentleman of humane disposition. Monteverde was neither one nor the other.

follow with the "Granada" regiment of Spaniards. He appears to have taken his time, and was possibly by no means unwilling to see Monteverde checked. Anyhow, when Monteverde came up with Bolivar's rearguard at Bárbula, near Naguanagua, Salomon was halting many miles behind him. Bolivar had intended to fall back through Valencia to the famous position of La Cabrera on the road to Caracas, and had already got Urdaneta's division at Valencia, when he was aware of the presence of Monteverde's 500 men on the heights of Bárbula.¹ At first, he would only believe that this was an advance guard a short distance in front of the main body, thrown out to tempt him to a rash attack. It was only on the 30th September, after reconnoitring for two days, that he found out the true position of affairs.

Monteverde, rashly as he had hazarded himself by his advance, was now too much alarmed to allow himself to be provoked into a descent on to the plain of Naguanagua in front of him. Bolivar, having now brought back Urdaneta from Valencia, proceeded to attack the heights in three columns, under Girardot, Urdaneta, and d'Elhuyar, respectively. His cavalry was useless on the steep slopes leading to Monteverde's position. However, his infantry so vastly outnumbered that of Monteverde that the Spaniards, after firing a single volley, took to their heels. Girardot was killed by a musket ball in the moment of victory, and though there was nothing particularly remarkable in his death, Bolivar chose to make it the subject of a glowing panegyric, and, a little later, took the dead man's heart to Caracas, where it was buried with an extraordinary amount of ceremony and pomp. Bolivar, like Napoleon, loved a theatrical display, but, in this instance, there was a good deal of method in his display. He desired, no doubt, to

¹ Bárbula and Naguanagua, not shown on the map, are about half way between Puerto Cabello and Valencia.

raise the spirits of his followers generally, and especially to conciliate the Granadians by the posthumous honours showered upon one of themselves.¹

The night of the 30th September was spent by the victors at Naguanagua, and next morning d'Elhuyar was taken forward by Bolivar with only 1000 men against Salomon and Monteverde at Las Trincheras, the rest of the troops remaining where they were. This division of his forces by Bolivar was hardly less rash than Monteverde's unsupported advance on the other side. He had not learnt that in war it is impossible to be too strong at the decisive point. Nevertheless, the result was different, for d'Elhuyar's division, all Granadians, were burning to avenge the death of Girardot, and, when they reached Salomon's and Monteverde's strong position at Las Trincheras, they attacked with fury. After five hours of desperate fighting, the royalist defence was broken down and the whole force fell back in disorder to Puerto Cabello, losing many men, arms, and stores of all sorts. Monteverde was severely wounded in the jaw during the retreat, and was now once more shut up in Puerto Cabello, where his wound compelled him to yield the command to Salomon. The blockading force was left in charge of d'Elhuyar,² whose victory of Las Trincheras was extremely creditable to him and his men; for it was gained over a force composed largely of picked European troops, and, if they did not number as many as the 2000 that Larrazabal gives them, they must have at least equalled the attacking force.

¹ The memory of Girardot is preserved in the town, named after him, from which the railway from the Magdalena to Bogota now starts. Hard by is the river port of Ricaurte, commemorating another young Granadian, whose death, to be recounted presently, was far more heroic.

² D'Elhuyar was with Bolivar up to 1815. He was drowned in a shipwreck in that year when returning to Cartagena to take part in its defence against Morillo. He had recently left it in consequence of the intrigues then at their height there.

Bolívar found Salomon a more reasonable person to deal with than Monteverde ; for, when Father Ortigosa was sent to propose an exchange of the prisoners taken at Bárbula and Las Trincheras against republicans in Puerto Cabello, on equal terms, Salomon agreed, and did not even except Jalon, whom Monteverde had so recently threatened to hang. Monteverde had refused an exchange of two Spaniards for each republican offered by Bolívar before Salomon's arrival.

The Spaniards had begun to recover from their defeats in the east and west within a month of Bolívar's arrival at Caracas early in August, and now he, in his central position, saw himself threatened by several forces acting concentrically. They were as follows :—

(1) Royalist guerillas were committing depredations, in Maracaibo and towards Cúcuta, on the communications with New Granada.

(2) Rosete was ravaging the valley of the Tuy to the south-east of Caracas.

(3) In the Orinoco plains, south and south-west of Caracas, Boves and Morales were raising royalist forces and harrying the country towards Calabozo.

(4) Yañez, on the Upper Apure, was threatening Barinas.

On the 13th October, Bolívar was back in Caracas, where he was again saluted as "Liberator," a title which was confirmed by acclamation of an assembly of the principal inhabitants convoked by the Cabildo. This title Bolívar retained to the end of his life ; it was always used in official documents, and by it he is generally remembered in South America to this day. The title, in 1813, was rather a dangerous one, however flattering it might be to Bolívar's vanity. He was quick to see that his personal elevation over the heads of men like Urdaneta, Ribas, d'Elhuyar, Piar, and Mariño, who had played so large a part in recent events, was calculated

to excite amongst them feelings of jealousy and dissatisfaction, and might give ground for suspicion that the Liberator was aiming at a royal crown for himself. Though in the eyes of some Venezuelan writers it would be treason to say so, it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that it was by these considerations that Bolivar was influenced in his creation of the "Order of Liberators," which was freely conferred on everyone of any distinction amongst the republican leaders. Mark that the name of the order was "of Liberators," not of "the Liberator," a distinction clearly calculated to imply disavowal of any monarchical ambitions.¹ Nevertheless, Bolivar himself remained *par excellence* "The Liberator." The first members of the Order were Ribas, Urdaneta, d'Elhuyar and Ortega (both the latter being Granadians), and Campo Elias, a Spaniard who had embraced the republican cause with such insane vehemence that he vowed to kill every other Spaniard in the country, and then to destroy himself as the last of them !

¹ The inscription on the obverse of the badge of the Order was "Liberator of Venezuela," and on the reverse was engraved the name of the holder.

CHAPTER V

THE SECOND DOWNFALL OF VENEZUELA, 1813-14

BOLIVAR'S position, in the centre of a circle of enemies standing at various distances, most of them considerable, from him, should have impressed upon him that safety lay in keeping his forces united, and falling in succession upon his adversaries, beginning with the nearest, Rosete. Instead of that, he committed the fatal mistake of dividing his troops. Urdaneta was sent westwards with one force to gather in the troops of García de Sena and those at San Carlos for operations against Ceballos, the Spanish commander in Coró, and later against Yañez. At the same time, Campo Elías was sent southwards towards Calabozo, to deal with Boves and Morales, who had destroyed Montilla's force at Calabozo. About this time also, Bolívar wrote to Mariño, the Dictator of the East, inviting him to a conference at Caracas for the arrangement of the mutual position of the two leaders. But before Mariño could possibly arrive, if he were willing to come, Bolívar found himself called away from the capital by news of disasters. The force of García de Sena, now commanded by Valdés in consequence of the illness of García, had been beaten at Yaritagua, not far from Barquisemeto, by Ceballos, issuing from Coró with 1300 men. Shortly before, another republican commander, Aldao, had suffered defeat at Bobare, west of Barquisemeto. At the same time Yañez, who had reorganised his forces

at San Fernando on the Apure, marched upon Nutrias with 2500 men, inflicting defeats there, and at Guanare, Obispo, and other places on republican parties. At Barinas he had executed the governor, and had his body cut up into small pieces. He was rapidly approaching Ceballos, and the united forces threatened disaster to the besiegers of Puerto Cabello, and to Valencia.

Against these misfortunes must be set a victory gained on the 14th October by Campo Elias, at Mosquitero,¹ over Boves. Unfortunately, however, this converted Spaniard had done the republican cause more harm than good by massacring the American prisoners as well as the Spaniards, and treating the whole country side with the utmost ferocity. Bolivar would have enlisted the Americans in his own army; for, in his proclamation of war to the death, he was careful to exempt Americans.² The great danger was, therefore, for the moment, in the west. Bolivar accordingly marched to the rescue of Urdaneta, who was encamped at Gamelotal on the slope of the Altar mountain, facing Barquisemeto. Bolivar, sending a battalion ahead to reinforce Urdaneta, marched as rapidly as possible with the rest of his force. On the 10th November he was within three miles of Barquisemeto, at Cabudare. In front of him was the victorious Ceballos, barring the advance of Urdaneta into the province of Coró. Bolivar at once attacked, and, after two hours' fighting, Ceballos was forced to retire on the Carora road. But, in the midst of the pursuit, some one sounded the retreat on the republican side. Panic resulted, as a report got about that Ceballos' retirement was merely a stratagem to draw his enemy

¹ Mosquitero is not shown on the map. It is on the left bank of the R. Guarico, north of Calabozo, about three-fourths of the way from that place to Sombrero.

² Nevertheless, Bolivar, on the 6th September, had issued a decree of death against all Americans joining the Spaniards in revolt (Restrepo, ii. 182).

into an ambuscade. Bolivar's men took to their heels, hotly pursued, and were only saved from utter disaster by the fortunate presence on the river Cabudare of a squadron of cavalry, which charged the pursuers and covered the republican retreat. This stopped Ceballos' pursuit, but Bolivar and Urdaneta, when they succeeded in rallying their troops on the Altar mountain, found they had been so badly beaten as to necessitate retirement to San Carlos in order to refit. It was also clear that there was nothing now to hinder the junction of Yañez and Ceballos, so Bolivar returned to Valencia to bring up reinforcements. Not only did the two Spaniards unite, but Ceballos urged Salomon to break out of Puerto Cabello and join them, either at Barquisemeto or San Carlos, marching by San Felipe and Nirgua. Salomon accordingly issued, on the 16th November, with 1000 men, and had reached the heights of Vigirima, on the road to Valencia, where he encountered Ribas with 500 men, chiefly students whom he had collected in Caracas, now practically denuded of troops. Bolivar, who had directed Ribas to hurry up with everything he could collect, now joined him with the troops from Valencia. On the morning of the 23rd November, Bolivar endeavoured, by four hours of firing, to provoke Salomon into a descent to the plain in front of him. He failed, and was equally unsuccessful on the 24th. On the 25th he changed his tactics, and sent Lamprea to seize some heights covering Salomon's left wing, whilst d'Elhuyar acted similarly on the opposite flank. These points appear to have been weakly held, for both were captured by midday, whilst Bolivar, advancing against the centre, withdrew Salomon's attention from his flanks. Seeing his position threatened on both flanks, Salomon, under cover of darkness, withdrew again to Puerto Cabello. Probably he would have had a better chance of success had he followed Ceballos'

suggestion of marching on San Felipe, instead of into the heart of Bolivar's army towards Valencia. His idea was to march by Guacara to the valley of the Aragua, or, at any rate, to divert attention from Ceballos and Yañez.

Bolivar now returned to Valencia to prepare for the campaign against Ceballos and Yañez. He ordered Campo Elias to leave a force to contain the royalists towards Calabozo, and to bring the rest towards San Carlos.¹ On the 28th November, Bolivar marched for San Carlos, where, on the 1st December, he found himself in command of 3000 men. He could get no information in a country which was now once more entirely royalist, and, believing Ceballos to be at Barquisemeto, he made for that place. On the way, he heard that Yañez had seized Araure on his left rear, and Ceballos also had moved thither. He at once turned back in that direction after them, leaving some cavalry to protect his communications with San Carlos against raids by the royalist guerillas who swarmed in the country. Passing the river Coyede on the 3rd December, he was before Araure on the 4th, in sight of the 3500 men of Yañez and Ceballos. On the morning of the 5th, they were gone, and Bolivar sent Manrique to regain contact with them with the advance guard and 400 cavalry. Manrique, who had orders not to hazard an attack, discovered Ceballos drawn up at the foot of some wooded heights, his front covered by a lake, and his flanks protected by woods. Disregarding his orders, Manrique attacked, with the result that he was utterly defeated before Bolivar's arrival with the main body. When Bolivar came up, he renewed the battle. Part of his cavalry had some success against Ceballos' infantry, but the rest was already broken by infantry and artillery fire when Bolivar saved the situation with the infantry,

¹ Campo Elias had had 2500 men in his battle with Boves at Mosquitero.

and completely defeated the Spaniards, who dispersed with the loss of 300 prisoners, the whole of their 10 guns, a quantity of supplies, and 1000 killed and wounded. Amongst Bolivar's troops on this day was one battalion composed of the remains of the infantry who had fled at the recent battle of Barquisemeto. By way of emphasising his disapproval of their conduct, Bolivar had dubbed them the "Nameless Battalion" ("Batallon sin Nombre"). At Araure they redeemed their reputation by their gallantry, and were rewarded with a name, that of the "Victor of Araure" ("Vencedor de Araure"). Amongst their opponents was the battalion "Numancia," which Yañez had organised at San Fernando, entirely of Venezuelans.

After his victory, Bolivar fixed his headquarters at La Aparicion de la Corteza, sent back his spoils to San Carlos, despatched columns to recapture Barinas, Barquisemeto, and other places, and himself went to Valencia, which he reached on the evening of the 8th December. On the 20th, he visited the besieging force in front of Puerto Cabello, returning thence to Valencia, and again reaching Caracas on the 29th to prepare for operations in the south against Boves and Morales.

Here, in reply to the compliments of his officials on his recent successes, he uttered words which were decidedly premature in their optimism. He spoke of having already avenged Venezuela, of having prostrated the best army which had aimed at her enslavement, and went on to state his views of the necessity of going on to liberate, not only Venezuela, but the whole of Spanish America, and of creating a united American nation in Venezuela, New Granada, Quito, and Peru. Again, Larrazabal admits that, "it was necessary to liberate America by creating a public opinion which did not exist."¹ To the Congress of New Granada, Bolivar

¹ Larrazabal, I. 246.

wrote, reporting his successes, and asserting that "the independence of Venezuela is assured." Again, in instructions to his Secretary for Foreign Affairs, he puts forward his desire for the union of Venezuela and New Granada as one nation, a scheme which he steadily pursued to the end of his life, only to die seeing its defeat by the separation of the two. The scheme was never really practicable; the differences of character of the two populations were too great, the area of the two countries was too vast for management by a single government, and the jealousies of the leading men of either were a bar fatal to it. At this particular time the chief supporter in New Granada of Bolivar's scheme of union was Camilo Torres.¹

Bolivar, at Caracas in December 1813, had a difficult political position to deal with amongst his own countrymen. Openly opposed to a Federal government, as unsuitable to the circumstances of a people struggling to throw off a foreign yoke, he had set up a provisional government, which was practically nothing but an absolute autocracy, with Bolivar himself at its head as Dictator. No one else had any real power, though there were many hungering for it. Under these circumstances, it is not in the least surprising that there should have been a rapid spread of hostility to Bolivar, and of intrigue against him. It was not from the lower classes that he had to fear opposition, for they had no politics. His opponents were men of his own class, the wealthy and influential creoles, who, one and all, with true South American vanity, considered themselves at least equal in ability to Bolivar, whose advancement they envied and resented, feeling that, under him, they were in no better position than they had been under the Spanish rulers. His admirers boast that his absolute rule had been blameless and excellent. But there were certainly abuses under it.

¹ Larrazabal, p. 249.

Ducoudray-Holstein, a prejudiced witness certainly, says there were many complaints of Bolivar's behaviour as an absolute sovereign ; of his following of his own caprices ; of the influence over him enjoyed by his mistress and other women, who distributed appointments in many cases ; of his disorganisation of the finances ; of his neglect of the army, which was in a very poor state ; and, finally, of his persistent evasion of demands for the assembly of a congress. Probably, too, his proposed union of Venezuela with New Granada was unpopular in Venezuela, whose people were as jealous of New Granada as the latter country was of them.

Aware of the strength of the feeling against him, Bolivar sought to appease it by summoning, for the 1st July 1814, a general meeting of the principal people of Caracas, with the greater part of the population in the streets outside as a background, and perhaps a threat.

This meeting Bolivar addressed at length,¹ vaunting his achievements and those of his companions-in-arms towards the liberation of the country. Having made the most of this, he proposed to resign his power into the hands of representatives of the people. No one ventured to propose acceptance of this offer, and only those spoke who were prepared to advocate Bolivar's retention of supreme power. That he had any intention that his offer should be accepted few will be ready to believe. This device of a resignation tendered, often with repeated protests of its finality, but without any intention that it should be accepted, became almost a habit with Bolivar, often his trump card. In the present case, it was certain that the best hopes of the republic lay in his retention of power. Whilst accepting this popular confirmation of his position, Bolivar had the good sense to refuse a proposal to erect a statue of himself at Caracas.

Before proceeding to describe his next campaign, some

¹ O'Leary, *Docts.*, xiii. p. 410.

mention may be made of the fate of Monteverde when he retired wounded to Puerto Cabello, after the defeat of Las Trincheras. He was, he found, out of favour with the Spanish Junta, which had been set up in the city, and presently he found himself compelled to resign his command. At the close of 1813, he embarked for Curaçao. According to Baralt and Restrepo, he sailed thence direct for Spain, but Larrazabal¹ affirms that he returned to Venezuela when the Spanish arms were again successful, and did not leave for Spain till the 7th July 1816. He appears to be right, for his statement is supported by quotation of a letter from Monteverde, dated Maiquetia, 29th October 1815. However, as Monteverde took no important part in Venezuelan affairs after December 1813, the matter is of no importance.

To Monteverde as Captain-General succeeded Cajigal, a Spanish gentleman, humane, and moderate, who, in 1812, might have been successful in pacifying the country, but was too much of a diplomat, and too little of the rough soldier, for these later days.

The new enemy, whom Bolivar was about to meet to the south of Caracas, requires some description.

With all due allowance for South American exaggeration, it is impossible not to regard José Tomas Boves as one of the most atrocious ruffians who have ever disgraced any country. Born in Spain, at Gijon, about 1770, and then surnamed Rodriguez, he was in early life a pilot. Then he emigrated to Venezuela, where he became half pirate, half smuggler, and, in 1809, was sentenced at Puerto Cabello as a "sea-robber" ("ladron del mar"). Thanks to the kindly intervention of two Spanish gentlemen, his imprisonment was commuted to simple detention at Calabozo, in the plains between the Orinoco and the northern hill tract of Venezuela. At the outbreak of the revolution in 1810, he changed his

¹ I. 252.

name to Boves, and joined the insurgents. Getting again into prison, he quarrelled with his friends, and transferred his services to the royalists, who had released him in 1812. He raised a body of cavalry and turned bandit in the King's interest—and his own. It was he who raised the insurrection of the negro slaves in 1812. When Bolivar entered Caracas in 1813, Boves joined Cajigal, the Spanish commander in the east, at Barcelona, and marched with him for Guayana, before the advance of Mariño and Piar. But, instead of crossing the Orinoco with Cajigal, he persuaded that commander to leave him to collect forces amongst the inhabitants of the plains, with whom his residence at Calabozo had rendered him familiar.

These "Llaneros,"¹ as they were called, were a half wild, uncivilised race, largely of mixed Spanish and Indian blood, living widely scattered in solitary huts, or in small groups of huts. They were cattle-breeders by occupation, subsisting mainly on the flesh of their herds, often unseasoned even with salt, which was scarce in these inland plains. The cattle being practically wild, had, when required for use, either to be lassoed, or else ridden down on horseback, and cast by a dexterous twist of the tail, which was a special accomplishment of the Llaneros. As a consequence of this necessity, the Llaneros were also breeders of horses, which they rode magnificently. They were skilled in the use of a long spear, which they wielded lying along the near side of the horse, thus affording practically no mark above the animal for an enemy to aim at. They were capable of being made into a very terrible cavalry of an extremely irregular type. To reckless bravery they added absolute ignorance and illiteracy. To discipline generally they were entire strangers, and it was only when one of themselves, a man such as Paez, of whom

¹ "Llano" in Spanish, a plain. "Llanero," a plainsman.

much will be heard presently, was able by a strong personality to take the lead, that they could be commanded at all. Naturally, to such men it was of very little consequence whether the government at Caracas was represented by Monteverde on behalf of Spain, or by Bolivar the Dictator of the Republic. Neither monarchy nor republic could do much good, or much harm, to men living under these conditions, having no property beyond the cattle and horses which they alone could manage, and scattered over vast plains, covered with long grass and seamed with rivers, watercourses, and morasses, in the midst of which they could defy pursuit by any punitive force. Under ordinary circumstances, they had no special predilection for or object in fighting ; but they were as susceptible as any other half-civilised race to the attractions of plunder, and it was this motive which alone, for the present at least, could enlist them on either side. They had nothing to gain in the way of liberty, of which they enjoyed as much as they could desire. They had the strongest objection to leaving their native plains. So long, then, as the Spaniards held the towns in the Orinoco valley, Angostura, San Fernando, and a few others, and were the only known authority, the republicans could look for no help from these people, who cared as little for them as for the Spaniards.

Boves, starting on the collection of his force, was a man quite ready to offer to the Llaneros great prospects of plunder, unhindered by any scruples on the part of the commander. His previous career raises a presumption against any tenderness of conscience on his part. He was, moreover, a perfect monster of cruelty, who seemed to delight in useless bloodshed for its own sake. Stories innumerable are told of his ferocity. Briceño Mendez relates that Boves was in the habit of tying his victims to posts, and exposing them naked to the rays of the tropical sun and the torment of

tropical insects, often aggravated by a previous flogging, which left the wretched creatures a mass of sores on which the flies settled. There the poor wretches were left, so far as Boves was concerned, to die of hunger and thirst. One other famous story of his brutality may be related. He had ordered the decapitation of an old and harmless prisoner, not even a soldier, when the man's son, a mere boy, fell at Boves' feet, imploring mercy for his father. "Will you," was the reply, "submit to have your ears and nose cut off, in order to save your father's life?" The boy accepted, and bore unflinchingly this terrible torture. All that Boves did was to order both father and son to be beheaded, the one as a rebel, the other as a potential enemy.

On the other hand, to give Boves what little credit is due to him, he was, considering his opportunities, an able leader. On his own followers he imposed an iron discipline in the field, treating cowardice or disobedience amongst them with the same severity which he meted out to the enemy. His courage was admitted by friends and enemies alike. Wherever the fighting was most desperate there was Boves to be found, dealing death on all sides and exposing himself without a shadow of fear. Such a man had little difficulty in gathering round him, besides the savage Llaneros, every ruffian and jail-bird in the country. So desperate and depraved were his men that even the Spaniards nicknamed them the "Infernal Division."

His second in command was Tomas Morales, a naval adventurer like Monteverde, but far more of a savage than the other. In this respect he ran a fair second to Boves. Each has characterised the other. Of Morales, Boves said that he was 'atrocious,' whilst, after Boves' death, Morales said of him that he was, "a man of merit, but too bloodthirsty!" Arcades ambo!

Boves had, as already mentioned, destroyed the force which Bolivar had sent against him under Montilla in August 1813. He had subsequently been heavily defeated by Campo Elias at Mosquitero. Now, at the close of 1813, he was threatening the valley of the Aragua and Caracas itself with a force of 4000 men from Calabozo.

Bolivar, earnestly appealing to Mariño for help, went off to visit the siege works in front of Puerto Cabello, which he reached on the 16th January 1814. There he learned that Mariño's jealousy had prompted him to stop his westward march, and even to order away the small squadron under Piar, which was blockading the place by sea. With difficulty Piar was persuaded not to sail away, whilst Bolivar made a fresh appeal to Mariño. In it he recognised Mariño as "Dictator of the East," a move which at last induced that vain young man to march, though too slowly and too late to save the situation.¹

Boves was now at Calabozo, whilst news came in that Yañez, recovering from his defeat at Araure, had collected 2000 Llaneros on the Apure, and had retaken Barinas, from which Garcia de Sena had unaccountably retired. Yañez had massacred the survivors of the garrison of 120 men which had been left in the place. Garcia, without any attempt at fighting, retired through the difficult gorges of Merida to Trujillo, losing most of his men by hardship or desertion on the way. There he left the remnants of his force, and himself fled to Valencia. Yañez, having taken Barinas, laid siege to Ospino, of which the small garrison refused to surrender. A chance shot in a skirmish put an end to Yañez on the 2nd February. His body, falling into the hands of the enemy, was torn to pieces by the townspeople in their fury. To him succeeded Calzada, who from a private soldier in 1810 had now risen to be lieutenant-colonel, a

¹ O'Leary, Documents, 13, p. 426.

man of the stamp of Boves and of Yañez himself. Re-assembling the troops which had fled on the death of Yañez, Calzada returned to Ospino, which he took and burned. Again advancing, he took Araure and threatened San Carlos. The whole country in this direction was infested by royalist bandits.

As a final blow to the republican cause, came the news that Boves, advancing from Calabozo, had encountered Campo Elías at La Puerta and completely defeated him. Boves, who had been severely wounded, in order to secure the fruits of his victory, pushed forward Rosete, with a strong column, into the valley of the Tuy, where Ocumare¹ was taken and sacked, many of its inhabitants being massacred. Rosete, like many of the Spanish leaders, was of low origin, being in fact in 1812 the keeper of a miserable tavern. It was men of this stamp who were responsible for many of the Spanish cruelties. Amongst the higher classes there was no doubt cruelty, but some of them, men of the stamp of Cajigal or Salomon, could not be accused of such atrocities.

The news of Boves' victory filled Caracas with horror and consternation. Bolivar, almost alone, retained hope. The news reached him when he was in front of Puerto Cabello. He at once hastened to Valencia with a large part of the besieging troops, ordered the fortification of the already famous position of La Cabrera, and placed it in charge of Campo Elías, who had reached Valencia after his defeat at La Puerta. To Ribas at La Victoria Bolivar sent instructions for his conduct as advanced guard, and to Urdaneta in the west he wrote to hurry up the pick of his division. Bolivar himself, with all the troops he could collect, marched to meet the new and terrible enemy. He could expect no help, at present, from

¹ South by east from Caracas. To be carefully distinguished from Ocumare de la Costa, a port between La Guaira and Puerto Cabello.

Mariño, who was marching slowly from Barcelona at the end of January 1814.

On the 12th February, Boves, with his army of Llaneros and ruffians, fell furiously upon Ribas at Victoria, which was prepared for defence. The fighting raged for hours with the utmost desperation. The houses and the streets were converted into a veritable shambles, deluged with the blood of royalists and republicans. By four o'clock in the afternoon the outnumbered patriots had been driven into the centre of the town, and their end seemed to be at hand, when suddenly a cloud of dust was seen in the west. It indicated the approach of Campo Elias with his troops from La Cabrera. Sending on an advance guard under Montilla, Campo Elias followed as quickly as possible, and attacked Boves with such fury that in an hour Victoria was cleared and Boves driven back in disorder on to the neighbouring heights. He is said to have lost 1000 men. He now received reinforcements from Cura during the night.

In the morning of the 13th Ribas, his men encouraged by their success of the previous day, assumed the offensive, driving Boves from his position and capturing guns, muskets, ammunition, and large quantities of supplies. Prisoners there were none, for quarter was not given when the fierce Campo Elias was present.

This victory was everywhere announced to the patriots with the greatest satisfaction, and Bolivar, in a proclamation, awarded unstinted praise to Ribas and his men. The Liberator now used part of Ribas' force to observe Boves, whilst the general himself was sent with the rest against Rosete, who had fortified himself in Yare, near Ocumare in the Tuy valley. Ribas executed his mission with complete success, putting Rosete to flight and reoccupying Ocumare. The streets of that town exhibited a ghastly spectacle, for they were strewn with the dead and dying inhabitants massacred by Rosete.

Neither sex nor age had been spared by the savage Spaniard, and a large proportion of the victims were women and children. Ribas captured Rosete's correspondence, which included, it is said, a plan for a rising of the Spanish prisoners in Caracas and La Guaira. An iron was also found which Rosete used for branding Americans on the forehead with the letter P (patriot). A similar iron had been taken at Araure bearing the letter R (republican). Bolivar's position at Valencia, before the defeat of Boves and Rosete, had been a very critical one, and it was the immediate cause of a measure taken by him, which it is impossible not to regard as a terrible crime. The position at Caracas and La Guaira was equally difficult, for they were threatened by the advance of Boves and Rosete; every man was required to fight, and it was difficult to spare guards for the numerous Spanish prisoners at both places. It will be remembered that, when Fierro fled from Caracas and embarked at La Guaira, in the beginning of August 1813, great numbers of Spaniards had been captured by the republicans at both places. The prisoners are stated to have numbered 4000 or more, and were confined partly at Caracas, partly at La Guaira. They were not by any means all soldiers, but comprised numerous peaceable citizens, merchants, and others. Had Monteverde ratified the capitulation signed by Fierro's emissaries, these prisoners should have been released, and it was pointed out to him that, under the Trujillo proclamation of war to the death, they were all liable to execution if he refused ratification. But he would not yield. On the 8th February, Bolivar received a report from Leandro Palacios, governor of La Guaira, saying that there was imminent danger from the multitude of Spanish prisoners in the place, combined with an insufficient garrison. Bolivar's reply was terrible in its brevity and its ferocity. "I order you,"

he wrote on the same day, "to shoot all the Spanish prisoners in those dungeons, and in the hospital, without any exception whatever." Similar orders were issued to the civil and military commanders in Caracas. That is Larrazabal's version.¹ O'Leary² quotes the same order.

The executions took place without any semblance of trial, on the 14th, 15th, and 16th February, at La Guaira and Caracas simultaneously. O'Leary gives the total number of Spaniards and Canary Islanders thus executed as 800—Larrazabal says 886. Ducoudray-Holstein, not speaking from personal knowledge, places the figures as high as 430 in La Guaira and 823 in Caracas. Mitre,³ following Restrepo, puts the number at 866. He gives details of the execution as carried out by Arismendi, some of them being given by Restrepo also. He says that Bolivar's order was for the execution, *excluding* those who had taken out letters of naturalisation, and was signed by his secretary. On this Arismendi remarked: "The Secretary of the Liberator is a fool: he has put '*with exception*' instead of '*including*.'" The writer goes on to say that Arismendi set the prisoners to make a great funeral pyre on which to burn their bodies. When it was ready, the prisoners were brought up in batches and done to death by the soldiers with bayonet, axe, and poniard, and their bodies, still quivering, were thrown upon the fire. Many of them, he says, were men who had saved the lives of patriots at the risk of their own. This massacre is ghastly enough in all conscience, even according to the least exaggerated account as to numbers and details, and its horror is aggravated by the admitted facts that many of the victims were innocent even of having borne arms,

¹ Larrazabal, i. 284.

² i. 191.

³ Pillings' translation, p. 345. The account is apparently based on that of Torrente (ii. 74), who gives the total at 1000 roundly, and gives details of the massacre as above.

and that they were not prisoners executed in more or less hot blood immediately after a battle, but had for the most part been for months in prison.

Larrazabal, Restrepo,¹ and O'Leary, the latter rather half-heartedly, endeavour to excuse Bolivar's action ; but it is best to look to what he himself said in an attempt to justify it in a lengthy manifesto issued, under his orders, over the signature of his secretary,² at the very moment when the massacre was in progress, on the 14th February. It is too long to quote *in extenso*, but may be briefly summarised. Scarcely resisting the temptation to plead as justification the three centuries of Spanish oppression, this extraordinary document begins with the bloody suppression of the revolt in Quito in 1810, which "armed us with the sword of reprisals to avenge it on all the Spaniards." A merit is made of the abstention from massacres in the Caracas revolution of 19th April 1810, and the employment in high posts of some Spaniards thereafter. Then follow several pages of details of the massacres and other atrocities committed by men like Antoñanzas, Boves, Yañez, Zuazola, and other Spanish leaders, without any admission of the atrocities which were committed on the other side, such as Campo Elías' massacre of Spaniards and Americans alike, and the Liberator's own massacres on the march to Caracas. Bolivar vaunts his own clemency and good faith regarding the capitulation of Caracas in 1813, and details the refusals of Monteverde to agree even to an exchange of prisoners. Then he alleges plots of the prisoners, in communication with Boves and Rosete,³ and again refers to the brutalities of these two Spaniards in Ocumare and elsewhere.

¹ Restrepo, ii. 225, etc.

² Larrazabal, i. 285.

³ It will be remembered that Rosete's papers captured by Ribas are said to have confirmed this, but even so they were not taken till after the issue of the orders of the 8th February.

The whole attempted justification is practically based on two grounds: (1) the atrocities of the enemy, justifying reprisals in the same form; (2) the danger of the position, with Boves and Rosete threatening Caracas, and backed by conspiracies among the prisoners.

No one, probably, belonging to a truly civilised nation will for a moment admit the validity of the first argument, and it is difficult even to allow it as an extenuation of the cold-blooded orders issued by a man of Bolivar's education and advantages. As for the second ground of defence, Boves and Rosete were, no doubt, a great danger when the orders issued on the 8th February, but the defeat of the former, at La Victoria on the 13th, had disposed of them for the moment. The executions only began next day, and might have been stopped. As for the plots of the prisoners, their existence is not to be lightly assumed, though it is not in the least improbable. It is certain that, in any case, many were slain who certainly took no part in them. Allowing Bolivar every possible advantage in his argument, is it possible to suppose that he will now be held blameless by anyone outside of South America?

On the 20th February, Bolivar established his headquarters at his own farm of San Mateo in the Aragua valley.¹ He commanded but 1200 infantry and 600 cavalry, and, as Boves' great strength lay in his numerous Llanero cavalry, the Liberator's object was to draw him into the hilly country. He was, at the same time, hard put to it to keep a check on the royalist guerillas about the Lake of Valencia, threatening his communications with the blockading force in front of Puerto Cabello under D'Elhuyar, as well as with Escalona at Valencia, and Mariño, now slowly coming up from the east. On the 25th, Boves with 7000 men, chiefly cavalry,

¹ The manifesto just described is dated, Headquarters at San Mateo, 14th February 1814. Is it possible that it was ante-dated?

attempted to pass the river Aragua at Cagua, near San Mateo, but was checked by Mariano Montilla, and retired at night.

On the 28th, Boves again advanced against a heavy fire from the trenches with which Bolivar had garnished his position. The royalist loss was heavy, but Boves continued the fight all day. At night, being wounded himself, he once more fell back on the heights behind him. In this day's action Bolivar lost a good officer in Colonel Villapol, a Spaniard by birth, who had joined the independent party. A still greater loss was that of Campo Elias, who was wounded, and died a fortnight later.

Boves was, after this, lying wounded at Villa de Cura, when the attempt by a young officer, Cedeño, sent by Bolivar with twenty men to try and capture him, failed.¹ On the 9th March, news arrived of the return of Rosete, now recovered from his recent defeat at Yare, to the Tuy valley, whence he seriously threatened Caracas, now practically undefended.

Boves also, cured of his wound, was preparing a fresh attack on San Mateo. Bolivar now sent Montilla, with 300 men, to Caracas with drums beating and making a great show, so as to alarm the Spaniard for his right flank. When he discovered that he had been fooled, Boves was furious. His next attack, on the 11th March, was again repulsed. Nothing more happened

¹ When a gallant Spaniard, later on, made a similar attempt on Bolivar, the Venezuelan writers speak of it as an attempted assassination!

Cedeño played a considerable part after this. He was one of those who kept alive the guerilla warfare in Venezuela between 1814 and 1816. He was afterwards a member of the Council of State at Angostura, and governor of Guayana. Born in Apure in 1784, he was killed at the battle of Carabobo in 1821. His division were hardly engaged in that battle, but Cedeño, armed with a lance, must needs take a personal share in the pursuit, and was shot down by a stray bullet when he was snatching a hurried meal. His valour was such that Bolivar gave him Ney's title, "the bravest of the brave."

till Bolivar, making a night march, fell upon Boves at daybreak on the 17th, inflicting a severe blow on him. Once more, on the 20th March, Boves, rendered desperate by the news that Mariño was at last approaching, furiously attacked Bolivar. Beaten off, he renewed his efforts on the 25th, directing them specially against the park and hospital, which were defended by Antonio Ricaurte, a young Granadian. The house in which was the hospital was the dwelling-house of the farm. It was to be assaulted by a special column, whilst Boves diverted attention by vigorous attacks all along the line. Boves himself, riding with desperate valour into the very midst of the fighting, and hurling against the patriots his reckless Llaneros, led charge after charge. Meanwhile, his assaulting column had got in silence round the flank of the enemy, and only came into view when it was close upon the hospital.

Now it was that Ricaurte¹ heroically sacrificed himself. First he removed the wounded, then ordered all his men to evacuate the house. He alone remained behind. Even Bolivar thought there was nothing left but to die fighting as the Spaniards charged with shouts of victory on the key of his position. They were already entering the house when a fearful explosion occurred. Ricaurte had fired the powder magazine, blowing himself, the empty house, and a large part of Boves' column to destruction. His gallantry saved the battle, for Boves, witnessing the destruction of his column, retired once more to the heights. On the 30th, he raised this siege of San Mateo, moving off by the road leading to San Sebastian and Villa de Cura.

But, though Boves was beaten off, Bolivar had suffered losses which he could ill afford. Two hundred officers and 1500 men were *hors de combat*, as the result of the

¹ Born at Bogotá, 1792. Joined Bolivar with the Granadian contingent at Cúcuta in 1813.

prolonged defence. Bad news, too, came in, telling of the defeat of Urdaneta at Barquisemeto by Ceballos and Cajigal with 1000 men from Coró. Unable to make a stand at San Carlos, Urdaneta fell back on Valencia, whence he reported to Bolivar that he expected to be attacked. Bolivar implored him to defend himself to the death, as Valencia contained all the magazines and ammunition. Meanwhile, Urdaneta was to send 200 men to D'Elhuyar's besieging force at Puerto Cabello. Bolivar promised that, as soon as Mariño's arrival enabled him to crush Boves, he would return to rescue Urdaneta. Valencia was attacked by Ceballos and Cajigal, who now had 3000 men, and, on the 30th and 31st March, nearly the whole town was captured.

On the latter day, Mariño had met Boves at Bocachica,¹ defeated him, and driven him back by Guiguë and the south side of the lake on Ceballos at Valencia. Then he marched to join Bolivar at Victoria.

Boves, though his rearguard was harassed by Bolivar's cavalry, arrived at Valencia with 3000 men, thus raising the besieging force to 6000. The garrison of Valencia was still holding out in the centre of the town, though suffering from the want of water, very hard pressed, and much reduced by desertions. It was the 2nd April when Boves reached Valencia, where the fight against Urdaneta raged all day. By evening, the defenders were reduced to the most desperate straits. Attacked on all sides, their position riddled by artillery, they had almost abandoned hope, when suddenly the attacks ceased. Ceballos' courage had failed him on the arrival of the defeated Boves, and at the prospect of the appearance of Bolivar and Mariño behind him. As a matter of fact they only met that day at Victoria, but Ceballos abandoned his attack on Valencia and fell back towards Tocuyito.

¹ Not shown on map. It is not far from Cura.

After a cordial meeting with Mariño on the 2nd April, Bolivar reached Valencia on the 3rd with reinforcements, only to find the place out of danger. On the 5th, he was back at Victoria, whence, after persuading Mariño to advance on Valencia, he paid a flying visit to the lines in front of Puerto Cabello. When he got back once more to Valencia, he found that Ceballos and Boves had separated, the former having gone to San Carlos, whilst Boves had marched for Calabozo to recuperate.

Bolivar now organised a force of 2000 infantry and 800 cavalry, partly his own men, partly Mariño's. He left Mariño in command, and himself returned to Puerto Cabello.

Mariño, marching on San Carlos, had to halt at Tinaco, ten miles short of that place, waiting for artillery and supplies. Then, hearing a false report that Ceballos had evacuated San Carlos, Mariño advanced through a hostile country, despite the warnings of Urdaneta, who knew the state of the country better.

On the 16th April, Mariño found himself on the plain of Aroa, short of ammunition, and faced by 2500 men drawn up in line of battle. First of all his cavalry was defeated, then Cedeño's men, overtaken by panic, gave way, and the troops were driven back to Tinaco, which they reached on the morning of the 17th. Mariño was not to be found, for he and others had made off as soon as Cedeño's men yielded. As they passed Tinaco they had destroyed the park and carried off the horses. At Palomeras, as the troops continued their retreat on Valencia, they found the artillery waggons had been fired by Mariño to prevent their capture. There, too, were found Mariño and Cedeño, whom the troops rescued from a handful of Spaniards surrounding them on a hill.

Bolivar was celebrating the anniversary of the 19th

April outside Puerto Cabello, and preparing to assault the place, when he received exaggerated accounts of Marino's defeat, representing the force of the Dictator of the East as utterly destroyed. Yet he did not lose hope. Turning to Palacios, he said, "Our position becomes more critical, we are alone to control the furious torrent of devastation; but we will stop it." Then he returned to Valencia, where he found the disaster was not quite so bad as he had believed. He at once proposed to start again to fight Ceballos. That general, however, as Bolivar learned, had been again reinforced by troops brought by Cajigal from Coró, and was at the head of 3000 men.

Bolivar, therefore, hurried off to Caracas for more troops. Thence he sent on Ribas with 800 men, followed by ammunition, medicines, and other supplies, whilst he himself went by Carabobo to take command in person of the new expedition. Just before he started he received a deputation sent from Cartagena to communicate to him the resolution passed by that city in his honour, and also the powers conferred on him by the Chamber of Representatives in the matter of the confederation of Venezuela and the State of Cartagena. This latter project, Bolivar remarked, must be put off for the present, looking to the existing precarious state of affairs in Venezuela.

On the 10th May he was at Valencia again; on the 12th he reviewed his troops; on the 17th he was on the plain of Carabobo in presence of the enemy.

He had got together 5000 men, but those who had come with Mariño were unreliable and deserted freely. Urdaneta, meeting a body of 200 such deserters who had lost their way, brought them back in custody of his own troops. By way of example, all their leaders were shot at Valencia, and one in every five of the rank and file.

Bolívar reorganised this army in four divisions, the right wing under Bermúdez, the left under Valdés, centre under Florencio Palacios, and the cavalry under Freites. Urdaneta was chief of the staff, whilst Mariño and Ribas were seconds in command under Bolívar.

Perhaps Mariño might have made difficulties about being reduced to this position had he not felt how completely he had put himself out of court by his fiasco at Aroa.

There was no fighting worth mention till the 28th May. On that day the battle began at 1 P.M. and was decided by 4 P.M., when Cajigal, forced back on to the heights, found himself unable to defend them, and was driven back in disorder with very heavy loss.

His infantry was almost entirely cut up or captured, whilst there remained in Bolívar's hands the whole of the Spanish artillery, 500 muskets, 9 standards, 4000 horses, and large stocks of munitions of all sorts. The colonel of the Spanish regiment "Granada" was captured, and several other leaders were killed.

Cajigal, Ceballos, Calzada, and others fled towards Barinas.¹ When the pursuing victors under Urdaneta reached San Carlos, they found that the barbarities of Calzada there had been as great as those of Rosete at Ocumare. He had spared neither sex nor age, nor did he treat a priest any better than a layman.

Bolívar, after his victory, again committed the fault of splitting up his army, instead of keeping it united for the destruction of Boves and the capture of Puerto Cabello, which still held out in face of a very feeble blockading force. Urdaneta was sent westward to recover the country which had been lost, Ribas went back to Caracas, Mariño and Jalon were sent towards Cura to face Boves. Bolívar himself went to Caracas.

¹ Larrazabal, i. 312. He speaks of this as the "celebrated battle of Carabobo." He should have called it the "first," for there was a much more celebrated battle on the same field in 1821.

Boves, reaching Calabozo after his separation from Ceballos, had displayed his usual energy in repairing the losses of Bocachica, and was now again at the head of 5000 Llaneros and 3000 infantry. He had, as mentioned, only 3000 men in all when he joined Ceballos at Valencia, and it is surprising to find him so soon again at the head of more men than he had at Bocachica.

The fact appears to be that, in all these battles of undisciplined troops, once disaster commenced the greater part of the defeated army dispersed all over the country, and filtered back to their starting-point, where they were quite ready to join again on the reappearance of their leader. The knowledge of this doubtless moved Boves to leave Ceballos and go where he knew he could recruit again when, *prima facie*, the better course would have been for the two to hold together. Had they done so, the fight at Carabobo might have had a very different result.

On the 12th June, Mariño, hearing of Boves' approach, advanced to La Puerta, a place of peculiar ill-omen for the republicans in this campaign.¹ Mariño had but 2300 men when Boves, on the 15th, showed only a small portion of his force. Mariño, thinking he had only an equal force before him, proposed to attack. At that moment, Bolivar, arriving from Caracas, took over the chief command. He was not to blame for the dangerous position into which Mariño had got himself, and he proposed to retire. It was too late, for Boves, who had concealed his numerous cavalry in the neighbouring ravines, fell upon Bolivar with immensely superior forces, and simply swept him off the field, with a loss of nearly half the republican force. Boves, as usual, massacred his prisoners, amongst whom was Jalon, the man who had

¹ La Puerta is not shown on the map. It is a short way east of Cura at the bifurcation of the roads to S. Sebastian and S. Juan.

formerly had a narrow escape of being hanged in revenge for the execution of Zuazola in front of Puerto Cabello. Boves was guilty of a refinement of cruelty towards this unfortunate general, for he treated him with civility, sat down to dinner with him, and then turned round upon him and had him hanged. Jalon's head was cut off and sent to Calabozo as a present to Boves' friends. At this battle there perished Freites (by his own hand), Garcia de Sena, Aldao, and Tebar, Bolivar's secretary. Mariño escaped with difficulty. Bolivar and Ribas got away also to Valencia, and thence to Caracas, where they arrived on the 16th June.

On that day Boves was in Victoria, where he also divided his troops, sending 2000 to Caracas under Gonzales,¹ and marching on Valencia himself with the main body. After beating and massacring the force at La Cabrera, he laid siege to Valencia, on the 19th June, with 3000 men. The place was held by Escalona, who fought desperately, hoping to be succoured by Bolivar or Urdaneta. Boves was furious, and sent the most ferocious threats to the garrison, but Escalona would not yield. By the 22nd, the Spaniards had fought their way far into the city.

The ferocity of the besiegers is illustrated by an anecdote. Two brothers on the republican side, apparently hoping to save their lives, deserted to the enemy. When they reached Boves' camp, bull's horns were bound on to their heads and they were turned loose in the midst of a ring of horsemen, to be tormented and done to death with lances, like bulls in the ring.

On the 24th June, Boves learned that D'Elhuyar, finding himself now between two fires, had raised the siege of Puerto Cabello and embarked with his troops

¹ Ducoudray-Holstein says he was informed by witnesses on both sides "that the column of Colonel Gonzales did not exceed 550 men; that the second, under Colonel Mendoza, was less" (i. 194).

for La Guaira. Leaving Morales in charge of the attack on Valencia, Boves marched for Puerto Cabello, where he procured fresh supplies of ammunition, was joined by Cajigal, Ceballos, and Calzada with 1200 men, and then returned to Valencia, where he now had 4000 men. In the town there was a mere handful of defenders, hard pressed by the attack, and suffering grievously from hunger and thirst. They still held out gallantly till the 9th July, when, after a salute of twenty-one guns fired by the royalist batteries, a white flag announced the advent of emissaries from Boves. They reported the occupation of Caracas by the royalists, and the retreat from it of Bolivar. The negotiations which ensued ended in the conclusion of a capitulation by which the lives, property, and liberty of the defenders were guaranteed. Next day Boves entered the place, and, with atrocious profanity, swore in the presence of the Holy Sacrament to respect the lives of all. Immediately he was in possession of the arms deposited in the great square, disregarding alike the terms of the capitulation and his solemn oath, he brutally massacred Espejo, the governor, 90 of the principal inhabitants, 65 officers, and 310 troops.

We must now return to Bolivar, who, on reaching Caracas on the 16th June after his defeat at La Puerta, found the capital in a terrible state of panic and disorganisation. His own military position was desperate, owing mainly to his foolish dispersion of his forces after Carabobo. With Urdaneta far away in the west, cut off from Caracas by Boves at Valencia, there was nothing to be hoped for from that direction. The Liberator assembled the people and endeavoured to inspire some hope in them; he demanded from the churches all the plate not actually required for use. All his measures were in vain, and an early attack was threatened by Gonzales, now approaching from Victoria. From the

south, Caracas was threatened by the guerilla Machado, moving over the Pass of Ocumare. With the few troops Bolivar could command, the defence of the capital was impossible. He saw that he must evacuate it to prevent further disaster, and his own capture.

On the 6th July, after wasting some troops in a useless attack on Gonzales, the Liberator set out on his retreat eastwards to Barcelona, leaving to the mercy of Boves all who elected to remain behind. Mercy with Boves of course meant massacre, pillage, and confiscation. Cajigal, at least, was a man of moderation, and he was now Captain-General in name. In reality, he was powerless, and all authority was vested in Boves and Morales. The contempt with which Boves treated his nominal chief is illustrated by his brief report to Cajigal of his victory at La Puerta: "I have recovered the arms, ammunition, and the honour of the Spanish flag, which your Excellency lost at Carabobo." So trying was his position with this ruffian that Cajigal withdrew to Puerto Cabello, rather than submit to the open shame of sanctioning what he could not prevent. He duly reported Boves' misdeeds to the Spanish government, which, quite satisfied with success, had nothing but praise for them.

It was the 16th July when Boves entered Caracas. As usual, his first act was to promise oblivion of the past. This was very shortly followed by general orders for the shooting of all who might be held to be accomplices in the death of Spaniards. Bands of assassins roamed through the city, murdering, robbing, and committing every other atrocity.

Boves himself set out, on the 26th July, in pursuit of Bolivar, leaving Quero¹ to carry out his orders in

¹ Quero, a Venezuelan who had served the republican cause under Miranda, went over to Monteverde in 1812. He could be thoroughly trusted to carry out orders in the spirit of Boves.

Caracas. Bolivar had twenty days' start of his pursuers, and he needed it all, for he was not marching with a mobile army. He had, indeed, some 2000 troops, including D'Elhuyar's force, which had arrived from Puerto Cabello at La Guaira and Caracas, but he was also accompanied by a large part of the population of Caracas, on whom the prospective terrors of the march had less effect than the anticipation of the horrors of an occupation by Boves. The roads to be traversed were bad at their best; now, in the height of the rainy season, they were mere lines of mud and slush. There was no accommodation for housing this multitude of people of all classes, all ages, and both sexes. Ladies, accustomed to comfortable living, found themselves, after a long day of tramping through a sea of mud or over rugged, rocky roads, compelled to lie for the night in the open, drenched to the skin by the pitiless rain, without even a fire, and almost starving. Despair drove them to desperate deeds, and they were constantly haunted by the dread of being left behind to fall into the hands of the royalist guerrillas. Mothers, unable longer to nourish, or even to carry, their children, were seen to hurl them over precipices, rather than leave them to die by the roadside. All the horrors of the retreat from Moscow were here, except the cold, which was made up for by the rain. For twenty days this miserable "Emigration of 1814," as it was called, dragged on until Barcelona was reached, just as Boves was starting in pursuit from Caracas. By that time, the emigrants had been terribly reduced in numbers by the hardships of the road, by famine, and by fever. From Barcelona, notwithstanding the desperate condition of his enterprise, Bolivar contemplated sending one of his commanders to London to open up relations between republican Venezuela and Great Britain. This at a time when the republic was on its last legs! There is something here

of the strange admixture of comic opera which seems to be inseparable from many things South American. The idea was worthy almost of the Presidency of Don Cipriano Castro of our own times.

Morales, Boves' second in command, leading the pursuing force by El Chaparro, appeared, on the 17th August, before Aragua, south of Barcelona. The place was fortified and occupied by Bermudez, with 1000 men sent back from Cumaná by Mariño, who had accompanied the flight to Barcelona.

Morales attacked in the morning of the 18th August. The fortifications enabled Bolivar and Bermudez to hold out for some hours. Apparently there was some disagreement between them, for Larrazabal says that Bolivar wanted to use his cavalry, which was good, in the open country behind the river Aragua,¹ but was compelled to give way to Bermudez, who was all for a passive defence of the town.

The fighting in Aragua streets was furious for seven hours. Then the republicans were driven out and put to flight. Bolivar, with some of the remnants, made for Barcelona, whilst Bermudez took the direction of Maturin.

Morales, a good second to Boves in ferocity, signalled his victory by wholesale massacres, which were carried even to the church, where many were killed, seeking sanctuary at the high altar. Larrazabal says 3500 inhabitants of Aragua were slain, but it is perhaps permissible to doubt this figure.

When Bolivar reached Barcelona with the few worn-out troops from Aragua, he found the inhabitants bent upon opening their gates to Morales, rather than risk the horrors of a sack. It was hopeless to attempt a defence under these circumstances, so Bolivar, accompanied by Ribas and Piar, set out for Cumaná, whither the poor

¹ This town of Aragua, and the river of the same name, must not be confused with the valley of Aragua at the east end of the Valencia lake.

remnants of the Caracas emigration had already dragged their weary limbs.

When Bolivar reached Cumaná, he found it almost deserted. Mariño, hearing of the disaster of Aragua, had proclaimed martial law (scarcely necessary under the circumstances one would have thought), and, in agreement with his officers, resolved to fall back on Guiria, almost the extreme point of Venezuela. The position at Guiria was good, and at the worst there was always a possibility of escape to the British colony of Trinidad, which was in sight just across the landlocked Gulf of Paria. The inhabitants of Cumaná were invited to emigrate to Guiria on the ships which had come back to Cumaná when the siege of Puerto Cabello was raised.

What happened at Cumaná it is very difficult to ascertain with certainty. Let us first take the account put forward by Bolivar and Mariño themselves in the *Cartagena Gazette* of the 30th September 1814.¹ According to this, Mariño was in great straits, abandoned by his troops, part of whom had embarked on board the squadron commanded by Bianchi, an Italian adventurer, who, it was reported, had decided to sail away with all the treasure brought from the churches of Caracas. Bolivar and Mariño were, therefore, obliged to embark with him in order to save the property. Arriving at the island of Margarita, and afterwards at Carúpano on the mainland, they found those places in a state of anarchy, "in consequence of the seditious views of some military chieftains, who were anxious to raise themselves to the high station of chief magistrates." Ducoudray-Holstein, always bitterly hostile to Bolivar, accuses him and Mariño plainly of deserting their companions in order to save their own lives. He also says that they could not land at Margarita because Arismendi,² who commanded there,

¹ Ducoudray-Holstein, i. 193.

² Juan Bautista Arismendi was born in Margarita in 1786 of parents in moderate circumstances. He received little or no education, and was scarce

threatened to shoot them as deserters, a threat which was repeated by Bermudez, whom they found at Carúpano.

O'Leary's story is that they sailed with the intention of landing somewhere on the coast in order to rally the republican forces. Both at Cumaná and Margarita they were unable to land on account of the seditious attitude of the other leaders. Nothing is said about Bianchi.

Larrazabal's account is again different. He says Bianchi sailed whilst the leaders were holding a council of war in Cumaná, the Italian meaning to appropriate the treasure. Bolivar and Mariño sailed after him, and succeeded in coming to an arrangement, under which he disgorged part of his plunder, which he pretended he had seized on account of arrears of pay of himself and his fleet. Under this arrangement, Bianchi returned two-thirds of the treasure, and gave up to Bolivar and Mariño part of the fleet. The arms and stores were to be landed in Margarita by Bianchi, who thus had left to him three ships and 40,000 or 50,000 pesos in treasure. The two remaining ships carried Bolivar and Mariño to Carúpano, where they arrived on the 3rd September. Afraid that Bianchi, repenting of his bargain, might attack him, Bolivar anchored under cover of the shore batteries. When Bolivar and Mariño landed, they found Ribas and Piar in possession. These two accused them of desertion, and Ribas even put Mariño in confinement. Then occurred a genuine comic-opera situation, for Bianchi appeared on the scene, took the part of Bolivar and Mariño, and

able to read and write. Short and broad in figure, with yellow hair and bright piercing eyes, Arismendi was of pleasant manners and of great energy and considerable natural ability. He was strong willed and cruel. Bolivar made him governor of Caracas in 1813, and it was he who carried out the massacre of the prisoners in February 1814. After the retreat from Caracas in that year, he returned to Margarita as governor, and his immense personal influence and popularity with the islanders gave him a power such as no one else exercised among these poor and hardy fishermen.

insisted on Ribas allowing them to embark for Cartagena. Before leaving, they made over part of the treasure for the defence of the country.

From all this confusion of accounts, all that seems possible to infer with certainty is that the two Dictators were in very bad odour with their subordinates who, perhaps, having witnessed the failure of the leaders, thought they could do better themselves, and, at any rate, were determined to get rid of Bolivar and Mariño. Before leaving, Bolivar fired a parting shot in the form of a verbose manifesto, dated 7th September, to his "fellow citizens," of which the general sense can be sufficiently inferred from the following passages:¹ "Your brothers, and not the Spaniards, have torn your breasts, spilt your blood, burnt your dwellings, and condemned you to expatriation. Your cries should be directed against those blind slaves who seek to bind you with the chains which they themselves bear. . . . I swear to you that, Liberator or dead, I will always merit the honour which you have conferred on me. . . . Hope, my compatriots, in the noble and virtuous people of New Granada, who will return, anxious to gain fresh triumphs, to lend you new help, and to bring you renewed liberty, if your own valour has not already gained it."

Before following Bolivar on his journey, we will recount briefly what happened in the eastern districts of Venezuela after he and Mariño left them.

Piar arrived at Carúpano on the 9th of September, just as Bolivar sailed. Bermudez was at this time at Maturin with Cedeño, Monágas,² Zaraza,³ and other

¹ O'Leary, *Docts.*, 13, p. 467.

² José Tadeo Monágas, born on the plains of Maturin in 1784, was one of the principal guerilla leaders who kept up the war in the interval between 1814 and 1816. He managed to survive all the perils of the war, and was President of Venezuela in 1847 and 1858. He returned from banishment in 1864, and died after taking Caracas and Puerto Cabello.

³ Zaraza, another of the guerilla leaders, was a native of Chaguaramas. His carelessness cost the republicans more than one defeat in 1818. He died at Caracas in 1825.

leaders, and had obtained some successes over Morales' detachments. Boves was in Cumaná on the 16th October, his passage everywhere marked by rivers of blood. Amongst the republicans there was disunion; for the men of the east objected to the supremacy in command of Ribas, whilst those of Caracas and the west equally disliked being under Bermúdez. These two disagreed in their views of what was expedient; for Bermúdez wished to await Boves at Maturin, whilst Ribas was for marching to meet him. This latter opinion eventually prevailed, and, on the 5th December, 3000 republicans met a larger force under Boves at Urica. The result was disastrous, and but few of the patriots succeeded in escaping to Maturin. But the victory cost the Spaniards dear, for Boves, ever in the forefront of the battle, dealing death in every direction, refusing quarter to all, was killed by a republican spear which pierced his body.

To him, more than to any other man on the royalist side, was due the complete subjugation of the Venezuelan republic of 1813-14. His vices were many, his virtues perhaps were limited to courage worthy of a better cause. Some accused him of keeping his courage up with drink; but, as O'Leary justly remarks, such courage does not last, whilst of Boves none ever pretended that he was for an instant wanting in bravery. As for his personal appearance, he was tall, with red hair, dark eyes, and a fair skin. Larrazabal quotes, as exactly applicable to him, the description given by Paulus Diaconus of Attila: "Broad of chest, hideous of expression, the forehead lowering, the nostrils wide, the eyes deep sunk, the head massive, with a restless and horrible look, wandering round like that of a tiger watching its prey . . . born for the desolation of the universe."

In the command he was worthily succeeded by

Morales. Piar's force had already been destroyed by Boves at Salado, Bermudez's at Magueyes.

The unfortunate Ribas, after his utter defeat at Urica, fled to Maturin, where his ruin was completed. Thence he tried to make his way, with two of his officers, to the plains of Caracas. Broken and ill, he halted for a few hours in the mountains near the valley of La Pascua. Thence he sent a negro servant to seek provisions in the town. The man betrayed his master to the royalists who seized Ribas asleep and carried him to the town. There he was slain to the accompaniment of insulting words and gestures. His head was sent in an iron cage to Caracas, and exposed on the road to La Guaira, wearing the Phrygian cap which he used as an emblem of liberty. He was Bolivar's uncle by marriage, and was for long one of his most trusted chiefs, but, in the end, his ambition brought him into collision with the Liberator, and resulted in his death. Venezuela, with the exception of a few guerillas under Cedeño, Monágas, and Zaraza, was in the power of the royalists. What had become of Urdaneta will be related presently. The coast was now in part blockaded, from Trinidad to Yrapa,¹ by a Spanish squadron under Gabazo, which stopped all emigration in that direction.

Thus rose and fell the second republican government in Venezuela. The campaign of 1813-14 was Bolivar's first in chief command, and had served to mark him out, not indeed as a great commander, but as one of the greatest determination and with an almost unlimited power of imposing the strength of his own personality on his subordinates. We have spoken of battles, but it must be remembered that throughout this campaign Bolivar never commanded a force of a strength greater than that of a European brigade. His troops were of a quality which would have entitled them to no respect in

¹ West of Guiria, nearly in the north-west corner of the Gulf of Paria.

a campaign in Europe. Amongst them were a certain number of regulars, men who had formerly been in the Spanish service, but the majority were recruits picked up as he went along. Their training was of the scantiest, their discipline almost nil. Yet they fought splendidly on many occasions, and were even able to defeat regular Spanish European troops. Not that we would vaunt the fighting value of these, for Wellington's Peninsular experience showed that it was not great. Still they were probably superior to any of the local troops in training and discipline. As for arms, the republicans at this period were rarely well provided, and a victory was largely valuable for its captures of muskets, ammunition, and artillery. The forty-five men with whom Mariño and his friends landed at Guiria were chiefly armed with spears or bows and arrows. It was only as they surprised and cut up the Spanish detachments that they were able to arm themselves in modern fashion. Uniforms of course there were none, except such as were found in the Spanish arsenals, or were worn by the men who deserted that service for the republican camp. In later years Colombian troops were a strange motley in this respect. Many of them were clad in uniforms bought from dealers in second-hand garments who had bought up, as a speculation, old French, Prussian, Austrian, or Russian uniforms after the fall of Napoleon. Many of them had possibly been filched from the dead by the ghouls who wandered over the battlefields of Europe, robbing the dead and even the wounded, as was the case at Eylau and Heilsberg.

The following extract from O'Leary's description of the recruits gathered in 1819 will give some idea of the raw material obtainable, and the difficulties of making soldiers out of it. "There was much to be done to transform these unhappy, though patriotic, peasants into soldiers and give them a martial appearance. Nothing

could be less military than their clothes ; a hat of grey wool with a broad brim and a low crown, covering a head which recalled that of Samson before the fatal scissors had shorn him of his long thick hair ; an immense square blanket of coarse wool, with a hole in the middle for the head to pass through, hung from the shoulders to the knees, giving the impression of an armless man. However easy it was to be certain that they were well set up and strong, and to impart a martial aspect by merely removing the 'ruana,' as the blanket was called, by taking away the hat and cutting their hair, it was quite a different matter to teach these men to handle a musket, or to fire it without shutting both eyes, turning the head to the rear, and so causing much greater danger to themselves and their fellows than to the enemy."¹ Yet these same recruits formed nearly one-third of the force with which Bolivar, within a few days, gained the decisive battle of Boyacá ! How far such infantry corresponded to trained soldiers must be left to the reader's imagination. Clearly troops of this class must have been incapable of manœuvring or of shooting with any accuracy, though O'Leary adds that "they presented an imposing appearance—*from a distance*."²

Evidently most of the battles must have consisted largely of a rough-and-tumble scrimmage carried out by an armed mob.

¹ O'Leary, i. 573.

² The following description is taken from Chesterton's book (vol. ii. p. 158): "A creole force usually consisted of men and lads of all ages and colours, some naked, others with merely a shirt or a pair of drawers ; a few wore old military jackets without pantaloons ; some were bareheaded, while others had straw hats or hairy caps. Such as were armed with muskets often strapped their cartouches round their naked loins, whilst the majority had no other arms than pikeheads loosely fixed upon short rough sticks. They marched in Indian or single file, and were unrestrained in their movements by practical exercises. . . . Still these men were the very men adapted to the regions they inhabited ; and in the hour of trial, as Morillo had too fatally proved, were more than a match for the heavily accoutred Europeans."

As for the numbers engaged, an industrious writer in the *Carreo Nacional*¹ has made out a table showing the number of combats of all sorts in which the Colombian army was engaged in the years 1810-1826 in Venezuela, New Granada, Quito, and Peru. There were 696 engagements, in which the numbers of troops *on both sides* totalled 973,000. That gives an average of about 1400 men, republicans and royalists, engaged in each.

Bolivar showed in this campaign no remarkable strategical qualifications. The direction of his advance was practically prescribed for him by circumstances in New Granada. It is true that he was successful in planting his army right in the centre of a widely dispersed enemy, when he debouched from the mountains of Merida, but that, looking to all the conditions, was probably more by good luck than good guidance. He was himself divided, and, had Marti succeeded, as he should have, in destroying Ribas at Niquitao, Bolivar's position would have been a very dangerous one.

The leaving of Yañez in unbroken force south of the Apure, in a position to threaten Bolivar's communications with New Granada, was fraught with danger. As was shown later, Bolivar would have done better to break up Yañez's force, to establish himself on the Apure and the Orinoco, and thence to operate northwards against the capital and the north of Venezuela. That would probably have resulted in his gaining over the Llaneros who formed the majority of Boves' forces. It, however, might have enabled Mariño and Piar to gain the credit of taking Caracas from the east, and have left Bolivar in a less commanding political position.

Later, when Bolivar found himself in a central position, he showed that he did not appreciate his advantages. The distances were so great between the various hostile forces that, had he kept his whole army together, he

¹ A Bogotá newspaper. Issue of 20th July 1908.

could probably have crushed Boves and Rosete before any of the others could interfere. Then he would have been at liberty to turn against Yañez, Ceballos, and the rest. Again, he might have begun by dealing more strongly with Monteverde in Puerto Cabello. If he had followed him thither with the greater part of his army immediately after the capitulation arranged by Fierro's envoys, it is by no means improbable that he might have stormed the place and got rid of Monteverde for good. Whilst he was doing this, he could have contained Boves with a small force. That was not difficult in the hilly region, seeing that Boves' strength lay largely in his Llanero cavalry, who were comparatively useless in the hills.

On the whole, it may be said that very little of the military art was displayed on either side.

CHAPTER VI

BOGOTÁ AND THE TWO SIEGES OF CARTAGENA— FALL OF NEW GRANADA, 1815-16

BOLIVAR and Mariño, without touching anywhere on the way, landed at Cartagena on the 25th September 1814. Castillo, the bitter enemy of the former, was soon busy representing that to Bolivar alone was due the loss of Venezuela to the republican cause. The Liberator's justification of his own conduct is contained in a manifesto of the 30th September, which has already been referred to.¹

Bolivar very soon left Cartagena to go up the Magdalena and, viâ Ocaña, to Tunja, where the Congress of New Granada was in session. When he got to Ocaña he heard of the presence at Cúcuta of Urdaneta, and that his Venezuelan troops were quarrelling with the Granadians. Turning aside to stop this friction, he heard at Salazar that the story was exaggerated, and, therefore, continued his journey to Tunja. Urdaneta had been at Barquisemeto when the news of La Puerta and the other disasters reached him. Entirely cut off by the intervening Spaniards from Bolivar and the east, having only three Venezuelan battalions and a squadron of cavalry, and recognising that the republic had for the time being collapsed, Urdaneta decided to fall back on New Granada. Arriving at Trujillo, he reported his situation to the Congress at Tunja. In reply, he was taken under

¹ *Vide supra*, p. 141.

the protection of New Granada, and directed to march to Tunja. Bolivar joined him at Pamplona, and was cheered by an enthusiastic reception by officers and men alike, notwithstanding that he had reproached the force with its indiscipline and insubordination.

On arrival at Tunja, Bolivar was cordially received by Camilo Torres, then President of the Congress. He insisted on appearing at the bar of the Congress to submit an explanation of his proceedings. The assembly was pleased to express loudly its approval, and Bolivar was at once commissioned to reduce to order Santa Fé (Bogotá),¹ which had separated itself from the Union and set up as an independent State, under the Dictatorship of M. B. Alvarez.²

Marching from Tunja, Bolivar arrived before Bogotá with 1800 men. In the city were Alvarez the Dictator and J. R. Leiva, a Spanish general in the service of the recalcitrant State. They had called in the aid of the Spaniards, and were supported by the influence of the clergy. The archbishop went so far as to excommunicate Bolivar as an enemy of religion.

That general was, on the 8th December 1814, camped at the farm of Techo, some four miles from Bogotá. Thence he wrote to Alvarez that he (Bolivar) was destined to be the Liberator, not the conqueror, of oppressed peoples. He desired union, and demanded the surrender of Alvarez and his State to the government of Tunja. He promised security of life and property, but Alvarez refused to yield.

¹ Santa Fé, as the name of the present capital of Colombia, was finally abandoned under article 5 of the fundamental law, passed on the 17th December 1819. Henceforward we shall always speak of the city by its modern name, Bogotá.

² Manuel Bernardo Alvarez, born in Bogotá in 1750, was a member of the Cabildo at the outbreak of the revolution in 1810. He was an opponent of Nariño, after whose capture in Pasto he became Dictator of Cundinamarca. He was shot at Bogotá in September 1816 by Morillo.

Bolívar, reconnoitring the city, was fired upon by artillery. He at once brought up his forces and commenced the attack of the city, which was not walled. On the third day of street fighting, Alvarez found himself driven back to the great square, and very short of water. He begged for an armistice, and negotiations were at once commenced for a capitulation. On the 12th December 1814, Alvarez surrendered the city to the national government. The news was received with delight at Tunja, and Bolívar was appointed Captain-General of the forces of the Confederation. The loss in the fighting had not been great, some 300 men on Alvarez's side, and less on Bolívar's. Having settled affairs in Bogotá, Bolívar returned to Tunja to arrange plans with the government for further operations. His proposal, which was accepted, was for an attack on the Spaniards at Santa Marta, on the north coast, which they still held in force. Thence a fresh advance eastwards could be organised against Rio Hacha, and later, against the Maracaibo province of Venezuela. Bolívar was clearly aiming at a repetition of his exploits of 1813. He had already indicated his views in his farewell to Venezuela at Carúpano.¹ In the meanwhile, Urdaneta was to be sent to Cúcuta with a division, to pacify that neighbourhood, and to be ready to support the advance against north-western Venezuela. Yet another detachment was sent southwards across the upper Magdalena, to Popayan in the upper valley of the Cauca, which was threatened by royalist attacks from the Quito direction. This expedition, which would have to cross the high passes of the Central Cordilleras, was commanded by Serviez² and Montúfar.

¹ *Supra*, p. 143.

² Manuel de Serviez, a Frenchman, after serving in the British and Russian armies, went to New Granada, where he played a part in Nariño's civil war in 1813. In 1816 he served in Casanare and under Paez. He was murdered in that year by robbers for the sake of \$6000 which he had.

Having arranged all this, Bolivar returned once more to Bogotá, which he reached on the 1st January 1815, to prepare his column for the march on Santa Marta. On the same date Congress decided to transfer itself from Tunja to Bogotá, and adjourn till the 23rd for that purpose. On the 13th, the President, the members of the Congress, and the chief officials were received in state outside Bogotá by Bolivar, the Archbishop, the Cabildo, and others. Bolivar made a long speech, and was followed by others. The Representative Body of Cundinamarca did not separate till it had decreed to Bolivar the title of "Illustrious and Religious Pacificator." The second adjective was perhaps meant as an apology for his recent excommunication.

For the expedition against Santa Marta, the only stronghold of the royalists now remaining on the Atlantic coast of New Granada, Bolivar had 2000 men, amongst whom was only one squadron of cavalry. Arms and ammunition are said to have been deficient, though it might be thought that enough would have been found in Bogotá.

Castillo, whom Bolivar knew to be intriguing against him at Cartagena, was still a thorn in his side. In order to get rid of this enemy from the scene of operations, Bolivar proposed to appoint him to a seat on the Supreme Council of War at Bogotá, where he would be out of the way, and deprived of the local influence which he enjoyed at Cartagena. This being agreed to, Bolivar marched from Bogotá, on the 24th January 1815, for Honda, the town on the Magdalena where the upper and lower rivers are separated by a mile of rapids.¹ All

¹ During this march a shocking act of barbarity was committed by one of Bolivar's subordinates. Eleven unfortunate Spaniards, under sentence of banishment, were murdered on the plea that they were worn out and could not keep up. (O'Leary, i. p. 249.) There is nothing said of Bolivar's having inflicted any punishment for this atrocious act. He can hardly escape blame, at least as an accomplice after the fact.

these marches sound very little ; for the distance from Bogotá to Honda is little over 100 miles ; but it must be remembered that the road, even at the present day, is of a character almost inconceivable to Europeans who have not left their own continent. A single traveller on a mule can get down from the plateau of Bogotá (nearly 9000 feet above sea-level) to the Magdalena at Honda (8000 feet lower) in three days in fine weather, but to march a force even of 2000 men is quite another matter. Even the journey to and from Tunja and Bogotá is not the plain sailing it looks on a small scale map.

In saying that Santa Marta was the last Spanish stronghold in the north of Colombia, it must be remembered that, besides the fortress, the royalists still held the province of that name down to Ocaña, which they had just recovered from the republicans. Bolivar now once more drove them from it with heavy loss. Thence he proceeded to Mompox, which was commanded by his friends, the brothers Pinères.

All was going well when Bolivar found that Castillo, too wary a bird to be taken with the bait of honourable exile at Bogotá, had refused his appointment to the Council of War there. It is certain that he had established himself as the principal power in Cartagena, the governor, Juan de Dios Amador, was his ally, and, though to some extent unpopular owing to his arbitrary conduct, Castillo had a large following, and held all the military power of the fortress.

Beyond this it is difficult to unravel the tangled skein of Cartagenian politics, and the result would be of little interest to European readers. According to Bolivar's admirers, his sole object was to get the arms and supplies necessary to enable him to conquer Santa Marta. On the other hand, enemies of Bolivar, and partisans of Castillo, like Ducoudray-Holstein, aver that Bolivar was well supplied ; that Santa Marta, hating Montalvo, the

Spanish Viceroy, was ready to rise; and that Montalvo himself had a French ship lying in the harbour ready to take him off at a moment's notice. Under these circumstances Ducoudray-Holstein says that Bolivar had only to march on Santa Marta to ensure the surrender of the fortress. He affirms that the destruction of Castillo was Bolivar's real object, and that in this he was supported by the Pinères, who, during his former stay at Cartagena, had intrigued with him against Torices (the then dictator) and Castillo, but had failed, and been banished.

The fact that the old enmity of 1813 between the two men was still as vigorous as ever is perhaps sufficient for our purpose. Castillo, determined not to have Bolivar at Cartagena, issued orders to oppose his march. During Bolivar's stay at Mompo, negotiations for a settlement with Castillo were carried on through the medium of Marimon, an ecclesiastic sent for the purpose from Cartagena. Nothing came of them, and Bolivar descended the Magdalena to Barranca, whence he again opened negotiations. Finding that Castillo was trying to suborn his troops, he marched to Turbaco, in the hills, a few miles from Cartagena. Thence he sent another emissary, Tomas Montilla, whose brother Mariano happened at the time to be military commandant of the fortress. He was not received at all, and some of Bolivar's friends in Cartagena were imprisoned when they demanded passports to go to him.

Thus the relations between the two leaders grew worse and worse, until Bolivar finally decided to appear before Cartagena with his troops. On the 27th March 1815 he seized the hill of La Popa, an elevation within cannon shot, even in those days, of the fortress. It rises some 500 feet above the plain, and commands, from the monastery on its summit, the whole town and the fort of San Felipe (or San Lazaro), from which Admiral Vernon's attack was so disastrously beaten off in 1741. La Popa

had a very deep well as its only source of water supply, and so bitter were the feelings against Bolivar in Cartagena that the garrison, unable to hold the hill themselves, poisoned the well by throwing rotten hides into it. That Bolivar should dare to sit down to blockade what was considered the strongest fortress on the north coast of South America, with a large garrison in it, certainly seems to show that his complaints of want of means to attack a place in the precarious state of Santa Marta were not founded. The only thing in favour of the story is Ducoudray-Holstein's statement that Bolivar had only one small gun to mount on La Popa. From the Popa there were more negotiations with Marimon, into the details of which it is useless to enter. They dragged on without result till the 22nd April, when Marimon wrote that General Morillo, with a large army from Europe, was already in Venezuela. About this time, too, Montalvo, the Spanish Viceroy¹ at Santa Marta, sent offers to the Cartagenians of assistance against Bolivar. These they had the decency to refuse. Even the bitterness of civil war was not sufficient to induce one party to call in the common enemy to help in the destruction of the other.

By the 29th April, the Spaniards had reconquered the Magdalena from Mompox to its mouth, and Bolivar was cut off from communication with Bogotá.

Then, at last, he gave way. Assembling a council of war, he explained that his own departure was an absolute necessity, if the situation was to be saved at all. The council agreed to this, provided they themselves, and any other officers who so desired, should be allowed to resign and leave the country.

On the 7th May, Marimon was informed of the decision. On the 8th, Bolivar embarked on the British brigantine "Discovery," sailing next day for Jamaica. Before sailing,

¹ In 1813 the Spanish Government had united New Granada and Venezuela under a single Viceroy, Marshal Montalvo (Pilling, 353).

Bolivar addressed his soldiers, explaining his motives. Advising his Venezuelans to go home, and his Granadian soldiers to conquer for their country, he laments the fate which compels him to resign the command, in order to save the army from destruction. He writes in a tone of deep despondency, saying that he is fated to have to leave his country and to die in inaction abroad. His own existence, he said, and that of the army being incompatible, he had preferred the army.¹

Of Bolivar's conduct in the whole of this affair and of his final departure what shall we say?

Ducoudray-Holstein, as usual, has nothing but blame for him; Larrazabal nothing but praise. These are the extremes. To us, looking at the whole matter from an impartial standpoint, it seems impossible to exonerate either Bolivar or Castillo. The quarrel between them seems to have been based, on both sides, mainly on personal considerations. Neither of them thought fit to yield, or even to compromise, in a personal quarrel which was incompatible with the interests of the cause which both professed to serve. It was perfectly well known that Spain was about to make a desperate effort to retrieve her lost position in the colonies, and true patriots would have hastened to sink their differences in favour of a united effort against the common enemy. Neither of them would do so, and, at the last moment, one of them was compelled to depart if he was not to be destroyed, and that one must be Bolivar, who, otherwise, would have found himself between the upper millstone of the Spanish forces from the Magdalena, and the nether of Cartagena itself.

Had Bolivar and Castillo united for an active defence of Cartagena, it is by no means improbable that Morillo's army might have been destroyed, perhaps even before it ever sat down before the place. The remarks made by

¹ O'Leary, *Docts.*, 15, p. 14.

Bolivar in his manifesto of 1812¹ anent the destructive effects of disunion might well be quoted against himself.

No sooner was Ferdinand VII. back on his throne at Madrid, on the 13th May 1814, than he began to think of measures for the suppression of the revolted American colonies. That was an idea which was always uppermost with every Spanish Government, were it Junta, Regency, Cortes, or the King himself. We must except the late Government of Joseph Bonaparte, for he knew well that he had quite enough to do at home, and that the naval supremacy of England forbade to him, though it allowed to a Spanish Government, any idea of an over-sea expedition.

The expedition now equipped by Ferdinand was the largest and most complete which Spain had been able to send. It consisted of 6 regiments of infantry, 2 of cavalry, and 18 guns, altogether 10,642 men, fully equipped in every way, including a siege train. The naval squadron, which carried and convoyed it, included 1 line of battleship of 74 guns, 3 frigates, 40 smaller ships of war, and 60 or 70 transports. To the chief command was appointed Don Pablo Morillo, who sailed, in the middle of February 1815, from Cadiz, as if for Buenos Aires, carrying sealed orders, to be opened off the Canary Islands. They were found to direct the fleet to Venezuela, which colony Morillo was to reduce to order. Having done that, he was to reconquer New Granada, then to march south, and, joined by the Quito royalists, under Montes, to carry the triumphant banners of Spain to Peru, and finally to Buenos Aires. Truly an immense and, as it turned out, impossible task.

On the 3rd April 1815, the fleet reached Puerto Santo, near Carúpano. Morillo decided that the first thing to be done was to subdue the island of Margarita,

¹ *Supra*, p. 81.

whose warlike inhabitants had kept the flag of liberty flying when it had been beaten to the ground on the mainland. At Carúpano Morillo found Morales, now master of the eastern provinces, in command of 5000 men, ready to proceed to Margarita. When the expedition landed there, the islanders saw that it was too strong to be resisted, and Arismendi, who commanded there for the republicans, submitted, with practically the whole of the island. Not so Bermudez, who succeeded in sailing with a single ship through the midst of the Spanish fleet, and, making a long circuit by Martinique and St Thomas, eventually arrived safely at Cartagena.

Morillo himself landed at Asuncion in Margarita on the 9th April. That general, like so many of the Spanish commanders in South America, was of humble origin. Originally a sergeant of marines, he had served on shore under Wellington, and quickly risen to the rank of brigadier-general, which he held when Ferdinand returned to Spain. He was one of the first to salute the restored monarch, which fact is said to have gained him his appointment, one beyond his very mediocre talents. His second in command and chief of the staff was Don Pascual Enrile, a Cuban of good family, whom Morillo called the "terror of evil doers," but of whom Boves had said that he "exceeded in barbarity and cruelty." The latter character was truly remarkable, looking to the source from which it came.

Leaving garrisons in Margarita and Cumaná; Morillo left for Caracas, where he arrived on the 11th May, and took over charge of the office of Captain-General from Cajigal, who became commander of the army. One of Morillo's first operations was to raise a forced loan of 200,000 "pesos," to replace the military chest which had been lost by the burning of the "San Pedro." In Caracas, he and his men acted in a very overbearing fashion. Many leading creoles were arrested, private

property was confiscated, the inhabitants were treated with entire lack of consideration in billeting soldiers on them, and cattle were taken without payment for the expedition to Cartagena. On the 17th May, Morillo issued a proclamation, informing the Granadians that he would soon be in their midst with an avenging army.

On the 1st June, the expedition left Caracas, consisting of 8500 men, led by Morillo and Enrile, and accompanied by two Inquisitors, who were to reopen the Holy Office at Cartagena.

The fleet of 56 ships, sailing from Puerto Cabello on the 12th July, reached Santa Marta on the 23rd and 24th. Morillo despatched thence two columns to operate by land. The first was to clear the lower Magdalena, to reinforce Mompox, and to occupy Ocaña on the east bank, and the province of Antioquia on the west. The second, under Morales, was the vanguard of the force for the siege of Cartagena. By the 15th August, Morales, after marching through a devastated country, crossed the Magdalena above Soledad and advanced on Turbaco, sweeping in all the resources in grain and cattle of the country to the south of Cartagena. Morillo, leaving Santa Marta on the 17th August, landed unopposed with the main body not far from the fortress on the 22nd and 23rd.

The blockade was established on the 1st September 1815. Cartagena was ill prepared for a siege, and the inhabitants of the surrounding country, after the disgraceful exhibition of civil war which they had recently witnessed, were inclined to help rather than to resist Morillo. Even those within the fortress were not all hostile to the Spaniard, seeing that the success of the independents apparently only meant civil war. Provisions were by no means sufficient for the maintenance of the large non-combatant population. For the sufferings from hunger, which soon began to be felt, Castillo

was blamed, and, on the 17th October, he was deposed from the command, Bermudez being elected by the garrison in his place.

Morillo's troops, however, were also suffering severely. Disease spread rapidly amongst the European troops, unseasoned to the trying climate of the neighbourhood, and they suffered constant loss in the frequent skirmishes which occurred. The defence was carried on with equal vigour by the gunboats in the outer harbour, and it was only after suffering considerable loss that the Spanish warships succeeded in entering it.

By November the famine in the fortress was intense. All ordinary food had run out, and the wretched people were living on limited rations of horse-flesh, dogs, cats, and rats. A certain amount of food was procured by fishing in the harbour along the shore of the Tierra Bomba, the island lying between the obstructed channel of the Boca Grande and the forts of Boca Chica commanding the open entrance of the harbour, seven or eight miles south of the city.¹ This source of supply Morillo determined to cut off by occupying Tierra Bomba. In order to divert attention, he proposed to attack the hill of La Popa, half a mile inland from the harbour. In Bolivar's siege this height had been held by the besieger, though, as he had practically no artillery, he could do little or no harm from it to the fortress. Against Morillo's artillery it was absolutely necessary for the garrison to hold La Popa, from the top of which the whole fortress was commanded.

¹ Cartagena stands practically on an island, connected with the mainland only by a narrow strip of land on the east. About two miles south of the city is the Boca Grande, the best entrance in old times to the splendid harbour. This entrance was blocked up with sunken ships in order to prevent the entrance of the buccaneers and other invaders, who, after that, had to go down another six miles to the narrow Boca Chica, and then beat up the harbour against the North-East Trades—no easy matter. The piece of low land between the Boca Grande and the Boca Chica is the Tierra Bomba.

On the 9th November, two deserters brought to Morillo the fullest information as to the defences of La Popa, and the attack was fixed for the night of the 10th. In the darkness the stormers arrived unperceived within 200 paces of the ditch of the defenders' works on the summit. Then a sentry gave the alarm. Though the surprise had failed, the Spanish column pushed bravely on up the steep hill; two men had actually reached the ditch when, the commander being shot down, the rest retired in disorder, after losing a third of their number. At the same time, an attack by the Spanish gunboats on those of the defenders in the bay had been repulsed.

Another attack was driven off on the 12th, and the besiegers' gunboats were compelled to run close into the shore to seek protection from their infantry. On the 13th, Morales succeeded in landing on Tierra Bomba, which stopped the fishing. He was master of the outer harbour, but was repulsed in an attempt to storm the now isolated forts of Boca Chica.¹

By the end of November, the sufferings of the inhabitants were so fearful that the civil population were urged to leave the fortress. A few hundreds, mostly women and children, got out, only to die for the most part of starvation.

The garrison, reduced almost to a shadow, looked in vain for a ship bringing relief. Sentries actually died of starvation on their posts; resistance was no longer possible. Morillo's men, the Europeans at least, were almost as badly off, owing to the ravages of disease, and the general called on the governor to surrender, throwing himself and his men on the mercy of the king. Other-

¹ These forts still stand on either side of the narrow channel. As one passes in a steamer through the Boca Chica, it seems almost possible to throw a stone into either. They are now useless. During the siege they were commanded by Ducoudray-Holstein.

wise, Morillo threatened to send back the starving wretches whose misery alone had induced him to forgo his right to prevent their exit.

But the governor, though determined not to surrender, now realised that further resistance was hopeless, and was preparing to evacuate the place by sea. On the 5th December, the guns were spiked as well as was possible, and the garrison, with about 2000 of the inhabitants, assembled on the edge of the harbour ready to embark. The last post to be abandoned was La Popa.

To carry this multitude there were but sixteen small ships, badly provisioned, and ill equipped for sea. Under cover of night the flotilla succeeded in running the gauntlet of the fire of the enemy's gunboats and shore batteries, and reached without very heavy loss the Boca Chica, where they anchored in safety under protection of the guns of the forts. Having taken in a supply of water and embarked the garrisons of the forts, the ships sailed the same night.

Morillo, becoming aware of the evacuation on the 6th December, entered the fortress. In his official account of what he saw he writes—"The city presented the most horrible spectacle, the streets were strewn with unburied corpses, which polluted the air, and the greater part of the inhabitants were actually dying of hunger." O'Leary states that Morillo and his men behaved with the greatest humanity to these starving creatures. The soldiers divided their own rations with them, whilst Morillo took all possible measures to relieve their sufferings. Not so Moráles and his troops, mostly Venezuelans, who freely indulged their lust for blood by indiscriminate massacres. That commander, on occupying the Boca Chica forts, found in them three officers and sixty soldiers who had been unable to embark with the other fugitives. Every one of them was brutally murdered.

Next day the inhabitants of the village of Boca Chica, who had concealed themselves in the scrub on Tierra Bomba, were induced by promises of safety to leave their hiding places. As soon as they returned, 300 or more of them were put to death. As usual, there had been atrocities on both sides, for O'Leary describes the murder, just before the siege, of some Spanish prisoners captured by republican privateers and brought to Cartagena.¹

Morillo, too, took toll in a more deliberate way of the patriot leaders who fell into his hands. Among those who were shot or hanged was Bolivar's enemy Castillo, the ex-governor of Cartagena.²

Here it will be convenient to narrate briefly the remaining movements of Morillo in subjugating New Granada.

As soon as he had occupied Cartagena, he sent Colonel La Torre southwards with a strong column. He was to be joined on the way by Calzada, already arrived in New Granada from Barinas.

Meanwhile, in Bogotá things had not been going smoothly. There had been two reactionary plots, in one of which it had been sought to implicate Torices (formerly of Cartagena). He was honourably acquitted. The people, generally alarmed at the impending danger

¹ O'Leary, i. 287.

² Close to the present railway station, on the outskirts of Cartagena, may be seen a double row of columns, each with a bust on the top. If the author's memory serves him rightly, he counted sixteen. Under each bust is the name of the patriot, followed by the words "ahorcado en 1816" (hanged in 1816), or else "fusilado por la espalda" (shot in the back). A list is given by Larrazabal and others of the names of patriots executed in different parts of New Granada in 1816, with their rank and place of execution. There are 125 in all, of whom the most notable are Castillo (shot at Cartagena), J. Camacho (Bogotá), Torices (President—shot and body hung on gallows at Bogotá), Camilo Torres (the same as last), F. Caldas (Bogotá), J. R. Leiva (Spaniard, at Bogotá), and Montúfar. The last-named will be remembered as originally a Spanish envoy, and then a revolutionary leader in Quito.

when Cartagena should fall, would give little assistance to the government's schemes for resistance. The Congress was busy talking of reforms, whilst the Spaniards were losing no time in following up their success at Cartagena.

Calzada, after suffering a slight check, had defeated Urdaneta at Chitagá, in the province of Trujillo, on the 30th November 1815. He had occupied Cúcuta and Pamplona, and presently moved towards Ocaña to meet La Torre. On the Paramo of Cachirí he attacked 3000 republicans, mostly recruits, on the 21st February 1816. Thanks largely to the "Numancia" battalion of Venezuelans, Calzada gained, in the second day's battle, a complete victory, which was followed by the usual massacres. One Spanish colonel is said to have boasted that he had, with his own hand, killed so many rebels that his right arm was useless for several days. The force destroyed at Cachirí was practically all the Bogotá government had to oppose to the Spanish advance. Had Calzada advanced at once, he could have conquered Bogotá there and then. But he had to wait for La Torre.

Meanwhile, Warleta, with another column sent by Morillo, had, by the middle of March, subjugated the whole of Antioquia and Chocó,¹ though he encountered serious resistance from the manly population of the former. In Bogotá, J. F. Madrid now succeeded Torres as President. He found himself with very little influence in the panic-stricken capital, and was abandoned by the troops under Serviez, who, with many of the country people, sought safety on the plains of Casanare. Madrid then retired with his personal guard to Popayan, leaving Bogotá to its fate.

On the 5th May, La Torre was in Bogotá. A few

¹ The western district of the Western Cordilleras down to the Pacific Ocean.

days earlier he had issued promises of amnesty to all who should submit and swear fidelity to Ferdinand VII. When Morillo arrived, on the 26th May, he disallowed the amnesty. Those leaders who had remained at home on the strength of it were arrested, tried by court-martial, and hanged or shot. Amongst them, as already noted,¹ were Torres, Torices, Camacho, Montúfar, and others, including Caldas, a well-known scientist.

Morillo stayed at Bogotá till November 1816, when events in Venezuela, to be presently recounted, recalled him to that province. He left in command of 3800 men at Bogotá General Sámano, whom he later appointed Viceroy of New Granada, in place of Montalvo, whose methods were, he thought, too mild. Sámano was a real savage, who deluged Bogotá in blood.² His troops were principally Venezuelans and Pastusos.

¹ *Supra*, p. 164, n.

² Amongst Sámano's victims was a girl named Polycarpa Salabarríeta. Her lover, a republican like herself, had been compelled to serve in the Spanish ranks. It is not denied that the girl plotted the desertion of her lover and others, and prepared supplies for their flight to join the republican bands in Casanare. They were arrested, and Polycarpa's letters, found on the lover, implicated her. The two lovers, with six companions, were shot in the back at Bogotá on the 17th November 1817. Just before her death, the girl exclaimed, "My blood will very soon be avenged by the liberators of my country." This horrible case has attained the greatest celebrity in Colombia, where the story of the martyred heroine is a prime favourite of poets.

CHAPTER VII

BOLIVAR IN JAMAICA, HAITI, AND VENEZUELA,

1816

IT is time to return to Bolivar, whom we last saw sailing from Cartagena on the 9th May, in the deepest despair. Arriving at Kingston, he sought help from the Duke of Manchester, then Governor of Jamaica, for the relief of Cartagena. The Duke, naturally, could not assist in the rebellion of his colonies against a sovereign with whom Great Britain was at peace. He seems, however, to have sympathised with the exile, and to have treated him with civility. Speaking of Bolivar on one occasion, and alluding to the fiery nature of the Venezuelan and his weak physique, the Duke remarked that, "the flame has absorbed the oil." Failing with the English authorities, Bolivar found little sympathy amongst the foreigners in the island, to whom he applied to aid him in his scheme for an attack on Venezuela whilst Morillo was busy at Cartagena. Then he took to writing voluminous letters and manifestoes. One of his letters to a Jamaican gentleman¹ is a regular pamphlet on recent European and South American history. On the 10th July, he issued a long manifesto to his compatriots.² It summarises his movements after leaving Venezuela on the destruction of the republic. It deals at length with the case of Castillo, who, the writer says, had fraudulently and forcibly obtained possession of Cartagena. Bolivar had done

¹ O'Leary, i. 291, etc.

² O'Leary, Docts., 14, p. 246.

everything in his power, but in vain, to effect a reconciliation with this personal enemy. He had, he says, been forced by Castillo's perfidy to lay siege to Cartagena, a course approved by a council of war. The whole document is a vehement indictment of Castillo, and a fervid defence of the purity and patriotism of Bolivar's own motives. It is unnecessary to go into it in detail, though it has been fully considered in forming the opinion we have already expressed regarding this miserable quarrel between two men whose whole thoughts, and whose every action should have been devoted to the repulse of the common enemy.

As time passed in Jamaica, Bolivar realised the impossibility of organising an expedition there. It is true that the difficulty of ships and arms was to a certain extent got over by the generous offers of assistance made by Luis Brion, of whom much will have to be said in the history of the next few years.

This devoted adherent of the Venezuelan cause was born in 1782 in the island of Curaçao, the son of a wealthy Dutch merchant, a native of Brabant. Luis had been sent to Holland to be educated. He voluntarily enlisted in the Dutch army, and served gallantly at the time of the Anglo-Russian descent on Holland in 1799. He was then sent back to Curaçao, and, after some years spent in travel and trade, he returned there, with the large fortune which his father had left him much augmented by his own trading ventures. This was in 1804. In the following year he made a brave attempt to beat off the English landing in Curaçao. Then he went to La Guaira and Caracas, where, amongst others, he met young Mariano Montilla, whose fortunes he pushed. When the revolution began, he joined the independents, and was appointed captain of a frigate in 1811. Thereafter, he devoted the whole of his large fortune to the cause which he had adopted.

When Bolivar was in Jamaica, Brion was at Aux Cayes, in Haiti, raising means for the relief of Cartagena, and Ducoudray-Holstein asserts that Brion actually supplied the place with a considerable amount of arms and provisions during Morillo's siege.

On the 9th December 1815, Bolivar narrowly escaped assassination. A negro servant, at whose instigation is uncertain, entered his chamber at night, and stabbed to death the occupant of Bolivar's hammock. Fortunately for the Liberator, he was away in new lodgings at the moment, and the man in the hammock was Felix Amestoy, one of his officers. The murderer was duly captured, tried, and hanged. Larrazabal¹ snatches at a story that he was instigated by Moxó, the governor of Caracas, but O'Leary² says the story was that Morillo was at the bottom of the affair. O'Leary, however, who was personally acquainted with Morillo in later years when the war was over, held him in esteem, and declines to believe him capable of such an action.

Shortly after this escape, Bolivar sailed from Kingston. According to Larrazabal, he was bound for Aux Cayes to join Brion. Ducoudray-Holstein, on the other hand, says he was on his way to Cartagena to supersede Bermudez, at the request of Ducoudray himself. However this may be, both agree that, on the way, he met a Colombian privateer who informed him of the evacuation of Cartagena, whereupon he made for Aux Cayes, whither also the fugitives of Cartagena were bound. From Aux Cayes he proceeded to Port-au-Prince, the Haitian capital, where at that time Alexandre Pétion³ was President of

¹ i. 407.

² i. 312.

³ A mulatto, born at Port-au-Prince in 1770. In 1800 he went with Toussaint-Louverture to France, and returned in 1802 as a colonel in the French expedition under Pauline Bonaparte's first husband, Leclerc. Disgusted with the cruelties of the French and their treatment of Toussaint-Louverture, he joined the independents against them. He rose to be President of the Republic of Haiti, and died in 1818.

the Black Republic. To him Bolivar was introduced by Sir R. Sutherland, and found in the mulatto President an excellent friend, who gave him substantial assistance in the matter of arms and ammunition. Pétion had to take precautions against this assistance embroiling him with Spain.

On the 16th January 1816, there arrived at Aux Cayes the remains of the party of fugitives from Cartagena. Immediately they got to sea after the evacuation, their ships were dispersed by a storm, some being lost or driven ashore on the coast between Cartagena and Puerto Bello. Amongst those who, at last, reached Aux Cayes were some notable enemies of Bolivar, especially Mariano Montilla, Bermudez, Aury, and Ducoudray - Holstein, though the latter professes to have been well disposed at the time towards Bolivar. On the other hand, Mariño, Zea, Piar, and Brion were friendly, and tried to keep the peace. There was plenty of wrangling and squabbling. Mariano Montilla went so far as to challenge Bolivar to a duel, whilst Bermudez openly charged him with cowardice and incapacity.

Bolivar now summoned a meeting of all the exiled chiefs to consider the question of the proposed expedition to Venezuela. At this meeting Brion proposed the election of Bolivar to the chief command, provisionally at least, until the assembly of a larger number of leaders in Venezuela should enable a supreme chief to be chosen by a more general vote. Brion's proposal was supported by Marimon, Zea,¹ and Duran, whilst Aury (commander of the ships), Montilla, and Bermudez strongly opposed it, proposing instead to entrust the command to a com-

¹ Francisco Antonio Zea was born at Medellin, in Antioquia, in 1770. In 1797 he was tried in Madrid for his republican sentiments freely expressed. He was released after two years in the dungeons of Cadiz. After being employed in Spain in various capacities, he went to England in 1812, whence he went to join Bolivar in 1816. He plays a considerable part in this history. He died at Bath (England) in 1822.

mission of three or five. In the end Aury yielded, whilst Bermudez and Montilla¹ were turned out as irreconcilables. Bolivar was then elected unanimously. Mariño became chief of the staff, with Ducoudray-Holstein as assistant; Brion was appointed admiral, and Zea Intendant.

The expedition consisted of six schooners and a sloop, with only about 250 soldiers, chiefly officers, though the ships carried arms and ammunition for 6000, the rest of whom were expected to join in Venezuela. The expedition was almost broken up at the last moment, for Aury put in a claim for the expenses of his ship, the "Constitution," and there was no money to meet it. Moreover, Aury, Bermudez, and Montilla tried to divert part of the expedition to Mexico. Pétion again came to Bolivar's assistance, not only by guaranteeing the sum due, but also by refusing to recognise the Mexican scheme, or to acknowledge any leaders but Bolivar and Marimon. Aury and Montilla thereupon left the patriots, and Bermudez was refused permission to go with them. For all his services, Pétion demanded of Bolivar a promise, which was given, that the freedom of all slaves in Venezuela should be decreed as soon as the Liberator landed there.

The fleet sailed, at last, on the 31st March 1816. In the "Bolivar" were Bolivar himself, Brion, and the staff. In the "Mariño" were Mariño, Piar, and MacGregor, a Scotch adventurer. Bolivar's orders were to sail for the island of Margarita.

In that island the moderate Spanish governor, Herraiz, left there by Morillo, had been succeeded by Urreiztieta, a man of a harsher stamp. One of his first measures was to try and do away with Arismendi, who, it will be remembered, had surrendered with the rest of the islanders

¹ Mariano, brother of Tomas Montilla, born at Caracas in 1782. After his reconciliation with Bolivar, he became one of the most devoted followers of the Liberator, after whose death he presently became the first Venezuelan Minister to England, and died in Caracas in 1851.

to Morillo. Arismendi, warned of the real designs of the governor in asking him to a dinner to celebrate the news of Napoleon's deportation, concealed himself. In November 1815 he, raising the standard of revolt, and with a few companions armed only with lances, seized the port of Juan Griego and Villa del Norte. Furious at the successes of Arismendi, Urreiztieta wreaked his vengeance on the innocent wife of the rebel. She was thrown into prison, where her new-born child died, and was afterwards sent to Cadiz as a criminal. One of the governor's officers, Pardo, even suggested a general massacre of the women and children as the best means of exterminating a rebel population, but this was too much even for Moxó, the Captain-General.

We now return to Bolivar, whose fleet, after a very slow voyage, only reached the Testigos islands on the 1st May. Next day the squadron came upon some Spanish warships, which it attacked. The brigantine "Intrepido" was captured by boarding, as well as a schooner, the "Rita."¹ Two other ships escaped.

On the 3rd May, the expedition reached Juan Griego in the island of Margarita. As we know, Arismendi was in possession of that place. When Bolivar went to Cartagena, in 1814, he had characterised Arismendi as "seditious," and there was, therefore, some doubt how he would be received by that chief. However, he found Arismendi prepared to receive him well, so he proceeded to disembark. Apropos of Arismendi, we may refer to a story, told by Ducoudray-Holstein, of how some

¹ Ducoudray-Holstein (i. 313) tells a long story of Bolivar's cowardly behaviour in this action, when he hid himself in a place of safety until all was over. Then he came out and began shooting at the Spaniards who were trying to swim away. Considering the marked bias of Ducoudray, and many notable instances where Bolivar showed plenty of personal courage, there seems very insufficient reason for believing this story, circumstantial though it be. After all, there was no earthly reason why the commander-in-chief should lead a boarding-party.

unfortunate Spanish prisoners of the recent naval action, having unfortunately been landed, were promptly shot by the Margaritan. As the writer strongly supports Arismendi against Bolivar, the story is probably true, and serves as evidence to show that massacres of prisoners were just as much in vogue with the independents as with the royalists. Arismendi had already distinguished himself as a butcher in the massacre of La Guaira in 1814.¹

The landing of Bolivar, and the considerable number of rebel troops, inclusive of those of Arismendi, now properly armed from Bolivar's stores, so alarmed the Spanish commanders in the island that they evacuated the castle of Santa Rosa and the town of Asuncion, which were occupied by Arismendi.

On the 7th May, Bolivar assembled, at Villa del Norte, the principal inhabitants of Margarita, and all the commanders. Addressing them, he said that it was necessary to appoint as commander the man in whom they had most confidence. Having his team now well in hand, he went on to deprecate his own appointment, which, perhaps, he would not have dared had Aury, Montilla, and Bermudez been still present. He was, as he clearly desired, elected unanimously "Supreme Chief of the Republic." On the following day, he issued a proclamation² in which he authorised the cities to nominate deputies to the Congress, with the same powers as they had enjoyed under the former republic, which had been wiped out by Boves and Morales. Moreover, he announced to the Spaniards in Venezuela the termination of war to the death on his part, provided they did likewise. It can hardly be doubted that, almost from the first, he had regretted

¹ i. 326. Arismendi it was who carried out the massacre of La Guaira in February 1814.

² O'Leary, *Docts.*, 15, p. 56.

his barbarous proclamation of Trujillo. To this Moxó, the Captain-General, replied by the offer of a reward of 10,000¹ pesos each for the heads of Bolivar and some of the other leaders. Bolivar now determined to land on the mainland at Carúpano, which he reached on the 1st June. The weak Spanish garrison was easily driven out, abandoning its ships, artillery and stores. Bolivar, in accordance with his promise to Pétion, called upon the slaves to join his standard, offering to them their liberty, and to their masters compensation.² Mariño was sent to Guiria, Piar to Maturin to raise the country, whilst the Liberator himself worked in Carúpano at the general organisation of the republican army.

On the 28th June, a fresh popular assembly at Carúpano recognised Bolivar as Supreme Chief, and demanded the constitution of a government "one and central." Three days earlier, Bolivar's authority had been recognised by the guerrilla leaders in the interior, Monágas, Rojas, Cedeño, and Zaraza. The expeditions of Mariño and Piar were successful, but their value was marred by the fact that, as soon as they were out of reach of Bolivar, these two subordinates began to intrigue for his displacement in favour of Mariño. Meanwhile, Bolivar's advance on Cumaná had met with a reverse at the hands of the Spaniards, who had also beaten the guerrilla forces of Rojas, Zaraza, and Monágas. Once more Bolivar, thinking his position at Carúpano untenable, sailed on the 1st July westwards round the north of Margarita, leaving behind Ducoudray-Holstein and others who were hostile to him. Here Ducoudray's personal connexion with Bolivar ceased. According to his own account, Bolivar had refused to

¹ About £2000, at five pesos to the £.

² Notwithstanding many proclamations by Bolivar decreeing the abolition of slavery in Venezuela, a law had to be passed providing for this reform so late as 1854.

shake hands with him as a traitor who deserved to be shot.¹

The expedition, which consisted of fifteen ships and some 800 men, anchored at Ocumare de la Costa, between Puerto Cabello and La Guaira, on the 6th July.

Once more Bolivar proclaimed the cessation of the war to the death, and offered an amnesty to all Spaniards surrendering. He also again notified the abolition of slavery.

That same night Soublette was ordered to march across the mountains to La Cabrera, on the north side of the Valencia lake, and Pinango was sent to collect recruits at Choroní.

On the day of Bolivar's disembarkation at Ocumare, there arrived at Valencia Morales, with a Spanish force sent back by Morillo from Ocaña, through which he was marching, after the fall of Cartagena, to subdue Bogotá and the rest of New Granada. Before the superior force which Morales had collected, Soublette fell back from La Cabrera on Ocumare. On the 14th July, he stood to fight in an advantageous position on the hills south of Ocumare. Bolivar here joined him with a reinforcement of 150 men. The republicans, inferior in numbers to Morales, and also inferior in quality as troops, were badly beaten, and fled in disorder to Ocumare. Bolivar, hurrying back to Ocumare, met MacGregor² on the road and despatched him to Choroní,

¹ Ducoudray-Holstein, i. p. 352. The impression of this author, conveyed by a perusal of his work, is of a conceited French adventurer always striving to make himself out a person of much more ability and importance than he really was.

² Sir Gregor MacGregor, a Scottish adventurer in South America, gives some account of his early life there in a pamphlet published in 1839, entitled "Exposicion documentada que el General Mac Gregor dirijó, &c.," being a claim against the Venezuelan Government. He went to Venezuela in 1811, was Colonel and Adjutant-General in Miranda's force, and married Josefa Lovera. They embarked at La Guaira for Cartagena after Miranda's capitulation, and MacGregor went with Bolivar to Mompox in 1813. After

whilst he himself endeavoured to embark his park. In this he failed, and presently a false report that the enemy was in the town decided him to cut the cable of the ship on which he was, and to sail away, leaving the remnants of his troops and MacGregor to their fate. Brion, with some of the other ships, had already sailed on a cruise, with instructions from Bolivar to try and open up relations with Mexico and the United States. On the 16th July, Bolivar reached the little island of Buen Aire, near Curaçao. Here he had fresh difficulties with the captains of his vessels, who proposed to seize the arms in payment of what was due to them. The situation was only saved by the arrival of Brion from Curaçao.

Larrazabal says that Bolivar had tried in vain to communicate with Soublette and MacGregor on the 15th July at Choroní, and now, on the 19th, he again sailed for that port, only to find his lieutenants gone, and the royalists in possession. Returning to Buen Aire he found Bermudez there and, sinking their differences, the two decided to sail for Guiria to join Mariño.¹

Before discussing Bolivar's conduct at Ocumare it will be well to look at what happened to MacGregor and Soublette after his departure. The Scotsman took command of the force collected at Choroní. He and the

that he was employed in the army of New Granada, which he left on account of illness in 1814. In 1815 he was in Cartagena during the two sieges, and, after the evacuation, went to Haiti, where he joined Bolivar. His retreat from Ocumare will be described presently. In 1818 he had a good deal to do with Lopez Mendez in England in regard to the British troops for Venezuela. In 1819 he took, and again lost, Puerto Bello, as will be related later. After that he appears to have been warned off from Venezuela by Bolivar. His later adventures, when he set up as an Indian "cacique" on the Mosquito coast, are recorded in the "Dictionary of National Biography."

¹ This is Restrepo's account. Larrazabal (i. 436) says Bermudez, after being left behind at Aux Cayes, had followed Bolivar in hopes of a reconciliation. But he denies that the two men saw one another at Buen Aire, whence they sailed, as Restrepo says, in separate ships.

other officers with him, Soubllette, Auzoátegui, Salom, and Briceño, were aware that it had been Bolívar's intention in landing at Ocumare to march into the Aragua valley, where, owing to his estates being there, he had great influence. Thence he purposed to push south to join the guerrilla chiefs who were operating in Central Venezuela. This plan, now that Bolívar was gone, it was resolved to carry through without him. It was a bold resolve bravely executed by MacGregor, who was, perhaps, the only man capable of keeping in order his quarrelsome Venezuelan subordinates. Had it been Bolívar's work, no praise would have been too great in Larrazabal's narrative. Being the work of a foreigner, he passes it over very lightly, even attempting to attribute the real credit to Soubllette and the other Venezuelans.¹

Marching through the Aragua valley by Maracay and Victoria without encountering serious resistance, MacGregor reached Chaguaramas on the 28th July. There he was beaten off in an attack on 300 royalists who had entrenched themselves. Hearing that Quero, whom he had recently brushed aside, was in pursuit of him with a considerable force, MacGregor pushed on to Quebrada Honda,² picking up small guerrilla reinforcements as he marched. At that place he was caught up and attacked by Quero, who was beaten off but not pursued. MacGregor was able, however, to continue his retreat. It was not till he reached San Diego de Cabrutica,³ far on the way to the Orinoco, that he fell in with Zaraza and Monágas, who joined him with their guerrillas. At San Diego, where he rested till the 25th August, he turned northwards for Barcelona. At Aragua de Barcelona he found the royalist Rafael Lopez too

¹ i. p. 434 n.

² Shown on the map as Socorro, just north of Unare, on the river of that name.

³ Not on the map. Its position about corresponds to that of the "r" of Cabrutica, south of El Pao.

strongly posted to be attacked. MacGregor, therefore, marched round him. Lopez followed at once, without waiting for Morales, who was hurrying up with his own division and Quero's. At El Alacran Lopez attacked the republicans, with disastrous results to himself. In consequence of his victory, MacGregor was able to occupy Barcelona without resistance, whilst one of his companions, Anzoátegui, seized the neighbouring small port of Piritú.

At Barcelona MacGregor was superseded in his command by Piar, his senior, who had arrived from Cumaná with reinforcements. Morales was hurrying up to Barcelona to avenge Lopez's defeat at El Alacran. To meet him Piar and MacGregor advanced to El Juncal, where they inflicted a very heavy defeat on him (27th September 1816). The pursuit was carried out by MacGregor and Monágas as far as San Lorenzo, Morales' force being almost wiped out, though he is said to have had 3000 men against 2000 at El Juncal.¹

At San Lorenzo MacGregor resigned his command, in consequence of his disgust at the jealousy of Piar, whose desire for sole and absolute command alienated Monágas also, and other subordinates.

Such were the operations successfully carried out by MacGregor after Bolivar's sudden departure from Ocumare. Not unnaturally, Bolivar has been reproached with desertion of his men in circumstances which were shown, by the subsequent course of events, to be far from desperate.

Restrepo,² whom Larrazabal follows, defends Bolivar on the ground that he distrusted the commanders of his vessels, whom he suspected of an intention of making off with the arms which had been shipped. He also alleges

¹ El Alacran, El Juncal, and S. Lorenzo are not on map. They appear to be all close to Barcelona, and Codazzi shows the two latter to the west of it.

² Restrepo, ii. 346.

that, just before the Liberator cut the cable of the "Indio Libre," on which he had embarked, he was informed by Alzuru that the enemy was already in Ocumare, and that his own troops had retired to Choroni. Soublette, according to Restrepo, had really sent Alzuru to say Morales was apparently halting for the night some distance short of Ocumare. The misdelivery of the message, whether due to stupidity or treachery on Abzuru's part, caused a panic in the port, and there was danger to the ships from the rush of people trying to get on board. On the whole, the story does not seem a very plausible one, and it is difficult to avoid the suspicion that there was some panic on Bolivar's part.

Bolivar reached Guiria on the 16th August, twenty-four hours after Bermudez, who had already worked upon Mariño to oppose the Liberator. Mariño accordingly received him coldly, and the estrangement grew to such an extent that, on the 22nd, there was a riotous mob shouting, "Down with Bolivar and up with Mariño and Bermudez!" According to Larrazabal, there were plots even to assassinate Bolivar, and Bermudez went so far as to draw his sword upon him. Bolivar, in the end, finding his position at Guiria intolerable, re-embarked, leaving Mariño and Bermudez in undisputed possession. He arrived once more at Port-au-Prince on the 9th October 1816. There he found Mina, the ex-Spanish general of Peninsula fame, organising an expedition to Mexico, which he promised should return later on to Venezuela if Bolivar would join it. This offer Bolivar refused. He had hoped for help in his expeditions from the United States, but he found none was to be got, whether public or private; indeed, President Madison issued a special proclamation against giving help to the revolted South American colonies. Thanks largely to the continued assistance of Brion and Pétion, Bolivar was ready to start again in November.

The various republican leaders in Venezuela were now separated by great distances from one another, each was acting independently, and all began to feel that the general control of Bolivar was necessary for united action. First Arismendi wrote (22nd September)¹ begging him to return. Then the chiefs of the central forces wrote (27th September)¹ in a similar strain, with many expressions of regret at the recent unfortunate events at Guiria. Their letter was sent by Zea, who sailed from Barcelona.

It was not till the 21st December 1816 that Bolivar and Brion sailed from the Haitian port of Jacmel for Juan Griego in Margarita, which was reached on the 28th of the same month. The rest of the ships sailed on the 28th December from Aux Cayes under Villaret, only reaching Margarita a month later. As soon as Bolivar landed he issued the usual proclamation to the Venezuelans convoking a Congress, and again proclaiming the emancipation of the slaves. Margarita, "the Sparta of Venezuela," thanks to the exertions of Arismendi, was in the power of the republicans, and that leader, having completed his task in the island, had gone to the mainland at Barcelona with 400 men, just as Bolivar sailed from Aux Cayes. Thither Bolivar followed him on the 31st December 1816, landing for the last time on South American soil, which he was never again to quit, except for the purpose of passing by sea from one part to another. At Barcelona, Bolivar and Arismendi met cordially. To the former, prospects seemed rosy, and he was already beginning to talk of proceeding, after the liberation of Venezuela and New Granada, to turn the Spaniards completely out of South America. His confidence is remarkable, especially when we know that he had only 300 men in Barcelona, besides the 400 Margariteños who had followed Arismendi to the main-

¹ Larrazabal, i. 444, and O'Leary, i. 364.

land. These latter would probably not have left their native island for any one with less personal influence over them than Arismendi had. Bolivar began with a very serious misfortune, for, advancing against Jimenez, who had 550 badly armed royalists at Clarines, he was heavily defeated and forced back to Barcelona. This at once reduced him to the defensive, and he had saved so few from the late battle that he could only get together 600 very inferior troops, whilst Moxó was understood to be mustering a force of 4000 at Orituco with which to crush the new revolt.

Bolivar, notwithstanding the weakness of his force, determined to carry out a passive defence of the Franciscan monastery at Barcelona. He chose to call it a fort (*casa fuerte*), though it was nothing of the sort. He also wrote to Mariño, then near Cumaná, urgently demanding help. Bermudez, the evil genius of Mariño, tried to persuade him not to move, but he insisted on marching for Barcelona with the 1200 men he had. He came, partly by land, partly by sea, the point of reunion being fixed at Pozuelos.

The Spaniards, now commanded by Pascual Real, with Morales and Aldama under him, appeared before Barcelona on the 8th February 1817, and opened fire on the defenders of the monastery. On the same date Bermudez, with the land division of Mariño's forces, was at Pozuelos. With great assurance he sent notice to Real that, Bermudez having arrived, he had better retire. This he at once did, first on Juncal, and then on Clarines. For this he does not seem to have had any excuse, except shortness of supplies and absence of his heavy artillery, defects which he should have taken care not to allow.

Real being gone, Mariño and Bermudez entered Barcelona, where Bolivar and Bermudez met on the most cordial terms. Truly kaleidoscopic are the quarrels and reconciliations of these Venezuelan patriots!

CHAPTER VIII

THE LIBERATION OF GUAYANA AND THE EXECUTION OF PIAR, 1816-17

REAL, after his unjustifiable retreat, left Bolivar unmolested in Barcelona, though the latter place was also short of food, and Bolivar found it difficult to maintain himself in it. The fact appears to have been that this part of the country was almost exhausted, through the constant war and destruction which had prevailed in it for years past. This remark applies to practically the whole of the hilly coast region of Venezuela, but it does not apply to the plains between the coast range and the Orinoco, which hitherto had vomited forth their hordes to prey upon the hill country, and had seen comparatively little fighting themselves. Still less does it apply to the plains south of the line of the Apure and the Orinoco. There there had been no fighting worth mention, and behind them lay in reserve the rich granaries of the missions. Not only were the Orinoco plains rich in supplies of food, but also they could supply large forces of cavalry to the party which should hold possession of the towns on the rivers. Hitherto the Llaneros had fought almost exclusively for the royalists, because the royalists were in possession of Angostura, San Fernando, and the other towns on the Apure and Orinoco, and alone represented authority. As we have already said, the Llaneros, thanks to their ferocity, their habits of life, and the impossibility of attacking them with a superior force, had nothing to

fear from either Spaniard or republican. They had practically no interest in the contest, and, notwithstanding the flattering words of some South American writers on the subject of the patriotism of these semi-savages, they were probably innocent of any such sentiment. They joined Boves or Yañez in the hope of plunder, and perhaps to some extent from a love of fighting. They would be equally willing to join Bolivar or Piar from the same motives, provided they had a leader congenial to them, and that the republicans were in possession.

In addition to all this, the party which held the line of the Orinoco and the Apure had a splendid waterway connecting them with the sea. They could move in either direction along this waterway, or, if defeated in the north, retire behind it to a position of security, still leaving, as a covering force on the north bank, the whole Llanero population of the plains north of the river. Hitherto Bolivar had neglected all this vast area as a base, and had persistently aimed at the possession of Caracas, Valencia, Barcelona, and the northern coast. Now, at last, perceiving the superiority of this country over the northern hills as a base, he resolved to abandon the exhausted northern area and to base himself on the Orinoco and the country behind it. The credit of the discovery must be given to Piar rather than to Bolivar, for the mulatto chief had already, in the end of 1816, transferred his operations to the Orinoco, and, by January 1817, was blockading Angostura, though he had been badly repulsed in an attempt to carry it by assault.

Bolivar, in great difficulties for provisions at Barcelona, resolved to join Piar before Angostura; but, even then, he made the great mistake of leaving behind at Barcelona 400 men, under the command of Freites, to defend the Franciscan monastery.¹ To do so was to

¹ Pedro Maria Freites. The man who shot himself at La Puerta was Antonio.

doom this small isolated force to destruction. This decision is a notable instance of the military incapacity of Bolivar and the men who formed the council of war in which the measure was decided on. The rest of the forces, some 2000 men, were to march, under Mariño's command, to Guayana.

On the 25th March the Liberator started, with only 15 officers and a few orderlies, leaving Mariño and the main body to follow three hours later. The leading man of Bolivar's small party suddenly came, at Quiamare, upon a Spanish ambushade. He was closely followed by Bolivar himself, who had the presence of mind to dismount and shout loudly an order to attack on both flanks. This was followed by a volley from the escort, and the two combined had the effect of inducing the enemy to believe the force much greater than it was. The Spaniards promptly fled, and their commander was disgusted when he discovered later what a prize they had missed. Bolivar had very narrowly escaped capture, but, after that, he reached the Orinoco without further adventure and crossed it. Finding Piar engaged in the siege of Angostura without any siege artillery, Bolivar decided to retrace his steps to El Chaparro, and to bring up his artillery to breach the place. At Chaparro he found Bermudez and Valdés, from whom he learnt that the unfortunate Freites had been destroyed at Barcelona. Moxó had replaced the incompetent Real by Aldama, who, placing his artillery behind the walls of Barcelona itself, was soon able to storm the monastery, which had no defensive strength, and was, moreover, crowded with non-combatant refugees. The assault was followed by the usual indiscriminate massacres. Freites and Francisco Ribas, who were taken alive, were sent to Caracas and there hanged by order of Moxó. Larrazabal gives a ghastly description of the Barcelona massacres and of the streets strewn with corpses on

which the dogs fed. He puts the number slain, some of them even on the altar steps, at 1000, of whom many were old men, women, and children. Fifty of the sick in hospital were murdered by special order. Restrepo tells the same story.¹ During these events, Mariño's army was still not far from Barcelona, but he remained deaf to all appeals for help. He objected to serving under Bolivar in the eastern districts, which he looked upon as his own special territory, and he had decided to go on his own account to Cumaná. Others urged on this weak young man in his perverse and selfish decision, but Bermudez was not amongst them, for he was now entirely on Bolivar's side. Curiously enough, Urdaneta, hitherto always working loyally with Bolivar, now joined Mariño, whilst Bermudez and Arismendi went on southwards to Chaparro to join Bolivar. They had but 500 men, the rest going with Mariño.

On the 25th and 26th April Bolivar again crossed to the south bank of the Orinoco, just above the mouth of the river Pao. The river being now in high flood, owing to the heavy rains, the passage was effected with great difficulty. Bolivar's position was not a promising one, looking to the facts that Mariño was gone off on his own account, Barcelona was lost, and Morillo, after reconquering New Granada, had returned to deal again with Venezuela. Finally, Bolivar now heard of the arrival at Cumaná of a fresh expeditionary force from Spain, under the command of Canterac, a French adventurer. That officer's orders required him, after giving such assistance as might be necessary to Morillo, to proceed across the Isthmus of Panama, and embark his 2300 men on the Pacific for Peru.

After his repulse from Angostura in January 1817, Piar had thought it well to annex the valuable resources

¹ ii. 382.

in grain and cattle of the missions on the river Caroní, which joins the Orinoco from the south, 100 miles below Angostura. Marching thither with part of his force, he seized the various Capuchin establishments, deprived the missionaries of all their power, and collected twenty-two of them at the monastery of Caruache. Thereupon the Indians, hitherto under the rule of the missionaries, promptly sided with the republicans, some of them enlisting in the revolutionary forces.

Against Piar marched Don Miguel de la Torre, the commander of the royalist troops in Guayana.¹ The opponents met at San Felix, just east of the junction of the Caroní with the Orinoco, with the result that La Torre was completely defeated, only escaping himself thanks to a good horse. Seventy-five of his officers, including Ceruti, the governor, fell into Piar's hands. The victor massacred the whole of the 300 European prisoners. What is there to choose in the conduct of the two sides, notwithstanding the virtuous indignation of South American writers at Spanish cruelties?

On the 2nd May Bolivar, with the troops from El Chaparro, joined Piar. El Chaparro was by this time occupied by Morillo and Aldama with some 6000 men. Bolivar, operating against Angostura, feared an attack by them on his rear, and, in order to get the captive Capuchins out of the way of re-capture, ordered them to be transferred from Caruache to a settlement called La Divina Pastora in the interior of the missions. According to O'Leary and Restrepo, the officer who received the order, being a new-comer, was unaware of the existence of such a place, and interpreted the order to send these unfortunate men to La Divina Pastora (the Divine Shepherdess) as a euphemism for sending them to another world. The whole of them were

¹ He had returned from Bogotá with Morillo, who had sent him to command in Guayana.

massacred. This version, if correct, would clear Bolivar of the charges made by the Spaniards to the effect that he made himself indirectly responsible for the murders, by uttering hasty words very similar to those of Henry II. regarding Becket. It is not of much importance whether he did or did not. The true significance of the massacre lies in the evidence it affords of the general spirit of the republicans, and of their recklessness of human life. If the officer could innocently misinterpret the Divina Pastora order, it shows clearly that such a massacre as was carried out was looked upon quite as a matter of course, and was certainly not likely to be censured by superior authority. Bolivar, according to Larrazabal, called upon Piar for an explanation. The mulatto replied with expressions of regret and promises of punishment of the guilty officers. Needless to say, the promises were not fulfilled, and no more was heard of the affair. Restrepo makes no mention of the call for an explanation, merely recording that the officer had good reason to reckon on impunity, for no charge was brought against him, to the disgrace of the Liberator.¹ Meanwhile, Mariño was holding an absurd Congress of ten members at Cariaco. He was supported by Zea, Brion, Canon J. C. de Madariaga,² and others. Madariaga, having only recently returned to Venezuela, thought that an elective administration should be formed at once. He was probably not alone in thinking that there was too much of the despot about Bolivar, and very little probability of his really allowing himself to be hampered by a Congress. How much of all these intrigues against Bolivar represented honest

¹ Restrepo, ii. 402.

² This man was deported to Ceuta by Monteverde in 1812. He and others escaped from that fortress to Gibraltar, and eventually back to Venezuela. After helping to create this disturbance in the east of Venezuela he went back to Jamaica.

patriotism, and how much was mere personal ambition, it is very difficult to say. As a matter of expediency, under the existing circumstances, it is hardly possible to doubt that in the centralisation of power in the hands of one leader lay the best chances of the republicans. To this miniature Congress Mariño surrendered his appointment of second in command of the army. Unlike Bolivar, he found his resignation accepted, and was only compensated by a minor appointment. The executive was to consist of a triumvirate again, but as Fernando Toro, one of them, was living in Trinidad, and Bolivar, another, was in Guayana, their places had at once to be filled by substitutes. The whole thing was farcical, and, notwithstanding the position Brion had taken up, he accepted orders from Bolivar to enter the Orinoco with his squadron. The Liberator, anxious to master the fort of Guayana Vieja and the course of the Orinoco which it commanded, had already gained some advantages with his small river craft; with the more powerful ships of Brion, it would probably be possible to clear the river completely of royalist gunboats.

On the 26th May, Bolivar left San Miguel for Guayana Vieja, of which he rearranged the blockade, whilst he took up a position with his main body at San Felix to await the arrival of Brion. Angostura was still blockaded also. The Liberator busied himself at San Felix in drafting a decree regulating courts martial, which after all were the principal class of judicial institution likely to have much to do during the war.

Bolivar now received a letter from Brion promising to sail from Pampatar in Margarita on the 31st May, and also sending the news that Morillo was proceeding to subdue that island. Both items of news were welcome, the latter because it promised Bolivar breathing space in which to make himself complete master of Guayana,

and any attack on the brave Margariteños was likely to prove a very thorny and unprofitable undertaking for Morillo. On the other hand, the unstable and ambitious Piar, excited by the apparent success of Mariño's revolt against the authority of Bolívar, was beginning to be restive, and Arismendi, with perhaps better intentions, was talking of a separate government for his native island of Margarita. Piar was warned and went no further for the moment. Arismendi was set to work to construct boats and organise operations on the river.

Brion, after some delay, duly put in an appearance with his ships on the lower Orinoco. It was desirable to send down to him the boats above Guayana Vieja, and, in the night of the 2nd to 3rd July, nine out of eleven succeeded in passing the fortress unharmed. The other two, unable to pass, returned upstream. The nine which had got past took shelter in the creek of Casacoima,¹ on the right bank, in order to avoid the pursuit of a superior royalist flotilla. To protect them there, Bolívar marched with a small force. The Spanish boats had also landed men. Bolívar, carelessly riding with his generals at some distance from his troops, was surprised by the Spanish landing force, and was so nearly finding himself a prisoner that he was, it is said, preparing to stab himself rather than fall into the hands of the enemy. He was rescued by the arrival of his men in the nick of time. He was, however, too late to save his boats, the crews of which, abandoning them to the Spaniards, effected their own escape by land. On the other hand, some "flecheras"² belonging to Brion, under the command of Díaz, gained a considerable success over the Spanish

¹ Not marked on map. It is just above the head of the delta.

² The "flechera" was a sort of large barge propelled by sails and oars. Many of them could carry 80 or 100 men, besides one or two cannon. Drawing very little water, they could penetrate into shallow places and backwaters of the rivers. They were fast, and, manned by the Margaritan sailors, gave excellent results both on the coast and on the Orinoco.

flotilla, which lost seven of its "flecheras." The lower Orinoco being now open, Brion was able to sail up and meet Bolivar at Casacoima, where a fort was built to protect the squadron.

The news of this river fight, and of Brion's arrival, determined La Torre to evacuate Guayana Vieja and Angostura. The latter place, closely blockaded by Bermudez, had been reduced to great straits, and, the command of the lower river being lost to La Torre, was no longer tenable. On the 17th July, La Torre, accompanied by Fitzgerald,¹ the last Spanish governor of Guayana, all the officials and the garrison, slipping quietly away from Angostura down the river, safely reached the British Island of Granada. Bermudez at once occupied the place.² Guayana Vieja surrendered at discretion on the 3rd August. Guayana was now completely in the power of the republicans. Writing to the Marquis de Toro in Trinidad, Bolivar says of his new acquisition: "This province is a point of capital importance, very suitable for the defensive, still more so for the offensive. We hold the rear of the enemy from here (Angostura) to Santa Fé [Bogotá], and possess an immense territory on both banks of the Orinoco, the Apure, the Meta, and the Arauca. Moreover, we have cattle and horses, and, since the struggle now depends on maintaining territory and prolonging the campaign, the party which can secure this advantage the best is sure to be the conqueror." Larrazabal, to whom Bolivar always seems perfect, vaunts his military insight as displayed in these words. He would have had better reason for doing so had his hero seen all this at a somewhat earlier date. Out of Guayana had issued most of the forces with which

¹ Fitzgerald had behaved with such moderation that Brion issued a special order that, if he were captured, he was to be treated with the same consideration as if he had been a republican leader.

² Angostura later acquired the name by which it is now known, of Ciudad Bolivar.

Boves, Morales, and Yañez had driven him from Venezuela, yet, had Bolivar established himself in Guayana before 1814, as he might easily have done, those very forces would have been available on his side, instead of against him.

Whilst Bolivar was establishing himself on the Orinoco, Morillo made a vain attempt to subdue Margarita. The islanders, whom Morillo himself described as "giants, fighting like tigers and facing fire and the bayonet with a courage unexampled amongst the best troops in the world," were the ruin of the expeditionary force. Hearing of Bolivar's conquests, and of other successes of the insurgents in all directions, Morillo returned to the mainland at La Guaira. He brought back 700 of his men wounded in the fighting in Margarita.

But matters were not going smoothly in Bolivar's camp. Piar, still plotting against him, now asked for sick leave to recruit his health in Trinidad or Curaçao. After refusing it at first, Bolivar granted the leave on the 30th June. Piar, instead of going to Trinidad or Curaçao, merely went southwards to Upatá, where he continued plotting and accusing Bolivar of cowardice and ambitious designs. Worse than this, he tried to stir up race feeling and rivalry between classes.¹ Returning after the capture of Angostura, he tried to incite Bermudez, and the leaders of mixed blood like himself, against Bolivar. Remonstrances being ineffectual, Bolivar ordered his arrest and transmission to

¹ There appears always to have been some anxiety lest the men of colour should take part against the whites. Perhaps Bolivar's best justification for shooting Piar lies in the danger of such a movement headed by a man of Piar's ability and ambition. The despatches of Colonel Campbell, British Minister in Bogotá, in 1828, confirm this idea of the dread entertained of a "coloured" movement; for he takes some pains to show that Padilla's insurrection at Cartagena in that year was a political and not a race movement.

headquarters. Piar was extremely popular in the army, and, had he held out boldly, it is quite possible he might have made matters very unpleasant for the Liberator ; but, his nerve failing him, he fled to Maturin, whence he entered into relations with Mariño. Thereupon, Bolivar made over Piar's division at Guayana Vieja to Urdaneta, who appears to have returned to his allegiance to his old chief, with directions to bring it into order and submission. Then Bolivar, after first obtaining from the assembled generals a fresh recognition of his own supreme authority, despatched Cedeño with some cavalry in pursuit of Piar. At the same time, he worked successfully at undermining the influence of Piar with the various leaders. The unfortunate mulatto, abandoned by most of his friends, fled with some cavalry to Cumaná, in the hope of obtaining protection from Mariño's people. Near that town Cedeño came up with him. Piar would have fought, but the commander of his cavalry deserted him. He was captured and led back a prisoner to Angostura. There he was tried by a court-martial, of which Brion was president, and sentenced, on the 15th October 1817, to be shot after military degradation. The charges of which he was found guilty were disobedience, sedition, conspiracy, and desertion. Bolivar confirmed the death sentence, but had the decency—perhaps, looking to Piar's popularity, the wisdom—to remit the degradation. The next evening Piar met his death, in the presence of the assembled troops, with the bravery which he had always displayed on the field of battle. Probably he was guilty, but, after all, his guilt was not greater than that of Mariño, or Bermudez, or many another who had rebelled against the authority of Bolivar, but met with very different treatment. He was one of the most capable of the Liberator's commanders. Bolivar himself had recently admitted the excellence of his conduct at the Battle of

San Felix. He was immensely popular with his men, and it certainly required a good deal of courage on Bolivar's part to risk the danger of an outbreak to rescue him from a public and ignominious death. The opponents of Bolivar do not hesitate to accuse him of sacrificing Piar because he was a dangerous rival, perhaps the most dangerous he had at the time. The charges are possibly exaggerated, but it cannot be denied that they appear, on the face of matters, to have some foundation.

Next day Bolivar published to the army a manifesto¹ justifying the execution, which, he pointed out, was the result of a sentence unanimously passed by men of the distinction and reputation of Brion, Torres, Anzoátegui, and other leaders. The immediate result of it was to bring the army and its leaders completely under the authority of Bolivar.

Piar was born, the son of a poor carpenter, in Curaçao, in 1782. He had served the republican cause steadily since Miranda's time in 1811, and had distinguished himself on many occasions, perhaps never more than by leading the way to the conquest of Guayana and the transfer of the republican base to that province. He was unquestionably brave and capable, but proud, ambitious, and cruel.

Bolivar, having got rid of Piar, turned his attention to Mariño, in pursuit of whom he was about to send Bermudez, naming him governor of the Cumaná province. Mariño, however, had gone to Margarita, and had ceased to be dangerous. Bermudez, too, put in a good word for his friend Mariño, and the idea of capturing him was abandoned. Probably Bolivar was only too glad of an excuse for not proceeding to extremities against another very popular leader.

On the 3rd September, before Piar's execution, Bolivar

¹ O'Leary, *Docts.*, 15, p. 423.

had decreed the confiscation of all Spanish property, and on the 10th he issued another order for the division of "national property" amongst the republican army. This, doubtless, was another sop to the troops, the forfeiture of whose goodwill he was about to risk by his proceedings against Piar.

He had certainly strengthened his position, but he probably felt that there was a good deal of dangerous suspicion of his own motives and intentions, for he now instituted a "Council of State," in order, as he said, to surrender into its hands the supreme power, and to lay the foundations of a constitutional government.¹ On the 10th November he assembled the principal leaders of the republican party at Angostura and addressed them at length on the situation. His speech is mainly taken up with an explanation of the reasons why, hitherto, since the destruction of the original republic of Miranda's day, nothing but a dictatorship had been possible. The present republic he dated from the assembly in Margarita on the 16th May 1816. It was now, he said, necessary to have a Council of State, partly as a legislative body, partly as an advisory council to the supreme chief, partly to take his place in case of absence or death. Furthermore, a beginning of judicial organisation was to be made with the institution of a High Court of Justice. The Liberator then goes on to detail the arrangements made for the government of the liberated provinces, and for the distribution to the army of the confiscated Spanish property. Finally, he nominated the members of the various departments of the Council. They were to be presided over thus :—

State and Finance . . .	Zea
Naval and Military . . .	Brion.
Interior and Justice . . .	Martinez.

¹ Decree of October 30th, 1817. O'Leary, *Docts.*, 15, p. 439.

With that the meeting terminated.

The fact of the matter seems to be that the Council of State was a mere sop to pacify public opinion, to allay suspicions of the Liberator's personal ambitions, and to flatter the vanity of some of the leaders by a nominal enlistment of their aid. Bolivar had himself done all the organisation, both civil and military, including the fixing of the capital of the new republic at Angostura. As soon as he was firmly based on Angostura and Guayana, Bolivar's ideas again reverted to the capture of Caracas. In order to facilitate his operations in this direction, he desired, if possible, to draw Morillo away westwards, and for this purpose he had the good fortune to secure the services of a remarkable man, of whom much more will be heard in the course of this history.

CHAPTER IX

BOLIVAR AND PAEZ—THE CAMPAIGN AGAINST MORILLO — THE CONGRESS OF ANGOSTURA, 1818-19

HERE we must pause to give some account of José Antonio Paez, who now appears on the stage and plays an important part during the rest of this history.

According to his own account of himself,¹ he was born on the 13th June 1790, in the neighbourhood of Acarigua in the canton of Apure. His parents were in a very humble station of life, and the boy got no education. O'Leary describes him as absolutely illiterate. So he remained to the end of his life. Restrepo describes him as being Caucasian by race. At the age of sixteen, being attacked by robbers when sent for some money by his father, he killed one of them, and, fearing the consequences, fled from home and took service in the "Llanos" under a rich cattle breeder. There he acquired all the physical accomplishments of a Llanero. On the outbreak of the revolution in 1810, he enlisted in the Barinas militia, on the patriot side, under his master Pulido. Having risen to be a sergeant, he retired to his old employment after Monteverde's con-

¹ J. A. Paez, "Autobiografía." After Bolivar's death Paez was twice President of Venezuela. In 1848 he was defeated and banished by Monagas. Returning to Venezuela, he was finally defeated and banished by Falcon and Guzman Blanco in 1863. He died in 1873, an exile in New York, where his autobiography, probably written for him by some one better educated, was published in 1867.

quest of Venezuela in 1813. Presently he was offered a captaincy in the Spanish forces by Tizcar. To avoid this he fled, to become once more a soldier under Pulido, who commanded a guerrilla band working in support of Bolivar's advance from New Granada. At the end of 1813 he was captured by Puig, a subordinate of Yañez. He was ordered to be shot, but by bribery managed to put off his execution, and finally escaped when Puig fled after Bolivar's victory of Araure. He then joined Garcia de Sena, and was a captain of cavalry when that commander decided to abandon Barinas in January 1814, a decision which Paez strongly opposed.

When Garcia's cavalry broke up, Paez went to Merida, and there was accepted in his rank of captain in the patriot forces. He distinguished himself in action, and, after Bolivar's defeat at La Puerta, followed Urdaneta in his retreat on New Granada. In consequence of a dispute with the commandant of the cavalry, Paez left the force and went off to Casanare. There he was given the command of 300 men, and again distinguished himself in several actions, notably at Mata de la Miel¹ in February 1816. For his conduct on this occasion he was promoted lieutenant-colonel by the Government of New Granada.

We cannot afford space to follow Paez's adventures in the plains of the Apure during the next two years. He was appointed chief of the forces which had escaped from Bogotá under Serviez when Morillo was marching on that capital from Cartagena in 1816.² Santander on that occasion resigned in his favour, knowing that, unless he did so willingly, he would have been compelled to. Paez's operations against the royalists were generally successful, and on some occasions remarkable. Amongst his own troops he acquired supreme authority in the territory in which he operated. His last considerable

¹ A little east of Guadalito.

² *Supra*, p. 165.

success in this period was gained over La Torre in February 1817, as that general marched back from New Granada in advance of Morillo. In this action of Mucuritas, Paez succeeded in drawing after him La Torre's cavalry far away from his infantry. Then, facing about suddenly, he completely cut up the opposing Llanero cavalry. Only the European hussars escaped. Following up his success, Paez fired the prairie all round the enemy's infantry, which only escaped destruction by standing in a marsh where the fire could not reach it. Thus, in 1817, when La Torre was gone, Paez with 2000 Llaneros dominated the plains of Apure.

Paez is described by O'Leary, whose first service in Venezuela was under him.¹ Of medium height, he was massively built as to the upper part of his body, very broad in the shoulders, and deep in chest. Below he rather fell away, as is not surprising in a man who spent his life on horseback. A short thick neck supported a large head covered with short crisp hair of a dark chestnut colour. His eyes were dark and vivacious, the nose straight with broad nostrils, the lips thick, and the beard full. His skin, naturally fair, had been tanned by exposure to the sun. Caution and distrust characterised his expression. With persons whom he believed better instructed than himself he was silent, and refrained from joining in conversation, though with his inferiors he was talkative and jocular, emphasising his speech with many gestures. He loved to recount his warlike achievements, but was devoid of military education. Had he had the best education, he would never have been a great leader, for the slightest contradiction or emotion threw him into violent convulsions, apparently of an epileptic character, which for the moment resulted in unconsciousness, and left him pros-

¹ O'Leary, ii. 441.

trated in mind and body. Such fits often overtook him in fights when he encountered unexpected resistance. "Rash, active, brave, fertile in resource, quick in imagination, resolute in execution, rapid in his movements, the weaker the force he commanded the more terrible he was." A force of 1000 men was beyond his powers of command, especially if many of them were infantry. He was an excellent guerrilla leader, but had no method, no moral courage, and in politics was a nullity. Inconstant in friendship, he fell under the guidance of the favourite of the moment. He was full of personal ambition, the ambition which sought only absolute power without any consideration for others. He was also covetous, and, we may add, cruel and reckless of human life. His influence with the Llaneros whom he commanded was immense, but was acquired at the expense of the relaxation of discipline consequent on his permission of plunder. He was an adept in horsemanship, and the feats of strength and skill which were characteristic of the Llaneros.

This character of Paez, taken almost entirely from O'Leary, seems on the whole fair, though perhaps some allowance should be made for the writer's natural prejudice against a man who afterwards proved himself one of his friend Bolivar's most bitter enemies.

Paez's writings are full of allusions to heroes of antiquity and others of whom, looking to his illiteracy, we may be sure he had never heard. It is clear that most of his writing must have been done for him by the educated men in whose hands he was often a tool.

Bolivar had heard of the operations of Paez on the Apure from Santander, who had joined him in the beginning of the year from that direction. The Liberator had sent from Angostura two officers to confer with Paez, with a view to enlisting his co-operation. After some negotiations, Paez agreed to recognise Bolivar as supreme

chief, and to conduct his own operations under the Liberator's general direction.

The first move of the republican leader was to send Zaraza as an advanced guard to watch towards Orituco and Calabozo, far north of the Orinoco. Morillo, now intent on the destruction of Bolívar, took up a central position, with his main body at Calabozo. He had five divisions, the leading one, under La Torre, at El Calvario, and El Sombrero watching Zaraza, whose military qualities did not extend beyond loyalty and personal bravery. Bolívar, now utilising his newly acquired waterway, sailed up the Orinoco with 1500 men to Cadenales, seventy-five miles above Angostura. Thence he sent orders to Zaraza to fall back, always avoiding an action, and join himself on the Rio *Claro*. Unfortunately, Zaraza misunderstood the order as one for union on the Rio *Santa Clara*, in quite a different direction. Moreover, he disobeyed his orders not to fight, and, finding himself with numbers greatly superior to La Torre, attacked that general at La Hogaza. But the discipline of La Torre's force more than made up for its inferior numbers. Zaraza was utterly beaten, losing 1200 men killed, as many horses, all his guns, 1000 muskets, and great quantities of military stores. La Torre's victory was complete, and attained at very small cost.

This disastrous news reached Bolívar on the 4th December at San Diego de Cabrutica. He at once marched back to Angostura, crossing the Orinoco to the south bank at Soledad. Martial law was at once proclaimed, and Urdaneta was despatched to Paez to propose his union with Bolívar in an effort to clear the country about the junction of the Apure with the Orinoco.

On the 31st December, Bolívar again started up the great river, this time with 2000 infantry and 1000 cavalry. Morillo, meanwhile, hearing at San Antonio

de Apurito of La Torre's victory, had hastened to Calabozo. Bolivar himself marched with the divisions of Monágas and Torres by the right bank of the Orinoco to Caicara ; Zaraza was to march to the river Caura ; Cedeño was posted on the Tigre. On the 22nd January 1818 the whole army was united at Urbana¹ on the upper Orinoco, fifty miles above the inflow of the Apure ; and, on the 31st, Bolivar and Paez met at El Caujaral, from which they marched to San Juan de Payara. Paez had 1000 cavalry and 250 infantry. Thence, after six days' rest, Bolivar marched on San Fernando, which was held by Quero, the Venezuelan renegade, with 600 men, determined to hold out. The republican general was for masking the place and marching against Morillo, who was actively organising his forces at Calabozo. Paez would have preferred to lay siege to it. He indicated as the best crossing of the Apure a place called El Diamante, and himself went ahead to prepare the means of passage. When Bolivar joined him there was not a single boat on the south side, but under the opposite bank lay a Spanish gunboat, three " flecheras," and some canoes. When asked where the boats for the troops to cross in were to be found, Paez coolly replied that he relied on the Spanish boats opposite. Then he performed a very remarkable feat by proving as good as his word. He called for volunteers to follow " Uncle " Paez, as his rough followers called him. He, with Aramendi² and fifty of his Llaneros, plunged into the rapid river on their horses, which they rode bare-backed. They reached the Spanish boats, the crews of which were utterly taken aback by this extraordinary form of attack. The Llaneros, climbing from their horses' backs into the

¹ Concepcion de Uruana on the map.

² Franciseo Aramendi, a Llanero, like Paez, of whom he was an inseparable companion. He was with Bolivar in the campaign of 1819 in New Granada, at the battle of Carabobo in 1821, and at the storming of Puerto Cabello under Paez. He was assassinated in 1827.

boats, soon overcame such resistance as was offered, and returned in triumph with the captured flotilla. On the 12th February, Bolivar appeared near Calabozo, much to Morillo's surprise. The comparatively small Spanish force present was attacked and badly beaten. The republicans gave no quarter, and Morillo himself narrowly escaped the pursuit of Aramendi's Llaneros. He evacuated Calabozo itself in the night of the 13th-14th February, and retired on El Sombrero up the river Guarico.

Bolivar's wish was to attempt to cut him off from Sombrero, but Paez raised objections, and was even insubordinate in defending his opinion, for he was too accustomed to be his own master, and sole commander of his Llaneros, to submit to the secondary position in which he now found himself. His excuse was that his cavalry were worn out and wanted rest. This enabled Morillo to get safely away to Sombrero, whence, after fighting another indecisive action, he retreated again to Barbacoas. Bolivar could not do without the Llaneros, and Larrazabal¹ himself admits that these savage warriors cared only for personal independence and set no value whatever on the freedom of the republic. Morillo, in some disorder, retired to the Aragua valley, whilst Bolivar, unable owing to Paez's attitude to pursue, also retired to Calabozo. Morillo, in 1820, affirmed that he had purposely fallen back from Calabozo in order to draw Bolivar into the hills where his cavalry would be almost useless.

Nothing would satisfy Paez but to return to the siege of San Fernando. Bolivar, making a virtue of necessity, appointed him commander-in-chief in the province of Barinas, with the reduction of which he was charged. Yet the force already left before San Fernando was ample to blockade it, and the place was eventually

¹ i. 516.

reduced by starvation. Its garrison, after a brave defence, evacuated it on the 6th March 1818. They were followed by Paez with a greatly superior force towards Barinas. There they were compelled to surrender. Quero, their commander, who had been badly wounded in the siege, died a few days after his capture.

On the 8th March, Bolivar, now apparently joined by his infantry, but without Paez's Llaneros, marched on Cura, whilst Zaraza, with all the cavalry and some infantry, went by Maracay to the familiar position of La Cabrera.

Bolivar, with headquarters at Victoria, was now master of the Aragua Valley and issued a proclamation to the people of the valley of the Tuy, demanding the services of every man capable of bearing arms. The Liberator's position was a dangerous one, for he was between Morillo at Valencia and La Torre at Caracas. His plan was to march first against La Torre, and then, after destroying him, to turn back on Morillo. The plan was good enough, provided Zaraza succeeded in detaining Morillo at La Cabrera. But the incompetent guerrilla chief behaved with carelessness hardly excusable if the enemy had been 100 miles away. Consequently, Morillo fell upon him and almost exterminated his force. This bad news reaching Bolivar on the 14th March, he found himself in imminent danger of being crushed by the concentric advance of Morillo and La Torre. Instant retreat being his only chance, he fell back in haste in the midst of torrential rain which rendered the miserable roads almost impassable. From Cura, which he reached early next morning, he continued his retreat to Bocachica where he picked up the remains of Zaraza's beaten cavalry. Morillo had just failed to intercept him at Cura.

At 2 a.m. on the 16th, Bolivar had just passed over the ill-omened field of La Puerta where Boves had over-

whelmed him in 1814. Here the road from Cura passes across a ravine and then, through a gap in the hills, on to a small plain enclosed by wooded heights. Beyond this plain it issues again, as it entered, over the ravine of El Semen, beyond which it bifurcates, the branch to the left leading to San Sebastian de los Reyes, that to the right to S. Juan de los Morros. Bolivar was in the act of passing his parks and baggage over the ravine of the Semen when the approach of Morales with Morillo's advance guard was announced. The Liberator drew up his force on the farther bank. According to Restrepo, Bolivar had less than 2,000 men. Torrente gives him 4,500, including three battalions of Englishmen, but this is manifestly wrong, for at this date Bolivar had received only ten or twelve English officers and a few men.

Morales advanced to the attack at 6 a.m. and seized a house on the near bank of the ravine, on his left of the road. But his force was very weak and unable to resist the republican counter attack. By 9 a.m. it was almost destroyed when Morillo, hurrying up as soon as he heard of the battle, reached the first ravine, that on the Cura side of the small plain of La Puerta. Seeing the critical state of Morales, he sent orders to his own troops to throw away their knapsacks and hurry forward. Attempting to rally Morales' men on the plain, he was almost captured by Bolivar's cavalry. At that moment two of his battalions arriving on the plain drove off the cavalry with a steady fire. More infantry and some horse artillery arrived and turned the tide, which had hitherto flowed so strongly against the royalists. The Spaniards, superior in numbers as well as in quality, soon dispersed Bolivar's force, his cavalry fled, pursued by the enemy as far as S. Juan de los Morros. Half of Bolivar's force was killed or wounded, Urdaneta, Valdés, and Torres being amongst the latter. All the baggage, 1500 muskets, and even the Liberator's

correspondence, fell into the hands of the royalists, whose loss, however, had been very heavy, for Morales had lost half his advance guard by 9 a.m., and the Union battalion at the head of the main body was very severely handled before the rest could arrive.

In the moment of victory Morillo received a lance thrust in the stomach from a patriot hidden in the brushwood. Half dead from loss of blood, he had to hand over the command to Ramon Correa, whom he ordered to carry on the pursuit.¹ So decisive was the victory deemed by the Spaniards that Correa reported to the Captain-General that it was impossible for Bolivar to recover from it. Nevertheless, the royalists were too exhausted to continue the pursuit, and Bolivar, marching by Parapara and Ortiz, reached El Rastro with the remnants of his force on the 19th March.

Morillo's army, now temporarily commanded by Correa, owing to the Commander-in-Chief's wound, waited at El Semen for the arrival of La Torre before marching for Calabozo.

Bolivar, reaching that place, set to work to reorganise his shattered troops and to remount his cavalry. He sent Torres to the Apure to call up Cedeño and Paez, and placed Calabozo in a state of defence so effectually that when La Torre arrived before it he thought it too strong to attack, and again fell back on Ortiz. Bolivar, energetic as ever, followed and found the enemy posted, with 1000 infantry and a squadron of cavalry, on the heights in front of Ortiz. For the attack Bolivar dismounted 500 cavalry, who could have done nothing if mounted against the rugged slope. With these and his infantry he succeeded in capturing the first line of heights,

¹ For this victory Morillo was made Marquis de la Puerta. That was the name given by the royalists to the battle. The republicans called it El Semen, to distinguish it from the two previous defeats which they had suffered on this fatal spot. There Campo Elias had been defeated, and then Bolivar, in 1814.

but La Torre retired to a second and stronger line, against which Bolivar's attacks failed. During the night, La Torre, fearing a fresh attempt by the republicans, fell back to Cura, but was followed no farther by Bolivar, who now abandoned the idea of a march on Caracas in favour of one towards the west.

The new plan was conveyed in orders dated 31st March 1818. They required Paez to move on San Carlos up the river Pao. Monágas was sent to Barcelona, Soublette to Guayana, Zaraza to Sombrero, all charged with the collection of fresh recruits. In a week Bolivar was again at the head of 600 infantry and a few fairly mounted cavalry. Proposing to join Paez on the San Carlos road, he marched, on the 8th April, to S. José de Tiznados, where, on the 16th, he was joined by Justo Briceño and took up a position at Rincon de los Toros, three miles from S. José, in ignorance of the presence in the neighbourhood of five squadrons of Spanish horse under Rafael Lopez, charged with the task of preventing the junction of Bolivar and Paez. Lopez, however, knew all about Bolivar, having captured one of his men who was searching for strayed horses. From his prisoner Lopez extracted full information regarding the republican camp, including a description of the exact place where the Liberator slept, and the password for the night. Captain Tomas Renovales proposed to make a bold attempt to capture or kill Bolivar, to which Lopez assented. Taking with him eight out of thirty-six volunteers, Renovales, in the night of the 17th April, made for the enemy's camp, it being understood that Lopez was to attack it at dawn. When he got to the outskirts of the camp Renovales stumbled on a patrol under Santander, but, thanks to having the password, he was able to satisfy the republican colonel. Then he moved silently, with the prisoner beside him as guide, towards where Bolivar's hammock was hung. There are several versions of exactly what

happened thereafter. Perhaps O'Leary's is the safest to take.¹ According to that, Renovales represented himself to Santander as a patrol seeking the general. Santander, to prepare Bolivar, shouted "General!" Bolivar at once jumped from his hammock, and, suspecting something was wrong, made for his charger, which was tethered close by. As he was preparing to mount, Renovales fired, as did his men, in the direction of the hammocks. Two officers and Bolivar's chaplain were killed,² and the general's charger was wounded. But the Liberator made off on foot for the centre of the camp, on which Lopez had already commenced the promised attack. Zaraza, as usual, was caught napping, and all was in confusion. One officer whom he met refused to give Bolivar his horse or to take him up on the crupper, but a cavalry soldier offered him a mule. As the Liberator approached to mount it, the brute kicked him on the leg. In this desperate plight, Bolivar was saved by a soldier named Infante, mounted on the charger of the Spanish colonel Lopez, who had been killed. This horse he made over to Bolivar, who escaped on it,³ coatless and hatless, some say only in his shirt.⁴ The rout of the troops was complete, and so few rallied to Bolivar, when he got back to El Rastro, that they were useless for further operations. The Liberator, therefore, leaving Cedeño as "Commandant-General of the plains of Calabozo," himself set out, with only forty men, to join Paez, whom he knew to be on the Pao. After three days and nights of strenuous marching, Bolivar reached the ford of Guadarama, on the river Portuguesa. Thence, hearing that Paez was approaching San Carlos, and that the road between them was very dangerous, he turned south to

¹ It agrees substantially with that of Restrepo (ii. 457).

² Restrepo denies this, and differs slightly from O'Leary in other details.

³ There seems some reason to believe that this Infante was the negro colonel whom Hamilton (ii. 242) saw shot for murder in Bogotá in 1825.

⁴ Restrepo denies this.

S. Fernando, by Camaguan, where he was joined by Cedefio's division, and raised more troops. For nearly the whole of the month of May he lay ill of fever in San Fernando. During this month he received much bad news. Before Paez's advance up the Pao, the local Spanish commander had fallen back on Valencia. Morillo sent La Torre and Correa to his aid, and they occupied San Carlos with 3000 men, their main strength being in infantry. On the 2nd May Paez reached the plain of Cojédes, some distance west of S. Carlos. He succeeded in drawing his adversaries on to the plain, in order to be able to make the most of the cavalry, in which lay his main strength. In the sanguinary action which ensued, his infantry was almost destroyed, but his cavalry retired to San Fernando, which he reached on the 21st May.

Morillo had sent Morales against Calabozo, which he found evacuated by Cedefio, who had taken up a position at Cerrito de los Patos, on the road to El Calvario. The republican force was beaten on the 20th May, and what remained of it had to fall back across the Apure. In this action the numerous republican cavalry behaved very badly, and failed to support the small body of infantry.

The patriot outlook at this moment was almost as black as it could be. Everything that had been gained in the campaign of 1818 had again been lost, and Bolivar and his lieutenants had been disastrously defeated in all directions. Arms, ammunition, and money were all wanting, and the loss in horses had been very heavy. But Bolivar never lost hope, and he now had, what he had not had in his earlier campaigns, something much better than the sea to retire upon—namely, the province of Guayana, with its great waterway the Orinoco. He set about collecting forces from every direction, and, on the 24th May 1818, started once more with his staff and

some infantry for Angostura, where he arrived on the 7th June.

Here there was more bad news to come in. First, Bermudez arrived, reporting the loss of Cumaná, and his own defeat at Puerto de la Madera, which was partly brought about by fresh vagaries on the part of the unstable Mariño, always aiming at his own advancement. Then Mariño himself had been defeated at Cumanacoa, and the royalists were in possession everywhere.

From the Apure came the report that the troops had thrown off their allegiance to Bolivar and acclaimed Paez as chief of the army and the state. He, too, could not brook subordination to the Liberator.

Bolivar now devoted himself to reorganising the government, which, it will be remembered, he had left in the hands of the Council of State. He appointed secretaries, and started a newspaper, the *Correo del Orinoco*, under the editorship of Zea. Then he again turned his attention to military matters. Ignoring the misconduct of Mariño, he appointed him to the command in what remained of the province of Cumaná. Bermudez he sent to Guiria to co-operate with Mariño, and to safeguard the trade of Angostura passing through the Gulf of Paria. Santander was despatched to the plains of Casanare¹ to organise a force which was intended to be the vanguard of the expedition to New Granada which Bolivar was already contemplating. Santander left by boat on the 26th August, carrying with him a proclamation to the Granadians,² in which the situation was painted in rosy colours, very different from the truth.³ It was stuffed full of promises for the future,

¹ Casanare, at the foot of the Eastern Cordilleras, was really part of New Granada; but, owing to its position, practically came under Venezuelan administration.

² Dated 15th August 1818. O'Leary, *Docts.*, 16, p. 84.

³ The opening words are sufficient proof of this. "Granadians! Already the army of Morillo no longer exists; nor do the new expeditions which

which seemed very unlikely to be realised. Bolivar's idea now was to proceed to Maturin, in order to deal with affairs there and with Mariño, but he was detained in Angostura by administrative matters. However unwilling he really was to hamper himself with a loquacious and meddlesome Congress, he felt that he must redeem his reiterated promises to call one. Unless he did so, he would afford to his rivals and enemies a plausible ground for alleging autocratic ambitions on his part. On the 10th October he held a meeting of the Council of State, at which he proposed the convocation of the Congress of Venezuela for the 1st January 1819; he held forth on the necessity for framing the new government on a republican model, and of summoning for its composition the most distinguished citizens. Then he went on to say that a soldier like himself, constantly engaged in war, could not, at the same time, carry on the business of government. Nor did he desire to do so, as the work and the position were opposed to his character and his destiny. On his proposal, a commission was appointed to consider the mode of election, and to draft an order of convocation of the Constituent Congress. The number of members was fixed at thirty-five, to meet on the 1st January 1819. Of course there was a manifesto (22nd October) addressed by Bolivar to the Venezuelans, with a resumé of his own doings, and an optimistic account of the present position, in which it was asserted that Guayana *and the greater part of Venezuela* were already free!¹ The area of the country south of the royalist lines was, no doubt, greater than the north, but in no other sense was the greater part of the country free. Larrazabal complains that the Spaniards ridiculed this proclamation. Considering how very strong a re-

came to reinforce it. More than 20,000 Spaniards have reddened the soil of Venezuela with their blood," etc. Exaggeration could hardly go further.

¹ O'Leary, *Docts.*, 16, p. 113.

semblance it bore to the division of the bear's skin in the animal's lifetime, their laughter seems scarcely remarkable. At last Bolivar got off from Angostura, and reached Maturin on the 2nd November. Thence he started for Mariño's camp, which he believed to be at Cariaco or before Cumaná, which latter place he proposed to besiege. He had not got farther than Guanaguana when he received news that Mariño, routed by Don Agustin Nogueras, had fled to Santa Maria. Bolivar at once returned to Angostura, whence he sent Colonel Avendaño to supersede Mariño in the Cumaná command, and directed Mariño to go to Barcelona and raise troops—rather a dangerous mission, one would judge, looking to the present ascendancy of the royalist cause, north of the Orinoco plains.

At this time, too, the republicans were much alarmed at the possible intervention of other European Powers to re-establish the supremacy of Spain over her colonies. This alarm drew from Bolivar, as "Supreme Chief of the Republic of Venezuela," a fresh manifesto (20th November 1818) nailing the republican colours to the mast. The whole gist of it is contained in the phrases, "no submission to Spain; negotiations with her only on a footing of equality as two independent nations; no foreign mediation except on this basis."¹

It was the 21st December 1818, only eleven days before the date fixed for the assembly of Congress, when Bolivar marched westwards, for the double purpose of continuing the struggle against Morillo, and of bringing back to his allegiance the turbulent Paez, who had accepted the title of "Supreme Director of the Republic," by which his officers had acclaimed him.

What had happened on the Apure was this.² Just

¹ O'Leary, *Docts.*, 16, p. 172.

² Here we follow the narrative of O'Leary, an eye-witness. He had just joined the republican army as a subaltern in the contingent brought out by

after Bolivar had left for Angostura in 1818, Paez held a review of the 2000 infantry and 2000 cavalry whom he commanded at Achaguas. A few days afterwards he was invited to dinner by Colonel Wilson, and treated with great consideration. Then Wilson got together a number of officers, who agreed to proclaim Paez commander-in-chief. Paez was delighted, and accepted the title at a great review got up for the occasion. Wilson, who had made all sorts of promises of raising levies in England, was then sent to announce the new state of affairs to Bolivar. That leader promptly put him in prison (where he remained till he left the country), and wrote a very sharp reprimand to Paez, though the blame was laid on Wilson, who was to be court-martialled for his insubordination.

When Bolivar met Paez at S. Juan de Payara, in the middle of January 1819, the latter had thought better of his folly, and, finding his chief very firm, proceeded to make out that he had had nothing to do with Wilson's escapade, and to promise to put down the movement. Thereupon, Bolivar made him general of division, and, after reviewing and haranguing the Llaneros, returned to Angostura, where he expected the arrival of Elsom's British battalion. He also wished to instal the Congress, which had not yet assembled.

As, hereafter, a large part is played in the struggle by troops of British nationality, it will be convenient here to give some particulars as to them. They arrived for the most part in the years 1817 and 1819. In the former year a contingent of 220 men, under Colonel Skene, was shipwrecked on the French coast, and all Col. Wilson from England. His regiment was the "Red Hussars," who, he believes, on account of their gorgeous uniforms, were placed at a review on the right of the tattered and often half-naked Venezuelans. O'Leary mentions that he was so disgusted with Paez's massacres of prisoners, Americans included, that he resigned his commission, and attached himself to Bolivar. O'Leary, i. 484.

were drowned. The other troops arriving in that year were—

	Officers and men.
(1) Colonel Wilson with the nucleus of a regiment of cavalry. (This is not Sir Robert Wilson's son Belford, but the man who tried to set up Paez)	60
(2) Colonel Hippisley with two more cavalry cadres	120
(3) Colonel Campbell with the cadre of a regiment of Rifles	130
(4) Colonel Gilmore, ¹ artillery (six guns)	90
(5) Colonel MacDonald and other officers	20
	—
	420

In 1819 arrived the following:—

(1) Contingent contracted for by Colonel Elsom	572
(2) Colonel English's contingent	1200
(3) Germans (? Hessians) raised by Elsom	300
(4) MacGregor's contingent	900
(5) Devereux's Irish brigade	1729
(6) Further contingent of Irish	187
(7) Colonel Gore's contingent, to join MacGregor's force	200
	—
	5088

The "British Legion" which fought at Boyacá, in 1819, consisted of the remains of the troops of 1817, added to part of Elsom's contingent. These afterwards became the "Albion" battalion, and some of the officers commanded the "Rifles," the rank and file of which, after being English in the first instance, were composed of Indians, and later of creoles, mulattoes, and men of all colours. The above details are given by Restrepo.² Probably the cadres were added to by other stray British recruits. Many of these men were veterans of the Penin-

¹ Really only a subaltern.

² Vol. ii., note on pages 607-609.

sula and Waterloo, thrown out of employ by the peace in 1815. English, who died in Margarita,¹ had been through the Peninsula War in the ordnance department. His men subsequently became the "Carabobo" battalion, so called from the part they played in that decisive battle in 1821. When they first arrived at Margarita, they were in a state of mutiny, which was not remarkable, considering the class of men who probably constituted the force. The Irish brigade, as will be narrated later, mutinied at Santa Marta, and had to be got rid of.

The contracts were arranged in London by Lopez Mendez, Bolivar's agent. The soldiers, receiving a bounty of £16 on enlistment, were to receive two shillings a day pay and free rations, and a further bounty of £100 on the conclusion of the war. Probably neither the daily pay nor the final bounty was realised. Lopez Mendez left behind him a very evil reputation, the result of promises which, in the state of the republican exchequer, could not be carried out. Nevertheless, Bolivar used to say he was the real liberator of Colombia, owing to his success in raising money, arms, and men in England for the service of the republic.

Some of the uniforms devised by the contracting officers were remarkable. That of Wilson's cavalry, the "Red Hussars," to which O'Leary belonged, gave them the appearance of a theatrical troupe rather than of soldiers.

Few either of the officers or the men returned to England. Many of those who survived became naturalised Colombians, and in some cases rose to high rank in Colombia. Colonel Fraser was Minister for War in Bogotá, after Bolivar's time. Amongst those who got

¹ His widow was very shabbily treated after his death. According to Mulhall ("The English in South America") English died of a broken heart after failing in an attack on Cumaná, in which he was frustrated by the jealousy of Urdaneta.

home was Hippisley, who left in disgust, as stated in his memoirs. Chesterton, another memoir writer, became governor of an English House of Detention.

On the 8th February 1819, Bolivar was back in Angostura. During the long days of floating down the Orinoco from San Juan de Payara, he had employed his time preparing and dictating the address he proposed to make to the Constituent Congress, and the scheme for a Constitution which he meant it to adopt. The 15th February was fixed for the assembly, and soon after noon on that day, the deputies being already assembled, Bolivar entered the hall in which they had met. He forthwith submitted his project for a Constitution, introducing it in a long speech, which covers twenty-four pages of O'Leary. It is an excellent example of Bolivar's style, but we must resist the temptation to translate it *in extenso*,¹ confining ourselves to an abstract, and to the quotation of a few of the more remarkable passages. Bolivar begins by expressions of satisfaction, the sincerity of which is doubtful, at being at last able to resign into the hands of popular representatives the almost absolute power with which it has, so far, been necessary to invest an individual. Hitherto the young nation has been immersed in an ocean of disorder and strife, from which it is now emerging. Many men capable of directing the State are beginning to show themselves.

Then he goes on to review the past and present condition of Spanish America. As when the Roman Empire broke up, so with the dissolution of the Spanish Empire in America, each constituent part forms itself into a separate nation, suited to its situation and interests. "We are neither Europeans nor Indians, but a race intermediate between the aborigines and the Spaniards. Americans by birth, Europeans in our

¹ An English translation of it was published, and can be found in the British Museum.

rights, we find ourselves divided between disputing with the natives the right of possession, and maintaining ourselves against the opposition of the invaders in the country which gave birth to us ; thus our position is most extraordinary and complicated. Nay more ; our lot has always been purely passive, our political existence has been void, and we have found ourselves in all the more difficult position for attaining liberty, because we have been reduced to a grade lower even than slavery. . . . We American people, weighed down by the triple yoke of ignorance, tyranny, and vice, have been unable to acquire knowledge, or power, or virtue. . . . We have been dominated rather by deceit than by force, and have been degraded by superstition more than by vice. . . . Thus, legislators, your undertaking is all the more laborious because you have to rectify men perverted by the illusions of error, and by noxious incentives." The Liberator was fully awake to the degradation of his countrymen, the result of three centuries of misgovernment. Where he erred was in supposing that such men were fit, in their present state, for free institutions. Yet he saw it at least in part, for he goes on to point out how many great nations have owed their greatness to a monarchical or an aristocratic government, though, in his opinion, " Democracy alone is susceptible of absolute liberty." Yet he adds—" The more I admire the excellence of the Venezuelan Federal Constitution, the more convinced am I of the impossibility of its application to our existing conditions." He admits the success of the Federal Constitution of the United States, but expresses his wonder that even there a form of government, which in theory he considers perfect, should in practice have been able to subsist. He had already, in a letter written in 1814 to the Governor of Barinas,¹ explained its success as due, first

¹ O'Leary, Docts., 13, p. 337.

to the fact that the sovereign states in North America delegated to the central authority all power except that of the administration of justice and local affairs; secondly, that the federation was only set up twelve years after the first revolt, when independence had been finally recognised, and after years of rule by the organisers of the revolution. Moreover, the population of the North American sovereign states was infinitely greater and more concentrated than that of the South American states. Finally, he points to the disastrous results of a Federal Government in New Granada, as shown by the terrible civil wars which had occurred. Page after page of Bolivar's speech of the 15th February 1819 is devoted to arguing against the possibility of Federal Government succeeding in Colombia at present. With all this it is impossible to disagree. He finally appeals to the Congress in these terms—"Horried at the divergences amongst us which have hitherto ruled and, owing to the subtle spirit which characterises the Federal form of government, must continue to rule, I have been forced to implore you to adopt centralism, and the reunion of all the states of Venezuela in a republic one and indivisible. This measure, in my opinion urgent, vital, and salutary, is of such a nature that without it the fruit of our regeneration will be death."

As for the constitution which he submitted, there were to be no more weak and inefficient triumvirates, but a single President. He probably desired a life Presidency, but dared not directly propose it. His constant references to the position of the King of England show that his thoughts were running in that direction. He vehemently advocated strengthening the executive rather than the Legislature. "The executive power in a Republic," he said, "must be strong, for all conspire against it. In a Monarchy the power should rest in the Legislature, for all conspire in favour of the monarch." Much of what

had been done by the first Congress must, Bolivar thought, be modified in the case of a people not yet fitted for complete representative government. "Our population is neither European nor North American. It is a combination of Africa and America, rather than an emanation of Europe, since Spain herself, with her African blood, her institutions, and her character, is hardly European. It is impossible to say positively to what human family we belong. The greater part of the aborigines have gone under, the European has intermarried with the American and the African, and the progeny of this union has again intermarried with the Indian and the European."

The Liberator lays down—"A republican government has been, and must be, that of Venezuela; its bases must be the sovereignty of the people, the division of power, civil liberty, the proscription of slavery, and the abolition of monarchy and privileges." Then he goes on to argue in favour of a hereditary Upper Chamber or Senate, with an elected Chamber of Representatives. In this he openly bases his proposals on the British Constitution. The first senators were to be elected by the Congress, and it was to be the special charge of the government to see that their successors were properly educated and trained for the responsibilities of their position. Such a body would be independent, having nothing to hope or fear from the government, on the one hand, or from popular favour or disfavour on the other.

Stated briefly the chief provisions of Bolivar's project for a Constitution were—

(1) The executive power was concentrated in the hands of an elected President, holding a position closely analogous to that of the British sovereign. His Ministers were to be responsible to Congress for his acts.

(2) The Legislature to consist of an elected Chamber of Representatives, similar to that of the United States,

and a Senate, elected by the Congress in the first instance, thereafter to be hereditary.

(3) Independence of the judiciary: Judges to be removable only for proved misconduct.

(4) There was a curious and anomalous provision in the constitution of a fourth power, which was to exercise control over public morality, to fight against frauds and corruption of all sorts.¹ Not a very practical idea, and a curious commentary on the general state of the people.

(5) Provision was made for trial by jury, liberty of the press, guarantees of civil liberty, and the abolition of slavery.

The fundamental law, which was finally adopted by the Congress on the 17th December 1819, and put into execution by Bolivar two days later, contained the following main provisions:—

(1) The Republics of Venezuela and New Granada to be united into the single "Republic of Colombia." The necessity for a centralised government was strongly insisted on.

(2) The Executive to be in the hands of a President, or failing him a Vice-President, both to be nominated by the existing Congress.

(3) The Republic to be divided into three great departments; Venezuela, with its capital at Caracas; Cundinamarca, capital Bogotá (no longer Santa Fé); Quito, with its capital at that city. Each department to have an administration with a Vice-President at its head.

(4) The first General Congress to fix on the plan and site for the new capital of the Republic, to be named after the Liberator.

(5) The General Congress to assemble at Rosario de

¹ This was a favourite idea of Bolivar, which reappears later in the Bolivian constitution.

Cúcuta on the 1st January 1821, the members being elected under a scheme to be framed by a commission.

(6) That Congress to decide on a Constitution, using as a basis the draft which had now been approved.

(7) The present Congress to dissolve at once, its place being taken by a commission of six members and a President, pending assembly of the General Congress. As for the draft Constitution now passed, it differed in some important respects from that put forward by Bolivar.

(1) The President was to be elected for four years, with permission to stand for one re-election only.

(2) The Senators, instead of being hereditary, were to be elected for life only.

Both these modifications were, no doubt, extremely displeasing to the Liberator, but resistance to them would have lent too much colour to suspicions of his monarchical tendencies to be safe.

As soon as he ended his speech on the 15th February 1819, Bolivar formally surrendered his power into the hands of the Congress, as well as all the offices conferred on himself and his companions in arms during his administration. These latter were at once re-conferred by the Congress, and the Liberator was invited, and consented, to continue in office for forty-eight hours, until a new President could be elected. The election resulted in the choice of Bolivar as President, and of Zea as Vice-President of the Republic.

Then ensued a comedy which was to be many times repeated in future years. Bolivar, after refusing the Presidency in the most explicit terms, allowed himself to be persuaded into acceptance. Then a decree was passed investing him with unlimited powers in provinces in a state of war, that is, as matters then and for many subsequent years stood, in the whole country. As the Vice-President was, at the same time, excluded from all

military authority, that practically amounted to a military dictatorship conferred on Bolivar.

In view of his own immediate return to active military command, the President now delegated his ordinary non-military functions to Zea, the Vice-President.

CHAPTER X

THE PASSAGE OF THE ANDES AND THE BATTLE OF BOYACA, 1819

ON the 27th February 1819 Bolivar set out once more for the Apure, after first sending Urdaneta to Margarita to take command of Colonel English's British troops, which were expected to arrive there, and to try, if possible, to land at La Guaira in order to operate against Caracas in Morillo's rear. On the 10th March, Bolivar was at Araguaquen, and, a few days later, on the right bank of the Arauca, where he joined Paez. Morillo had passed to the south of the Apure in the end of January. It was certainly a risky move, for the climate of these plains was sure to play havoc with his European troops, and, if he allowed himself to be detained there till the rainy season commenced in May, he was almost certain to be destroyed by the floods and consequent starvation. Still he moved forward, and on the 3rd April was close to the left bank of the Arauca, beyond which were Bolivar and Paez.

On this day Paez gained a notable success. Reckless as ever, he had crossed the river with 150 Llaneros. Morillo, seeing him retreating with the river behind him, made sure of exterminating him, and sent in pursuit 1000 cavalry, all he had. Paez continued to retreat till he had drawn the royalist horsemen well away from their infantry; then, utilising his intimate knowledge of the ground, which told him exactly where it was sound and

where marshy, he turned on his pursuers. Dividing his men into small bodies of twenty or thirty each, he attacked in several directions, utilising the marshy ground and inflicting very heavy loss on the Spaniards, who were driven back in confusion on Morillo. The action is known by the name of Queseras del Medio.¹ Every survivor of it on Paez's side was rewarded by Bolivar next day with the "Order of the Liberators."

The rivers were now beginning to rise with the melting of the snows of the Eastern Cordilleras, and Morillo's real difficulties began. Thinking the campaign must be over for the season in these parts, the Spaniard made his way back to Calabozo to find better quarters for his troops. But Bolivar, relieved of the pressure of Morillo, was about to execute a design which he had been contemplating for some time, namely the reconquest of the central and southern provinces of New Granada. The scheme was perhaps one of the best Bolivar ever designed; for its success would cut Morillo from the rich provinces which could supply him when the exhausted hill tract in the north of Venezuela should fail him. It was a large scheme, requiring much preparation, which had already been begun by the despatch, in August 1818, of Santander to the plains of Casanare.² The Liberator's first move was to march on Barinas, which had been uncovered by Morillo's retreat to Calabozo. All went well till the Apure was reached, *via* Mantecal, about Nutrias. There it was found that the cavalry horses had been rendered practically useless by hard work, and a

¹ Professor Bingham ("Caracas to Bogotá," p. 97) places Queseras del Medio a little east of Guadalito. Codazzi's map shows it a very long way farther east, south of Achaguas. The latter certainly seems the more probable locality, looking to Bolivar's movements about this time. It seems as if there was some confusion with Mata de la Miel, an earlier victory of Paez, the field of which Codazzi shows almost exactly where Mr Bingham puts Queseras del Medio.

² *Supra*, p. 209.

halt had to be made whilst Paez went to beat up fresh horses about Guadalito. Whilst halted at Cañafistolo, Bolivar received Santander's report of the state of affairs in New Granada. The country, goaded to desperation by the tyrannies of the Viceroy Sámano, was ripe for revolt. Santander had ingratiated himself with the Casanare people. At a council of war Bolivar expounded generally his idea of a march on Bogotá, which was not accepted by all the members. The army then marched back to Mantecal, whence, on the 25th May, Bolivar started for Guadalito. There he left Paez with 1000 cavalry to execute a movement on Cúcuta. This was designed to screen Bolivar's own movements from Morillo, as well as to prevent La Torre from retiring into New Granada, there to oppose Bolivar's own expedition. On the 4th June the Liberator commenced his march westwards, still concealing its destination, as far as possible, even from his own men; for he knew that the unknown terrors of a march through the great range of the Eastern Cordilleras would alarm the weaker spirits. But some general idea leaked out, and desertions became numerous. The Llaneros in particular, with their rooted aversion to leaving their own plains, abandoned the expedition in great numbers. Colonel Iribarren, one of the dissentients of the recent council of war, left with his squadron; so did Colonel Rangel, who was ill, taking his squadron with him. On the other hand, Rook, with the British Legion, vowed he would follow Bolivar to Cape Horn if required.

On the 11th June the Liberator was at Tame, where he was joined by Santander with the forces he had organised in Casanare. The whole expedition now counted some 2500 men.

Looking at the map, it seems but a small matter to march across the broad open plains which lie at the foot of the Eastern Cordilleras all about the head-

waters of the Apure, the Arauca, and other tributaries of the Orinoco. In the dry season, no doubt, it is comparatively easy; for, though the roads were, and still are, elementary in the extreme, the dead level of the country is only varied by slight elevations rising a few feet above it. Even the rivers, shrunk to mere brooks for the moment, are generally no serious obstacle. The country is a vast sheet of grass, broken only by scattered clumps of palms, and streaked with lines of forest trees marking the course of the innumerable rivers and streams. As for the roads, they are mere cattle tracks, rendered difficult only by the fact that the heat of the sun in a period of drought has left a hardened mould of every hoof mark and every rut worn when the mud was soft. But in the rainy season, from May to November, it is very different. The rivers and streams have overflowed their banks, and for the sea of grass has been substituted a sea of water, with islands representing the raised ground, and the lines of the water-courses still marked by the upper part of their fringe of trees. The roads have practically disappeared, and every petty stream has become a raging torrent. It was over such country that Bolivar's little army marched day after day. For a week on end the soldiers would be marching all day up to their knees, or even their waists, in water and soaked by the rain above. At night they camped on the nearest eminence where they could obtain, not dry ground indeed, but ground not covered deeply by water. Day after day they had to ford a dozen streams, or to swim or ferry themselves across in boats constructed of hides. Swimmers were always exposed to terrible risks from alligators, electric eels, and the dreaded "caribe" fish. The men, badly fed, were unable to find any shelter at night, and with difficulty kept their powder dry in the torrential rain. None suffered more than the English, ill suited as they

were to live on the small ration which kept the frugal Venezuelan alive and well. Bolivar, of necessity, shared all the hardships of his soldiers on equal terms.

The Mark Tapley of the expedition seems to have been Colonel Rook, commanding the English contingent. Nothing could damp his irrepressible good humour, and he was always satisfied, whatever the miseries and the discomforts.¹

Pore was reached on the 25th June, and here the ascent of the Cordilleras began, an ascent full of difficulties, which culminated after Paya was reached on the 27th. At Paya the first armed resistance was met with. Three hundred Spaniards, attempting to defend the place, were dislodged and driven back on Labranza Grande, on the ordinary road to Bogotá.² They expected to be followed thither, but Bolivar, fully aware of the immense defensive strength of the positions on the mountain road, had other designs. After a few days' rest at Paya, during which he issued proclamations to the Granadians announcing his advent, which he could no longer conceal, he started again on the 2nd July. Instead of marching on Labranza

¹ O'Leary tells some amusing stories of Rook's imperturbable acquiescence in the existing conditions. On one occasion he was very near fighting a duel with a friend who maintained that Bogotá was a finer city than Caracas. Neither of the disputants had seen either of these capitals, but Rook felt bound to defend the claims of the capital of the country in which he happened for the moment to be.

Later on, he was left behind at the foot of the Cordilleras as rearguard. When he rejoined Bolivar he reported, in reply to a question, that all was well with his corps, which had had quite a pleasant march through the awful gorges and over the freezing "paramo." Anzoátegui, who was as pessimistic as Rook was optimistic, happening to be present, retorted that 25 per cent. of the men had perished in the march. Rook was quite ready with an answer. It was true, he said, but it was really a very good thing, for the men who had dropped out were all the wastrels and weaklings of the force.

² The general map in this part is not accurate. The enlarged sketch, which is taken from Codazzi's atlas, should be consulted. It is more accurate.

Grande, he turned to his right by the track which led over the elevated and desolate Paramo de Pisba.¹ So difficult was this route, rarely used even in dry weather, that the Spaniards never thought of guarding it, believing its passage by the army to be impossible. Road there was none in the ordinary sense of the word. The track which was followed was in many places blocked by fallen rocks or trees, over which the soldiers had to scramble as best they might. In other places the path had disappeared in a landslide. Every horse which had survived so far perished. Late in the night of the 2nd July the army bivouacked at the foot of the Paramo de Pisba. The unfortunate Venezuelans, hailing from a climate which is always warm and in the plains excessively hot, now found themselves, poorly clothed at the best, some of them almost naked, in even greater misery than before; for these "paramos," at an elevation of 12,000 to 15,000 feet, only just below the line of eternal snow, are truly the abomination of desolation. Swept by an icy north-east wind, constantly enveloped in a chilly fog, almost devoid of animal life, and even of vegetation, except for a few stunted and distorted thorny plants of low orders, Dante, had he known them, would have described them as one of the infernal circles. Yet there was no retreating, and the weary, shivering men pushed on next day over the "paramo" itself. Many died from the effects of the freezing and rarified air. Flogging had to be resorted to, not for punishment, but to revive circulation in the failing bodies. There were even women enduring these hardships. O'Leary records that his attention was called to the case of a soldier's wife who, in this awful desert, gave birth to a child, and yet marched on five miles on the same

¹ Santander ("Apuntamientos para las memorias sobre Colombia," p. 9) avers that Bolivar would have turned back but for the persuasion and arguments of himself and Anzoátegui.

day over this ghastly road. Ranks or order it was impossible to preserve as the troops toiled painfully through gorges where a hundred resolute men might have barred the way against the whole army. But no Spaniard was seen, for none supposed it possible the republicans could reach the uplands by this horrible pass.¹

On the 6th July they had descended beyond the "paramo" to Socha, only some 9000 feet above the sea, and all the horrors of the past days were almost forgotten in a climate where it is always spring, where the thermometer rarely rises to 70° Fahrenheit in the shade, and as rarely falls below 50°, where frost is almost unknown, and where, in the broad and fertile upland valleys, every crop of temperate climates can be grown irrespective of season. The army was in a terrible state. Not a horse was left, and the Llaneros were reduced to an unaccustomed mode of progression on their own legs. What stores had not been left

¹ Some may think, as many have thought, that this account of the difficulties of the passage of the Andes is exaggerated. Fortunately there is now available the evidence of a witness who, holding this view, decided to test it. In the (English) *Geographical Journal* for October 1908, Professor Hiram Bingham describes how he and a friend followed the route of Bolivar's march. He begins his article thus: "I had always felt that the difficulties of this march, which has been compared to those of Hannibal and Napoleon, had been greatly over-estimated." He then describes the route, noting that he passed the plains of Casanare in the dry season instead of, like Bolivar, in the rains. It was only when he got into the mountains that he encountered the spring rainy season (March to May). (There are, it should be noted, only two seasons in the plains—May to November being rainy, the rest of the year dry. In the Andes of New Granada there are two wet seasons—March to May and September to November.) The last sentence of the article runs thus: "In regard to the difficulties of Bolivar's famous march, we came to the conclusion that the half had not been told."

Since that article appeared Professor Bingham has published a book, "The Journal of an Expedition across Venezuela and Colombia, 1906-1907," giving a fuller account of his travels. He gives the height of the "paramo" of Pisba as about 13,000 feet. For brevity, the book is referred to in the notes as "Caracas to Bogotá."

behind at Paya were almost all lost, for want of transport, in the passage of the "paramo." The cartridges had been kept dry with infinite difficulty, but the muskets were so rusty that the first operation was to get them reasonably clean. It had been essential to push over the "paramo" with the utmost rapidity before the movement could be discovered, and, therefore, much of the ammunition had been left at Paya to follow later with the British Legion, the men of which Bolivar described as half dead with their exertions.

At Socha the invaders were received with open arms, and supplied with food, tobacco, and country beer. Bolivar was all activity collecting supplies, arms, ammunition, horses, mules,¹ and recruits. The class of recruit he got has already been described.² Arrangements were made for bringing up what had been left at Paya, including the British Legion, and some of the stragglers dragged themselves in from the "paramo."

By the 7th July Bolivar was able to send out a cavalry patrol, which captured a small royalist detachment at Corrales, about half-way to Sogamoso. At the last-named town the Spanish commander, Colonel Barreyro, had some 1500 or 1600 troops commanding the main road from the plains by Labranza Grande, by which he had expected the republicans to arrive. Finding that he had been turned by the march over the "paramo" of Pisba, he now moved northwards to meet the invaders, who were moving southwards against him.

In another small advance-guard action at Corrales the royalists were again worsted, but their main body continued to advance, and had crossed the river Gameza when it encountered Santander's division. Barreyro

¹ Not often saddles, however. The Llaneros, when they were again mounted, for the most part had to ride barebacked, until they were able to get saddles from the stores of the defeated Spaniards.

² *Supra*, p. 146.

drew back over the Gameza to a strong position, the Peña de Topagá. Santander halted for the night at Tasco. Next morning Barreyro again advanced towards the Gameza, but fell back to his position of Topagá as soon as he encountered Santander. Bolivar ordered an attack upon the position before Barreyro could get up the reinforcements he was expecting from Bogotá and elsewhere. Barreyro's rearguard held on to the bridge of Gameza until they were forcibly dislodged, when the whole force took up a still stronger position at Molinos de Topagá. After fighting most of the day, the republicans fell back again. Santander was slightly wounded.

Barreyro was clearly not disposed to fight, for he was waiting for reinforcements from his rear, and, moreover, expected to hear of Morillo advancing by Cúcuta against the rear of the patriots; for he could not believe that Bolivar's march had been concealed from Morillo. The Liberator redoubled his efforts to draw to his standard the patriots who had taken refuge from the tyrannies of the Viceroy Sámano in various out-of-the-way places. Seeing that he could not force Barreyro out of his position, the Liberator marched to his right, towards Santa Rosa across the Chicamocha river, and occupied the fertile valley of Serinza. The move had had the desired effect of drawing Barreyro from his strong position at Topagá. Fearing to be turned and cut from Bogotá, he had followed Bolivar's westward march and taken up an equally strong position above the plain of Bonza.¹ He had now got in most of the local forces, and was prepared to accept battle.

On the 20th July Bolivar advanced over the plain but found the enemy's position too strong for attack. On the 22nd he was joined by Rook with the British Legion. On the 25th he repeated his manœuvre of a

¹ On the left bank of the upper Sogamoso (Chicamocha), a little east of Duitama.

march westwards towards Paipa. Barreyro followed the same direction, and, at Pantano de Vargas,¹ was found on the hills facing the republicans, whose position was by no means favourable. Their right rested on the marsh ("pantano") of Vargas, but their left was dominated by heights, which Barreyro seized with one battalion, aiming at getting in rear of the patriots. Santander was easily driven off the heights. At the same time the Spaniards attacked Bolivar's centre with such vigour that the battalions "Rifles" and "Barcelona" gave way. The day seemed lost, when Bolivar sent Rook with the British Legion to recapture the heights on his left. This was gallantly carried out by the Englishmen. Simultaneously another vigorous attack was made in the centre by Barreyro, which was at first successful, but was repulsed by Bolivar's small reserve. At this critical moment the Liberator seized upon Colonel Rondon,² commanding a squadron of Llaneros, and with the words, "Colonel, save the Fatherland!" launched him against the Spanish cavalry, who were driven back in disorder. The infantry, following up, completed the discomfiture of the royalists. Night put an end to the desperate and still doubtful combat. Defeat had been saved by the desperate valour of the British and of Rondon's Llaneros.³ Both forces fell back on their former positions.

¹ Vargas, according to Professor Bingham's new book, is south of Duitama, beyond the upper Sogamoso (Chicamocha), on the road to Tunja via Toca. The marsh is on the right (west) of the road which runs close under hills on its left. When Bolivar crossed the river, Barreyro moved from Paipa to meet him on this road with 3800 men. The cavalry were on the plain, the infantry on the hills. "Caracas to Bogotá," p. 272.

² Juan José Rondon, born in Caracas, 1790, served in the Spanish forces till 1817, when he joined Paez, and distinguished himself by gallantry in many actions, notably at Queseras del Medio, where he played a leading part. He died in 1822 from tetanus, supervening on a wound in the foot received in one of his fights under Paez.

³ Rook was badly wounded at Pantano de Vargas. Next day his arm had to be amputated. With his imperturbable equanimity he underwent the

Recruits now came in freely for the republican force, 800 being collected in a few days, and ammunition also arrived. On the 3rd August Bolivar again advanced, with the result that Barreyro evacuated Paipa, and retired to the heights commanding the road to Tunja. That night Bolivar encamped in front of the enemy. Next afternoon (4th) he marched off ostentatiously towards his old position on the plain of Bonza, but at nightfall suddenly counter-marched, crossed the river at Paipa, and marched for Tunja by the Toca road, leaving the enemy in position on his right rear. At 9 a.m. on the 5th he was at Civatá, and two hours later captured Tunja with the small garrison left in it. The governor had, in the early morning, marched north to join Barreyro with the "Numancia" battalion and three guns. All Bolivar's troops were in Tunja by 2 p.m., thus having placed themselves across Barreyro's communications with Bogotá.

It was only at dawn on the 5th that Barreyro discovered the real direction of the republican march. He at once set off along the main road to Bogotá, halting at 5 p.m. short of Combitá, and starting again at 8 p.m. At 6 a.m. on the 6th he was at Motavita, three or four miles north-west of Tunja, always watched and harassed by a detachment of Bolivar's dragoons.

At dawn on the 7th the republican scouts brought news that the enemy was marching on Samacá, and a personal reconnaissance by Bolivar revealed the fact that Barreyro was trying to regain the main road to the capital at Boyacá, and to pass by the bridge there. The republican force marched off in the same direction by the main road from Tunja.

At 2 p.m. Bolivar's cavalry came upon Barreyro's

operation with some facetious remarks as to the beauty of the limb he was losing. He died a few days later, a victim, no doubt, to the very rough surgery of Bolivar's medical department. Before he went to South America he had served on the staff of the Prince of Orange at Waterloo.

advance-guard, just as it was nearing the bridge of Boyacá. The Spaniards, thinking they had only to do with some scouts, sent their chasseurs to drive them off the road, whilst the main body moved along it. But the rest of the republicans had hurried up, and the Spanish advance-guard found itself opposed to the whole of the patriot infantry. Driven back at first behind a wall, the Spaniards were presently forced across the bridge and took position beyond it, the rest of their force being still a mile and a half short of it.

Santander, on the patriot left, attacked the bridge, which was held by Barreyro's advance-guard, and, after a sharp fight, succeeded in capturing it. Meanwhile, the rest of Barreyro's force, cut off from its advance-guard by the stream, was attacked by the other republican troops. Anzoátegui charged the Spanish (European) cavalry on the right flank, which fled, abandoning the artillery. The infantry, which had fought bravely so far, was forced to retire to a second position further west. Here they were again attacked, whilst Santander, at the same time, passed the bridge and completed the rout of the advance-guard. The main body was now in a desperate situation, and the whole of it surrendered to Bolivar, except the cavalry and some others who had effected their escape. Barreyro had already been captured, and there fell into the hands of the victors Jimenez, his second in command, 1600 men, besides nearly all the officers, the artillery, and all the military stores. The republicans state their loss at only 13 killed and 53 wounded.¹

¹ It is extremely difficult to follow the exact movements in this battle and others, such as Pantano de Vargas and Carabobo, seeing that no plan of them has ever been published. Professor Bingham appears to have thoroughly studied these three fields in 1906-7, but until he publishes the plans he presumably made, the difficulty must continue to some extent. With regard to Boyacá, he says that the Spaniards were obliged by want of a guide to take the road to Bogotá by the bridge of Boyacá instead of that by Chiquinquirá.

Santander pursued the remnants of Barreyro's force as far as Venta Quemada on the road to Bogotá.

At Bogotá there was consternation in official quarters, but the news of the defeat of Boyacá only leaked out generally on the morning of the 9th August, when the Viceroy had already fled. Despite his great age, he managed to reach Honda, on the Magdalena, in twenty-four hours, a good three-days' riding for most people even nowadays. He was accompanied by the troops left behind by Barreyro, and by all the officials.

Bolívar entered the capital on the evening of the 10th August 1819, amidst the plaudits of the inhabitants. At Boyacá he had won his first really decisive victory, one which undoubtedly marked the final liberation of the Andean tracts of New Granada from Spanish dominion. The indomitable courage and determination which he showed in deciding on this bold stroke against Cundinamarca, the resolution with which he carried through his terrible march against all obstacles, are worthy of the highest praise. This was, perhaps, the first occasion on which he had, of his own motion,¹ shown a broad strategical insight. He had promised, in his proclamation of August 1818, the rescue of New Granada. Unlikely of realization as it seemed when made, he had redeemed his promise. His success at Boyacá he owed largely to his British troops.

It is admitted by O'Leary that there was some looting and misappropriation of funds by so-called patriots in Bogotá, but Bolívar soon reduced the place to order. He had already, on arrival on the plateau of Bonza, appointed governors of the provinces of Pamplona and

He appears to think that all the Spaniards got across the bridge which Santander was unable to take until the Llanero cavalry, passing by a ford lower down, turned it. He also says that Bolívar did not reach the field till 4 p.m., when the battle, which had begun at 2 p.m., was practically over. "Caracas to Bogotá," p. 274.

¹ In the seizure of Guayana Piar had led the way.

Socorro farther north. He now organised civil government in Bogotá, and was recognised by an assembly of the principal inhabitants as "Liberator of New Granada." But military matters equally required attention. In order to raise the strength of his army, the Liberator enlisted all the South American prisoners taken at Boyacá. He sent Soublette¹ northwards with one force to occupy the Cúcuta valleys, where he had intended Paez to be. The Spanish commander, Calzada, had gone with the Bogotá garrison towards Popayan and the Quito frontier, whilst Sámano the Viceroy, on arrival at Honda, had embarked on the Magdalena for Cartagena. In pursuit of Calzada, Bolivar despatched another force to occupy Popayan and watch the Quito frontier. Colonel Cordova,² with 150 men, was ordered from Honda into the Central Cordilleras of Antioquia, to rouse the people of that province, the best in many ways of the population of New Granada.

On the 18th September, Bolivar enjoyed the triumphal entry into Bogotá which had been decreed to him along with his title of "Liberator of New Granada." He passed from the north, down what are now the Camellon de las Nieves and the Calle de San Francisco, to the Cathedral in the Plaza Bolivar.

A provisional government was now established, with

¹ Carlos Soublette was born at Caracas in the end of the eighteenth century. He was engaged in most of Bolivar's campaigns up to 1819, when he was chief of the staff at Boyacá. His name will appear several times as Vice-President of Venezuela. Ducondray-Holstein is particularly hostile to him, and tells many scandalous stories about him and his family, which may be taken for what they are worth. He joined Paez in the separation of Venezuela from the rest of Colombia. Was President in 1837-38, and died in 1870.

² José Maria Cordova, born at Rio Negro in 1799, was already fighting for the republican cause at the age of fifteen. He fought in many battles with Paez as chief, and was with Bolivar at Pantano de Vargas and Boyacá, when he became colonel. His subsequent doings and death will be recorded in this volume.

Francisco de Paula Santander as Vice-President of New Granada.¹ Before leaving Bogotá for the north, Bolívar proposed to Sámano an exchange of Barreyro and the other Spanish prisoners.

On the 20th September the Liberator left Bogotá in charge of Santander. Bolívar's back was scarcely turned when, on the 11th October, Santander had the unfortunate Barreyro and thirty-eight other Spanish officers publicly shot on the square in front of the Palace which the vice-president occupied.² He himself was present on horseback at the execution, which was conducted with the greatest brutality and ignominy. The victims were gallant Spanish officers who had done their duty honourably, yet they were shot in the back like cowards or traitors. For this "cowardly and unnecessary crime," as O'Leary frankly styles it, there is no possible defence. That the Spaniards had shot patriots in the back in Cartagena, Bogotá, and elsewhere, is no excuse, nor can any weight be attached to Santander's defence,³ that there was danger from the presence of these unfortunate men in Bogotá, where they were in prison with no friends about them.⁴ Of this crime Bolívar is absolutely

¹ Santander, as a native of the province, was extremely popular in New Granada. It will be remembered that he had formerly been a supporter of Castillo against Bolívar (*supra*, p. 90), and it will be seen in the sequel that the old enmity never really died out.

² Larrazabal says that the round number of forty was made up by the addition of a Spanish civilian, who, on seeing the preparations for the execution, was rash enough to utter invectives against the republican government. Yet Larrazabal is quite inclined to plead extenuating circumstances for Santander. Probably he would have tried to whitewash Satan, had there been any reason to believe he was a South American patriot.

³ See his "Apuntamientos para las memorias sobre Colombia," p. 10.

⁴ O'Leary gives the following account of the execution. In the night of the 10th October, the prisoners were removed in chains from the houses in which they were confined to the cavalry quarters in the plaza, and late at night were informed of their fate. Next day at noon they were marched, heavily ironed, across the square where the benches had been set up for the execution. The unfortunate Barreyro handed a portrait of his fiancée to the

innocent. He had already sent to Sámano to propose the prisoners' exchange on equal terms, and he was much distressed when the news of the execution reached him. O'Leary adds that, "for the honour of the country it should be said that this measure of Santander was generally disapproved."

Bolívar was on his way back to Angostura, whence bad news reached him. He enjoyed an unbroken triumph as he passed northwards through Velez, Socorro, and Pamplona.

Let us see now what had been happening in Venezuela in his absence. Morillo had remained at Calabozo till the beginning of August, when he moved to Valencia, and, later, to Caracas, where he heard of the battle of Boyacá. Then he went to Tinaco and Barquisimeto, doing his best to conceal the bad news, and to spread reports of Canterac's successes in Peru, and of the great expedition then fitting out in Spain under O'Donnell. In Guayana the republican executive power, as we know, had been vested in Zea, a man of somewhat feeble character, though a scholar and a good writer. He, as a civilian, was looked down upon by the military leaders. There was a good deal of grumbling against him and the absent Bolívar, and presently, Zea himself tried to curry favour by turning against the Liberator. Aris-

officer in charge, begging him to give it to her brother. Then he, Jiménez, his second in command, and the others were led out in succession and shot in the back. "An ignominious death, certainly not deserved by a brave soldier who on the field of battle had always courageously exposed his breast to the bullets of the enemy." At this sickening scene Santander, mounted on his charger and surrounded by his staff, calmly looked on from in front of the Palace hard by. When all was over, he addressed a few words, "unbefitting the occasion," to the people, and then rode through the principal streets preceded by some musicians, and himself joining in the chorus of a song alluding to the tragedy which had just occurred. If this story is true, could anything be more disgraceful or more unworthy of a man in Santander's position? (O'Leary, i. 583.) These details are not given by Restrepo or Larrazabal. Let us hope O'Leary was misinformed.

mendi had been told by Bolivar before he left, to get 500 soldiers from Margarita. Even Arismendi's great influence in the island could only induce the brave Margaritans, fishermen mostly, to serve as sailors, but Zea was obstinate in insisting on having soldiers. Then disturbances began at Angostura, fomented by Arismendi and Gomez.

Mariño, meanwhile, had gained a considerable success at Cantaura. Instead of allowing him to reap the full fruits of his victory, Zea insisted on his coming to Angostura to sit in Congress. Not unnaturally, when Mariño arrived, he joined the party of Arismendi against Zea. There was a disturbance and interruption of Congress by a mob raising the cry of "Down with the Vice-President" (Zea). Zea resigned on the 14th September, and Arismendi was appointed in his place by the Congress, which fetched him from the prison into which he had been thrown. His first act was to appoint Mariño to the command of the "Army of the East." That general at once went off to supersede Urdaneta and Bermudez.

Arismendi did not govern so badly, but soon made himself unpopular by decreeing a State monopoly in hides, spirits, and tobacco. Then he went off to Maturin to organise the army.

Bolívar was at the Salt Mines of Chita, on the eastern slope of the Cordilleras, when he received this unwelcome news, as well as that regarding the executions in Bogotá, and that of the death of Anzoátegui,¹ who had greatly distinguished himself at Boyacá. He had suddenly dropped dead at table.

The Liberator at once hastened his march for

¹ Jose Antonio Anzoátegui, born at Barcelona (Venezuela) in 1789. He had been through the earlier wars, but, in 1815, left the army in consequence of the feud between Bolívar and Castillo. He rejoined the Liberator in Haiti, and was one of his most trusted lieutenants until his death at Pamplona on the 15th November 1819.

Angostura. Leaving Chita on the 20th November, and travelling by Casanare and Apure, he was in Angostura on the 11th December. There he was received with enthusiasm by the fickle people ; for Arismendi had not yet returned from Maturin, though, as a matter of fact, he was already on the opposite bank of the great river. Thence he could see flags waving in Angostura, and hear the discharge of guns and the shouts. He flattered himself they were meant for him, and sent over an A.D.C., followed by two others. When none of them returned, he crossed over to Angostura, only to find that the welcome was for Bolivar, not for himself.¹ Seeing the game was lost, Arismendi made his peace with Bolivar, and, on the 17th December, resigned his post of Vice-President. The Liberator said little to him or his friends, or those of Mariño, and took no action against them, though he spoke his mind freely to some of his own special dependants who had deserted him in his absence.

The Congress was now all subserviency to its returned master. The members all went out on the 14th December to meet him at the entrance of the chamber, brought him in, and invited him to address them.

After recounting his exploits in New Granada, he told them that the time had come to frame a solid and permanent base for the republic. Then Zea, as President of the Congress, made a speech full of the grossest flattery, in the end of which he urged the union of Venezuela, New Granada, and Quito in one republic. Bolivar replied with flattering remarks about his subordinate commanders in the recent campaign. Then Alzuru, a deputy who had been in the opposition when Bolivar was away, added his tribute to the merits of the Liberator. However bold they might be when Bolivar was far away, few at this period dared to oppose

¹ O'Leary, ii. 14.

him when he was on the spot. The conduct of Arismendi, Zea, and Alzuru is a good example of this. On the 17th December, Congress elected Bolivar President of Colombia (including Venezuela, New Granada, and Quito), Zea Vice-President of the Republic, Roscio Vice-President of Venezuela, and Santander of New Granada. The law for the incorporation of the three provinces had just been passed.¹ As for Quito, the election of a vice-president was postponed until the province should be wrested from the Spaniards who still held it. At this time Bolivar was reconciled to Mariano Montilla, who had been his bitter opponent in the disputes with Castillo at Cartagena in 1815, and in the expedition from Haiti in 1816. Montilla was now sent, with the Irish Brigade of Devereux, to try and take Cartagena from Sámano.

¹ Cf. *supra*, p. 219.

CHAPTER XI

THE ARMISTICE AND TREATY FOR REGULARIZATION OF THE WAR, 1820

IT has been already mentioned that Morillo, about the time of Boyacá, was talking loudly about the new expedition which was coming from Spain. He had received notice that there was assembling at Cadiz, for the re-conquest of Spanish America, a force consisting of 20,200 infantry, 2800 cavalry, and 1370 artillerymen, with parks and supplies of every sort.

When Ferdinand VII. returned from France to his kingdom in 1814, he was resolved to rule absolutely. He abolished the Regency, the Cortes, and every institution incompatible with autocratic rule. These measures being followed by various revolts, Ferdinand thought he might do a good deal towards getting rid of dangerous elements by sending them off on an expedition to South America. He was also anxious to leave no opening to the French, who were intriguing for the appointment of a Portuguese prince as King of Buenos Aires. The chief command was given to O'Donnell, but he was the real soul of the conspiracy in favour of constitutional government. Presently, he was suspected and replaced by the Conde de Calderon. At this moment there was an outbreak of yellow fever in Cadiz, which helped to fan the fire of discontent in the army, by adding a new terror to the prospect of a voyage to South America. A fresh conspiracy was hatched under the direction of Antonio Quiroga. On

the 1st January 1820, two battalions, headed by Rafael Riego, broke into revolt and seized Calderon, the commander-in-chief. Quiroga was voted leader of the revolution. Ferdinand now thought matters were alarming, and saw the sceptre slipping from his grasp, notwithstanding the suppression of the revolt and the execution of Riego. He accordingly summoned the Cortes, and no more was heard of the great expedition to South America.

Morillo heard of the revolution at Cadiz at the end of March 1820, Bolivar not till late in April. The former naturally said little about it, and equally naturally, Bolivar was delighted at what, it was not difficult to foresee, meant the end of the idea of reinforcements from Spain for the enemy.

Leaving Angostura on the 24th December 1819, Bolivar spent most of January 1820 in Apure and Guadalito, reaching Cúcuta on the 8th February. After reviewing the "army of the north," and visiting some of the neighbouring towns in Merida, he went to Socorro where, on the 25th February, he received news that Santander had, on the 12th, proclaimed in Bogotá the fundamental law for the union of Venezuela and New Granada. To Santander's compliments he replied in the same strain. Santander, whatever his faults, was not lacking in capacity, and had made much progress in the work of administration in Bogotá and the neighbourhood. The Congress which Bolivar left sitting at Angostura had also been prolific in laws for the government of the republic, and in conferring honours on the Liberator. He was to be called "Liberator-President" on every occasion, his picture was to be hung in the Congress Hall, with his name and titles inscribed in letters of gold, "Bolivar, Liberator of Colombia, Father of his Country, Terror of Despotism." Finally, a law was passed regulating elections to the

General Constituent Congress. The principal business of this Congress would be the final approval of the Constitution of 1819. The Congress of Angostura then dissolved itself on the 19th January 1820. Bolivar, on the march once more to Bogotá, reached Tunja on the 1st March, Bogotá on the 4th. During the eighteen days of his stay there, he discussed with Santander the campaign both in the south and in the north of New Granada. Expeditions were sent out in all directions, and Valdés, who had arrived from the east with a division, was despatched to Neiva on the upper Magdalena, in order to guard the southern provinces, and to prepare for the advance hereafter to the liberation of what is now Ecuador, and of Peru. He had also to eject the royalists under Calzada from Popayan, which they had wrested from Antonio Obando. Cauca was constituted a new province, and Colonel Cordova, a native of Antioquia,¹ who had recently been employed in raising the people of that province, was now directed to do the same in the plains about Mompox.

Mariano Montilla, with the Irish Brigade, had disembarked on the 13th March at Rio Hacha on the north coast, whence he had marched on Valle de Upar. Thence, however, fearing attacks on his communications by the Spaniards in Maracaibo and Santa Marta, he had returned to Rio Hacha to refit. At that place, Devereux's² Irishmen (600 out of the total of 1300

¹ The Province of Antioquia is situated mainly in the Central and Western Cordilleras. Its population has a larger admixture of European blood than any other in the Republic of Colombia of the present day.

² John Devereux, an Irish adventurer of some private means, had assisted Bolivar's expedition from Haiti in 1816. He and 150 of his men still remained with Montilla till Cartagena was taken in 1821. In 1822 he was sent as Colombian envoy to Russia, etc. He became blind, and in 1840 was granted a small pension in Colombia, as he had apparently spent all his fortune in the service of his adopted country. Some of these Irish appear to have been ex-rebels of 1798. One Aylmer, at any rate, a rebel commander in Wexford, was killed at Rio Hacha.

with Montilla) mutinied. These poor wretches sacked Rio Hacha (which was probably very poor sport, as it was a wretched place), and getting drunk, fired it. Montilla reported this to the Governor of Jamaica, and the British admiral, though why he should have expected them to manage his Irish mercenaries is not quite clear. Eventually the Irish were shipped off to Jamaica, and Bolivar expressed his satisfaction at getting rid of them. Of course, nothing is too bad to be said of them, according to Larrazabal, but it must be remembered that, after all, they were only mercenaries fighting for Venezuela, against the orders of their own sovereign, and they naturally expected, at least, pay and decent food. They had got neither, nor even plunder, and it is not very surprising that they, having no personal interest in the cause for which they fought, should have striven to help themselves. Rio Hacha being an open roadstead, Montilla thought it unadvisable to hold on there, and that he would do better to invade the province of Cartagena.

Meanwhile, Morillo the Spanish commander-in-chief had his forces distributed thus :—

La Torre, with 1400 men, in Merida, watching Bolivar. Morales, with 2300 men in Calabozo.

Real, in Barinas, kept open the communications between these two. Morillo himself had 2500 at Valencia, San Carlos, and Pao.

There were 1300 men in garrison at Cumaná ; 1600 in Barcelona ; 4000 were distributed, in small free corps, between Maracaibo and Caracas.

Altogether there were about 14,000 men, distributed over an enormous area, under Morillo's command. In addition to these, Sámano had 2000 in Cartagena, whilst Calzada, with 3000 in the south, was acting under orders of Aymerich, the President of Quito. The distribution was far too wide, and Morillo would have done

better to keep his troops together and make an effort to destroy Bolivar, rather than aim at holding outlying places, which must fall if the Liberator and his army were finally disposed of.

Bolivar, with better judgment, decided to concentrate his efforts on only two points, the destruction of Morillo, and, as a minor matter, the defence of the south, which was necessary to protect his own rear.

On the 19th April, he issued a short proclamation to his soldiers, reminding them that it was the tenth anniversary of the first effort towards liberty—the deposition of Emparan at Caracas—and recalling the struggles since then.

As for Morillo, he had for a long time deferred proclaiming the Constitution recently granted to Spain. Now, under positive orders from home, he was compelled to do so, and to release the political prisoners. These orders had been followed by instructions to open negotiations with the “disidentes” of Venezuela. The term was, as Larrazabal remarks, a considerable amelioration of those of “sedition mongers,” “rebels” or “bandits,” which had been generally used hitherto in orders from Spain. Morillo was disgusted, and is reported to have said: “They are fools in Madrid, not understanding what they order; they know neither this country nor what has occurred, nor the present circumstances. They wish me to condescend to treat with those whom I have fought; to undergo the humiliation of calling the seditious my friends, and recognising as brothers those whom, as enemies and rebels, I have wounded in the most sensitive place. Thus all will be lost. I will obey, but it is useless to hope any longer for the subjugation of these provinces.” The Count of Cartagena certainly concluded rightly. The time for negotiations and pacification had long passed, though there had surely been room for it in the days of Monteverde, or before. The struggle had now been too long and too embittered to

be determined by anything but the complete overthrow of one party or the other by main force. With the prospect of the arrival of more than 20,000 Europeans there had still been hopes of the revolutionists being crushed ; now, since Riego's mutiny had brought about the abandonment of this expedition, there was no hope of reinforcements from Spain, and Morillo must have recognised that it could only be a question of time when his existing army should be worn down, if not defeated, by a hostile nation constantly recruited from the whole of its population. Nevertheless, Morillo loyally carried out his orders. He established a " Junta of Pacification " in Caracas, and entered into communication with the various republican leaders, Bolivar, Paez, Bermudez, Monágas, Zaraza, and many others, including the Congress of Angostura. Perhaps he had a lingering hope that, by addressing all of them separately, dissension might arise among men whose ambitions he must have known, and many of whom he might suspect of being ready to desert the common cause in their own personal interests. Bolivar was now fully aware of the new position of affairs in Spain. He had learnt everything from Spanish correspondence intercepted in Chiriguana. In a long letter to Soublette, dated Rosario de Cucuta, the 19th June 1820,¹ Bolivar shows that he understands the desperate position of the Spanish king, pressed by the liberals and afraid of an army which was desirous of peace. Ferdinand had no option but to negotiate for the stoppage of the war in South America. The Liberator was willing to enter into, even to facilitate negotiations, but he would insist, as a preliminary condition, on the recognition of Colombia's independence as a republic.

His concluding remarks on the incapacity of his own government at Angostura are far from complimentary,

¹ Quoted *in extenso* by Larrazabal, ii. 34.

and he is especially furious at their neglect to send him the arms which, as he was aware, had reached Angostura. Vice-President Zea had now gone to England, and German Roscio had been elected to succeed him. The Congress, which had dissolved in January, was re-assembled to consider the proposals of Morillo's delegates. Their answer had practically been dictated by Bolivar in his letter to Soublette, and it was delivered to the Spanish envoys, Cirés and Duarte, as follows: "The sovereign Congress will gladly entertain all proposals of the Spanish government having for basis the recognition of the sovereignty and independence of Colombia; it will admit none which differ from the principle so often proclaimed by the government and people of the Republic." Bolivar himself replied in similar terms, on the 7th July, to La Torre, and on the 23rd to Morillo.

Leaving the Spanish commissioners to digest these replies, he now went off on a tour to the Magdalena, visiting Mompox, Barranquilla, and Turbaco, within a few miles of Cartagena, in order to make arrangements for the continuation of Urdaneta's campaign in those parts.¹ At Barranquilla he received a proposal from Torres, the Spanish governor of Cartagena, for a suspension of hostilities. Seeing, however, that Torres demanded the submission of Colombia, Bolivar angrily replied that he would have nothing to do with such proposals.² Cartagena was strictly blockaded by land by Mariano Montilla, who had been joined by Cordova from Mompox.

¹ During this campaign Luis Brion commanded the operations on the Magdalena, and eventually captured Santa Marta on the 11th November 1820. He died shortly afterwards at Curaçao, after spending the whole of his fortune in the service of the republican cause.

² Larrazabal defends the terms of Bolivar's letter to Torres against Restrepo, who calls them "harsh." O'Leary honestly admits that Torres was indignant at "the insults which had been hurled at the nation to which he gloried in belonging." He refers to Bolivar's angry reply. To do him justice, Bolivar was generally polite in his correspondence, even with the enemy.

The Liberator was back at Cúcuta by the middle of September to find that the Spanish commissioners had come down somewhat in their terms, for, though they still insisted on an oath of fealty to Ferdinand, and the acceptance of the Spanish constitution, they were willing that the republican chiefs should retain authority in the districts they occupied, subject to the general control of the Spanish commander-in-chief. This was refused by the Colombians. The proposal certainly seems to smack of an attempt to work upon the personal ambitions of the leaders, and thus to induce them to betray the common cause. Nevertheless, Morillo, in proposing an armistice, had addressed Bolivar as "President of the Republic of Colombia."

Bolivar's first agent in London had been Lopez Mendez, who had succeeded in ruining Colombian credit there. Probably the unfortunate envoy was more helpless than deceitful, for he had really very little basis on which to seek credit. Anyhow, the pages of Hippisley¹ show that Mendez had succeeded in making Colombian promises a byword of contempt and distrust. Zea had now been sent to replace him. He succeeded in satisfying the creditors of the republic by the issue of transferable debentures bearing interest at 10 per cent. if paid in London, or 12 per cent. if paid in Colombia.²

Besides attending to financial matters, Zea attempted to open negotiations with the Duke of Frias, Spanish Ambassador in London, regarding the recognition of Colombian independence. His advances were rejected by Spain and disapproved by Bolivar. His idea was for a voluntary recognition by Spain of American independence, to be followed by a confederation of the

¹ "A Narrative of the Expedition to the Rivers Orinoco and Apure, etc.," *passim*.

² It is not necessary to recapitulate here the history of Colombian bonds. A short epitome will be found at p. 321 of the author's book, "The Republic of Colombia." The story is hardly a creditable one.

Spanish-speaking peoples. In the United States, Torres, the Colombian agent, found an advocate in Henry Clay, President of the Chamber of Representatives. But the Government held aloof. Sucre, on the other hand, had been successful in procuring from the Windward Islands the 10,000 muskets about which Bolivar was so angry with his people in Angostura when he wrote to Soublette on the 19th June. They were sent up the Orinoco in April, and on, partly by the Arauca, partly by the Meta, to Bolivar. On the 21st September Bolivar wrote to Morillo regarding the proposed armistice, which appeared to be intended as a preliminary of peace.¹ He still rode the high horse, alleging that, unless the armistice was to be preceded by an acknowledgment of Colombian independence, it would be detrimental to the interests of the republicans, who, by continuing hostilities, might reasonably expect to conquer the rest of Venezuela, as well as Quito. He ended by saying his headquarters would be at San Fernando by the end of October.

Meanwhile, hostilities continued. Bolivar occupied the provinces of Merida and Trujillo. On the 26th September he wrote again to Morillo, who had not yet replied, that he could not go to San Fernando, and proposing conditions for the armistice. These Morillo rejected, and then Bolivar wrote to him proposing a treaty to "regularise the war of horrors and crimes which so far has inundated Colombia with tears and blood."

By way, apparently, of enforcing his views, Morillo had, during this correspondence, advanced from Barquisemeto to Carache, with 2000 infantry and 200 cavalry. Bolivar at once wrote that he would accept no terms dictated by force, adding: "Your Excellency will be responsible before humanity and your nation for the

¹ O'Leary, *Docts.*, 17, p. 449.

continuation of this bloody struggle, the final result of which will be either the emancipation of the whole of America, or else its complete destruction, if it is still proposed to subdue it."

Nothing could shake Bolivar's firmness. Negotiations were continued at a meeting of the commissioners of both sides on the 21st November. It lasted till the night of the 25th, when the terms were finally settled, after much discussion. The armistice was to last for six months; the usual provisions were made for the delimitation of the spheres of occupation. Envoys for the conclusion of peace were to be nominated, and either party desiring to terminate the armistice before the period named must give forty days' notice of his intention. Finally, a treaty for the regularisation of the war was to be made.

This treaty was signed on the 26th.¹ It provided for exchange and proper treatment of prisoners, and abolished the death penalty in the case of deserters recaptured from the enemy. The dead in battle were to be properly buried or burnt, captured towns were not to be sacked or burnt; in a word, the war henceforward was to be carried on as if between civilised nations, not as among savages. The armistice and treaty being concluded, Morillo expressed a desire to make the personal acquaintance of his antagonist, to which Bolivar willingly agreed.

The place fixed for the meeting was the hamlet of Santa Ana, midway between Bolivar's headquarters at Trujillo and Morillo's at Carache. On the morning of the 27th November 1820, Morillo arrived there with a staff of some 50 officers, including La Torre, and an escort of a squadron of hussars. Shortly afterwards

¹ Given in full by O'Leary (ii. 52). The preamble distinctly describes one party as "The most Excellent President of the Republic of Colombia, Simon Bolivar." This is repeated in Morillo's ratification.

O'Leary announced the approach of Bolivar. Morillo asked him what escort the republican chief brought. On being told Bolivar had only 10 or 12 officers, besides the Spanish commissioners, Morillo replied: "I thought I had adventured myself thus far with a very small guard, but my former enemy has outdone me in generosity; I will order the hussars to retire," which he did. He also asked the names of any Spanish officers likely to be unwelcome to Bolivar, and ascertained that none of them were present. As the Liberator appeared in sight, Morillo, dressed in full uniform and wearing his orders, went forward with La Torre and others to meet him.

Again he asked which was Bolivar, and, on O'Leary's pointing him out, exclaimed, "What! that little man with a blue coat and a military cap, riding a mule?" As they met, the two generals dismounted and embraced cordially. Then they returned to the best hut in Santa Ana, where Morillo had prepared breakfast. They spent the day together, talking over their wars, and equal harmony reigned between their officers. Both slept that night under the same roof. Morillo had proposed erecting a monument to commemorate this strange historic meeting, and a large square boulder was placed to mark the spot meanwhile. Next day the Spanish and Colombian chiefs parted on the most cordial terms, never to meet again.¹ Both appear to have been perfectly satisfied with their interview.

A few days before signing the armistice and the treaty, Morillo had received orders from Spain relieving him of the command of the army of Venezuela, La Torre being appointed to succeed him. Morillo handed over charge at Caracas on the 14th December 1820, and, on the 17th, sailed from La Guaira for Spain. He appears no more in this history.

¹ This account is taken from O'Leary (ii. 56-59).

O'Leary¹ gives an estimate of Morillo which, perhaps, may be taken as a fairly impartial one. The Spanish commander was essentially a soldier rather than an administrator. "Without the sword in his hand his manly figure was insignificant, and it was only in the field that he felt himself in his true place." He was incapable of perceiving the great opportunity which still existed, even after he was master of New Granada, for conciliation by just and humane measures of administration. His wholesale executions of men like Camilo Torres and Caldas were a grave political mistake which culminated in his appointment to the Viceroyalty of such a savage as Sámano. Morillo had done much for the liberation of Spain from the French; all the merit he thus acquired was wiped out by his enthusiasm for the enslavement of the colonies. But to his administration some credit must be given for the public works, roads, bridges, etc., which he carried out during his short residence in New Granada. If his methods of enforcing work on them were unpopular, they were really necessary, in order to arouse the natural indolence of the Granadians in such a cause.

In Venezuela his executions were fewer, for he incurred greater resistance, and his appetite for blood was satisfied on the battlefield.

His personal courage was admitted on all hands; even the Llaneros, none too prodigal of their praises of the valour of others, used to say of him that "it was a pity he was born in Spain, and a shame that he was not a patriot."

For Bolivar, after the meeting at Santa Ana, he always expressed the highest admiration, and when O'Leary and Soublette visited him in his retirement at Corunna, in 1835, he willingly supplied them with such of Bolivar's papers as had fallen into his hands during

¹ ii. 63, and Preface to vol. i.

the war. Restrepo (iii. 80) deals more briefly with Morillo, but does not differ widely from O'Leary in his general estimate of his character.

After making arrangements for the carrying into effect of the armistice, and the posting of his troops during it, Bolivar returned (22nd December) to San Christóbal, intending to go south, at least as far as Popayan. His real motive for visiting the south was to get into communication with San Martin, O'Higgins, and the other patriots in Chile, Peru, and Guayaquil. At the last-named place a revolution had occurred, on the 9th October 1820, of which information had been sent to Colombia, by ships from Guayaquil to Buenaventura, on the Pacific coast of Colombia.

CHAPTER XII

THE BATTLE OF CARABOBO AND THE CONSTITUTION OF 1821

BOLIVAR now, thinking a fresh outbreak of war in Venezuela unlikely for the present, urged Valdés, commander of the army of the south, to advance on Quito, and sent Sucre, the best of the republican generals, to command that army. Valdés had met with some reverses, and, by his arbitrary conduct, had made himself very unpopular in the south. Quito had not been included in the armistice, for it had its own independent President, Aymerich.¹ As for Guayaquil, it also was excluded, as Aymerich claimed that it belonged to Peru. Sucre's orders required him to go to Guayaquil, in order to get into touch there with the new revolutionary Government, which had already been approached by San Martín, who was anxious to unite it to Peru. Sucre's movements will be more conveniently recounted later.

Bolívar reached Bogotá on the 5th January 1821, whence, a few days later, he started for the south. But he had only got to La Mesa, the first march out of the capital towards the Magdalena, when he received notice from La Torre of Morillo's departure and his own accession to the chief command. The letter also

¹ The Viceroy of Peru had practically taken over the administration of Quito and Guayaquil after the outbreak, which was suppressed in 1812. Aymerich is sometimes called Captain-General of Quito.

mentioned the arrival of commissioners from Spain, to treat for peace. The commissioners themselves sent a letter to Bolívar. The latter, supposing the commissioners to be invested with full powers, decided to return to Bogotá, whence he wrote, on the 25th January, to La Torre, to the commissioners, and to Ferdinand VII. himself. The letter to La Torre mainly consisted of congratulations, and expressions of pleasure at having to deal with him as a friend, or, if it should unfortunately so happen, to have him as an honourable enemy.

To Sartorio and Espelius, the Spanish commissioners, he expressed the desire of Colombia for peace, and stated that he had appointed, as plenipotentiaries to Spain, for the conclusion of a definite treaty, José Rafael Revenga and Tiburcio Echeverría.

The letter to Ferdinand VII., after congratulating him on his accession, ended by requesting him to listen favourably to the cry of Colombia for political existence.¹ Bolívar then started again for Cúcuta. On the way he received a letter from Francisco Delgado, governor of Maracaibo, stating that that city had proclaimed its independence of Spain and its adhesion to the republic. Urdaneta had, it appeared, sent troops to support the Maracaibo revolutionaries, thereby, as it seems clear, committing a distinct breach of the terms of the armistice. La Torre, naturally enough, wrote to protest, and to demand the withdrawal of Urdaneta's troops. On the 19th February, Bolívar, writing from San José de Cúcuta, in a private letter to La Torre,² shows that he felt a mistake had been made. "If," he writes, "the possession of Maracaibo was at any time an object of desire to us, to-day it is a matter of regret, on account of the equivocal position in which it places us. No doubt you will do me the justice of

¹ O'Leary, *Docts.*, 18, p. 44.

² *Ibid.*, 18, p. 81.

believing that I did not take the slightest part in the insurrection of that city." He went on to deprecate a breach on account of this occurrence. His official reply¹ frankly admits that Heras, who had taken the troops to Maracaibo, was wrong, and promises to put him on his trial for exceeding his orders. He pleads with justice that Heras' act must be separated from the revolt of Maracaibo, and that the latter was no breach of the armistice, seeing that it was spontaneous on the part of the citizens and the governor. Then, with extraordinary perversity, he proceeds to argue, on grounds worthy of the most pettifogging lawyer, that he was bound to support Heras' action. He evidently does not believe his wretched arguments will be accepted; for, after suggesting arbitration, he inquires whether, if no settlement is come to regarding Maracaibo, hostilities are to recommence without the forty days' notice prescribed; if the notice is required, from what date will it count—that of despatch or of receipt by the opposite side? Must notice be given to all commanders, or only to the commander-in-chief? Probably Bolivar felt that he dared not throw over his own commanders at the request of a Spaniard, even when they had acted wrongly. That seems to be the real view of Larrazabal,² though he pretends to be very indignant with Baralt and Restrepo, who censure Bolivar's action, and characterise his arguments as specious.

On the 10th March Bolivar, from Boconó de Trujillo, sent notice of resumption of hostilities on the 28th April.³ Bolivar's action has met with considerable criticism in this matter. La Torre himself characterised the notice as "unexpected and inconceivable," whilst Restrepo says the Liberator's action may justly be stigmatised as in-

¹ Larrazabal (ii. 70) gives it in full. Those who are interested in the argument of Bolivar can read it there, or in O'Leary, *Docts.*, 18, p. 77.

² ii. 74.

³ O'Leary, *Docts.*, 18, p. 130.

consistent.¹ Larrazabal² attributes his action to his discovery that the Spanish commissioners had no power to conclude a definite agreement. That being so, he considered that it was to his advantage to recommence hostilities at once, without allowing the enthusiasm of his own men to cool, or the spirit of the Spaniards to improve. The rupture of the armistice may, therefore, be considered a somewhat unscrupulous seizure of a favourable opportunity. Larrazabal quotes a private letter of Bolivar to his friend William White, in support of his theory, and another passage in which the Liberator expresses his dread lest his envoys in Madrid, Revenga and Echeverria, should be deceived by false stories of republican defeats, and induced to accept terms which would not be approved in Colombia.

On the 25th April, Bolivar, whose headquarters were at Barinas, issued three proclamations.³ The first was to the Spaniards, endeavouring to show that La Torre was the breaker of the armistice, and promising that the treaty for the conduct of the war should be faithfully observed. The second was to the Colombian people, also laying the blame on the Spaniards. The third was a short one to his soldiers, foretelling victory, and impressing the order that violations of the treaty regularising the war would be punished with death.

Then Bolivar marched for Guanare to be ready for the opening of the campaign. At Trujillo he heard of the revolt of the "Numancia" battalion against the Spaniards in Peru.⁴

¹ Restrepo, iii. 109. His words are : "It is clear that there was a violation of the armistice, cloaked by a few specious arguments. The Liberator had weighty reasons for breaking the cessation of hostilities ; but . . . he adduced reasons which were not in accord with his letters and recent operations ; which afforded good ground for branding his conduct with the epithet inconsistent."

² ii. 75.

³ O'Leary, Docts., 18, p. 210.

⁴ The "Numancia" battalion was raised, in 1813, by the Spanish general Yañez in Venezuela, and consisted entirely of Venezuelans. After fighting at Boyacá on the royalist side, it had gone south with Calzada to Quito, and

In the meanwhile there had been trouble in Cúcuta with the Congress. When Zea went to England he was succeeded, as Vice-President of the Republic, by German Roscio, as has already been mentioned. Owing to Rosario de Cúcuta having been fixed as the meeting place of the Constituent Congress summoned to pass the Constitution, Roscio had to leave Angostura for Cúcuta on the 14th November 1820. To fill his place at Angostura, Bolivar appointed Soublette to be Vice-President of Venezuela. Roscio died at Cúcuta, and Bolivar nominated as his successor General Azuola, who also died very soon after (13th April 1821). To succeed him, the veteran Antonio Nariño was appointed. He had escaped from his imprisonment in Spain, and was now on his way back, by Angostura and the plains, to his native Bogotá. Till his arrival in Cúcuta, in the end of April, there was an interregnum following on the death of Azuola.

When Azuola died there were already assembled in Cúcuta all but a few of the members of the Congress. Bolivar being away, and the Vice-Presidency of the republic vacant (for Nariño's appointment was not yet known), the deputies began squabbling as to who was to preside at the opening of Congress. Then they accused Bolivar of having made no provision for their maintenance at Cúcuta. Some of them had come from great distances, and were in financial difficulties.

Nariño's arrival settled some of these difficulties, and the Congress met on the 6th May in the sacristy of the parish church at Rosario de Cúcuta. But Bolivar, furious at the behaviour of the deputies, resolved to play his usual trump card of a threatened resignation. So certain of his position did he feel that he ventured to say that, having been appointed by the
on to Peru, where it had now revolted, and placed itself under the orders of San Martín, the "Protector of Peru."

Venezuelan Congress to be President of the Republic of Colombia, he was not President of New Granada, that he was not suited to be so, and that he was weary of being dubbed tyrant by his enemies. Therefore, he declined to continue at the head of the State, adding that, if the Congress insisted on it, he would rather renounce his citizenship of Colombia than accept that position.¹ Needless to say, when the Congress, now thoroughly cowed, wrote him a letter of fulsome adulation refusing his resignation, he was pacified, and accepted the Presidency of the Republic.

The Congress then settled down to the discussion of the fundamental law and the Constitution.

When Bolivar left Barinas with part of the army for Guanare, he was detained some days at La Yuca by a river in flood. He only reached Guanare on the 19th May. There he received the resolution of the Congress, just recorded, and in reply, besides accepting the Presidency, renounced the various money grants made to him as President. Perhaps they were not then worth very much, but, to his honour be it said, Bolivar was never grasping in the matter of money, and was always willing to devote his personal property to the service of his cause.

At Guanare, also, he learnt that La Torre, after advancing as far as Araure, had again retired on Valencia. The Liberator at once sent Cedeño to occupy San Carlos. Soublette,² meanwhile, had ordered Bermudez to march on Caracas, and Zaraza, aided by Monágas, to operate towards Calabozo, both movements being intended to relieve the pressure on Bolivar. The desired effect was attained; for La Torre detached a battalion to aid Correa in the defence of Caracas, which that general, nevertheless, felt himself obliged to evacuate.

¹ Letter of 10th May 1821. O'Leary, *Docts.*, 18, p. 540 *n.*

² It will be remembered that he was now Vice-President of Venezuela at Angostura.

It was occupied by Bermudez on the 14th May, after defeating 700 royalists at Guatire on the previous day. Moreover, Morales had to go to Aragua with 800 men, both these detachments being deducted from the main army opposed to Bolivar.

On the 1st June, the Liberator established his headquarters at San Carlos, where he was joined by Paez and Urdaneta. Paez was the first to arrive, with 1000 of his Llaneros, followed two days later by the rest of his division. Urdaneta arrived later. La Torre was encamped on the plains of Carabobo, the scene of Bolivar's victory, in 1814, over Cajigal and Ceballos. Morales had rejoined him, but, on the other hand, he had detached two battalions to oppose a small force sent by Bolivar towards San Felipe to threaten the Spanish communications with Puerto Cabello. La Torre's whole force present at Carabobo was probably about 5500 men.

Bolivar had 6500, and this "army" (of about the strength of a European brigade) he organised in three divisions. The first, under Paez, comprised the British battalion about 900 strong, the battalion "Bravos de Apure," and 1500 Llanero cavalry. The second division, under Cedeño, consisted of a brigade of the "Guard," three battalions, and one squadron of cavalry. The third, under Colonel Plaza, was similar, but had a fourth battalion, and a whole regiment of cavalry.

On the night of the 23rd June, Bolivar, who had left San Carlos on the 21st, encamped in front of the heights to the south of the Carabobo plain. He had expected to have to fight at the strong position above the defile of Buenavista, but had found it unoccupied, and had passed the defile unopposed. It was a night of torrential rain, which reminded some of the English veterans of the night of the 17th to 18th June 1815 before the battle of Waterloo. On the morning of the 24th the

exhalations of the previous night's rain created a mist, which, lifting as the republicans advanced, showed a cloudless sky. The day was oppressively hot, and the English especially suffered greatly from the heat and from thirst. On the plain of Carabobo and the hills in front of it, the Spaniards were drawn up in six columns, evidently expecting a frontal attack by one or both of the two roads leading, the one from San Carlos, the other from El Pao, to Carabobo. Commanding as they did the mouths of both passes, the Spaniards seemed to bar all possibility of a deployment by the republicans in front. Bolivar, recognising the strength of the enemy's position, resolved to turn his right flank. Paez moved in that direction under a heavy fire and through a very difficult defile. The "Bravos de Apure" led the way, followed by the British battalion and a regiment of cavalry. The Spaniards, with the plain to manœuvre on, were able, as soon as they saw Bolivar's aim, to reinforce their right. About 11 a.m., the "Bravos de Apure," issuing from the steep ravine up which they had with difficulty scrambled, advanced against La Torre's right flank, under a heavy fire from the Spanish guns in front of the San Carlos road. The Spanish infantry held their fire until the Venezuelans were close up, and then discharged a volley in their faces, which completely broke the battalion, and sent it hurrying back in the wildest confusion on the British. The latter were almost carried away by the fugitives, but, being a very superior class of troops to the Venezuelans, managed to hold their ground as the "Bravos de Apure" fled through their midst. As the pursuing Spaniards came up, the British grenadier company, under Captain Minchin, received them in line with so steady a discharge at short range that they at once fell back under repeated volleys fired by company after company of the British. They retired to the position in which the Apure men had attacked them.

But they still greatly outnumbered their opponents in this part of the field. The British waited for reinforcements, but none came, though the Colombian writers assert that the Apure battalion rallied and supported them. Paez also seems to have tried a cavalry charge, which he led himself. The ground was unfavourable, and he was driven back. Ammunition now began to fail in the British line, and the men, especially the officers, fell terribly fast under the Spanish fire. Colonel Ferrier had been killed, and replaced by Captain Scott. He in turn fell, and was succeeded by Captain Minchin. Then, at last, Paez brought up some fresh ammunition, and the Englishmen advanced in line with the bayonet against a superior force in a strong position. They charged with the fury of a forlorn hope. It was a desperate business, and the Spaniards fought bravely; but British valour conquered, and at that moment some companies of the "Tiradores" of Bolivar's second division came to their aid. The enemy gave ground slowly at first, then fled, leaving the position in the hands of the British. Only a part of both armies had been engaged, and the second and third Venezuelan divisions had scarcely fired a shot. They had made no attempt to fix the Spanish force in its position and prevent reinforcements being sent to the right to oppose the turning force. The breaking of their right flank spelt disaster for the Spaniards. Two fresh battalions tried in vain to retrieve the position, though they retreated in perfect order. The Venezuelans were now issuing from the San Carlos road, opened by the Spanish movement to their right, and the cavalry charged upon the open plain which they had before them. The Spanish force completely broke up, whole battalions surrendered, the republican victory was complete. La Torre only succeeded in keeping together his reserve of two battalions, which had not been engaged at first, and part of his cavalry. Bolivar

carried out the pursuit with the "Grenadiers," "Rifles," and Paez's cavalry. He made a vain endeavour to intercept the retreating enemy at Valencia, by mounting some of his infantry and sending them round. Nevertheless, only one Spanish battalion succeeded in reaching Puerto Cabello intact. There they were joined by the two battalions detached to the west before the battle, who succeeded in slipping away from between Bolivar and his detachment.

The loss on both sides was heavy, especially on that of the republicans. The British battalion lost two commanders in succession, and one-third of its men. Cedeño and Plaza, the commanders of the second and third divisions, were killed.

This decisive victory may fairly be attributed entirely to the steadiness and valour of the Englishmen, most of them veterans of the Peninsula and Waterloo. Bolivar himself acknowledges their splendid behaviour in his despatch, and, according to the writer in *All the Year Round*, he saluted the men, as they passed him after the battle, with the words, "Salvadores de mi patria!" (saviours of my country!).¹

¹ This account of Carabobo is based on Bolivar's despatch (O'Leary, *Docts.*, 18, p. 337) and on the account of an Englishman engaged in the battle, given in *All the Year Round*, vol. xix. (1868), p. 367. Professor Hiram Bingham has since published an account of the battle, based on comparison of the various accounts and a careful study of the locality. According to him, the Spaniards should certainly have fought at Buenavista. They preferred to defend the junction of the roads from Tinaquillo and from Pao to Valencia. The plain of Carabobo was visible from Buenavista hill, five miles off. The intervening country was very hilly and confused. The Spaniards were facing the two roads at their issues from the hills. Paez's turning movement was discovered when his troops appeared on a hill above the Spanish right. His people started down the two miles of hill, under the impression that it led direct on to the plain. When they got to the bottom they found themselves in a valley 150 feet below the level of the plain, faced by the Spaniards, who had had time to reinforce their right. That movement, it seems clear, could have been hampered by a vigorous frontal attack along the road. On the other hand, had Paez made a rather wider turning

Whilst La Torre fell back on Puerto Cabello with the remnants of his army, Morales' cavalry drew off in disorder by the El Pao road, making for the plains.

Hearing of the victory, the Congress at Cúcuta decreed a triumph and other honours to Bolivar, including a column of commemoration on the battlefield which, like that at Santa Ana in commemoration of the meeting with Morillo, was never erected.

Bolivar, entering Valencia on the night of June 24th, at once sent Heras off after the two detached Spanish battalions towards San Felipe. As already mentioned, they succeeded in eluding him. Colonel Rangel was sent to blockade La Torre in Puerto Cabello. Then the army was reorganised and the chief command given to Mariño.

To Bermudez at Caracas was opposed a Spanish force under Perreira. Bolivar now marched for the capital to take Perreira in rear, but the Spaniard, hearing of Carabobo, tried to slip away towards the plains. On his way he received an order from La Torre, directing him to make for Puerto Cabello. This Perreira found to be impracticable, for Bolivar was in Caracas on the 29th, and the country between him and Puerto Cabello was impassable. Perreira then tried to get the French Admiral at La Guaira to take him off, but was refused. La Torre had sailed from Puerto Cabello with some small ships to try and pick up Perreira, but, finding La Guaira in the enemy's hands, had returned. Perreira, now in a desperate situation, entered upon negotiations for capitulation. He and such of his men as desired were allowed to go to Puerto Cabello. Only 200, out

movement, he would have descended on the right rear of the enemy without encountering the valley in which he found himself before reaching the plain. Professor Bingham says that the British formed a hollow square in the valley after the first repulse of the "Bravos de Apure"; these rallied and passed on to the plain farther north, that is beyond the right of the new Spanish line. *Vide* "Journal of an Expedition, etc.," pp. 276-79.

of 700, followed him, the rest preferring to enlist under the republican banner. Soon after reaching Puerto Cabello, Perreira died of fever, brought on by hard work and privations.

Bolívar now sent for Soublette, the Vice-President of Venezuela, from Angostura, and, leaving him to continue the work of restoring order and government in Caracas, himself returned to Valencia on the 11th July, leaving a sufficient force in Caracas and La Guaira.

At Valencia, the Liberator despatched Mariño, with three battalions, into the western districts, and took measures for making secure the blockade of Puerto Cabello.

On the 22nd he was back at Caracas, where he divided Venezuela provisionally into three military districts—

- (1) Coró, Merida, and Trujillo, under Mariño.
- (2) Caracas, Carabobo, Barquisemeto, Barinas, and Apure were the charge of Paez.
- (3) In Barcelona, Cumaná, Guayana, and Margarita, Bermudez commanded.

The royalist power in Venezuela was now reduced to the blockaded fortresses of Puerto Cabello, and Cumaná, and to a few guerrillas in the provinces of Caracas and Coró, chiefly the latter, which had all through favoured the royalist cause.

Bolívar gives his reason for dividing the country into *military* areas in a letter to Dr Gual.¹ The army, he said, was in a dangerous state, full as it was of men who had fought long and were now in a state of misery, unpaid and hopeless of any reward of their services. The Llaneros in particular were a danger. "We are on the brink of an abyss," he wrote, "or rather on a volcano in a state of proximate eruption. I fear peace more than

¹ Larrazabal, ii. 91.

war. That gives you an idea of all that I do not, and cannot, relate to you." The situation can easily be understood, and it is to be remembered that Mariño, Bermudez, and Paez, always greedy of separate command, if not pacified by having each his own kingdom, would not have hesitated to plunge the scarce liberated republic into a fresh civil war. What had happened in New Granada, in Venezuela, and in Buenos Aires was sufficient to show that patriotism was always liable to be put aside in favour of personal ambitions by the majority of the so-called patriot leaders.

Venezuela was practically free of the Spaniards, and its freedom was never really in doubt after Carabobo, but Bolivar's mission, at any rate as he defined it for himself, was far from ended. The royalists still held Cartagena and Panama in New Granada, and were as strong as ever in that hotbed of royalism Pasto in the far south. Nor did Bolivar's views of liberation end with Venezuela and New Granada. Beyond these were Quito, Lower and Upper Peru, perhaps even Chile and Buenos Aires, all to be freed.

On the 1st August, the Liberator left Caracas for the west once more. His plan was to land at Rio Hacha and Santa Marta, with a force sufficient to subdue Cartagena and Panama, and, after that had been accomplished, to embark on the Pacific for the conquest of Guayaquil and Quito.

In the first days of September, Bolivar found himself in Maracaibo, after issuing orders for the pacification of Coró. From Maracaibo he sent Salom¹ with the battalion of "Rifles" to Rio Hacha. There he was to organise an expedition from Santa Marta to Puerto Bello and across the isthmus to Panama.

¹ Bartolomé Salom, one of Bolivar's most trusted lieutenants, was born at Caracas in 1780. His last command was in Maturin, where Bolivar sent him to succeed Mariño after Paez's insurrection of 1827. Died at Caracas in 1863.

The isthmus, Bolivar characterised as the "artery of the universe."¹

The Congress at Cúcuta had already, on the 12th July, sanctioned the Constitution of 1819. As finally passed it stood thus. The republic was centralised and the whole territory divided up into Departments, Provinces, and Cantons. The local Vice-Presidents (of Venezuela and New Granada) were abolished and at the head of the Departments were placed Intendants, who practically occupied the same position of subordination to the executive. Under the Intendants were the chief magistrates of Provinces and Cantons.

The Legislature consisted of two chambers, the Senate and the Chamber of Representatives, the members of which were chosen by Electoral colleges. Senators were elected for eight years, Representatives for four. The age qualification was thirty years for a Senator, twenty-five for a Representative. There was also a property qualification of \$4000 in the case of the former, and of \$2000 for the latter. The franchise for citizen electors was fixed at \$500. The executive power was exercised by a President elected for four years and allowed only one re-election. In his absence or death, his place was to be taken by a Vice-President elected for the same period. There was a Council of Government consisting of five secretaries and one member of the High Court. The President's powers were strictly limited, and he was responsible for the acts of his government. Only in the case of foreign invasion, or civil war, did absolute power pass into his hands. As Bolivar neatly put it, "the government of Colombia was either a gentle rivulet or a devastating torrent."² It was hardly ever anything but

¹ "El vehiculo del Universo." To translate the word "vehiculo" by its ordinary English equivalent "vehicle" would not express the meaning. The secondary meaning, "blood-vessel" or "artery," seems more correctly to interpret Bolivar's idea.

² O'Leary, ii. 102.

the torrent in his lifetime, for there was almost always either invasion or civil war.

The ministers were the irresponsible agents of the executive. The judiciary was entirely independent of the executive which, while required to take care that the law was properly administered, was rendered impotent by being deprived of the power to punish or dismiss judges, even for gross misconduct or incapacity. Slavery was only partially abolished by regulations for the manumission of the sons of slave women.

The capital of the republic was transferred again from the central position of Cúcuta to Bogotá, where it would be very far removed from the Department of Venezuela, a fact not likely to improve the chances of maintenance of the union. In this move O'Leary sees the handiwork of Santander who wished, as Vice-President, to be in a position to curb the great popularity enjoyed by his rival Nariño in Bogotá. Altogether, O'Leary does not think very highly of the wisdom or experience of this Congress, which went a good deal beyond its proper business of promulgating the Constitution.¹ Amongst other measures which he condemns is the remission of excise duties on liquors, and the substitution of a direct land tax.

At this time, the Liberator received many letters from members of the General Congress at Cúcuta, begging him to come and direct their deliberations. That was incompatible with his plans of conducting personally the expedition to the Isthmus, and he refused. To Gual, the Finance Minister, he replied at greater length in a letter, in one passage of which he says his ambition is that the verdict of history may be: "Bolivar took command to liberate his fellow-citizens, and, when they were free, left them to govern themselves by the law and not by his will."² Thereupon the Congress proceeded, on the 7th

¹ O'Leary, ii. 104.

² Larrazabal, ii. 95.

September, to the election of a President and Vice-President. For the Presidency, Bolivar had a large majority. For the Vice-Presidency there was a closer contest between Nariño and Santander, the latter eventually coming out victorious after several scrutinies.

It now became necessary for Bolivar and Santander to go to Cúcuta to take the oath of office. Both arrived about the same time, but, before taking the oath, the Liberator insisted on being allowed liberty still to continue military operations. A special law was passed on the 20th August 1821, providing that, whilst he was absent in the field, the Vice-President should act for him. He took the oath on the 3rd October. Before he signed the Constitution and decreed its execution, he addressed the assembly, protesting his unwillingness to accept the Presidency. "I prefer," he said, "the title of citizen to that of Liberator, for the latter is the outcome of war, the former of law." To this the President of the Congress replied, insisting, on behalf of the assembly, on the necessity of Bolivar's being the first President of the Republic. Larrazabal is sure that Bolivar *bonâ fide* desired what he said. Others, looking back on the whole history of his life, and considering the numerous occasions on which, even after the most violent repudiation of office or honours, he finally accepted them, will hardly be inclined to agree. Santander was next sworn in as Vice-President, an appointment fatal to Bolivar's interests; for Santander, his enemy of 1813, though cloaking his hostility under the pretence of friendship and admiration, probably never ceased to be at heart the enemy of the Liberator. To the Granadian Santander, the Venezuelan Bolivar was never the proper tenant of Presidential chair of Colombia, including, as it then did, New Granada. Bolivar, it will be remembered, had appointed Nariño Vice-President in April 1821, but that high-handed leader had soon quarrelled with the Congress,

and been compelled to resign his Vice-Presidency. Could Bolivar have obtained his election, as against Santander, by the Congress, it seems doubtful if he would have found Nariño easier to deal with than Santander. Certainly Nariño's past history points to it as unlikely. Yet it must be admitted that he quietly accepted a subordinate position under Santander's government in Bolivar's absence in Peru. Finally, Santander was in power at Bogotá, and, had Nariño been preferred to him, he would possibly have raised the standard of civil war. Bolivar now organised his administration afresh, making Gual Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Castillo Rada for Finance, Restrepo for the Interior, and Briceño Mendez for War and the Navy. On the 8th October, the Liberator issued a proclamation to the various peoples of the republic, those of Venezuela, of Cundinamarca,¹ and of Quito.² The last-named had still to be gathered into the fold. The last sentence of this proclamation announces the delegation of powers to the Vice-President during Bolivar's absence in the field.

Having come to Bogotá, Bolivar now abandoned the idea of an expedition by sea to Puerto Bello and Panama in favour of a march south by land or river. Salom was therefore directed to bring the expeditionary force from Santa Marta up the Magdalena to Bogotá. There was a good deal of delay in starting, and it was not till the 6th December that Salom got off with the last detachment of the troops.

Bolivar, meanwhile, had sent off two ministers-plenipotentiary, one to Mexico, the other to Chile, Peru, and Buenos Aires to the republican governments in those countries. At the same time he received information that Revenga, Echeverria, and Zea had gone to Madrid

¹ That is really New Granada. Cundinamarca is the province in which Bogotá is situated.

² O'Leary, *Docts.*, 18, p. 558.

as envoys to arrange a peace at the time of the armistice with Morillo. After one formal visit to the minister, they remained three months in Madrid without being able to obtain another, and without being noticed by anyone. Then, on the 2nd September 1821, they were suddenly given their passports and ordered to leave the country within twenty-four hours. Larrazabal's characterisation of this order as "barbarous" is certainly not justified, when it is considered that the news of the battle of Carabobo must have reached Spain.

On the 1st October 1821, Cartagena had been gathered in to the republican fold. The messenger bringing its golden keys from Mariano Montilla reached Bolivar at Suata on the 15th October.

It will be remembered that Montilla had been sent with the Irish brigade, at the beginning of 1820, to conquer Cartagena.¹ He had arrived before the place in August—though without the Irishmen, most of whom had mutinied and been sent off—and had blockaded it for fourteen months, when, at last, the governor, Torres, accepted the very liberal terms offered by Montilla. The garrison was sent to Puerto Rico at the expense of Colombia.

Four months' grace, in which to dispose of their property, were granted to private persons wishing to leave the country, and the safety of the persons and property of all was guaranteed. The only condition demanded by Torres, and refused by Montilla, was that the entry of the Colombian troops should be deferred till after the garrison had sailed. Montilla, who had 4000 men with him, was now ordered to proceed to the isthmus of Panama. This, however, was rendered unnecessary by a popular rising at Santos, which ended in the incorporation of Panama, as a new Department, in the Republic of Colombia. Thereupon, Montilla was

¹ *Supra*, p. 240.

ordered to follow the march to the south by river and land. He was, Bolivar wrote, to follow to Quito "to finish the enterprise."

As we are now about to accompany Bolivar in his effort to complete the task, which he had marked out for himself, of finally destroying the Spanish power in Quito and Peru, we may pause for a moment to anticipate very briefly the end of the war of independence in Venezuela and New Granada, which had been practically assured by the battle of Carabobo, the blockade of La Torre in Puerto Cabello, and the fall of Cartagena.

A few days after the fall of Cartagena, Cumaná capitulated to Bermudez (10th October 1821), the garrison being transported by Colombian vessels to Puerto Rico. Puerto Bello and Chagres in the Isthmus of Panama also fell.

Spain still had a foothold on the northern coast in Puerto Cabello, and in the province of Coró, which throughout had been notorious for its fidelity to the royal cause. After the battle of Carabobo, the remains of the forces of La Torre and Morales had been blockaded by land in Puerto Cabello. The republicans had no artillery to enable them to carry on a regular siege. As the Spaniards were superior at sea, their communications in that direction were free, and it was impossible to starve them out. Moreover, they were free to undertake raids by sea against other parts of the coast.

As there were some 4000 Spanish troops in the place, Morales, who succeeded La Torre in the command, was able to embark on a considerable expedition in 1822. Proceeding by sea with 1200 men, he reached Maracaibo, and took it on the 7th September 1822. Thence he crossed the Lake of Maracaibo, defeated Montilla, and threatened a southward march to Cúcuta. Santa Marta and the

province of Coró both fell into his hands by the beginning of December 1822. In the beginning of 1823 the tide turned. Santa Marta was retaken by Montilla, and Coró by Soublette. Later on, Padilla, with a fleet of small ships from Cartagena, followed Morales into the Lake of Maracaibo, where he completely routed the Spanish flotilla on the 24th July. A few days later (3rd August 1823) Morales capitulated at Maracaibo, on conditions which provided for the transmission of himself and his European troops to Cuba, at the cost of Colombia, provided they were not to serve again in the war.

Calzada still held out in Puerto Cabello, the siege of which had been raised by Paez, who had retired to Valencia. The Llanero chief now again blockaded the place on the land side, and to some extent by sea. Drawing lines of circumvallation about the fortress, he eventually succeeded in cutting off the fresh water supply of the place. But Calzada, in reply to Paez's summons, refused to capitulate, though the garrison was reduced to great straits by hunger and thirst.

In the beginning of November, Paez, hearing of an expedition fitting out in Cuba for the relief of Puerto Cabello, decided to storm it.

During the night of the 7th November 1823, 400 men, guided by a Spanish deserter, waded across the marshy lagoon, and had almost reached the city before they were discovered. Other attacks were simultaneously made from the besiegers' lines in different parts. Calzada and his garrison made a desperate resistance, but were finally forced to surrender.

The citadel of San Felipe, still untaken, began to fire on the city next morning. Honourable terms of capitulation, including departure with the honours of war, and no promise not to fight again, were offered to the commandant. On the 10th they were accepted, and

on the 15th the Spanish troops were shipped off to Cuba.

Thus, on the 15th November 1823, Venezuela and New Granada were finally cleared of all Spanish troops, except a few guerrillas who still carried on a hopeless struggle.

CHAPTER XIII

GUAYAQUIL AND QUITO, 1821-22

HERE we return to the south and to the movements of Bolivar and Sucre in that direction. It has already been related¹ how the revolt in Quito was suppressed in 1812, with the result that, for eight years, the province submitted quietly to Spanish dominion.

On the 9th October 1820, revolution again broke out, this time at Guayaquil, the port nearly south of Quito on the Pacific. The usual Junta was formed and the surrounding province joined in the movement. But Quito itself had been too completely crushed in 1812 to dare even now to break out again, and the Guayaquileños were left to face alone the wrath of Aymerich the Spanish Captain-General. That officer dealt promptly with the rebels, whom he utterly defeated at Guachi, as they moved on Quito, on the 22nd November 1820. Guayaquil itself was threatened by the victorious royalists, and any ideas of revolution entertained by the Quiteños were nipped in the bud. It was at this juncture that Bolivar, on the signing of the armistice of Santa Ana with Morillo, had sent Sucre to Guayaquil, with the double object of helping the new republic, and gathering it into the Colombian fold.

Sucre, whom Bolivar described as possessed of the "best organised head in all Colombia,"² succeeded in

¹ *Supra*, p. 77.

² Mitre, iii. p. 547, giving reference to La Croix. "Diario de Bucaramanga," p. 70.

collecting 1000 troops at Popayan. With these he reached Guayaquil by sea in May 1821. He found the people, alarmed by the defeat of their forces at Guachi, only too ready to accept the welcome reinforcement he brought. But there was not the same readiness to accept the condition which Bolivar attached to his offer of assistance, namely, the annexation of Guayaquil to the Republic of Colombia and its absorption into it. The weight of public opinion in Guayaquil was on the side of union with Peru, its southern, rather than with Colombia its northern neighbour. There was a small party in favour of Bolivar, and a third which was for entire independence alike of Peru and of Colombia. This latter party was headed by J. J. Olmedo, perhaps the most important personage in Guayaquil at the time.

San Martin, the Protector of Peru, was as desirous of getting hold of Guayaquil for his state as Bolivar was of absorbing it into Colombia, and had already despatched Tomas Guido to press his views in Guayaquil. Of the three parties, probably, that of Olmedo was the strongest, that of Sucre the weakest. But Sucre's troops were an important factor. He was wise enough not to insist, for the moment, on complete compliance with Bolivar's wishes for the incorporation of Guayaquil in Colombia, though he was able to induce the Junta to put the infant republic under the protection of Colombia as against Spain.

In the middle of July 1821, Sucre being at Sanborondon,¹ there occurred a revolt of some of the Guayaquil troops, and of the flotilla, in favour of Spain. The Junta, in desperation, sent for Sucre, who, returning promptly with some troops, rescued it from its difficulties by putting down the mutineers.

Sucre now took command of all the troops, Guayaquileños as well as Colombians, and advanced to meet

¹ Sanboramban on the map.

Aymerich, who was descending from Quito with 3000 royalists. The republican had scarce half this strength, but he was able to take advantage of Aymerich's grave error in dividing his force into two columns marching from different directions. When Sucre fell upon and severely defeated one at Yaguachi (27th August 1821), the other also retired.

Sucre now again pressed for union of Guayaquil with Colombia, but the Junta temporised by affirming that, though the provincial vote was in favour of union, no final resolution could be passed till the electoral college had been convoked. Sucre, flushed with his victory of Yaguachi, had moved on to Ambato¹ on the way to Quito. There he was attacked by Colonel Gonzales with superior forces, and driven down again to his old position, after losing a large part of his force, and being himself wounded (12th September 1821). Fortunately he was reinforced by 500 fresh Colombians, and 300 more were promised shortly. This enabled him to show a bold front, and, on the 20th November, an armistice for 90 days was concluded with the Captain-General. It saved Guayaquil, but also gave time to Aymerich to make fresh preparations for the defence of Quito.

On the 24th December 1821 there arrived at Quito the new Viceroy, Murgeon, whose reign was but a short one. He died on the 3rd April 1822. During the armistice, Sucre heard of the revolt against the Spaniards of the Venezuelan battalion "Numancia"² and, being in quest of troops, he requested San Martín to send it to

¹ Hambato on map.

² The "Numancia" battalion was originally formed in 1813 by the Spanish General Yañez and consisted solely of Venezuelans. We have already heard of it at Calzada's action of Cachimí in 1816, and again on the royalist side at Boyacá. After that battle it went southwards to Peru and now, incited by some patriots serving in its ranks, the battalion had changed sides and placed itself under the orders of San Martín. We shall hear of it again.

him, as the men were Colombians. San Martin, however, sent him instead a Peruvian contingent of 1100 men which was quartered closer at hand, at Piura. They marched by land.

During the armistice, also, there arrived at Guayaquil fresh emissaries, both from Bolivar and San Martin. Diego Ibarra, Bolivar's aide-de-camp, brought to Sucre orders to march on Quito as a diversion in favour of Bolivar's march by Pasto. He also carried Bolivar's offers to San Martin of assistance in completing the liberation of South America. About the same time San Martin's envoy, Salazar, also arrived. His mission was nominally to welcome Bolivar on his expected arrival at Guayaquil. In reality he was charged with the task of pressing his master's claim for the union of Guayaquil with Peru.

When Sucre returned to Guayaquil from Babahoyo, where he had been organising the defence against Aymerich, he found the city more torn by factions than ever, and nothing could be done towards the desired union with Colombia. His own influence in Guayaquil had diminished considerably after his defeat at Ambato. Taking with him most of the troops in Guayaquil, he marched, in compliance with Bolivar's orders, for Quito towards the end of January 1822. He left behind him, at Guayaquil, La Mar, whom the Junta had appointed to the command of the troops other than Sucre's army. La Mar was a strong partisan of San Martin and an advocate of the union of Guayaquil with Peru. He was, moreover, an intimate friend of Salazar, San Martin's envoy to Guayaquil.

We must now return to Bolivar, whom we left starting from Bogotá for the valley of the Cauca. His intention was to unite his army at Cali, in the Cauca valley, to march thence over the Western Cordilleras to the port of Buenaventura, and there to take ship for Guayaquil.

Looking at an ordinary map of Colombia, it seems but a simple matter to go from Bogotá to Cali. In reality it is no such thing. From Bogotá the traveller has to descend from an altitude of 9000 feet to the Magdalena valley, only 1400 or 1500 feet above the sea; then there is a long journey up that valley to Neiva, and up the La Plata river to La Plata itself. There the real difficulties begin, as the route turns west over the pass of Guanacas, 12,000 feet or more above sea level. Mollien, who crossed this pass in 1823, has left a terrible account of its desolation, and of the corpses and skeletons of wayfarers, of the broken-down mules, and other signs of the passage and re-passage of troops and travellers, which strewn the freezing "paramo." From the summit, the path (road there is none) descends again to the Cauca valley, 4000 feet above the sea. There indeed there is genial warmth and fertility exceeding that of most valleys. It is easy to write that a force marched from Bogotá to Cauca. Let us remember, at the same time, the privations it must have undergone on the way.

Leaving Bogotá on the 13th December 1821, Bolivar was at Cali on the 5th January, where he issued (17th January 1822) a proclamation announcing to the peoples of the south of Colombia, of the Cauca valley, of Pasto, and of Quito his own advance to free them from the chains of Spanish servitude.¹ He had by this time changed his plan; for, after starting his troops off over the western Cordilleras for Buenaventura, he received information from Sucre that Murgeon, the Spanish President, had reached Quito by sea from Panamá via the port of Esmeraldas, with reinforcements, and had left a squadron cruising on the Pacific coast from Buenaventura to Guayaquil. In these circumstances, the transport of troops by sea had become far too dangerous to be risked. Murgeon had been sent out from Spain

¹ O'Leary, *Docts.*, xix. p. 129.

to replace Aymerich; for the moment, the new commander was to take the title of President of Quito, which was to be raised to that of Viceroy of Santa Fé when he had succeeded in reconquering two-thirds of the kingdom of New Granada. Bolivar, therefore, resolved to go by land to Quito, whilst Sucre, from Guayaquil, made a diversion drawing away the Spaniard's attention from himself. Marching up the Cauca valley, the Liberator reached Popayan on the 26th January, passing through an easy and well supplied country. Thence he sent forward J. P. del Castillo and Antonio Obando, nominally to negotiate an exchange of prisoners, really to get information as to the state of the country to the south. They had got to within thirty miles of Quito when Murgeon wisely¹ ordered them back out of the country. The Liberator was more successful with the guerrilla chieftain José Maria Obando,² commanding the Spanish advanced forces. He was first induced to sign a month's truce, and then to visit Bolivar at Cali. There he was gained over to the republican side. He was a person of considerable enterprise, and, as his influence was great in the valley of the Patia on the road to Pasto, he was a very valuable acquisition.

If the march from the Magdalena to the Cauca was difficult, that from Popayan to Pasto was even worse. The Bogotano of to-day will tell you that, in the dry season, you can march by land from the Colombian capital to that of Ecuador in about five weeks, that you

¹ Larrazabal (ii. 118) inveighs against Murgeon's barbarity, though only a few lines before he has admitted that espionage was the real object of the mission.

² José Maria Obando was born near Popayan in 1797. He served the Spaniards loyally till Bolivar gained him over. Later, in 1828, he rebelled against the Liberator. He was accused of participation in the murder of Sucre in 1830. His life after that was a stormy one. He was twice banished, and in 1852 was President of New Granada. He was assassinated in 1861.

cannot do it at all in the rainy season, and that, unless you wish to be in misery all the way, you had much better go round by Cartagena to Panama, and thence by sea to Guayaquil, whence you can complete the journey by rail. Roads worthy of the name there are none over the desolate, fog-bound, mud-flooded "paramos" of Pasto. Mule-tracks running, where they have not been washed away, along precipices, thousands of feet deep, alternating with levels obstructed by thickets and undergrowth, are met with all along. The country is sparsely populated and provides little food. When you descend into the valley of the Patia you encounter one of the worst climates in the world, where fever will probably work more havoc than even the privations of the high level route.

In 1822 matters were still worse; for the fierce mountaineers of Pasto had ever been, and still were to be for some years, staunch supporters of the Royalist cause, who would harass the republican advance at every step.

Jiménez de Padilla, bishop of Popayan, was another ardent supporter of royalism whose influence was great with the people of Pasto, living under his jurisdiction and following the lead of their priests with blind ignorance.

Bolívar, having no wish to disturb this hornet's nest at Pasto, proposed to pass it by at a safe distance, leaving its subjugation until he had subdued Quito and joined Sucre. Accordingly, he turned off the road about Beruecos and proceeded down the right bank of the river Juanambú which he crossed near its inflow into the Patia. Between the Juanambú, the Patia, and the Guátara is a great mountain mass extending south-eastwards to the volcano of Pasto, on the eastern slope of which lies the town of the same name. Bolívar's idea was to cross the Guátara also near its junction with the Patia, and then to march up its left bank to rejoin the road which he had left at Beruecos.

He had left Popayan with 3000 men on the 8th March, 1822; on the 24th he crossed the Juanambú with only 2000, the rest having died or been incapacitated by privations and disease. His passage of the Juanambú, though difficult owing to the nature of the country and the bridge, was unopposed. But the Guáitara he found it impossible to pass near its mouth, as even the rope bridge had been destroyed, and the river flows in appalling gorges. There was nothing for it but to march up its right bank to rejoin the road from Pasto to Quito, and pass the river by its crossing at Yaquanquer, instead of only regaining the road beyond the Guáitara. This entailed marching across all the spurs of the mountain mass stretching down to the river. Opposing this march were 2000 Spanish troops, including a large number of Pasto mountaineers, who knew every inch of this difficult country. Their commander, Colonel Basilio Garcia, had promised the destruction of Bolivar with small loss to his own troops. Aymerich, who, in consequence of Murgeon's death, was now again President of Quito, had replied to Garcia's boasts that "that is not difficult, for Garcia has forces equal to Bolivar's and holds impregnable positions." The Liberator reached, without serious opposition, Consacá, on one of the spurs of the volcano. In front of him, beyond a deep ravine, was the plain of Bomboná on the next spur. Beyond that, behind another ravine, Garcia was drawn up, about two and a half miles from Consacá, facing north-west. The plain of Bomboná was unoccupied. Garcia's right rested on the volcano, his left on the tremendous gorge of the Guáitara; his front was protected by the ravine in front of him, over which there was but one bridge, and that commanded by his artillery. A thick wood and abattis still further protected it. It was the evening of the 6th April.

Bolivar, returning next morning from a reconnaissance

of this apparently impregnable position, remarked—“Well, the position is formidable; but we cannot remain here, nor can we retreat. We have got to conquer, and we will conquer!” Then he ordered Valdés to move to the left with the “Rifles” over the slopes of the volcano, above the head of the ravine, and so outflank the Spanish right. The centre and right attacks were to be made by two battalions and a squadron in first line, with one battalion and the rest of the cavalry in reserve. In this part of the field an unfortunate mistake was made; for Torres, who commanded, set his men to eat their breakfast, misunderstanding Bolivar, who said they were to attack first and breakfast afterwards. Bolivar was furious, for he saw the delay would give the Spaniards time to move troops to their right to meet Valdés, who was steadily moving forward over the slopes of the volcano. He ordered Torres to hand over the command to Barreto. Torres, thereupon, dismounted, and seizing a musket said, “Liberator! if I am not worthy to serve my country as general, at least I will serve her as a grenadier.” Touched by his devotion, Bolivar embraced him and restored him to his command. Then Torres advanced, endeavouring to cross the ravine and break in the enemy’s right by a frontal attack. But the ravine was filled with abattis, and the republicans could make no way. The losses were fearful. Torres fell and was succeeded by Paris,¹ Paris by Barreto, Barreto by Sanders,² Sanders by Carvajal; both battalions of the

¹ Joaquin Paris, born in Bogotá in 1795, took part in the earlier events in New Granada with Mariño. Captured by the Spaniards in 1816 in Popayan, he was sent in chains to Maracaibo, and later, when on board a Spanish vessel, was set free by a Colombian privateer. He did not go to Peru with Bolivar, whom he had followed in Guayana. He passed through the troubles after Bolivar’s death with varying fortune, and died in 1868.

² Notwithstanding his surname, Arturo Sanders was a native of Venezuela (Valencia). He followed Bolivar to Peru, but was sent home by the rebel troops under Bustamante. He was with Sucre in that general’s campaign against La Mar in Ecuador.

first line were almost exterminated. Meanwhile, Valdés and the "Rifles," scrambling as best they could over the rocky side of the volcano, drove in the Spanish right. In places they had to make ladders by sticking their bayonets into crevices of the rocks. The weather being calm, the hanging clouds of smoke long prevented Bolivar from noting Valdés' progress. At last he saw it and launched his reserve battalion against the Spanish centre. It was his last hope, and, as the battalion "Vencedor en Boyacá"¹ moved forward, he shouted to the men—"Battalion Vencedor! your name alone suffices for victory. Forward! and assure our triumph!" Night had already fallen, and the field was illuminated by a brilliant full moon, when the Liberator received from Valdés the welcome news that the enemy was retreating. There was no pursuit, for Bolivar's troops were about at the end of their tether, and moreover, he feared a disaster in a country full of precipices and unknown to himself or his men.

Despite his hard-earned victory, Bolivar was still not across the Guátara for the position of Bomboná was a considerable distance short of Yaquanquer. He had lost over 500 killed and wounded out of his 2000, whilst Garcia, fighting with about equal forces, but behind entrenchments, had not lost more than 250 altogether.

On the 8th March, Garcia tried to induce Bolivar to retreat, but nothing resulted from the eight days spent in negotiations. All the time the inhabitants of Pasto kept urging Garcia to a fresh effort. They promised that every man, and many of the women, would join him in destroying Bolivar. The latter would have been glad of an armistice till he could get up fresh men to supply his losses, but at least he was not attacked by Garcia, who had had enough fighting for the present.

Bolivar remained at Bomboná till the 16th April,

¹ "Victor at Boyacá."

when, as no reinforcements had arrived, he retired to take up a strong position at El Peñol, near the Patia, in the angle between it, the Guátara, and the Juanambú. He was obliged to leave behind 300 sick and wounded,¹ in charge of an officer, who had a letter recommending him and his charge to Garcia's consideration.

Bolívar was fully alive to the fanatical hatred borne by the Pastusos towards the republicans. In urging the Colombian Government to send him men and supplies, he writes :—"These people (the Pastusos) are the worst enemies of liberty; in their hatred of us there is no distinction of sex, or age, or quality; we are opposed by every rational being in the country." He gives a miserable description of the trials of his men, of the dearth of food, and of the terrible character of the country they were in.

Leaving Bolívar at El Peñol, let us trace the march of Sucre in the early part of 1822.

We left him marching from Guayaquil in the latter part of January 1822. At the same time, the Peruvian contingent, sent by San Martín from Piura, was advancing through the province of Loja under General Santa Cruz.² Sucre moved south to meet them. Sucre's troops had a terrible march from Guayaquil, over freezing "paramos" and through dense forests, to reach the great line of valleys running northwards from Loja to Quito. Their transport was wretched, and cold and disease carried off many of them before they reached Saraguro early in February. There they were joined by Santa Cruz and his Peruvians, who were to be under Sucre's orders. This raised the total of Sucre's force to something less than 2000 men, but the country rose as he advanced,

¹ Among them Torres, who soon after died of his wounds.

² Andrés Santa Cruz was born at La Paz (Bolivia) in 1792. His career, in so far as it was connected with Bolívar, will appear presently. He died in Europe, as Peruvian Minister, in 1855.

and he gathered in a good many recruits. He also received some reinforcements from Colombia on his march. The Spaniards under Tolrá, at Cuenca, were only about 900, many of them recruits. They had retired to that place before the advance of Sucre, and, on the 20th February, again retreated to Riobamba to await reinforcements, which Murgeon, threatened also on the north by Bolivar's advance, could ill spare.

Sucre, occupying Cuenca immediately Tolrá left it, remained there for some time to rest and reorganise, sending out detachments to seize Alausí and other places. He had already fulfilled his prescribed mission by drawing southwards troops which, otherwise, would have operated against Bolivar in Pasto.

At Cuenca there were difficulties with Santa Cruz, who announced that he had been recalled to Peru. After some correspondence, Sucre induced him to stop. When he had been about a month at Cuenca, Sucre recommenced his advance on Quito, a few days after Bolivar's battle of Bomboná. On the 3rd April Murgeon died and was succeeded by Aymerich. On the 19th, Sucre met and defeated the Spaniards south of Riobamba, which he occupied on the 22nd. He was at Lactacunga on the 2nd May, and on the 4th he turned the Spanish position beyond it by marching to his right over the slopes of Cotopaxi. On the 16th, he was in the fertile valley of Chillo, only ten miles south of Quito. The Spaniards were still in front of him, and he was about to endeavour, by a fresh turning movement, to get between them and the capital when, divining his intention, they retreated the same night to Quito. On the 21st they were driven from their position on the hill of Puengasi. The next two days were spent in manœuvring. On the night of the 23rd Sucre undertook another of his bold turning movements, marching to his left over the rugged slopes of the volcano of Pichincha, which rises above the west

side of Quito. It was a night of trial as the men, in pouring rain, stumbled and scrambled in the darkness, over the rocky and wooded slopes of the volcano. By dawn on the 24th, the little army was gazing on Quito spread out like a map below their feet in the open valley, separated from them by forest-clad slopes, up which the Spaniards were pushing to fight for the salvation of the capital.

Presently the royalists issued from the forest, threatening the left of the republicans. Both sides fought with the fury of despair, for to the Spaniards defeat meant the loss of the whole province with the fall of its capital, whilst the republicans, if beaten, could only look forward to captivity, or to a miserable death amongst the snows and rocks of the mountains. Things were going badly for Sucre's men, especially on the left, which bore the brunt of the attack. The Peruvian contingent had almost run out of ammunition and had to charge with the bayonet. Then they were driven back and threatened on their left by three Spanish companies. At that moment three companies of Sucre's battalion "Albion"¹ charged and turned back the flowing tide of Spaniards. Two more companies of the "Magdalena" battalion, led by Cordova, one of the most gallant of the Colombian commanders, also charged. At noon the Spaniards were fleeing in disorder down the slope to Quito, which Cordova entered on their heels. The remains of the Spanish infantry took refuge in the fort of Panecillo. Their cavalry, four hundred strong, was still intact, standing to the north of the city. Aymerich hoped, with their aid, to be able to fall back towards Pasto, but, seized with panic, they fled before a very inferior Colombian force.

Next day (25th May 1822) Aymerich, in reply to Sucre's summons, agreed to surrender Quito and all that

¹ The remains of the English of Boyacá had been formed by Sucre into a battalion bearing this name.

it contained. The prisoners were 160 officers and 1,100 men; 400 had been killed, and 190 wounded in the battle of Pichincha, against 200 killed and 140 wounded on Sucre's side. Besides the prisoners, Sucre captured 14 guns, and all the military resources of the capital. Aymerich himself was a prisoner, and the province of Quito had passed for ever from the hands of Spain, a few years less than three centuries after Benalcazar had first carried thither the banners of Castille.

When Quito thus fell to Sucre, Bolivar was again north of the Juanambú which he had been compelled to recross on the 10th May, when there remained only three days' provisions at El Peñol. Reinforcements now began to come up, but only in sufficient numbers to raise Bolivar to his old strength of 2,000 men. With these he again advanced and summoned Garcia to surrender. The Spaniard in his reply of the 28th May was inclined to yield. Then he veered round again under pressure from Pasto. In despair he sent Padilla, the bishop, to try to reduce the Pasto fanatics to reason. But a far more effectual sedative had arrived in the news of the capture of Quito.

Bolivar, hearing by chance of Sucre's successes, but without any details, was nearing the Juanambú with the Colombian "guard." As he approached the river he met Garcia's envoys, on their way to settle with him the terms of capitulation. The Spanish commander agreed to hand over the whole of the territory occupied by his division, in return for an unconditional guarantee of the persons and property of all within the command.

The capitulation was hardly signed when Garcia sent to say that the city of Pasto was in a ferment. Bolivar at once formed a column for its subjugation. Garcia, coming out with his staff to meet him, the two entered the city together and proceeded to the quarters prepared for Bolivar which, for more than an hour, were guarded

by Spanish troops, until they were relieved by the arrival of the Liberator's personal guard. It was the 8th June, and Sucre had already been nearly a fortnight master of the capital. On that date a proclamation was issued by Bolivar to the Colombians of the South. "From the banks of the Orinoco," it said, "to the Andes of Peru, the liberating army, marching in triumph, has covered with its arms the whole extent of Colombia. Only one place¹ still resists, and it will fall. Colombians of the South! the blood of your brothers has redeemed you from the horrors of war. . . . Colombians! share with me the ocean of joy which inundates my heart, and raise in your own altars to the liberating army which has given you honour, peace, and liberty."²

The province of Quito had been wrested from Spain; but by whom? Surely the glory belongs largely to Sucre, who, with less than 3000 troops, had driven the Spaniards back from Loja to Quito, had defeated them at Riobamba, and in half a dozen other actions, before the final victory of Pichincha laid Quito at his feet.

Bolivar, on the other hand, had vainly endeavoured to break into Pasto, until the way was opened for him by Sucre's successes. He had, indeed, gained a Pyrrhic victory at Bomboná, but had been so weakened by it that he was compelled to retreat and wait for reinforcements. Even with them, it was only when he heard of the fall of Quito that he dared to advance again on Pasto; it was only that news which had determined Garcia to surrender, and had deterred him from another battle on the Juanambú, which might not have had so happy a result for Bolivar as that of Bomboná. Restrepo³ calls Bomboná a costly and barren victory. Larrazabal, able only to see right in his hero, combats this view. But it certainly was, as a matter of fact, both costly and barren. It was, moreover, unnecessary;

¹ Puerto Cabello.

² O'Leary, *Docts.*, 19, p. 300.

³ *iii.* 216.

for Sucre would have got Quito whether Bolivar had fought at Bomboná or not. The Liberator would have played his part sufficiently had he been content to hold Garcia at Pasto, and prevent his going to the relief of Quito. That was a subordinate part which Bolivar would never have consented to play. After all, however, he cannot be seriously blamed for fighting at Bomboná, for he was then ignorant of the successful advance of Sucre, which, indeed, had scarcely begun when Bomboná was fought.

On the 9th June there reached Pasto, from Quito, a Spanish battalion which had escaped from before Sucre. Salgado, its commandant, finding to his surprise that Garcia had surrendered, also capitulated.

Aymerich, Garcia, and the other Spanish generals embarked for Spain when Bolivar entered Quito on the 16th June 1822. The Republic of Colombia was now beginning to be officially recognised by foreign nations. Brazil had already done so, and now, in the spring of 1822, the United States recognised the independence of the American nations, formerly Spanish provinces. The Spanish Minister in Washington vehemently remonstrated, but naturally in vain.

This was a good beginning, and, on the 8th April, Zea, from Paris, addressed a circular to the European Cabinets, other than Spain, begging for recognition of Colombian independence by them also. Great Britain did not go further at present than to allow the entry of Colombian ships into her colonial ports, though she afterwards recognised Colombia, and sent a minister to Bogotá in 1825.

Sweden and France¹ sent envoys to inquire into the state of affairs in South America. Even in the Spanish Cortes the question of recognising the independence of the colonies was discussed. Envoys

¹ The French envoy was Mollien, to whom we have already referred.

were sent to treat with the Colombian Government, though nothing came of the mission.

When Bolivar entered Pasto, he organised the neighbouring territory as the "Province of the Pastos." Antonio Obando¹ was appointed governor, and the Pastosos were assured that "the beneficent laws of Colombia were the guarantee of their liberty." This organisation took him some time, and, meanwhile, he only sent Salom with a small force to Quito.

Whilst he was at Pasto he received a letter from Padilla, the bishop, his bitter enemy, and the staunch supporter of the royalist cause, in which the writer asked for a passport to Spain, where he expressed his intention of retiring into a monastery. Bolivar, in a friendly reply, pointed out to him that he would be deserting his flock. Eventually, the bishop returned to his bishopric of Popayan, and thenceforth honourably worked in support of the *de facto* republican government.

On the 11th June, Bolivar, with 200 infantry and a squadron of cavalry, started for Quito. Everywhere on the way he was favourably received. He reached Quito on the 16th June. That city he entered in triumph, the whole population turning out to welcome him, and the municipality decreeing the erection of a pyramid on the field of Pichincha, with an inscription setting out that it was erected "by the sons of Ecuador to Simon Bolivar, the angel of peace and Colombian liberty." Sucre's name was to follow, with the words, "Quito free the 24th May 1822." Other honours were at the same time decreed to Bolivar, but Sucre, the real victor, received no further acknowledgment.

¹ Antonio Obando was born in Socorro in 1790. He was a mover in the revolt of Socorro in 1810, and afterwards followed Nariño. In 1816 was with Serviez in Casanare, served in Venezuela in 1818, with Bolivar from Pore in 1819, and followed him to Bomboná. In 1828 he took charge of Bustamente's rebel troops at Riobamba. After Bolivar's death he was for a time Minister of War, and died at Tocaima in 1849.

Bolivar was again busy organising his latest acquisitions. The provinces of Quito, Cuenca, and Loja became the Department of Ecuador, with Sucre as governor, holding the rank of General of Division. Education received Bolivar's attention, and he favoured the construction of a road to the port of Esmeraldas. In conferring honours on the Peruvian division which had fought at Pichincha, Bolivar wrote to San Martin, that "the war in Colombia is ended, and my army is ready to march wherever its brothers require, especially to the country of our neighbours of the south."¹

The question of Guayaquil was still on the *tapis*, always menacing the maintenance of peace between Colombia and Peru. No doubt Bolivar had in his mind the possibility of not getting Guayaquil when he turned his eyes in the direction of Esmeraldas as the seaport of Ecuador.

Thanks to the presence in Guayaquil of La Mar and Salazar, San Martin's cause had continued to make progress there in Sucre's absence. Mosquera, Bolivar's envoy in Peru, was at the same time negotiating in Lima, with San Martin's minister, Monteagudo, for a confederation between Colombia and Peru. The negotiations always broke down over the question of Guayaquil. On this subject San Martin felt so strongly that, at one moment, when Bolivar had called on the Guayaquil Junta to sanction union with Colombia, the Protector actually got the Peruvian Council of State to decide on war with Colombia.² Nothing, however, came of this, as San Martin's hands were otherwise full.

Bolivar, having settled matters at Quito, the inhabitants of which had agreed to union with Colombia, decided that affairs at Guayaquil must be arranged by

¹ O'Leary, *Docts.*, 19, p. 307.

² It was this decision which had nearly caused Santa Cruz to leave Sucre at Cuenca in March 1822.—*Supra*, p. 286.

himself on the spot. At present the place was almost in a state of anarchy, and the general feeling was apparently in favour of Olmedo's party of absolute independence. At that idea the Liberator openly scoffed. He had already declared the whole of Quito, including Guayaquil, to be part of the great Republic of Colombia, and it would have been a terrible blow to his prestige to have allowed a fragment like Guayaquil to set up on its own account, or to go over to Peru. Besides, the port was of great value to Quito, and in those days was the only place on the Pacific coast with a dry dock. The Peruvian troops at Quito would have been a danger to Bolivar's scheme if they had occupied Guayaquil before his arrival.¹ Therefore he sent off, in advance of himself, Salom, with three Colombian battalions, to occupy the port, and kept back Santa Cruz and his men. On the 11th July, Bolivar entered Guayaquil, arriving there by boat down the river, at the mouth of which it stands.

From the conflicting accounts of events in Guayaquil during the next few days, given by the partizans of San Martin on the one hand and of Bolivar on the other, it is difficult to arrive at exactly what happened. The broad features can, however, be made out, and that is all that is necessary. The Liberator was certainly received with much outward cordiality and enthusiasm. Triumphant arches were erected for him to pass under, and he was received everywhere with cheers and salutes. But there were more loud cries in favour of Peru, or of complete independence, than in favour of union with Colombia. Olmedo,² at the head of the Junta, was

¹ A Peruvian squadron, commanded by Blanco Encalada, was waiting there to embark them on their homeward journey.

² José Joaquín Olmedo, born in Guayaquil, was deputy for that province in the Spanish Cortes of 1812. In 1820 he took a lead in the Guayaquil revolution, and became President of the Provisional Government; went on a mission to Europe in 1824, and in 1827, being at Paris, he strongly

hostile to the Colombian idea ; Roca, the second member, was a furious opponent of it, and the third member, more or less of a cipher, was on the whole in favour of Peru.

What was about to happen was foreshadowed in Bolivar's proclamation of the 12th July. He told the Guayaquileños plainly that the idea of an independent republic was absurd. He offered them union with Colombia, and was sure that they would accept it.¹

All the Junta would do was to convoke the electoral college for the 30th July. On the 13th, Bolivar finally settled the disturbances, which were still going on, by informing the Junta that he had taken over supreme power, civil as well as military, as the only means of putting an end to the prevailing anarchy.² The Junta, thereupon, resigned and went on board the Peruvian ships in the harbour.

Except for the formal vote of the electoral college, the result of which, with Bolivar's troops in possession of Guayaquil, could not be doubtful, the annexation to Colombia was complete. Nothing more remained to round off the republic, as designed by Bolivar to include the whole territory formerly ruled by the Viceroy of New Granada and the Captain-General of Venezuela.³

opposed Bolivar's Bolivian constitution. In 1845 he was elected to the triumvirate forming the government of Ecuador. He died at Guayaquil in 1847. His literary attainments were considerable. Amongst other things he translated Pope's "Essay on Man," described in poetry the Battle of Junin, etc.

¹ O'Leary, *Docts.*, 19, p. 333.

² *Ibid.*, 19, p. 334.

³ Quito as a whole, including Guayaquil, had been a dependency of New Granada since the creation of that Viceroyalty in 1739. During the first outbreaks in Quito in 1809-12, the Peruvian Viceroy had occupied Guayaquil. The arrangement had been terminated in 1819 by order from Spain. (Pilling, p. 416.)

CHAPTER XIV

THE INTERVIEW WITH SAN MARTIN AT GUAYAQUIL, 1822

AS Bolivar is now about to meet San Martin, and to enter upon the liberation of Peru, it is necessary here to briefly recount the course of the revolt against Spain in Peru, and the part played in it by San Martin.

The year 1809 had witnessed more or less complete revolts in all the Spanish American colonies, consequent on the overthrow by Napoleon of the Spanish monarchy. In July of that year, an outbreak in Upper Peru resulted in the installation of a Junta, which was promptly overthrown by Goyeneche, the President of Cuzco. In the following year there was a fresh revolt in Cochabamba, the fertile territory situated between Charcas, Potosí, and La Paz, which extended through all the provinces of Upper Peru, as far as Arequipa. But the energy of Goyeneche, and of the Viceroy Abascal, proved too great for the revolutionaries, who were again put down, after suffering defeat in the battles of Huaqui and Sipesipe in 1811.

There was a certain amount of guerilla warfare up to 1814, the principal actor on the republican side being Arenales. On the 3rd August in that year, Mateo Pumacagua, an Indian, again raised the standard of revolt in Cuzco, but he was defeated in the spring of 1815, captured, and executed.

In Lower Peru, also, there had been a few small con-

spiracies which had been nipped in the bud. Secret societies had been working hard to rouse the Peruvian people to action. Still, up to 1819, Lower Peru had given no serious trouble to Spain. As the headquarters of the Viceroy, it had always been the centre and mainstay of the Spanish dominion in South America. It was, too, the centre, in a geographical sense, of the colonies, and, pushed in, as it was, like a great wedge between Venezuela and New Granada, on the north-east and north, and Chile and Buenos Aires on the south and south-east, there could be no security for the new republics so long as Peru remained Spanish.

Buenos Aires had thrown off the Spanish yoke quite in the early days of the revolution, and had succeeded in maintaining her independence throughout. It was from Buenos Aires that there came the liberator of Chile, in the person of José de San Martín, who was born in Paraguay in 1778. At the age of eight he was sent to Spain to be educated. Entering the Spanish army, he fought against the French in 1808, being promoted lieutenant-colonel for his conduct at the Battle of Baylen in that year. He took part in various other actions in the Peninsula, including Beresford's Battle of Albuera in 1811.

Long before this he had become a member of the secret society known as the "Sociedad de Lautaro," which was affiliated to the "Gran Reunion Americana," founded in London by Miranda. The object of both was the fomentation of revolution against Spain in South America.

Thus, whilst San Martín was fighting the battles of Spain against Napoleon, he was at the same time working secretly to deprive her of her American dominions.

After Albuera he went to London, whence he sailed, in 1812, for the River Plate. There he joined the Argentine forces, soon obtained an important command, and did good service.

In 1814 he formed the project of leading an army

across the Andes to liberate Chile. It was not till early in 1817 that the "army of the Andes" was ready for its great task.

San Martin had now been joined by the Chilian patriot, Bernardo O'Higgins, who commanded one of the brigades of the expeditionary force of 3000 men. The difficulties of the march were as great as those which Bolivar incurred, two years later, in his march to Bogotá. They were surmounted with equal success, and, on the 14th February 1817, Santiago de Chile was occupied by the patriots. San Martin, a much less ambitious man than Bolivar, refused the offer of the Chilians to make him chief of the new republic, and the place was filled by O'Higgins.

At the Battle of Maipú, on the 5th April 1818, the Spanish power in Chile was practically overthrown.

San Martin, equally with Bolivar, recognising that so long as Spain remained strong in Peru there could be no safety for the new republics, resolved on destroying the power of the Viceroy. For this purpose he, with the invaluable aid of Lord Cochrane, organised a Chilian navy. Cochrane's first expedition against Callao took place in February 1819. It was merely a raid, and gave no great results, beyond strengthening confidence in the new-born navy. A second expedition, in the latter part of 1819, was of the same nature, but was more successful, and Cochrane had now fairly established the power of Chile at sea. By the time that San Martin's land forces were ready in 1820, it was quite safe to transport them by sea to the coasts of Peru, under the protection of Cochrane's fleet.

In September 1820, San Martin landed, with 4500 Chilian and Argentine troops, at Pisco, 150 miles south of Callao. The Viceroy, Pezuela, had five times as many troops, but they were scattered over a vast area. He, therefore, entered into negotiations, which had no result.

Then San Martin re-embarked, leaving Arenales with 1000 men to operate in the mountains, and eventually to reach Lima through them.

San Martin, passing in front of Callao, landed at Huaura, 50 miles north of Lima, whilst Cochrane blockaded Callao by sea and carried out his famous exploit of the cutting out of the Esmeralda.

It is not within the scope of this volume to narrate the events of San Martin's struggle in Peru, which led to the evacuation of Lima by the Spaniards, its occupation by San Martin, and the declaration of Peruvian independence twenty days later, on the 28th July 1821. Torre Tagle, the governor of Trujillo, had already led the way in this respect by a declaration of independence on the 29th December 1820.

Pezuela, the Viceroy, had been compelled by the general dissatisfaction of the royalists with him to abdicate, and La Serna had been elected to succeed him.

On the 21st September 1821, Callao surrendered to the patriots. Amongst its garrison was La Mar, of whom we have already heard in Guayaquil, and who henceforward plays an important part on the republican side, which he joined.

We must again pass over the events of the latter part of 1821 and the earlier part of 1822 in Peru. The northern provinces had declared for San Martin, who, as "Protector of Peru," practically ruled them, and held Lima, Callao, and other points on the coast. But the Spaniards still held in unbroken force the fertile valleys of the Cordilleras, whence they made occasional descents on the coast region.

Canterac, a French adventurer,¹ chief of the staff to the

¹ The same to whom reference has been made already in the history of the war between Morillo and Bolivar in Venezuela, *supra*, p. 185. He was born in France about 1775, and was shot in Madrid in 1835 when trying to suppress a mutiny. He was a French royalist who took service under the Spanish Bourbons.

Viceroy, in particular gained a notable victory at Ica over the republican general, Tristan. The enervating climate of Lima had made it the Capua of San Martin, and he seems there to have lost much of his former energy. He felt that, without assistance from the victorious troops of Bolivar, he had little chance of destroying the strong Spanish forces subsisting in comfort in the mountain valleys. From the Peruvians themselves, lukewarm as most of them were in practical support of the republican cause, he could get little assistance. His endeavours to annex Guayaquil to Peru have already been referred to.

It was as far back as February 1822 that San Martin, aware of Bolivar's march southwards, determined to meet him at Guayaquil. He started on the 6th February, after announcing his reasons for seeking the interview in the following words: "I go to meet at Guayaquil the Liberator of Colombia; the general interests of both states, the energetic termination of the war which we are waging, and the establishment of the destiny which America is rapidly nearing, necessitate our interview, since circumstances have constituted us responsible in the highest grades for the result of this sublime enterprise."¹

San Martin, finding Bolivar was not likely to be at Guayaquil for the present, returned to Lima, from Paita, and remained there awaiting an opportunity for the meeting. On the 13th July he wrote to Bolivar announcing that he would sail from Callao before the 18th to Guayaquil, and thence march to meet Bolivar at Quito.² No doubt he intended on the way to gather in Guayaquil to Peru. But Bolivar had anticipated him, as we know.

On the morning of the 25th July, San Martin's ship, the "Macedonia," anchored at Puná, outside Guayaquil. The Liberator sent aides-de-camp to meet the Protector, to offer him accommodation in the house which had been prepared for his reception, and to welcome his arrival on

¹ Mitre, iii. 610.

² *Ibid.*, p. 612.

"Colombian soil." That was a plain statement that the annexation of Guayaquil to Colombia was definitely settled.

San Martin, landing on the morning of the 26th, was received by Bolivar and his staff with full military honours. The Protector of Peru had nothing to complain of in his reception either by Bolivar or by the Guayaquileños, but he realised at once that he had been anticipated by the astuteness of the Venezuelan, and that Guayaquil was not to become a province of Peru. In the evening, after dinner, Bolivar and San Martin retired alone to a private room to discuss the weighty matters with which their interview was concerned.

Of what occurred at this interview Larrazabal professes to give an exact account, though, as O'Leary says very little about it, one is inclined to suspect that the account is founded on presumption rather than on knowledge.

According to Larrazabal's account, San Martin propounded three principal questions for discussion. First, was Guayaquil to be Colombian or Peruvian? That question had practically been decided by recent occurrences. The electoral college had not yet assembled to vote, but it was to do so in a few days, and, with Bolivar dominating the city with his troops, it was impossible to doubt how the vote would go, despite the efforts of Salazar, La Mar, and the rest of the Peruvian party. Bolivar argued the superior claims of Colombia, finally falling back on the general desire of the more important families in Guayaquil for union with the northern republic, and the fact that the matter would be finally decided by the vote of the Representative Assembly. Of course he vaunted the liberty of choice which was to be allowed to that Assembly, but such vaunts may be taken for what they are worth.

Then San Martin asked who was to command the auxiliary force to be sent to Peru to form an army round

the nucleus of the Venezuelan battalion "Numancia." To that the Liberator replied that he had decided on General Juan Paz Castillo, an officer who had served under San Martin, and was one of his admirers. San Martin expressed his satisfaction at the appointment. On the next question, of the form of government to be instituted in the Spanish dominions when they were liberated, there was direct opposition between the views of San Martin and Bolivar. The Liberator had all along been a staunch republican. It is true that he would listen to nothing but a centralised republic, as opposed to a loose confederation, or a Federal Government, with its implication of separation as the word was understood in South America. San Martin, on the other hand, starting as a republican, had gradually become convinced that, looking to the conditions of South America generally, the country was not ripe for a republican government. He would have preferred a constitutional monarchy under some cadet of one of the European reigning families, independent, of course, of Spain. For himself he had no wish to wear a crown. He told Bolivar plainly that he had already entered upon negotiations in this sense with La Serna, the Spanish Viceroy of Peru, and had sent as envoys to Spain Don Juan Garcia del Rio and General Jardissen. This action Bolivar strongly disapproved, asserting that the Colombians had worked hard to eradicate the monarchical idea, and propagate a republican sentiment. He strongly maintained that nothing would induce the peoples of Venezuela and New Granada to accept a monarchy. It was this republican sentiment alone which had induced the "Numancia" battalion to revolt, at the instigation of a few men of Cundinamarca and Cauca serving as privates in its ranks. As for himself, the liberator of slaves, even if he should wish to import a European monarch, he would at once be disowned by his countrymen, who had worked with

him for the destruction of the monarchy. In fine, he would have no hand in such an undertaking; to do so would be to forfeit his title of Liberator.

San Martin replied that, no doubt, the cruelties of the Spanish leaders in Colombia had created a republican feeling which could only be guided in more appropriate directions by men like Bolivar, Sucre, and Santander. In favour of a monarchy he urged the general want of education in the Spanish colonies, the diversity of the races inhabiting them, the unity of religion, the power of the clergy, the general ignorance of the parish priests, the military spirit engendered in the masses by war. All these, he said, foreboded anarchy, once the war of liberation was finished. In a few towns, like Caracas, Bogotá, and Buenos Aires, a few men had qualified, by study and by their talents, for leadership. Elsewhere in Spanish America, including Mexico and Peru, there were no republican elements. In his opinion, it would be much simpler to establish a monarchy, as in Brazil. He had left Spain expecting, from what he had heard from Colombia and Buenos Aires, to find South America imbued with republican principles; but now he confessed he had no longer any hope of seeing the establishment of a republic. So convinced was he on this subject that, if Bolivar still opposed a monarchy, he (San Martin) would prefer to leave the regeneration of South America to him, and to abandon to him the command.

To all this Bolivar replied that the proclamation of republican tenets in South America was no isolated fact, but the consequence of the great revolution of ideas which had spread from the United States all over the Christian world. He praised English institutions as the light of civilisation, and the origin of the institutions of a model republic. It would be easier to establish a republic than a monarchy, which would be a mere caricature. Such titles of aristocracy as existed in the South American

provinces were held by paupers, who could not afford even to give a dinner to a prince. A monarchy in the New World could only be an ephemeral one, and kings would be deposed by their palace guards, in order to substitute a republic. Yet Bolivar was ready to admit that a fresh revolution would in all probability follow on the final acquisition of liberty. "Neither shall we," he said, "nor the succeeding generation see the glory of the republic which we are founding. I consider America as a chrysalis; she will undergo a metamorphosis in the physical existence of her inhabitants; finally, she will develop a new caste formed of all the existing races, one which will produce a homogeneous people. Let us not hold back the march of the human race by institutions which, as I have told you, are exotics in the virgin soil of America."

As for the idea of his own movement to Peru to take command of the army, Bolivar said that neither he nor the army could go without the sanction of Congress. Yet he made it quite clear that, if the army did go to the south, he alone would command it, and would yield the management of the campaign to no one. That was a plain enough warning to San Martin that, if Bolivar came to Peru, he meant to be at the head of affairs there, and there would be no place for San Martin himself.

As if with the intention of inflicting another blow upon his rival, Bolivar then handed to the Protector a letter, showing that, immediately after his departure for Guayaquil, his own generals had fallen away, and it appeared probable that his unpopular minister, Montea-gudo, had been deposed and Lima handed over to the royalists. This news had reached Bolivar by land from his agent at the Peruvian capital, whilst San Martin was at sea. After reading the letter, San Martin said, "If this has happened, I shall go to Europe and bid an eternal farewell to South America."

So much for Larrazabal's account, which does not pretend to be based on documents or the accounts given by either of the parties to the interview.

Mitre¹ gives San Martin's version, in so far as it was communicated, about 1840, to Captain Lafond, and produced in his "*Voyages autour du monde*."

In the first place, there is San Martin's judgment of Bolivar in the following words: "At first sight his personal appearance prejudiced me against him. He appeared to have much pride, which was in contrast with his habit of never looking in the face of the person he was addressing, unless the latter was by far his inferior. I was able to convince myself of his want of frankness in the conferences I had with him at Guayaquil. His language was at times somewhat rough, but it seemed to me that that was not natural to him, and that he only sought in this way to give himself a martial air. Public opinion charged him with unlimited ambition and a burning thirst for command, a reproach which he himself has completely justified."²

This is supported by a letter from Blanco Encalada, the Chilian admiral commanding the ships at Guayaquil, to O'Higgins, dated 22nd September 1822.³ "Guayaquil is incorporated in Colombia by the vote of Bolivar and his bayonets. His modest ambition extends a great deal farther beyond that than you and the world can imagine."

Elsewhere San Martin says: "His feats of arms entitle him to be considered the most extraordinary character that South America has produced; of a constancy to which difficulties only add strength."

Against these opinions of Bolivar may be set his own of San Martin, expressed in a letter to Sucre.⁴ "General

¹ "*Historia de San Martin*, etc." (1890), chap. xlv. (v.).

² Lafond, "*Voyages autour du monde*," ii. 152, cited by Mitre, iii. p. 620 n.

³ Taken from Vicuña Mackenna's "*General San Martin*," p. 54.

⁴ O'Leary, *Docts.*, 29, p. 259.

San Martin was respected by the army which was accustomed to obey him; the people of Peru regarded him as their Liberator; his party had been favoured by fortune, and you know that the illusions which fortune lends are at times worth more than merit. In fine, Peru has lost a good captain and a benefactor."

The most important evidence as to what happened at the conference is afforded by the letter which San Martin wrote to Bolivar on the 29th August 1822, after his return to Peru. This letter was only published by San Martin ten years after Bolivar's death.¹ The more important passages in it are these:—

"The results of our interview have not been such as to promise me the early termination of the war." It goes on to say that Bolivar evidently did not believe in the sincerity of San Martin's offer to serve under him, and had pleaded that it would not be becoming to accept such an offer, and that, in any case, Colombia would not allow him to go to Peru. Then San Martin dilates on the strength of the royalists with 19,000 veteran troops, who could be concentrated in two months, whilst the republicans had but 8500 inferior troops. Under such circumstances, Bolivar's offer of 1400 men would be useless. They would only be enough to garrison Callao. "In fine, my part is irrevocably chosen. I have convened the first Congress of Peru. The day after its installation I leave for Chile, for I am convinced that my presence is the only obstacle which prevents your coming to Peru with your army."

As for Guayaquil, San Martin says he will only remark that he had thought it a matter which would be settled by the respective governments after the war of independence was over. He had not thought it a matter to be decided by Bolivar and himself.

Then he says: "I have spoken to you, General, with

¹ For the letter in full see Mitre (1890 edition), Appendix 31.

CHAPTER XV

QUITO, PASTO, AND PERU, 1822-23

ON the 30th July 1822, the Electoral Junta of Guayaquil voted, as it was bound to do, for union with Colombia. Salom was appointed Intendant of the Department. On the 1st September, Bolivar started southwards, having previously despatched 2500 Colombian troops to march to Callao by land and join the "Numancia" battalion. From Cuenca Bolivar wrote to San Martin's Foreign Minister offering another 4000 men, provided Chile and Buenos Aires also furnished troops to aid in the liberation of Peru.¹ But Bolivar soon had to stop his southward march; for bad news reached him from Pasto. Benito Boves, said to be a nephew of our old acquaintance of 1814, had been captured at Quito, along with Aymerich and the other Spanish leaders, but had effected his escape. Collecting a body of Spaniards, he now appeared before Pasto, where there was no garrison, and proclaimed Ferdinand VII. on the 28th October 1822. The Pastusos, ever ready to support the royalist cause, flocked to his standard and enabled him to defeat Bolivar's general Obando.

Bolivar at once hurried back to Guayaquil, and despatched Sucre at the head of some troops to put down the insurrection. But the Pastusos faced Sucre bravely and drove him off. He fell back for reinforcements. Having obtained them, he again advanced, and defeated

¹ O'Leary, *Docts.*, 19, p. 370.



SIMON BOLIVAR
After a painting by Gil engraved by Charles Turner

Boves, who was driven into Pasto. The "parlementaire," carrying a summons to the Cabildo to surrender, was imprisoned, and Sucre found himself under the necessity of storming the place. But the royalists, seeing their situation was desperate, had decided to leave it. Boves and a few companions made for the mountains eastwards whilst the others dispersed among the "paramos" of the Juanambú. When Sucre entered the place he found no inhabitants left, except a few monks, women, and old men. The punishment meted out to the rebellious city was of the severest. More bad news reached Bolivar at Tulcan, where he heard of a movement in Caracas and Bogotá aiming at the restitution of the Federal Republic, which he had so persistently condemned, even before its first failure in the days of Miranda. The constitution was to be modified in this sense by the first Constitutional Congress of 1823, a Congress which had no power to amend or alter the fundamental law. That, however, did not trouble the agitators.

In Federalism Bolivar saw certain anarchy and civil war, and nothing would induce him to consent to it. He at once wrote to the Congress and to Santander. To the former he said, in firm and unmistakable language, that the fundamental law of Colombia was fixed for ten years, and that he would die sword in hand rather than permit its violation or alteration. To Santander he wrote, equally firmly, in the same sense. So decided was his tone that the danger was averted on the receipt of the letters.

From the 1st to the 14th January 1823, Bolivar was in Pasto, busy settling up for the recent rebellion. Whilst offering an amnesty to those who might come in promptly, he imposed upon the rebel towns a forced contribution for the maintenance of his troops, pressed into military service all those who were fitted for it, confiscated the

goods of the principal rebels, dividing them amongst his men, and turned out of the country many hostile ecclesiastics. Finally, as a radical measure for the suppression of opposition to the republican cause, he passed a general order for the expulsion from Colombia of all European Spaniards, and of all South Americans notoriously opposed to the cause. Such an order, applied to a vast territory, was obviously incapable of execution. For the moment, Pasto was cowed into submission. Reaching Quito on the 22nd January, the Liberator learnt that San Martin had abandoned Peru, and that the Junta, which now reigned there, had ordered the return northwards of the Colombian auxiliary force.

In order to be in closer touch with Peruvian affairs, the Liberator proceeded to Guayaquil, which he reached on the 30th January 1823, and was greeted with the news of the defeat of the Peruvian independents by the royalists at Toratá and Moquehua. Alarmed for the safety of the southern provinces of Colombia, he ordered the collection of warlike stores, in order to be ready to resist invasion by the victorious Spaniards.

When he got back to Lima, after the interview with Bolivar at Guayaquil, San Martin reassumed the government, and attended the assembly of the Constituent Congress on the 20th September 1822. In presence of the Congress he formally resigned his command. The resignation was accepted by the Congress, which declared itself the representative of national sovereignty.

In this summary manner San Martin left Peru to her own devices. The army was under the command of Alvarado, who promptly showed his incapacity by losing most of his army at Toratá and Moquehua. As for the Congress, it was necessarily devoid of experience, and soon became nothing but a tool in the hands of its President, the ecclesiastic Luna-Pizarro, and of Dr Riva Agüero.

Having got rid of San Martín, the Congress voted him various honours and titles, the chief of which were "Founder of the liberty of Peru" and "Generalissimo of the armies of Peru." Next day San Martín embarked again for Chile, bidding adieu for ever to Peru.

When the Protector was gone, the Congress proceeded to appoint a triumvirate consisting of General José La Mar, Felipe Antonio Alvarado (brother of the general), and the Count of Vista Florida, to be the executive. It was this "Junta Gubernativa," or rather La Mar, who was the real power in it, who refused Bolívar's offer of 4000 Colombians, and ordered the return of the three battalions already marching under the orders of Juan Paz del Castillo.

The defeats of Toratá and Moquehua soon raised a storm of complaint against the inefficiency of the Junta, and even led to a demand by the officers of Arenales' force for the removal of La Mar and his two colleagues. This the Congress refused; whereupon the army assembled outside Lima, under command of General Andrés Santa Cruz, and told the Congress plainly that it had got to comply. The Junta was at once dismissed, and Colonel José de la Riva-Aguero¹ was appointed President of the Republic.

The Republic was certainly in a very unpleasant predicament, and, had it been left to itself, would probably have collapsed completely before the very superior forces of Spain. The revolution had in fact acquired very little vitality in Peru, and, saving the neighbourhood of Lima and part of the coast, the country was completely under Spanish dominion. Bolívar was at this moment at

¹ Born at Lima in 1783 and went to Spain, whence he returned to Buenos Aires in 1808. He went to Lima and served as a Spanish official, though all along favouring and aiding the revolution. His banishment by Bolívar was followed by his return to Lima in 1831. He died in 1858. He wrote very bitterly, under an assumed name, against Bolívar and the Colombians. In 1832 the Supreme Tribunal of Lima absolved him of the charges brought against him in regard to his Presidency in 1824.

Guayaquil, anxiously preparing to stem the flood which might at any moment break over the southern border. The moment he heard of the two defeats already referred to, he despatched Colonel Luis Urdaneta to offer to Peru 2000 Colombians, to be followed shortly by 4000 more. Then, further news reaching him of the great superiority of the Spaniards, he decided to despatch 3000 men at once. On the 13th March 1823, in informing the Peruvian government of this decision, he added an offer to follow later with another 3000, commanded by himself in person. The first 3000 left by sea, convoyed by two ships of war.

It was a bold decision, to which Bolivar professed to be led largely by considerations of the safety of Colombia. Irrespective of the general consideration that there could be no security for Colombia so long as Peru remained a centre of Spanish power, it was clear that, once they had re-occupied Lima and Callao, and obtained possession of the great resources of the city and port, the Spaniards would be in a much strengthened position. Then they would be able to operate by sea as well as by land. Public opinion, never very strongly in favour of republicanism in Peru, would soon be turned by Spanish successes back to the old royalist direction, and even in Guayaquil, Quito, and above all Pasto, the royalists could still command strong support.

Having decided to help Peru, whether her government wished it or no, Bolivar called upon Chile and Buenos Aires to aid in the work of liberation. As a matter of fact, the unfortunate leaders of the Peruvian Republic, Riva-Aguero and Santa Cruz, were no longer in a position to reject the proffered assistance of Colombia. General Mariano Portocarrero had already been despatched to arrange with Bolivar to carry out his former offer. The envoy, who was invested with full powers, begged Bolivar to come himself. He was well received by the

Liberator, who, however, made his own coming conditional on the previous consent of the Colombian Congress. He probably cared little really what the Congress thought, and only put in the condition by way of enhancing the value set upon his services. Anyhow, he promptly set to work to equip the second 3000 men whom he had promised. The difficulties were great, for there was a shortage of men, money, and every other requirement of war. Just at this moment there arrived more bad news from Santander, who wrote from Bogotá, that Morales was again making headway in Venezuela, and was already marching from Merida against Cúcuta.¹ Bolivar knew that the country between Merida and Bogotá was very scantily garrisoned, and that the danger was great from Morales' advance. He had received other letters, from Gual and Briceño Mendez, imploring him to return and save Colombia.

On the other hand, unless the Peruvian expedition were carried through promptly, it might be too late to save Lima and Callao from falling into Spanish hands, thus necessitating a recommencement of the work of liberation. "Never," wrote Bolivar, "have I had such hesitation over forming a decision; in the end, after a long inward struggle, the love of my country conquered, and I set out with General Valdés to march to Bogotá." But before doing so he despatched Sucre, certainly his most able commander, to represent him at Lima. With a man of Sucre's stamp to direct them, there was some chance for the Peruvians.

On the 26th April, just as the Liberator was about to march for Bogotá, two more envoys arrived from Lima, urgently pressing him to come at once in person. He still replied that, much as he personally desired to come, he dared not do so without the permission of the Congress of Colombia.

¹ *Vide supra*, p. 272.

Four days later, he started on the weary march to Bogotá. He had, however, only made three or four marches when he received fresh advices from Briceño Mendez¹ from Bogotá, informing him that Morales' forces had fallen away rapidly, and that the Spaniard was already retreating again northwards. Satisfied that the danger was past, Bolivar started back next day for Guayaquil.

Writing, on the 3rd May, to Gual to announce his determination, he added, "unfortunately the patriots of Peru are divided like those of the rest of America; moreover, part of the government is Goth,² and the whole of it incapable. The military men do not agree, because none of them has the slightest authority. The southern hemisphere requires a man of weight, and one having many resources at his command."³

Whilst he was still at Guayaquil, he received yet another urgent call for help from Riva Agüero, who enclosed a resolution of the Peruvian Congress, dated 4th May 1823, in which he was implored to represent to that of Colombia that the universal desire in Peru was that the Liberator should come as soon as possible. This was followed by yet another resolution of the 5th May, full of flattery of Bolivar, and of thanks for what he had already done.⁴ In his reply Bolivar still insisted on the necessity for respecting the Colombian Constitution, great as his desire was to help Peru, and his anxiety at her danger. A letter of the 24th May 1823, to the address of Sucre, is interesting as showing Bolivar's views on the political situation generally.⁵

¹ Pedro Briceño Mendez, born in Caracas in 1794, was with Bolivar in most of his campaigns up to 1819. Was member of the Congress of Cúcuta and the Convention of Ocaña, and partly conducted the negotiations with Morillo in 1820. He was the recipient of almost the last of Bolivar's letters, and himself died in Caracas in 1836.

² The term "Goths" was almost universally used at this time in South America to denote the Spaniards.

³ Larrazabal, ii. 196.

⁴ *Ibid.*, ii. 197.

⁵ *Ibid.*, ii. 198.

After saying that he does not yet know the result of the expected decisive battle between Morales and Montilla in the north, he mentions that the Congress had assembled, and possibly he might receive his permission to march to Peru by the 15th June. He did not greatly regret the delay, as it enabled him to improve his troops. He was more than ever confirmed in his views of the situation as regards Peru. "England," he writes, "is the most interested in this matter; for she desires to form a league of all the free peoples of America and Europe against the Holy Alliance, to place herself at the head of those peoples, and to rule the world." It would not suit England at all to have Peru under a strong European power, such as Spain, whose strength in Europe he seems to have over-estimated. England would prefer to see Peru independent under a weak government. She would, therefore, seek some pretext for supporting the independence of that country. On every ground, she would wish to see Peru independent of Spain. Spain herself must know that her retention of Peru must mean perpetual warfare. Bolivar, therefore, argues that Spain must, as matters now stood, eventually recognise the independence of Peru. He goes on to show that the Spaniards in Peru have every advantage, their troops are good, their resources great, there is unity of command. On the other hand, the independent troops are inferior, and, based on the coast region, they have not the resources of the interior which feed the Spaniards, and there are endless parties and dissensions. As for Santa Cruz, if he goes trying conclusions with Canterac and Valdés,¹ he will infallibly be beaten, and will merely contribute to the strength of the enemy. It was clearly impossible to turn recruits at once into veterans, or perform other miracles. "My unalterable decision is that Peru must await her

¹ The Spaniard. There was a General Valdés on either side, who must not be confused.

independence from politics and lapse of time; certainly not from battles." A lost battle merely meant strengthening Spain, and making it more difficult to compel her recognition of Peruvian independence. The Liberator was all for Fabian tactics, the withdrawal of Santa Cruz to Pisco or Callao, and avoidance of any general action. Should it appear, however, presently that Spain would not recognise Peruvian independence, then, and then only, would it be time for a general advance of all available troops, led by Bolivar himself. All this throws a good deal of light on the Liberator's professions of virtuous respect for the Colombian Congress, and seems to show that he was not really in such a very great hurry for the permission to go to Peru.

The Liberator's estimate of the importance of the Peruvian independents had already been realised, for Canterac and Valdés appeared before Lima with 8000 men, and the republican government, unable to oppose anything like an equal number to them, decided to evacuate the capital and retire to the fortress of Callao. Sucre, who had hitherto refused the military command, now accepted it.

In Callao confusion reigned, and, on the 22nd June 1823, the Congress deposed Riva-Aguero, ordered him to leave Peruvian territory, and appointed in his stead Francisco Valdivieso. Riva-Aguero, declining to take any notice of this order, continued to exercise his functions. Sucre, unable to support this sort of confusion, promptly turned out of Callao the Congress, Riva-Aguero, and the other civil employés, and sent them off to Trujillo, there to continue their squabbles without interfering with his military conduct of the defence of Callao.¹

Canterac had in the meanwhile come to the conclusion

¹ But with regard to Riva-Aguero's guilt, see note on p. 311 *supra*. The Peruvian view appears to be that he was innocent. See also Markham's "History of Peru," p. 264.

that he was in danger from Sucre and Santa Cruz, and that he could do nothing against the fortress of Callao. Therefore, he again evacuated Lima, and marched off, with the design of attacking the insurgents in detail. He left the capital on the 17th July, after exacting a forced loan of 500,000 pesos, as well as a quantity of church plate, and the coining machinery from the mint. He took the direction of Huancavélica after taking precautions against news of his doings in Lima reaching Europe.

Sucre, now freed from anxiety on the side of Lima, delegated to the Marquis of Torre Tagle the powers conferred on himself by the Congress, declared the northern departments in a state of siege, and, after seeing that Callao was strengthened so as to be safe against attack, embarked, with 3000 men, on the 19th July, for Chala in the south, with the object of assisting in the operations of Santa Cruz in that direction. But Santa Cruz, who had gone off towards Upper Peru, declined Sucre's aid. His operations, at first partially successful against the Spaniard Valdés, failed completely when that general was joined by Olañeta. Santa Cruz was driven back to the coast, after losing the greater part of his 5000 men. Sucre, unable to save him, re-embarked at Quilca.

Bolívar, meanwhile, still waiting for permission from Congress for his expedition to Peru, heard at Guayaquil that Pasto was once more in a blaze, that Colonel Flores,¹ commanding the republican troops there, had been defeated and forced to escape to Popayan. The king

¹ Juan José Flores, born at Puerto Cabello in 1800, was serving in the Spanish ranks at the age of twelve! Passing over to the republican side, he served under Páez and in the campaign of Boyacá. He was only twenty-three when he commanded at Pasto. In May 1830 he declared the separation of Ecuador from Colombia, and became first President of the former. In the civil wars which followed Bolívar's death Flores was defeated, and left the country in 1845. Returning, he was finally defeated by the Colombians under Mosquera in 1863 and died shortly afterwards.

had been proclaimed by Merchancano and an Indian named Augustin Agualongo, who set up a government in the name of Ferdinand VII. They were collecting troops and preparing to retake Quito.

Bolivar, his communications with Colombia once more severed by the devoted loyalty to Spain of the Pastusos, set out from Guayaquil to re-open them. He had with him 400 men and 1000 spare muskets. Reaching Quito, he gathered up another 1000 men, chiefly militia, and marched against Ibarra, on the road to Pasto, where the rebels had collected a force of about the same numerical strength as his own.

Arriving before Ibarra on the 18th July, he at once attacked the Pastusos, who fought with their usual fury. They rallied again, after being shaken at first, and it was with the greatest difficulty that Bolivar at last succeeded in completely defeating them, after they had lost about half their force. The rest were driven across the Guáitara and dispersed in the mountains.

The command of the division was now given to Salom, with instructions to pacify Pasto. Bolivar returned to Quito and there appointed two commissions, one for the expulsion of all adherents of the Spanish cause, the other for the purpose of distributing over the province a monthly contribution of 25,000 pesos, for the support of the republican garrison. Then he returned to Guayaquil, where he found awaiting him yet another deputation from Peru, to which he gave the same reply as to its predecessors—that he would come when he received permission from Congress.

At last there arrived the decree, dated 5th June 1823, by which the Congress authorised the President to leave Colombian territory and proceed to Peru. Its arrival had been delayed by the rising in Pasto, which had stopped communication with Bogotá.

CHAPTER XVI

BOLIVAR AND SUCRE IN PERU—BATTLES OF JUNIN AND AYACUCHO, 1823-24

ON the 7th August, Bolivar at last embarked at Guayaquil on the "Chimborazo" for Callao. He arrived there on the 1st September, only to find things in a shocking state. Riva-Aguero had replied to his deposition by the Congress by dissolving it, on the ground that its existence was prejudicial to the public good. The Congress equally disregarded Riva-Aguero's order of dissolution, and, when he drove the deputies from Trujillo, they reassembled at Lima, again decreed the deposition of Riva-Aguero, and appointed Torre Tagle as President. Thus Bolivar found that there was one President (Riva Aguero) at Trujillo, and another (Tagle) with the Congress at Lima.¹

The Liberator entered Lima on the first September, the same day that he arrived at Callao. He was received with acclamation by the whole population. Next day, the Congress passed a decree authorising Bolivar to put

¹ There is, it must be admitted, another side to this story, which is put thus by Sir Clements Markham ("History of Peru," p. 263). "Sucre was secretly intriguing to undermine the government of Riva-Aguero, and prepare the way for the advent of his master Bolivar. He, and his colleague Tomas Heres, seduced and corrupted several members of the Peruvian Congress, and through their means a revolution was prepared at Callao. On the 19th June 1823 the President, Riva-Aguero, was lawlessly deposed. Don José Bernardo Tagle, Marquis of Torre Tagle, a weak, unprincipled man, who was the tool of Bolivar, was nominally placed in command of the Peruvian executive, with the title of Supreme Delegate, but General Sucre retained all the power in his own hands, as commander-in-chief.

a stop to the dissensions due to the action of Riva-Aguero. On the 10th September, another decree invested him with full civil and military power.¹ Notwithstanding this, Torre Tagle continued to be President in name, though in fact his powers, and those of the Congress, were subject to Bolivar's dictatorship.

Bolivar's first address to the Congress, after thanking the assembly for their confidence, expressed his firm determination to conquer liberty for Peru, and his assurance of victory. "Sir," he said, "the liberating soldiers who have come from the Plata, the Maule,² the Magdalena, and the Orinoco will not return to their fatherland except they be crowned with laurels, passing under triumphal arches, and bearing as trophies the banners of Castille. They will either conquer and leave Peru free, or all will die—I promise it. I offer victory, confident in the valour of the united army. Thus shall Peru be independent and sovereign through all the centuries which Divine Providence may appoint to her." This speech was received with loud cheers.

Invited to speak further, Bolivar replied that he was delighted to find, on landing at Callao, that the Congress had reinstated itself in power, a fact which enabled him to devote his whole attention to the main object of his expedition, the war against the Spanish forces. He disclaimed any desire to mix himself up with civil government, to avoid which he had left the Colombian capital. He was a soldier, he said, desiring to confer upon Peru the greatest possible benefit, by protecting her national representation.

On the 9th September, a great banquet was given by the city of Lima to celebrate the arrival of the Liberator. Besides Bolivar, there were present at it the President of the Peruvian Congress (Dr Figuerola), the President

¹ O'Leary, *Docts.*, 20, p. 321.

² The river marking the frontier between Chile and Peru.

of the Republic (the Marquis of Torre Tagle), General O'Higgins the Chilian, Olmedo of Guayaquil, and many others of note. There was in the speeches the usual large amount of mutual flattery between the various leaders, and Bolivar did not forget to mention the great benefits conferred on Peru by San Martin, who was now gone for good. He concluded the proceedings by a vehement denunciation of men who, like Napoleon or Iturbide, the unfortunate Emperor of Mexico, had attempted to usurp supreme power, and had fallen in the attempt.

Bolivar's first business, notwithstanding what he had said about the power of the Congress, was to deal with the rival President, Riva Agüero. He addressed a letter to him, urging him to terminate the civil war which he was exciting. Whilst awaiting the reply, he requested from Chile a loan of two millions of pesos, as well as the further reinforcements promised by that country. To England he wrote urging a loan of eight millions of pesos, the security for which was to be mainly confidence in himself. He busied himself with preparations for an expedition against the Spaniards in the upland valley of Jauja, and in consolidating his own position in Lima. He was at present very poorly provided with troops, having only two battalions of infantry, a regiment of Buenos Aires mounted grenadiers, and a squadron of Peruvian cavalry. The rest of the forces were partly with Sucre, partly with Riva Agüero at Trujillo, whilst Santa Cruz, as we know, was in process of being thoroughly beaten in his advance on Upper Peru. Riva Agüero would pay no heed to the Liberator's demands for his submission. Clearly, nothing could be done against the Spaniards until this enemy was got rid of. Two and a half months were spent in fruitless negotiations with the rebel President. Then some of his letters were intercepted, showing that he was negotiating with the Viceroy,

La Serna, aiming at the establishment of a sovereign of the House of Bourbon. Bolivar saw that there was no course open to him but the suppression by force of this traitor to the republican cause. He wrote to Quito and Guayaquil for more Colombian troops, and for the despatch of supplies to Callao, for Lima was rapidly becoming denuded of the necessities of life, owing to its separation from the fertile valleys of the Andes, held by the Spaniards. Sucre declined to act against Riva Agüero, on the ground that the latter had calumniated him,¹ and demanded Bolivar's personal assumption of the command. Arriving at Corongo, Bolivar despatched emissaries to Riva Agüero's military commander, Colonel Silva, who was retiring on Cajamarca. He offered an amnesty and guarantees to Silva and his troops. The bait was taken, and Silva was gained over. Bolivar continued his advance on Trujillo, and, by disclosing to Colonel A. G. de La Fuente, another of Riva Agüero's commanders, the treasonable designs of his leader, gained him over also. On the 25th November 1823, La Fuente, entering Trujillo at the head of his troops, arrested and imprisoned Riva Agüero and his Minister Herrera, and placed his force at the disposal of the Liberator. La Fuente sent Riva Agüero off to Guayaquil, whence Bolivar ordered him to be allowed to depart, on condition of his retiring to Europe, a condition which the ex-President accepted. He had a narrow escape, for La Fuente had received, from the government in Lima, secret orders to shoot him.²

Thus, this troublesome business being settled without fighting, Bolivar found his forces increased by the adhesion of the troops which had hitherto supported

¹ Bolivar's sketch of the life of Sucre, in O'Leary, *Docts.*, 1, p. 14.

² Sir C. Markham ("History of Peru," p. 264) holds that Riva Agüero would have liberated Peru had he not been deposed by the intrigues of Bolivar and Sucre. Also that Bolivar incited Torre Tagle to send the order for his execution, for his escape from which he was indebted to La Fuente.

Riva Agüero. He now made over command of the troops to Sucre, who was no longer hampered by scruples regarding his personal relations with the banished President. On the 15th December 1823, Bolívar reached Cajamarca,¹ and at once set to work at the organisation of the now united army of Peru. The difficulties were great; for, whilst publicly asserting that he was received with enthusiasm, the Liberator was obliged to admit privately that the country gave him little or no material support, and required very careful treatment, if it was to be prevented from going over bodily to the Spaniards. Money was wanting, requisitions were dangerous in the existing state of feeling, and the people were by no means willing to take up arms on the republican side. "The country," Bolívar wrote to Colonel Heres, "is patriotic, but does not desire to serve; it is good, but apathetic; it has plenty of food and supplies, but no desire to give them. In truth we have a very great job on our hands."²

To add to his difficulties, he heard, on the very day of his arrival at Cajamarca, that a Spanish squadron had arrived in the Pacific, cutting off his communications by sea with Guayaquil. Orders had already gone for the despatch of troops in merchant vessels, and now, in view of the great danger of the operation, the greatest precautions had to be taken to avoid their capture, and they had to be marched overland. Then Bolívar returned to Trujillo, whence, after issuing more orders for the army, he proceeded to Lima. There he was occupied with the fortification of Callao, but he found his position getting worse and worse, owing to constant desertions both of Peruvians and Quiteños. Again he sent to Colombia for reinforcements. Yet another piece of bad

¹ In the valley of the upper Amazon, between the two ranges of the Andes, north-east of Trujillo.

² Larrazabal, ii. 218.

news reached him, namely, that the 2500 men sent by Chile had arrived at Arica, and, not finding Santa Cruz there as they had expected, had first sailed north and then, meeting General Alvarado, had been turned back by him to Coquimbo. As the year 1823 closed, Bolivar was almost in despair, as is shown by a confidential letter to Sucre. "At times," he wrote, "I lose all heart. . . . It is only love of the country which recalls the courage lost when I contemplate the obstacles. As soon as difficulties are overcome in one direction, they increase in another."¹

The commencement of 1824 found Bolivar at the small port of Pativilca, 80 or 90 miles north of Callao. There he succumbed to a bilious fever, the result, no doubt, as much of the worry and anxiety he was passing through as of the climate. For a week or more he was scarcely conscious, but no sooner did his health begin to improve than his indomitable courage reasserted itself in affirmations of his certainty of ultimate success, despite all the evil omens of the moment.

More bad news came from Colombia, in the form of reports of intrigues against himself. The deputies from Quito to the Colombian Congress showed themselves specially hostile to him. They wrote to Quito demanding documentary evidence of the oppressions of the magistracy, and even accusing Bolivar himself of misconduct. Their letter was put up in the public places and streets of Quito by the Cabildo. Deeply hurt by these accusations, Bolivar wrote to the Congress, resigning his office of President of the Republic, an office which he had, he said, never really exercised. If the country required his services as a soldier, they were at its disposal, but he would not be induced to expose himself to an end such as that of San Martin in Peru. At the same time, he resigned the pension of 30,000 pesos per annum which had been

¹ Larrazabal, ii. 223.

awarded to him by the Congress. To his friend Sucre he wrote¹: "I have sent in my resignation to Congress. This course will not fail to produce some result: if it does, I shall take the opportunity to resign the service altogether; I am determined not to allow Colombia to be destroyed in my hands, still less will I liberate her a second time. Such work is not to be done twice. I am ready to fight a battle against the Spaniards, to terminate the war of America, but nothing more. I am worn out old,² and have nothing to look to. Yet I am like a miser dreading the robbery of his wealth. Everywhere there is suspicion and unrest. It appears to me that I am from moment to moment losing my reputation, which is the recompense and fortune which I have gained by such immense sacrifice."

Notwithstanding his despair, and his daily increasing difficulties, he continued his organisation of the military forces, and was anxiously awaiting reinforcements from Colombia. Time was what he wanted, and he proposed to gain it by negotiating with Canterac. He wrote, therefore, to Torre Tagle, the President, to send his Minister of War to Jauja to interview the Spanish commander-in-chief and propose an armistice. Berindoaga, the minister in question, went accordingly to Jauja and negotiated openly in the sense desired, without any result. But, at the same time, he carried on, under secret instructions from Torre Tagle, another negotiation, which had for its objects nothing less than the restoration of the royal authority in Lima and the surrender of Callao.

Just at this juncture, Bolivar had moved the Colombian regiment from Callao, and entrusted the defence of the fortress to the Buenos Aires auxiliary force. As soon as the latter was in possession, it revolted, under the leadership of a sergeant named Moyano, and arrested Alvarado, the commandant, with all the officers of the garrison.

¹ Larrazabal, ii. 228.

² He was in years scarcely forty-one.

The pretext for the revolt was found in arrears of pay, for the discharge of which there was no money available. Bolivar did his best to find it, but within twenty-four hours of the outbreak the rebels had hoisted the Spanish flag on the battlements of Callao, and sent envoys to La Serna at Cuzco, placing themselves at his disposal. La Serna at once despatched General Rodil as governor and commandant of the province of Lima, with command of the fortress of Callao, and a commission as colonel in the Spanish forces for Sergeant Moyano. Callao was lost to Bolivar for the present.

The Congress, in despair at these events, turned for help to Bolivar, suspended the Constitution, declared itself prorogued, and invested the Liberator with dictatorial powers.

The Dictator's possessions in Peru were practically reduced to Trujillo, whither he had gone once more from Pativilca, and where he commanded about 5000 Colombians and 4000 Peruvians, ill-supplied, and, in the case of the Peruvians, lacking in military spirit and enthusiasm for the cause. The royalists, on the other hand, had 18,000 men, of whom the Viceroy hoped to be able to use 12,000 for the destruction of Bolivar and his army, whilst the remaining 6000 maintained peace in Upper Peru, and on the coasts of the south.

One advantage Bolivar certainly enjoyed in an absolutely free hand; for the decree of the Congress, dated 10th February 1824, placed no limits on his civil and military power, and left with him alone the decision as to when the prorogued assembly should be again called together.

His first thought was for the rescue of Lima from the Spaniards, but his Colombians were too far off, though he himself, with his staff, was at this time only about 70 or 80 miles away. He abandoned that idea, but sought to bring back the troops in Lima to join his army. After trying in vain to induce the Chilean general Pinto to

undertake the business, he sent General Mariano Necochea. When the latter reached Lima he found everything in the wildest confusion. Torre Tagle, Berindoaga and others had fled to Callao to join Rodil and the royalist garrison. Amongst the fugitives were the majority of the military officers, a regiment of Buenos Aires mounted grenadiers, and other troops. Desertions to the enemy occurred daily. There was practically nothing left for Necochea to bring back. The situation was desperate, yet Bolivar's courage never failed, and, though he professed to the Congress that he abhorred the office of Dictator, and would hold it no longer than was absolutely necessary, he still spoke hopefully of victory. Everything, as he wrote to Sucre, depended on the maintenance of the army of the north. He summoned Sucre to join it as soon as possible. After detailing all the misfortunes which beset him, and referring to the possibility of help from England, he adds: "The year will not be ended before we are in Potosí."¹ Truly a bold prophecy, looking to the existing condition of affairs! The Liberator had received notice from Colombia that neither arms, nor men, nor money would be sent without the previous consent of Congress. He wanted 400,000 pesos; with difficulty he collected one fourth of that sum, and Canterac was already marching against him.

In the middle of April, Bolivar marched for the Department of Huamachuco via Otusco, intending to unite his Colombians with the Peruvian army, which was beyond the western range at Cajamarca. His activity had been rewarded, and, on the 15th April, he wrote from Otusco to Colonel Héres:² "The next fortnight we must employ in

¹ Larrazabal, ii. 238.

² Tomas Héres, a native of Guayana, served the Spaniards for several years, when he became a convert to the other side. He was then with the "Numancia" battalion, and he was the leader in the revolt of that battalion against Spain in Peru. He remained behind in Peru in 1826 as Santa Cruz's minister, but, after opposing the revolt of Bustamente, he returned to Colombia, where he supported Bolivar's cause to the end.

preparation, in May we must march, and in June fight." He wrote to Sucre, at the same time, that he would be able to meet the enemy's 8000 men with an equal number, and that meant victory for himself. The concentration of the two armies was ordered to go on through May. Some of the troops had 500 miles to march in order to reach Pasco the point of concentration; all had to pass through terrible snow-clad mountains. The Peruvian army was under La Mar, whilst Sucre commanded the Colombians. In general command of the united cavalry was the Argentine Necochea, with Miller,¹ the Englishman, under him in command of the Peruvian cavalry. The mounted grenadiers of Buenos Aires, such of them as had remained faithful, were led by Bruix, a son of the well-known French admiral of Napoleon. Santa Cruz was chief of the staff of the Peruvian army, Colonel O'Connor of the Colombian. Bolivar himself commanded in chief over the whole, about 9000 strong. During the whole of June the troops continued their march through country as difficult as that which Bolivar had crossed from Ocaña to Cúcuta in 1813, and from the plains of the Orinoco to the lofty plateau of Bogotá in 1819. It was only on the 29th July 1824, that the Liberator was able to review his united army on the plateau of the Sacramento, 12,000 feet above sea level, between Rancas and Pasco. He had 7700 men, besides some 1500 guerrillas. His proclamation on this occasion is less verbose than usual, and is worth quoting in full, as it has something of the Napoleonic ring.

"Soldiers! You go to complete the greatest work Heaven has been able to entrust to men, to save a whole world from slavery.

¹ William Miller, born at Wingham (Kent) in 1795, served in the British army in the Peninsula and in the United States. Took service in the republican army of Buenos Aires, and was with San Martin in Chile and Peru. His memoirs, edited from his papers by his brother, give much useful and interesting information at first hand.

"Soldiers! The enemies whom you are going to destroy boast of fourteen years of triumph; they are worthy to measure arms with yours which have shone in a thousand fights.

"Soldiers! Peru and all America look to you for peace, the daughter of victory; even liberal Europe regards you with enchantment, for the liberty of the new world is the hope of the universe. Will you disappoint them? No! No! You are invincible."

The beauty of the scene was well calculated to excite enthusiasm. Before the troops lay the broad sparkling surface of the lake of Reyes, whose surplus waters flow to join eventually the mighty stream of the Amazon, whilst all around the snowy peaks of the Andes looked solemnly down on the little army in which so many hopes were centred. As Bolivar passed down the ranks, he was greeted with loud cheers, especially by the Colombians, whom he reminded of their great victory, in more or less similar surroundings, at Boyacá, almost exactly five years before. Then they had assured the liberty of New Granada, now they appeared to be on the eve of a similar struggle for the liberation of Peru, the last remaining stronghold of Spanish dominion in South America.

Canterac was already within a march or two, with 7000 infantry and 2000 cavalry, beyond the further end of the lake. The main road leading southwards from Pasco passed between the mountains and the eastern side of the lake, but there was a perfectly practicable road through the hills on the west also. On the 4th August, Canterac, hoping to fall on the patriots in detail as they debouched from the Cerro de Pasco on to the plain, marched to the town of Reyes on the main road. Next day he was at Carhuamacho, with his cavalry patrolling right up to Pasco. All seemed to be going well for the Spaniards, but, whilst they had taken the eastern road, Bolivar had marched parallel to them on the opposite side of the lake,

and in the reverse direction. He hoped to fall on their communications at the southern end of the lake and to compel a battle "à front renversé." On the night of the 5th, he was at Conacancha, but Canterac, having heard that day of the enemy's movement, was marching rapidly back to recover his almost intercepted communications. On the 6th, Bolivar, from the hills on the west of the lake, looked down on the plain of Junin at its southern extremity. There he saw the Spanish army hurrying back through Reyes and over the plain. His infantry was too late to catch the enemy, but, at 4 p.m., he sent on 900 cavalry, who came close upon the retreating royalists. The republican cavalry, before reaching the enemy, had to debouch through the defile between a marshy brook on their left and the hills on their right. Canterac, seeing his opportunity, at once drew up 1200 cavalry in line to cover the retreat of his infantry and charge Bolivar's horsemen as they debouched and attempted to form line after passing the defile. Canterac's line had a squadron in rear of either flank as reserve. Bolivar's men had no time to deploy properly before the Spanish cavalry were on them. Miller, with the Peruvian cavalry, had been sent to the left beyond the rivulet, with orders to get round the right of the enemy and charge him in flank as he met the rest of the republicans in front. There was no time for this, and Miller found himself compelled by the rapid approach of the enemy to form front to his right and meet the Spanish right in a frontal attack. He was still forming when the charge struck him, and he was driven leftwards in disorder, with the exception of a few mounted grenadiers, under a German named Braun, who carved a way for themselves through the Spanish horse.

The Spaniards, who had come on in an excellent line, now broke up in pursuit, some following Miller eastwards, others driving Necochea, with the republican centre and

right, back into the defile. The day seemed lost for Bolivar; but, fortunately, a single Peruvian squadron, under Captain Suarez, had been left some distance behind. This now pushed into the wide interval left between the pursuers of Miller and those of Necochea. Turning to his left, Suarez fell upon the rear of the Spaniards pursuing Miller. The latter also faced about, and the enemy's right, now between Suarez and Miller, fled in confusion. This diversion enabled Necochea to rally his defeated men and turn the tables on his pursuers. The left, too, being rallied, the Spaniards were driven in disorder right back upon their infantry, whose presence alone stopped the republican pursuit.

In the fight Necochea¹ was wounded and taken, but was rescued from death by a Spanish soldier who had formerly served under him, and now took him up on his crupper. At this moment some of the Colombian cavalry came up, rescued their commander, and killed the Spaniard before Necochea could save him by saying what he had done.

Thus ended the so-called battle of Junin, a purely cavalry action in which not a single shot was fired on either side. The Spaniards lost, in the three-quarters of an hour of fighting, 19 officers and 345 men killed or wounded, and 80 prisoners. The republican loss was only 11 officers and 133 men killed or wounded. Miller, from whose memoirs the above account of the battle is taken, records that most of the wounded died during the night from the piercing cold of that great altitude.

Bolivar, who had directed the first movement, on seeing the apparent defeat of his cavalry, had galloped back to post his infantry and guns on a height two and a half miles in rear of the scene of the cavalry action. That night he occupied Reyes.

¹ Mariano Necochea, born in Buenos Aires in 1790, was educated in Spain, and returned home to embrace, in 1810, the republican cause. Served under San Martin and Bolivar. In 1829 was with La Mar's ill-fated expedition against Guayaquil. Died in Lima in 1849.

Canterac, without waiting to use his infantry next day, continued his retreat unmolested, but, marching as he had to through difficult mountains, his army, demoralised by the defeat of its cavalry, lost heavily from privations, fatigue, and desertion. At this time his army was short of 5000 men under Valdés, who had been sent to put down Olañeta in Upper Peru. That general, after the restoration of Ferdinand VII. to absolute power, and the abolition of the Spanish constitution of 1820, had adopted extreme absolutist views, whilst La Serna and the army of Lower Peru remained constitutionalists. Olañeta refused obedience to the Viceroy, and, after much acrimonious correspondence, Valdés was sent to bring him to book. There was a good deal of fighting, with varying fortune. Finally, Valdés was victorious at La Lava on the 17th August 1824. He was then recalled to join the Viceroy's concentration on the right bank of the Apurimac.

Bolívar's men gained greatly in morale from their first very marked success.

By the 24th August, the independent army had marched as far as Ayacucho (Huamanga), where it halted till the 18th September. In the first half of October, Bolívar went over the whole country up to the Apurimac, the boundary between the departments of Huamanga and Cuzco. Thence he returned to the coast in search of reinforcements, leaving Sucre in command of the army. Before doing so, he held a grand review of the forces, followed by a banquet at which he drank to the army, to Peru, to the patriots blockaded in Lima, and to the triumph of liberty. His concluding words were these: "May the valiant swords of those who surround me pierce my breast a thousand times if ever I oppress the nations which I now lead to liberty! May the authority of the people be the only power which exists on earth! May the very name of tyranny be blotted out from the language of the nations and forgotten!"¹

¹ Larrazabal, ii. 256.

His instructions to Sucre required that general, until he should be reinforced, to advance with caution, only occupying districts as they were evacuated by the enemy. If the enemy, whose superiority he recognised, notwithstanding the victory of Junin, should advance, Sucre was to fall back to Huancavelica and take up a position behind the bridge there. He was only to engage a superior enemy in the last resort.

Miller says that, after Bolivar's departure, he and others counselled a march against Canterac at Cuzco, in order to attack him before he was joined by Valdés from Potosí. Sucre, however, held that his instructions forbade any such offensive movement.

On his way to the coast, Bolivar received an Act of the Colombian Congress depriving him of the extraordinary powers to be exercised when he was in the field, which had been conferred on him in 1821.¹ The Act, in its last clause, even deprived him of the command of the Colombian army. The special powers and the command were conferred, instead, on the actual holder of the executive power, Santander to wit. Santander delegated them to the chiefs of the Departments of the south, and appointed Sucre commander-in-chief. A plausible excuse for this was found in the fact that it seemed anomalous that Bolivar, now Dictator of Peru, should continue to exercise high powers in Colombia, and to command the auxiliary force lent to Peru. There can be little doubt that the move, however apparently justified by such considerations, was really based on the enmity and jealousy of Santander, which dated back from the days of Castillo in 1813. Moreover, it was Santander's object to keep himself in power as head of the executive by keeping Bolivar out of Colombia. Bolivar felt the blow bitterly, but he wrote to Sucre, placing him in command of the Colombian troops, and adding that there should be no more inter-

¹ *Supra*, p. 269.

² O'Leary, *Docts.*, 22, p. 526.

ference by the writer than was absolutely necessary for his retention of the general direction of operations, as Dictator of Peru. Bolivar had the highest respect for Sucre, both as a man and as a commander. Indeed, it is difficult not to recognise in him the most upright, loyal, and talented of the commanders with whom the Liberator ever had to deal. There was, perhaps, no other with whom it would have been possible for him to act cordially and confidently under the trying circumstances.

Bolivar clearly saw the hostile influence of Santander at the back of the new Colombian law which he so deeply resented. The official communication from Santander was accompanied by a private letter, in which he promised Bolivar all the help in troops which he required. To the official letter no reply was sent; to the private one Bolivar replied that Peru would have remained for years subject to Spain, but for the help of the Colombian troops. Civil war had been threatened in the north, whilst the Spaniards held all the south. Callao had been sold by its garrison. The situation had been saved by the Colombian army, which had set free five departments and thirty provinces. The fear of civil war had been removed, the royalist cavalry defeated at Junin, and now the Spanish commanders had evacuated Lima, leaving Callao to be blockaded by the patriots. Santander was thanked for his assistance in sending troops, and for promising more, which were urgently required for the final liberation of Peru. There was no word of reproach, no allusion to the slight which had been passed upon the Liberator.¹

Three days earlier Bolivar had written to the Marquis de Toro, his old friend, in terms which indicate that, however hopeful he might be about the future in Peru, he was deeply hurt by what had occurred in Colombia. "This news (regarding the war)," he wrote, "will, I sup-

¹ Larrazabal, ii. 260.

pose, satisfy you, and mitigate the pain of the commencement of my letter. You understand, my dear Marquis, that my melancholy comes from my philosophy, and that I am more of a philosopher in prosperity than in adversity. I say this in order that you may not fancy my condition, much less my fortune, is sad. If I am sad it is for you (in Colombia), since my own condition has been so greatly raised that it is difficult for me to be unfortunate. When I shall have lost everything on earth, there will still remain to me the glory of having performed my duty to the utmost, and that glory will for ever be my good fortune and my happiness.”¹

In the middle of November, Bolivar was at Chancay, 30 miles north of Callao, on the point of entering Lima, which had been abandoned by the royalists in consequence of the news of the defeat of Junin. Rodil was now securely blockaded in Callao. On the 7th December 1824, Bolivar entered Lima amidst much enthusiasm, and was begged by the inhabitants not to leave the place again.

Meanwhile, the Spanish Viceroy, La Serna, was at Cuzco when the news reached him of the unfortunate affair at Junin. He at once sent to summon Valdés, who was at Chuquisaca. As soon as Valdés reached Cuzco with his division, La Serna set about the organisation of a large force with which to avenge the defeat of Junin. He was able to collect almost 11,000 men, whom he organised in three divisions of infantry and one of cavalry, with twenty-four guns. His divisions were commanded by Monet, Villa Lobos, and Valdés, his cavalry by Ferraz, and his artillery by Cacho. Placing himself at the head of this “army,” which a European commander would have called a division, or a very weak corps, the Viceroy left Cuzco at the end of October. He made a wide circuit in order to get round the right of Sucre,

¹ Larrazabal, ii. 261.

whom he hoped to defeat as easily as he had defeated Santa Cruz in the preceding year.

When, at last, the Spanish force arrived within a few miles of Sucre, the latter, convinced of the superiority of the enemy, determined on retreat, in accordance with Bolivar's instructions. The general direction of the march of both armies was north-westward, through a country of great difficulty, at a very great elevation. Rivers flowing at the bottom of tremendous gorges had constantly to be crossed, the roads were of the most primitive nature, and marching in the rarefied air of these great altitudes was very trying, even to the most acclimatised troops. The march was very slow in consequence. On the 25th November, Sucre and La Serna were moving parallel to one another. On the 1st December, Sucre tried to recover his communications with Lima, but the Viceroy refused the battle offered to him on the 2nd. On the afternoon of the 3rd, the royalists marched, concealed by heights, in order to try and get right across Sucre's communications. Sucre, getting wind of the movement, also recommenced his retreat. On this day his rearguard, the "Rifles," under Colonel Sands, was attacked by Valdés, and dispersed.¹ On the 4th, the retreat was continued, the royalists marching parallel to the republicans, along the crest of the hills a few miles off, just as the English and French marched parallel to one another before Salamanca. The sufferings of both sides in this strenuous march were great. The Viceroy again refused battle offered by Sucre. On the 6th December, the patriots were at Quinua, with the royalists five miles off on their right, separated from them by a deep valley. Sucre proposed to attack their line of outposts, but so much

¹ Miller (ii. 188) states that the original battalion of "Rifles" was composed of Englishmen. It fought in many actions in Colombia, and nearly all the English being killed or dead of disease, their place was filled first by Indians, then by creoles, mulattoes, etc. In Peru there remained with it but ten British officers.

time was lost in preparations that it was too late by the time he was ready.

On the 7th, the royalists, moving to their left, on the farther side of a valley 600 feet deep, stood at Guaman-gilla, right across the line of retreat of Sucre, who was unable to attack across this great and precipitous valley.

On the afternoon of the 8th, La Serna crossed the deep valley beyond Sucre's right,¹ and placed his army on the heights of Condorkanki, on the right of the patriot force, facing south-west at right angles to Sucre's front. The Viceroy's object appears to have been to drive the patriots to destruction in the great valley. His new position on the heights was just out of artillery range from the patriots. In the evening there was some skirmishing with a royalist battalion, which started to descend from the heights, but presently retreated. Sucre had faced to his right, in order to get his line parallel with the enemy.

The republican army now stood facing north-east on the plain of Ayacucho. Directly in front of it was the Viceregal army on the steep heights of Condorkanki; on its left there was first a shallow valley, then some level ground, and, beyond that again, the deep valley of which mention has already been made. Behind Sucre lay the village of Quinua, through which passed the road by which he had hitherto been marching, and which on his left rear made a precipitous descent into the great valley.

From Sucre's position to the road there was a gradual descent, ending in the precipitous heights at the foot of which the main road passed. On his right was another ravine running at right angles to the opposing fronts.

Sucre's position was clearly desperate; he could not avoid fighting, and, if he were beaten, he could not escape entire destruction. For the coming battle he drew up his army thus—on the right, in first line, Cordova's Colombian division of four battalions; on the left, La

¹ The armies were now facing in the direction of their bases.

Mar's Peruvians, also four battalions; in the centre Miller, with four regiments of cavalry. Lara's division, of three battalions, formed the reserve, and the one four-pounder gun, which was all Sucre had to oppose to La Serna's twenty-four guns, was placed in front of the centre. During the night the patriots kept up musketry fire, in order to prevent the royalists from descending and attempting a night attack. As La Serna's infantry were within musket-shot from the foot of the heights, they spent a very disturbed night.

The 9th December dawned brightly on the field on which was about to be decided the fate of Peru, perhaps of the whole of South America.

There was equal enthusiasm on either side, though in some cases brothers were fighting against one another, and each knew of the other's presence in the enemy's ranks. In one case Miller records the meeting of two brothers at the outposts on the evening preceding the battle. Twenty-four hours later he of the Spanish army found himself the prisoner of his republican brother. As the sun rose over the great mountains, shedding its mid-summer warmth on the shivering men, the enthusiasm waxed. At 9 a.m. the royalists began to move down from the heights. La Serna marched on foot at the head of the division of Villa Lobos, moving slightly towards his left, whilst Monet's division moved straight down the rocky declivity. The cavalry, dismounted and leading their horses, filled the intervals between the infantry.

As the advance began, Sucre rode along his lines, encouraging his men as he passed. Then, stopping in front of the centre, he shouted, "Upon your efforts of this day depends the fate of South America. Another day of glory is about to crown your admirable constancy." He was answered by loud "Vivas."

The republicans felt that their situation was desperate, for, though La Serna's humanity was well known, it was

equally notorious that many of his subordinates were men to whom massacre of the enemy was an ordinary incident of victorious battle. Possibility of retreat, in the event of defeat, there was none. Cordova emphasised the position by dismounting and stabbing his horse, accompanying his action by the words. "There lies my last horse; I have now no means of escape, we must fight it out together. Forward! with the step of conquerors!" About half of the two Spanish divisions had reached the foot of the heights and had begun to re-form, when the republican attack with the bayonet fell upon them. For a moment the result seemed doubtful, for the Spaniards fought gallantly. Then the Colombian cavalry charged, headed by Colonel Silva, who fell covered with wounds. In an instant all was over; the Spaniards were in flight up the hill which they had just descended. La Serna was wounded and captured, and his defeated troops were decimated by the fire of the pursuing Colombians.

Meanwhile there had been fighting on the republican left; for at dawn La Serna had sent Valdés round on to the level ground between the great ravine and the lesser one on which rested Sucre's left. Across the latter Valdés opened fire on the Peruvians with musketry and four guns, just as the attack in the centre began. Two of La Mar's battalions were forced to retire, as did a Colombian battalion sent to reinforce them. Two of Valdés' battalions actually crossed the ravine, but, being opportunely charged by Miller with a regiment of hussars, and then attacked by the rallied republican infantry, were driven back. After them, across the ravine, poured the Peruvian and Colombian infantry and Miller. So fierce was the republican attack that Valdés' men broke and fled, their four guns being taken. The battle, which had lasted but an hour, was won. Sucre's single gun had done admirable service in drawing on itself the fire of the royalist batteries, which would have

been better employed in firing on the crowded columns of infantry.

The royalists had lost 2000 men and fifteen guns, the republicans not more than half the number of men.

La Serna had allowed himself to be hurried into a premature frontal attack, instead of awaiting the development of Valdés' attack on the republican left. On the other hand, great credit is due to Sucre for his careful timing of the moment for his counter-attack. He seized the time during the Spanish descent of the hill for his address to his troops, thus preventing them from being lured into a premature advance by their eagerness. When he had finished, there was just time for his men to reach the first half of the two Spanish divisions, as they were seeking to restore their formation, which had been broken by the difficult descent of a rocky and steep slope. The other half was still in disorder on the slope itself. The victory was decisive, and Sucre knew it, as is shown by the opening words of his report to Bolívar: "The war is ended, and the liberation of Peru completed."¹

By 1 p.m. the divisions of La Mar and Lara had mounted the heights of Condorkanki in pursuit of the defeated Spaniards. At sundown Canterac, now in command owing to the captivity of the Viceroy, proposed a capitulation, and rode down to Sucre's quarters. The Viceroy, Canterac, Valdés, Monet, and all the principal officers, with some 3800 other officers and men, became prisoners of war. The rest of those who had escaped death dispersed over the country.

Decisive as was the battle of Ayacucho, it was fought between armies neither of which exceeded in numbers an ordinary European division. The royalists numbered about 9500, their opponents not more than 6000.² Miller

¹ O'Leary, *Docts.*, 1, p. 198.

² Torrente puts both at about 7000 to 8000 men, but in allowing for the Spanish losses in the trying march and the fighting on it, he forgets to make a similar deduction for Sucre.

says that "the troops on both sides were in a state of discipline which would have been creditable to the best European armies." Perhaps, in considering this statement, some allowance should be made for the natural prejudice of a man who himself commanded part of them.

Late on the night of the battle, Miller visited the captive Viceroy, who was confined in the least miserable of the huts of Quinua. There he found the old man sitting on a bench, leaning against the wall, his white hair still clotted with the blood from his wound. Tall and dignified, but broken by misfortune, was the last of the Spanish Viceroys of Peru, the man who, but a few hours before, had been to all intents and purposes a king. Now he was only too thankful to Miller for the offer of a cup of tea, and for the Englishman's consideration in removing to the outside the sentry whom he found mounting guard in the room in which the Viceroy was. On the very day of his ruin, the King of Spain had despatched to La Serna the patent creating him "Conde de los Andes."

The terms of the capitulation,¹ signed by Sucre and Canterac, provided for the transmission to their own country of all the Spanish soldiers desiring to leave South America, whilst those desiring to serve Peru in their present capacity were to be allowed to do so. No one was to suffer on account of his political opinions, or his past services in the royal cause. The principal officers were allowed to retain their swords and to leave the country with their families. In the surrender was included the whole country still held by the Spaniards, as far as the Desaguadero, that is, excepting Upper Peru, which was outside the Viceroy's jurisdiction. Callao was to be surrendered, the Spanish ships of war being allowed to depart in peace, as well as all Spanish merchants, and their ships in Peruvian ports. Bolivar received the

¹ For full terms, see O'Leary, *Docts.*, 22, p. 565.

news of Ayacucho with the greatest joy, and, on the 27th December 1824,¹ issued a proclamation in which full credit is given to Sucre and his army, the former being styled "The Great Liberator of Peru"; the latter, "Conqueror of Ayacucho." Sucre also received the title of "Grand Marshal of Ayacucho," and provision was made for various honours and rewards to the army and the families of those killed in the battle. To Sucre Bolivar wrote thus: "The 9th December 1824, on which you triumphed over the enemies of independence, will be for ever a day which thousands upon thousands of generations will recall, ever blessing the patriot and warrior who has made it celebrated in the annals of America. So long as Ayacucho exists, the name of General Sucre will be remembered. It will last as long as time endures."

On the signature of the capitulation, Canterac sent orders to Rodil to surrender Callao in accordance with its terms. That officer, however, declined to receive the Spanish and Peruvian officers bringing the orders, or to recognise their authority. The captain of H.B.M.S. *Cambridge*, then at Callao, offered his ship as a meeting-place for negotiations, but Rodil was obstinate in his refusal to surrender, and nothing remained but for Bolivar to continue to strictly blockade the place and starve it out.

¹ O'Leary, *Docts.*, 22, p. 605.

CHAPTER XVII

BOLIVAR IN PERU AND BOLIVIA, 1825-26

BOLIVAR was now practically free from anxiety on the score of the Spanish forces, though Upper Peru still remained to be subdued. He at once set to work at the civil reorganisation of the country. Recruiting was stopped, an amnesty was proclaimed for deserters, a Supreme Court of Justice was established, and a Constituent Congress was summoned to meet on the 10th February 1825. A proclamation was issued on the 25th December 1824, in which Bolivar told the Peruvians that, the liberating army having accomplished its task, he would now, as he had promised, resign into the hands of the Congress his powers as Dictator.¹

The Liberator, considering America practically free from Spanish dominion, now proceeded to suggest, in a circular to all the governments of America, his idea of an assembly of plenipotentiaries at Panama, as a sort of court of general reference and consultation for all disputes and common interests.

He also wrote to the President of the Colombian Senate, again begging to be allowed to resign his office of President. The letter seems worth quoting *in extenso*, as illustrating the views which Bolivar publicly expressed.

LIMA, 22nd December 1824.

"MOST EXCELLENT SIR,—The peace of Peru, which our arms have procured by the most glorious victory of

¹ O'Leary, *Docts.*, 22, p. 601.

the New World, has ended the war of the American continent. Colombia thus has no longer any enemies in all her territory, or in that of her neighbours.

I have fulfilled my mission ; consequently, the time has come for me to complete the offer, so often made to my country, to cease to continue my public career when there were no more enemies in America.

All the world sees, and says, that my remaining in Colombia is no longer necessary, and no one knows this better than I. I say more, I believe that my glory has reached its zenith, that, seeing my country free, well constituted and tranquil, it is time for me to leave her glorious coasts. This result has been attained by my arrival in Peru, and I flatter myself that, in the future, the liberty and glory of Peru will be infinitely greater. The Legislative Body, the Vice-President, the army, and the people have shown in the first years of their career that they are worthy to enjoy liberty, and most capable of maintaining it in the face of the greatest difficulties. I will say once for all, Sir, I desire that Europe and America should be convinced of my horror of supreme power, whatever aspect or name it may bear. My conscience suffers under the weight of the atrocious calumnies which the liberals of America and the slaves of Europe assail me with. Day and night I am tormented by the idea of my enemies that my services are directed by ambition. Finally, I make bold to say to Your Excellency, with the utmost frankness, and hoping that I shall be pardoned for doing so, that I believe that the glory of Colombia will suffer by my remaining on her soil ; because she will always suppose herself threatened by a tyrant, and because the injury she thereby does me dims the brightness of her virtues, since I am a part, though a small one, of this Republic. Most Excellent Sir, I implore you to submit to the wisdom of the Senate the renunciation which I tender of the Presidency of

Colombia. Its acceptance will be the recompense of my services in these two Republics."¹

In this place it will be convenient to anticipate somewhat by briefly describing to their conclusion Sucre's operations subsequent to the battle of Ayacucho.

Immediately after the battle he marched on Cuzco, where he arrived on the 24th December 1824, the very day before Bolivar at Lima issued his proclamation to the Peruvians. There Sucre found that, on hearing of the defeat of Ayacucho, a local Junta had assembled and had elected as Viceroy of Peru, Brigadier-General P. Tristan, then at Arequipa. He had appointed as his *locum tenens*, Antonio M. Alvarez, President of the Royal Audiencia.

Resistance to Sucre's victorious army being clearly impossible, the Spanish garrisons scattered about the neighbouring towns dispersed, and Tristan, the so-called Viceroy, Alvarez, and the rest gave in their adhesion to the capitulation of Ayacucho. There remained only Upper Peru, which was still held by Olañeta.

From Cuzco, Sucre marched to the Desaguadero, the population everywhere raising the Republican standard. Olañeta, abandoning Potosí, was attacked by Mediñaceli, one of his own lieutenants who had gone over to the republicans, at Tumusla, on the 1st April 1825, where he met defeat and death. Three days later Sucre was in Potosí and the Spanish flag had been lowered throughout Peru, except in the fortress of Callao, where Rodil still obstinately held out.²

¹ Larrazabal, ii. 278.

² A return signed by Sucre's chief of the staff gives as follows the numbers of Spaniards disposed of by death, wounds, capture, or dispersion :—

Defeated at Ayacucho	9,510
Garrisons of Cuzco, Arequipa, Quilca, and Puño	3,280
Army of Olañeta	4,630
Generals and officers killed or captured	342
Prisoners south of the Desaguadero	836

(O'Leary, ii. 377n.)

Total, 18,598

We now return to the doings of Bolivar, whom we left at Lima in the end of December 1824.

On the 25th January 1825, a great ball was given in his honour by the Municipality of Lima. In the courtyard of the Municipal Hall his portrait was hung, with the inscription: "He created Colombia, restored Peru, and gave peace to America." As he entered, the Liberator was greeted with hymns of praise, and his path was strewn with flowers by members of the Cabildo. On this occasion he inhaled the incense of flattery in quantities phenomenal even for him.

Three days later, Monteagudo, who had returned from banishment, was murdered in a back street of Lima. It was asserted that the murder was political, and indicative of a reactionary conspiracy; but, on the whole, it appears probable that its motive was either private revenge or robbery. Monteagudo's tyrannies, during San Martin's absence at Guayaquil, and his evil living, are quite sufficient to account for his assassination, without seeking to attribute political motives to it.

On the 10th February 1825, exactly a year after he had taken up the reins of supreme authority, Bolivar met the Peruvian Congress.

To the deputation sent to invite his attendance in the Chamber he replied with those expressions of his horror of supreme power in the hands of a single man which every South American Dictator uses as a matter of course. The more loudly he proclaims these virtuous sentiments the more completely one is convinced that he means to exercise the power he condemns. The words have become a mere formula of hypocrisy.

The Dictator now adjourned to the Assembly, preceded by all the chief functionaries, civil, military, and ecclesiastical, through streets everywhere decorated, and crowded by the populace.

As he entered the Chamber, he was greeted by shouts

of "Long live Bolivar! Long live the Redeemer of Peru!" Then he proceeded to address the Assembly.

The liberating army, he said, had broken the fetters which Pizarro had rivetted on the sons of Manco Capac. His own administration during the past year had amounted to little more than a campaign, though he had found time to carry out some essential reforms. Notwithstanding his ardour in the cause of liberty, he was still unable to say that the cloud of political disruption had passed away. It would require all the wisdom of Congress to organise a good government. (In this one can hardly help recognising a strong hint that his own services were still necessary.)

Then, after dilating on the debt of gratitude due by Peru to Colombia, and alluding to his scheme for a general Congress at Panama,¹ he proceeded to congratulate the Peruvians on being liberated from the two greatest evils, "from war by the victory of Ayacucho, from despotism by my resignation." He added that his destiny called him to aid in the liberation of Upper Peru and the reduction of Callao. After that, he would return to his own country to render an account of his mission. Then the President of the Congress replied, saying that past events,

¹ This was an old idea of Bolivar's, to which he gave much thought in the Jamaica days of 1815. It was to be a sort of Amphictyonic League, at which were to be represented all the late Spanish colonies, Brazil, the United States, and even Great Britain and Holland. It would be a sort of Federal Congress for the whole of America, in which would be discussed all great questions concerning the states constituting the Confederation, and their relations with other nations. The idea never came to much. Mexico, Guatemala, Colombia, and Peru sent representatives, who met in 1826, after many delays. Brazil formally agreed. Buenos Aires and Chile would have nothing to do with it. Great Britain, Holland, and the United States merely agreed to send representatives to watch the proceedings.

The Congress, such as it was, in no way realised Bolivar's expectations, and he finally damned it by comparing it to "that mad Greek who, from a rock in mid-ocean, pretended to direct the ships sailing around him" (O'Leary, ii. 345).

the insecurity of the present, and the general opinion of all were against the acceptance of Bolivar's resignation.

The Liberator again spoke, repeating that, now that Peru was practically free, there was no place in it for a foreigner like himself, at any rate once Upper Peru was freed and Callao taken. He would serve Peru with his sword and heart as long as a single enemy remained on her soil; after that, "let the Republics of Peru and Colombia, hand in hand, give the example of the great confederation which must fix the future destinies of this new universe."

He then left the Congress, which at once set to work to prepare a decree for the continuation of Bolivar's power until the assembly of the Congress of 1826. As soon as the decree was completed, a deputation waited on Bolivar with it.

The Liberator, no doubt, fully expected this, and was graciously pleased to yield to the reiterated demands of the Congress. On the same day, the Assembly passed a resolution of thanks to "Simon Bolivar, Father and Saviour of Peru," and to the army. A statue and a medal were decreed, Sucre's title of "Grand Marshal of Ayacucho" was confirmed,¹ with a grant of 200,000 pesos added, and finally, a reward of one million of pesos was granted to Bolivar, with a second million for distribution by him among the officers and men of the army. He accepted all but the personal endowment, which he refused, though later on he agreed, at the suggestion of Congress, to accept it for works of beneficence in his native city of Caracas. Personal avarice was certainly not one of Bolivar's faults; he entered on his career a rich man, he died, notwithstanding all the opportunities he had to enrich himself, a poor one.

¹ It was at this time that Bolivar wrote his "succinct epitome of the Life of Sucre," which is reproduced in O'Leary, *Docts.*, 1, 9-15. All these decrees are in O'Leary, *Docts.*, 23, p. 29, etc.

The Liberator, seated once more firmly on the Dictatorial Chair of Peru, again set to work at the organisation of the administration. There were a thousand urgent matters to be attended to. Civil and criminal laws had to be codified, the army to be reorganised, education to be attended to, in fact, every branch of administration called for creation or reconstruction. For the organisation of education Bolivar employed his old tutor Simon Rodriguez, who had at last returned to Colombia, and, on a special invitation from his former pupil, had gone to Lima.¹

Having set all these matters in motion, he entrusted the government, during his absence, to a council consisting of La Mar, Sanchez Carrion, and Unánue, with whom he left full instructions for their guidance. Amongst their duties were promulgation of the constitution and preparation for the elections to the constituent Congress, reform of the army and navy, the remittance of 2,000,000 pesos from the English loan, when received, to Upper Peru, to pay no one before settling the arrears of the army and navy, to send envoys to England and other countries to open relations, and many other matters.

Bolivar reached Arequipa by land on the 14th May, 1825. On the way he heard of the death of Olañeta and the pacification of Upper Peru. Everywhere he was busy with reforms and the redress of grievances, into details of which it is impossible for us to enter.

Leaving Arequipa on the 10th June, he was in Cuzco on the 25th. Wherever he passed on this long journey he was enthusiastically received. At Cuzco, especially, the welcome assumed forms of flattery such as had dis-

¹ In his letter to Rodriguez, dated 24th January 1824, Bolivar fully admits the influence of the tutor in forming his political opinions.

Rodriguez and Bolivar were both firm believers in the educational system of Joseph Lancaster, which they adopted, and founded normal schools in accordance with it. Of the million pesos voted to him by the Congress, Bolivar sent 20,000 to Caracas for the foundation of schools on this system.

gusted the more simple-minded San Martin at Guayaquil. Bolivar's capacity for swallowing such nauseous stuff seemed to be as unlimited as his readiness in making speeches. Here a thousand young women, headed by the prefect's wife, presented him with a golden civic crown. This, however, he destined to Sucre, saying of the Grand Marshal of Ayacucho: "He is the man to whom are due all the honours of Peru; it is he who is the conqueror of Ayacucho, and the true Liberator of the Republic." One cannot help wondering whether all these demonstrations were purely spontaneous or were, to some extent at least, made to order. From Cuzco, Bolivar continued his progress to Puno, visited the great lake of Titicaca, and reached La Paz on the 18th September.

He was now in Upper Peru, the future position of which had been a matter of some anxiety.

It had become a tacitly recognised principle in the revolted colonies that the new republics should be based on the divisions of territory recognised in the days of Spanish rule. It was on that principle that Bolivar had treated Quito as part of the late Viceroyalty of New Granada, of which it was certainly an apanage. The province of Upper Peru had occupied an analagous position in the Spanish time towards the Viceroyalty of Buenos Aires. Therefore, on Bolivar's own principle, it should, when liberated, belong to the United Provinces of Argentina. Chile was different, for she had been independent of Peru.

Sucre's first measure after the death of Olañeta was to order the convocation of a general assembly to decide the destiny of Upper Peru. He set aside the claims of Buenos Aires in a somewhat summary manner which Bolivar disapproved. He told Sucre that, as matters stood, Upper Peru should belong to the Federation of La Plata, just as Quito belonged to Colombia. If it was to be otherwise, that must be the result of negotiations.

Under the circumstances, he considered the unconditional convocation of a popular assembly to be a mistake. All Sucre should do was to maintain a military occupation of the province and await orders. This Bolivar wrote from Lima on the 21st February, adding that he was awaiting the decision of the Peruvian Congress.¹ Sucre was somewhat offended by these orders, pleading, amongst other things, that he should have had instructions earlier, before he had been compelled by the disturbed state of Upper Peru to convoke the Assembly.

On the 16th May, at Arequipa, Bolivar was in a position to speak more definitely. In his decree of that date he records in the preamble that the Peruvian Congress, by decree of the 23rd February, had admitted the rights of the Republic of La Plata and the provinces of Upper Peru. That disposed of any claim Peru might have had.² Bolivar said that he had been officially informed by Arenales that "the executive power of the United Provinces of the Rio de la Plata had informed him that it had granted to the provinces (Upper Peru) the power to pronounce as they should choose on their interests and form of government." He now had a free hand both from Peru and La Plata. He therefore issued a fresh order for an assembly as proposed by Sucre.³ Its decisions, however, were to be subject to sanction by the Peruvian Congress of the following year.

The Assembly of Deputies of Upper Peru met in Chuquisaca⁴ on the 10th July 1825. On the 6th August, it declared Upper Peru an independent republic under the title of the "Republic of Bolivar."⁵ Bolivar's protection was sought, and the usual honours and flattery were lavished on him. At La Paz he was met by a

¹ O'Leary, ii. 384.

² It could hardly have been a strong one, for it could only be based on the position previous to the creation of the Viceroyalty of Buenos Aires.

³ O'Leary, ii. 393n.

⁴ Now known as Sucre.

⁵ The name was afterwards changed to Bolivia.

deputation of the Assembly, demanding immediate recognition by him, on behalf of Peru, of the independence of Bolivia. That, he said, he could not give, but promised to use his influence with the Peruvian Congress, a promise which was recognised probably as tantamount to the grant of their request. He was then invited to draw up a project of constitution for the Republic. Pleading his want of a legal education, he yet agreed to draft a constitution.

Five deputies were then appointed as an advisory council *ad interim*, the 25th May 1826 was fixed for the meeting of the national representatives, commissioners were despatched to request recognition of the new Republic by La Plata, Peru, and Colombia, and then, on the 6th October 1825, the Assembly dissolved.

After setting the administration in order, Bolivar left La Paz, on the 20th September, for Potosí, which he reached on the 5th October. There he was met by a mission from La Plata which was to congratulate him, and convey the recognition by the Republic of the independence of Upper Peru. With this mission there was a great deal of diplomatic fencing over the question of war with Brazil regarding the annexation to the new Empire of the Banda Oriental. Brazilians had invaded the province of Chiquitos in Upper Peru at an earlier date. Sucre had wanted to employ strong measures, but Bolivar wisely offered the Brazilian Government a bridge for retreat by disowning the action of their subordinates. That settled the dispute as regards Upper Peru.

We cannot allow ourselves to be drawn into wearisome details of the dispute between Buenos Aires and Brazil regarding Montevideo and the Banda Oriental. It seems difficult to resist the conclusion that Bolivar would dearly have loved to intervene—on his own terms—just as he had gone to Peru, also on his own terms. But the Buenos Aireans did not see it in this light. They had

long seen that Bolivar's ambition was pushing him on to establish himself as the arbiter of the destinies of the whole of the new Republics of South America. Mitre tells how, at Quito, in 1823, Bolivar had said at a public dinner: "The day is not far distant when I will carry the flag of Colombia triumphant to Argentina." An Argentine officer, who was present with San Martin's contingent, promptly rose to propose a toast, "To the independence of America, and of the Argentine Republic."¹ Another incident had occurred at Arequipa, when Bolivar again spoke of shortly treading Argentine soil. Again an Argentine officer replied: "My countrymen do not welcome Dictators to their soil." Bolivar, in a fury, sprang upon the table, crushing the glasses and plates under his heel, and shouting: "Thus will I trample upon the Argentine Republic."² Even if these incidents are exaggerated, there is ample evidence, in the vituperations of the liberal press of Buenos Aires, that Bolivar's advent in Argentina would not be welcomed. He was very cautious at Potosí, and later at Chuquisaca, in dealing with the Argentine envoys, whom he declined to treat with officially, on the ridiculous ground that his Minister for Foreign Affairs was in Lima. Possibly this might have been some excuse in the case of an ordinary President, but it was none with Bolivar. The negotiations came to nothing, though at one time there was imminent danger of an armed conflict between Bolivar and Argentina. The Liberator had already tried to take a hand also in Chilean affairs. He had offered to help the Chilean Government to expel the Spaniards from the island of Chiloe, which they still held. Chile was willing to accept a subsidy, but did not want Bolivar's soldiers. Nothing came of this, for a subsidy, without his own interference in Chilean affairs, was not at all what the Liberator wished to give.

¹ Pilling, 420.² *Ibid.*, 462.

Foiled in his desires to impose himself upon Chile and Argentina, Bolivar left Chuquisaca on the 10th January 1826 for Arica, whence he sailed to Chorillos, reaching Lima on the 10th February. He was still hankering after fresh laurels, and had begun to meditate the liberation of Cuba. He had hoped to find the Cuban Iznaga at Lima, but he was gone before the Liberator's return.

When Bolivar reached Lima he was greeted with the news of the recent surrender of Rodil at Callao. The place had been blockaded by sea and land for sixteen months, during which time Rodil had shown much activity, and inflicted heavy losses with his guns on the besiegers under Salom. The garrison had been reduced to desperate straits by hunger, but it was only when there was not left another dog, or cat, or rat for food that Rodil would surrender. Further resistance in any case would have been hopeless, as there could be no expectation of a relief expedition from Europe, and the Spaniards had been practically obliterated in South America.

Bolivar had promised to resign his position once this end had been attained. It is difficult not to agree with Restrepo¹ that he would have acted wisely, both for the country and his own reputation, had he at once left Peru. He had announced, from La Paz, his intention to do so, and had even ordered the return to their native land of some of his Colombian troops. It should have been manifest to him that both he and the Colombian troops would presently wear out their welcome in Peru, and become as hated as they had once been popular.

But he had stayed on in Upper Peru, carrying on his negotiations with Argentina, and revelling in the incense of flattery which was offered at his shrine. His continued stay was bad for him, and worse for his soldiers, who naturally began to look upon themselves as arbiters of the

¹ iii. 477.

destiny of the country on which they were living. Such ideas they carried back with them when eventually they returned home, and the whole circumstances of their stay in Peru were such as to tend to their corruption and to foster the idea of prætorianism.

In Peru there had long been a tendency towards monarchical government, the result, doubtless, of its long experience of the splendours of the Spanish Viceregal Court. Some of the more influential people now began to put forward a project for the coronation of Bolivar under the title of "Emperor of the Andes," or of "Emperor of Bolivia, Peru, and Colombia." One cannot altogether put aside the suspicion that the scheme may have been a trap. If it was, Bolivar did not fall into it. Whatever his ambitions may have been, the Liberator was wise enough to see that his whole past career of republicanism was inconsistent with a change of front in the direction of monarchy pure and simple.

He entered Lima amidst all the usual outward demonstrations of enthusiasm, but these did not represent the real state of affairs. So early as the end of February a plot was discovered to be aiming at the expulsion of Bolivar and his Colombian troops from Peru. In it were involved Necochea, Alvarado, and several other notables. Though the plot was a feeble one, aiming at a definite end without any definite means of attaining it, it should have warned Bolivar that the time for his departure had come. He allowed himself to be deceived by outward demonstrations, and to be lulled into security by the charms of Lima, which to him and his army became a Capua, just as it had been to San Martin and his men. The Congress had assembled, and Bolivar, according to all his promises, was bound to surrender his power as Dictator to it. The deputies began now to enter upon discussions as to the validity of their own election and powers, and Bolivar referred the question to the High

Court. Then there was an agitation in favour of the departure of the Liberator and his Colombians from Peru. Annoyed at this, Bolivar, at the end of March, threatened to clear out at once with all his troops. That at once produced an alarm of anarchy, and the Liberator was besieged by deputations begging him to stay. Some of the petitions, notably one presented by fifty-two deputies, proposed the dissolution of the Congress, pending a fresh appeal to the people for an expression of their opinion as to the future government. This met with the approval of Bolivar, who was now intent on introducing into Peru the constitution which he had framed for Bolivia according to the request preferred to him at Chuquisaca.¹ This constitution he desired to have adopted not only by Bolivia, but also by Peru and Colombia. As it throws much light on his views of his own future position, it will be well to state concisely the leading provisions of this anomalous constitution.

The Legislature was to consist of three chambers instead of the ordinary two. They were the chambers of the Tribunes, the Senators, and the Censors. The idea was that the Censors were to act as a sort of referee in cases of difference between the other two. They were also to safeguard the observance of the constitution and to scrutinise the conduct of the superior officials. The office of censor was tenable for life.

The Tribunes were to initiate financial measures, to fix the strength of the naval and military forces, and vote the budget. They were elected for four years, and half their number retired every two years.

¹ *Supra*, p. 352. The drafting of the Constitution was really completed before Bolivar left Chuquisaca, but it was only sent to Bolivia in May 1826. It was adopted in the autumn of that year. The life Presidency had been conferred on Bolivar, but Sucre became the first actual President, with powers subject to Bolivar, when the latter should be in Bolivia. Sucre accepted this Presidency for two years only, and that solely on the condition of being allowed to retain in Bolivia 2000 Colombian troops.

The Senators, elected for eight years, and half of them retiring every four years, were to initiate measures relating to judicial, ecclesiastical, and commercial matters, to present, for the choice of the Censors, three names of proposed officials, judicial and ecclesiastical, and to decide on the choice of subordinate magistrates from amongst the names submitted by electoral colleges. The executive was to consist of a President for life, a Vice-President proposed by him to the chambers, and three secretaries of state, appointed and removable by the President. The functions of the President were similar to those of the President of the United States, but he had no judicial or ecclesiastical patronage. He was free from responsibility for the acts of his administration. That rested on the Vice-President or the secretary countersigning an order. In case of death or illness of the President, the Vice-President filled his place. The President could thus practically nominate his own successor.

The judicial power was entirely independent of the executive. The electorate presented candidates for judicial employment to the Legislature, which selected from the candidates so presented.

The suffrage was universal manhood, subject to the qualification of being able to read and write, and exercising some science, art, or industry; one elector was chosen for every ten citizens. The electorate thus included one-tenth of the whole adult male population. The electorate chose the members of the three chambers, and proposed to the executive candidates for the principal offices of the departments, provinces, and cantons. They also proposed to these chief officials candidates for the lower offices. To the Senate they proposed candidates for judicial appointments.

Slavery was abolished, and the press given full liberty.

This extraordinary constitution was subjected to much criticism in the three republics to which the Liberator de-

sired to apply it. It was adopted by Bolivia and Peru, probably under compulsion; indeed, Mitre says plainly that the Peruvian electoral college voted it "within a hedge of Colombian bayonets."¹ Bolivar and his Colombians had not long left when the Bolivian Constitution was abrogated in Peru. As we shall see presently, Bolivar was obliged to abandon the idea of forcing it on Colombia, which had already rejected his proposal of a President for life, and was still less likely to accept a constitution under which the Presidency was practically either hereditary or assignable to whomsoever the President might nominate as Vice-President.

The whole thing was one of Bolivar's dreams, which now began to grow more and more extravagant. Amongst them was that of uniting Colombia, Peru, and Bolivia, each with the same constitution, in a confederation of which he himself would be the controlling authority. This idea he presently developed still further.

There were to be seven states² in the Confederation, viz., Bolivia as one state, Peru divided into two, and Colombia into four, again with Bolivar at the head of all. Each of the constituent states would have its life President. A treaty was actually signed (15th November 1826) between Peru and Bolivia for the creation of a Federal Congress representing them both. On the death of the Liberator each state was to be at liberty to secede from the union.³ Bolivar appears to have expounded these views to Santander in a modified form, without very clearly indicating himself as head of the Confederation. Santander's reply is indicative of the opposition such a scheme was likely to meet with in Colombia. He writes,

¹ Mitre, iii. 132.

² Baralt and Diaz, "Resumen, etc.," ii. 160 and 263.

³ Mitre, iii. 133, etc. Bolivar is said to have remarked, with reference to the end of his personal government, "My obsequies will be as bloody as those of Alexander." Gutierrez Posada, *Memorias*, etc., p. 140.

on the 6th July 1826, in reply to Bolivar's letters of the previous April and May, as follows: "The idea of a federation of Buenos Aires, Chile, and Bolivia is very fine; but as Buenos Aires and Chile are so little friendly to Colombia, it would be a power always menacing us. The federation of Colombia, Peru, and Bolivia seems to me somewhat impracticable. . . . I believe that an Empire extending from Potosí to the Orinoco would be very strong and important, and would reconcile us with Europe, though it would be a perpetual germ of war between monarchists and democrats. I am going to speak to you with my heart in my hand, with all the sincerity and frankness of my character and of your generous friendship.

"Who is to be Emperor or King in this new Empire? A foreign prince? That I do not wish, for I have always been a patriot, and have striven continuously, during sixteen years, for the establishment of a legal Government under republican forms. In my position, and since I have gained some moderate reputation, it would be the greatest iniquity to betray my principles and belie my protests.

"Is the Emperor to be yourself? I obey willingly and will never be a conspirator, for you are worthy to govern us, because you would always rule us according to the laws, because you would always respect the reasonable opinion of the people, because you are disinterested, philanthropic, etc., etc.

"And after your death, who is to be your successor? Paez? Montilla? Padilla? I will have none of them as a crowned supreme chief for life. I would cease to be a Colombian, and would sacrifice all my fortune rather than live under such a rule. I will never give my vote for an Empire in your hands, even if you were capable of desiring to be Emperor, because I am not disposed to sacrifice my principles; but, on account of my devotion to you, on account of the love and gratitude I owe you,

and for all the other reasons I have already stated, I should be your most faithful subject and servant.

"I do not believe you capable of entering into such a plan; for it would be to hold a poor opinion of the greatness, the immensity of your glory and reputation. Moreover, you have told me a hundred times that you would die a republican, and that you would leave America rather than embrace such a part, and I believe it firmly, because no one can appreciate better than yourself all the loss you would, in such a case, suffer in the opinion of the world, or all to which you would expose your unfading glory and your immaculate reputation. Yes! General! be ever a republican, the same Bolivar who has given us our country, and you will live for ever in the free hearts of posterity, raised above all the heroes whom history recognises and the world admires."¹

On the 1st June 1826, José Maria Pando, Bolivar's Minister of the Interior, and the backer of many of his chimerical schemes at this time, issued a circular offering to the Peruvian nation, as represented by the electoral colleges, the Bolivian constitution which had just been transmitted to Chiquisaca.

Meanwhile, Bolivar's unpopularity and that of his troops had been growing, despite the outward manifestations in favour of him, which were probably engineered by his friends. The arrogance of the Colombian troops, Bolivar's refusal to commute the death sentence passed on Berindoaga and Teron for alleged connivance with the Spaniards in 1824, and many other things, all contributed to this. There were mutterings of complaint at his failure to carry out his promised resignation. Another conspiracy to drive out him and his Colombians, perhaps even for his assassination, was discovered, and followed by executions and other punishments.

¹ O'Leary, *Docts.*, 3, pp. 271, 272.

CHAPTER XVIII

THE RETURN TO COLOMBIA AND THE SUPPRESSION OF PAEZ

IN the midst of all these troubles there arrived at Lima, Antonio Leocadio Guzman, father of the well-known Venezuelan President, Guzman Blanco, of our own times. He was the bearer of a letter from Paez, dated 1st October 1825, in which the Llanero deliberately proposed that Bolivar, imitating the action of Bonaparte returning from Egypt, should return from Peru to establish a monarchy in Colombia. The situation in Colombia, torn as it was by factions, resembled, according to Paez, that in France when Bonaparte returned from Egypt in 1799.¹ To him Bolivar replied, "Neither is Colombia France, nor am I Napoleon. . . . Napoleon was great, unique, and, moreover, supremely ambitious. Here there is nothing of the sort. I am not a Napoleon, nor do I desire to be; equally little do I desire to imitate Cæsar, still less Iturbide.² Such models appear to me unworthy of my glory. The title of Liberator is superior to any that have been vouchsafed to human pride: it is impossible for me to degrade it. On the other hand, our population is like the French in nothing, nothing, nothing. The Republic has raised the country to glory and prosperity, by giving it laws and liberty. The magistrates of Colombia are neither Marats nor Robespierres. . . . I tell you, with all frankness, that this project is suitable neither to you, nor to me, nor to the country."³ The

¹ O'Leary, *Docts.*, 2, p. 57.

² For a short time Emperor of Mexico.

³ Larrazabal, ii. 334.

letter is a long one, but the words quoted contain the gist of it. The Liberator expressed the same horror of monarchy in letters to Sucre and other friends.

He had been re-elected to the Colombian Presidency on the 15th March 1826, by 582 out of 608 votes, and he now once more renounced, for the fourth time, this honour. In a letter to Santander, he says, in the first place, that it would be unconstitutional for him to serve as President for more than eight years,¹ and in the second, that he does not desire to hold office any longer. He was not born to be a ruler, and his continuation in office would be bad for Colombia, now that he had fulfilled his promised mission. In refusing to have anything to do with Paez's proposals of a crown for himself, Bolivar had been wary enough to avoid a snare, the result of falling into which would probably have involved him in disaster as great as that which had fallen upon Iturbide in Mexico.²

In order to understand why Paez was suddenly moved to his advocacy of a monarchy, with Bolivar as its head, it is necessary to give some account of what had been happening in Colombia. It will be remembered that after the victory of Carabobo in 1821, Bolivar, in order to conciliate and, if possible, prevent quarrels amongst his turbulent subordinates, divided Venezuela into three military commands. These were given to Paez, Bermudez, and Mariño respectively, the first named having the Caracas division. Each of these three men had, at one time or another, played Bolivar false, and all were ambitious. Even with Bolivar himself in Colombia, there was no great security for internal peace; when he went south to Quito and Peru there was every probability of disturbance. That probability was increased by the fact that Bolivar,

¹ See "Abstract of Constitution," *supra*, p. 267.

² Iturbide, returning from Italy to try and regain his lost throne, was taken prisoner and shot in July 1824.

President in name, had to delegate his powers, during his absence, to the Vice-President, Santander, an old and bitter enemy of Paez.

Paez was little more than a barbarian, absolutely uneducated, and unaccustomed to government beyond the rough and ready control of his Llaneros. Naturally he proceeded to apply to the more cultivated inhabitants the rough modes of government which alone had been effectual with the cowboys of the plains. Such methods were, equally naturally, resented openly. Then he fell into the hands of intriguers, who induced him to go to the opposite extreme.

Paez, being subject to the orders of Santander in Bolivar's absence, writhed under the necessity of obeying them, and proceeded to execute them in such a way as to make odious the name of Santander, their author. The trouble began to be serious in 1824, when Santander issued orders for a general conscription, as there were rumours of a fresh attempt from Spain. The orders were unpopular in Caracas, especially, no doubt, as they came from Bogotá, and Paez suspended them, which he had no possible right to do, though he reported his action to Bogotá. Thence he received a peremptory answer, requiring him at once to execute orders.

During 1825, Paez enforced them very inefficiently, but suddenly, towards the end of the year, he had a fit of energy, and ordered the assembly of the citizens on two separate dates. Few answered the call, so Paez fixed the 6th January 1826 for assembly. Again very few put in an appearance, the others counting on a continuation of the slackness with which Paez had hitherto enforced the decree. The Llanero chief, offended at what appeared to be a slight on his authority, at once turned out two battalions to scour the streets in parties and bring in every man they found, without regard to age or social status. The orders were executed with

severity and brutality, and for a few hours the whole city was almost in a state of insurrection. Escalona, the Intendant, and the municipality thereupon laid a complaint against Paez in the Chamber of Representatives, which indicted him in the Senate. That body ordered his suspension from his functions of Commandant-General of Venezuela, and summoned him to appear and answer the charge in Bogotá (30th March 1826). As might be expected, Paez received this decree with fury. He, indeed, handed over the command of the departments of Venezuela and Apure to Escalona in accordance with the Senate's order, but he absolutely refused to go to Bogotá, and retired to his own house at Valencia, bent upon rebellion. This was soon fomented by his friends, who represented that Venezuela could not do without him. They went about armed at night, committing robberies and other crimes in the streets of Valencia, by way of showing that, without Paez at the head of affairs, the country must relapse into anarchy. At length, the municipality, which had all along favoured Paez, formally called upon Peñalver, the governor, to restore him to power. Matters were not improved by the arrival at Valencia of Mariño and a number of his officers, who were all in favour of these revolutionary methods.

Peñalver honestly refused to have anything to do with the restoration of Paez, which, as he said, was not his business. Finally, however, Paez was acclaimed by the populace and the troops, and, after some hypocritical pretence of reluctance, accepted the position. This happened on the 30th April 1826, after a specially riotous night in the city. Peñalver was practically compelled to continue in his office of governor.

Paez, having successfully put himself at the head of a military revolution, now assumed the title of "Civil and Military Chief of Venezuela," and, in a letter of the 26th

May 1826, defied the Government at Bogotá, a defiance which he repeated on the 16th July.¹

Venezuela was divided between the supporters and the opponents of Paez. Of the former, Mariño was the chief, whilst Peñalver, Mendoza, and Bermudez were the leaders of the latter. Mendoza, arousing the special wrath of Paez, was banished; Peñalver, as already mentioned, saved himself by continuing to act as governor of Valencia. As for Bermudez, he was firmly established in the east, and steadily supported the lawful government, notwithstanding Paez's endeavours to gain him over. Arismendi in Margarita, and Urdaneta in Zulia, were also opposed to Paez. The state of Colombia, driven to a prospective civil war by the indefensible action of Paez, was lamentable. It is easy now to see why Paez displayed such sudden anxiety to get Bolivar back, and to tempt him with the offer of a crown. Had the Liberator accepted, he would have been bound to Paez, and, once that turbulent person had succeeded in establishing himself firmly as against Santander, he would, no doubt, have thrown Bolivar over. The latter's letter to Paez, refusing consideration of the idea, was dated 26th March 1826, and must have reached its destination some time after Paez's revolt of the 30th April.²

In the existing deadlock, both parties, Paez and Santander, appealed to Bolivar to return and settle affairs. Each, of course, gave his own version, and each averred that Bolivar, the founder of the republic, was the only person to heal its internecine quarrels. The central portions of the republic showed no sympathy with Paez's revolution. In the south, in Quito, Cuenca, and Guayaquil, there was a movement in favour of reform under the Dictatorship of Bolivar.

¹ Larrazabal, ii. 347.

² Larrazabal (ii. 350) quotes a long letter from Urdaneta to Paez reprobating the idea of a crown for Bolivar.

When Bolivar received, on the 5th July 1826, his first fairly full information of the events in Venezuela, he at once decided that he was bound to return to Colombia, whither he had already sent O'Leary on hearing the first news from Guzman. A few days later arrived Santander's letter and envoys begging his return. On the 6th August he publicly announced his intended departure. He was besieged by deputations imploring him to stay, eight of them in all. To each he gave the same reply, that Colombia called him, and he must go. On the 13th August, a great crowd, with bands of music and bearing Peruvian flags, assembled before Bolivar's window and called for his appearance. He was greeted with prolonged cheers, which were followed by a speech of half an hour by the parish priest, begging the Liberator not to leave Peru. Still he refused, on the ground of duty. The same answer was given to the municipality and others. On the 15th, there were more deputations, ending with one of ladies. His flowery and ambiguous answer to the latter for a moment gave rise to an idea that he had yielded, but on this occasion he really meant to go. On the 16th, the electoral college unanimously accepted the Bolivian Constitution. The vote was probably dictated by fear rather than conviction. Bolivar was voted President for life. At first he refused in a half-hearted way, then yielded, and finally, looking to the bad news from Colombia, decided to return thither. At last, after many festivities, ending with a ball, which was what Bolivar enjoyed more than anything, he left Callao for Guayaquil on the "Congress" on the 4th September 1826, after having bid farewell to the Peruvians on the preceding day in a short proclamation.¹

On the 12th September he landed at Guayaquil, having been met the previous day, outside the port, by Tomas C. Mosquera, bearing the news of his election at Guayaquil

¹ O'Leary, ii. 527.

as Dictator. At that he professed himself much displeased, and refused the post. Landing at Guayaquil, he announced his arrival to the Colombians by a proclamation, in which he deplored the existing dissensions, regretted not having arrived in time to prevent them, and offered his services in their suppression.¹

On the 18th September, after setting things more or less straight in Guayaquil, he set out for Quito, which he reached on the 28th. There he was enthusiastically received, and on the 5th October started for Ibarra, which he reached on the 7th. On the 13th he was at Pasto, on the 23rd at Popayan. After a few days' stay there, he marched across the Cordilleras to Neiva in the Magdalena valley, where he arrived on the 30th. There he was again begged to take up the Dictatorship, but refused, and continuing his journey, reached Bogotá on the 14th November.² There he was met by Santander. Mutual compliments of doubtful sincerity marked the meeting. In reply to the greetings of the military officers of the capital, he expressed his pleasure that the army had remained obedient to the law, remarking that such conduct should always be that of soldiers, "because on the day on which armed force is decisive, liberty will be endangered, and the great sacrifices of Colombia will be wasted."³ That day had already arrived. Bolivar re-

¹ *Ibid.* 671.

² At this point, unfortunately, O'Leary's "Memoirs" abruptly cease. A third volume appears to have been published, which Rojas ("Legendas Historicas," i. 151n.) says he had seen. He adds that it had been suppressed immediately by the Venezuelan Government, for reasons of which he was not aware. He believes that only two or three copies were saved, one of which was lent to him. This third volume is not in the British Museum, and I have been unable to hear of a copy obtainable. The only story I have heard as to the reason of its suppression is that Guzman Blanco's father figured in it, and that in anything but a creditable way. Consequently the son, the "Illustre Americano," who paid for the publication of O'Leary's writings, and the twenty-nine volumes of letters attached to them, destroyed the volume to save his father's reputation. The correspondence is published up to a later date.

³ Larrazabal, ii. 368.

assumed the executive power temporarily, announcing the fact by a decree dated 23rd November 1826. Two days later, after doing much work in all branches of administration, he once more made over to Santander his authority as President, and started northwards on the 25th, taking with him Revenga, the Secretary for Foreign Affairs. At Pamplona he heard that Paez had summoned a Constituent Congress of Venezuela, to meet in Valencia on the 15th January 1827. At La Horqueta, at the junction of the rivers Zulia and Catatumbo, he learnt that there had been bloodshed at Puerto Cabello, which Paez had attacked as a stronghold of the government's supporters. There had been more fighting in Cumaná, and civil war had fairly started. Bolivar had already concluded that he would have forcibly to suppress revolt in Venezuela, and had demanded reinforcements for the purpose. Crossing the Lake of Maracaibo, he reached the town of that name on the 16th December. Thence he issued a proclamation calling upon the Venezuelans to lay aside their arms and listen to him, but continued to demand more troops. The district of Zulia was declared in a state of siege, Urdaneta was appointed to the command of the army now assembling, and the departments of Maturin, Venezuela, Orinoco, and Zulia were placed under Bolivar's direct orders. After two days spent at Maracaibo, he advanced on Puerto Cabello with forces certainly insufficient for the forcible suppression of the revolt, and his hopes of receiving more from Bogotá were not great. Before leaving the capital, he had despatched Ibarra with letters to Paez, which produced no effect on that truculent leader, except to make him issue a proclamation, in which he asserted that Bolivar had come, not to destroy the authority which Paez had received from the people, but to aid by his advice in the reform of the administration. This proclamation, reaching Bolivar at Coró, drew from him a

letter (dated 23rd December 1826)¹ to Paez, which Revenga characterised as a "pearl thrown to swine." In it, the Liberator, professing admiration for the principles of Paez's proclamation, insisted on his own desire to retire from office. But he denied that he came as a simple citizen, as Paez had said—as such he could do nothing, and he had been summoned by Colombia to her aid. He could not believe Paez would attempt to wrest his authority from him, who had come from Peru to save Paez from the crime of civil war. Paez himself had summoned him, yet his proclamation said nothing of Bolivar's authority or mediation. He would not, said the Liberator, oppose a scheme of federation, still less would he insist on the introduction of the Bolivian constitution into Colombia. His only desire was to restore law and order. In conclusion, he was going to Puerto Cabello, where he hoped Paez would meet him.

As Bolivar approached, Paez realised that public opinion in Caracas was turning against himself. He was determined to resist, and endeavoured to raise Apure in his own favour. But, before the magic name of Bolivar, his forces rapidly melted away. His commanders could do nothing, and he saw the game was up. On the 31st December 1826, Bolivar reached Puerto Cabello, still in ignorance of the favourable turn taken by affairs in Apure, Barinas, and Carabobo.

The last hours of 1826 found Bolivar in the greatest anxiety, for his position, looking to his ignorance of the revulsion of feeling in his favour, seemed indeed desperate. On New Year's Day 1827, he tried conciliatory measures by issuing a decree of amnesty, by notifying that Paez would be continued in his office of "Superior Chief of Venezuela," and would exercise civil and military authority. A similar position was recognised for Mariño in Maturin. A National Convention, he said, would

¹ Larrazabal, ii. 373.

be summoned, as he had already promised from Maracaibo.¹

Paez, who had probably by this time begun to tremble for his own fate, eagerly accepted the golden bridge which the Liberator had built for his retreat. He recognised Bolivar's authority as President of the Republic, directed that he should everywhere be received with full honours as he marched to Caracas, and annulled his own decree summoning a Congress. Bolivar was delighted with his success, though indeed it was probably very different from what he had hoped for before he had, to all appearance, put his head in the lion's mouth at Puerto Cabello. Possibly he now regretted that he had not been a little firmer, but the danger had been great.

Then Paez demanded his own trial. His motive in doing so is not very clear. Possibly he hoped that, if he thus appeared as a martyr, the result might be a fresh change of the fickle people of Venezuela in his own favour. If so, he was disappointed, for Bolivar, quoting his own amnesty, refused a trial, and, in replying to the demand, said that Paez had saved the republic and given it new life. That seemed absurd enough, but it was still more absurd when Bolivar repeated the statement in more definite terms. "General Paez, far from being culpable, is the Saviour of the country."² The man who had lighted the match was dubbed the saviour of his country because he extinguished the train just before it had burned down to the powder!

Restrepo emphatically condemns this letter of Bolivar. Even Larrazabal cannot defend Bolivar in this. He attempts to defend him against the charge of weakness in issuing the amnesty, and the confirmation of Paez's authority, on the 1st January; but the defence is very weak. Those orders were, Bolivar believed at the moment, his best hope of getting out of the noose into

¹ Restrepo, iii. 587.

² *Ibid.*, iii. 589.

which he had thrust his head. Had he known how fast Paez's power was slipping from his grasp, it seems extremely improbable that he would have let him off so easily.

Marching, on the 4th January, from Puerto Cabello for Caracas, Bolivar met Paez at Naguanagua, and both adjourned to the house of the latter at Valencia. The two met as if there had never been a difference between them. But during dinner a petty dispute between Bolivar's chaplain and Paez's chief of the staff nearly led to a fracas. Bolivar, after reminding Paez's man that he had formerly been a Spanish officer, added, in the belief that the offender had acted with the sanction of Paez, "Here there is no authority, no power equal to mine, I am as the sun amongst my lieutenants, making them shine by the light which I lend them." He had but a small following, who were naturally alarmed as to the possible consequences of his words, surrounded as they were by enemies. Nothing happened, which is excellent evidence that Paez felt his position to be desperate, and would have yielded completely had Bolivar been firmer at Puerto Cabello. Arriving at Caracas on the 10th January 1827, the Liberator was welcomed with the usual round of banquets and entertainments. For his conduct in 1826 Paez afterwards expressed his regret. In 1837, in a proclamation to his compatriots, he said :— "I have been guilty of a thousand errors, the sad impression of which has been diminished by the indulgence of my compatriots. The events of 1826, to which I was led by an accusation, unjust in itself, and still worse interpreted by some people, fill me still with grief and repentance."¹

The relations at this period between Bolivar and Santander were about to become strained in the highest

¹ Dr J. Gutierrez Ponce, "Vida de Don Ignacio Gutierrez Vergara," p. 300.

degree. In examining the causes of this there is much assistance to be derived from a long memorandum written by Colonel Patrick Campbell, the British Minister in Bogota, which forms an enclosure to his despatch to Lord Aberdeen, dated the 4th June 1829.¹

His view is that, whilst Bolivar was away in Peru, Santander, being practically President for the time being, had no reason for opposing the Liberator. On the contrary, it was his interest to keep Bolivar satisfied and supplied with troops, so as to induce him to stay where he was, leaving Santander to enjoy the sweets and profits of office. According to Campbell, who, it must be admitted, was a strong believer in Bolivar as against Santander, the administration of the latter was extremely bad during the Liberator's absence. He says that during his term of power Santander "had practised and connived at the most scandalous abuses. . . . The facts substantiating this assertion are numerous and notorious; the jobbing and ruinous contracts, the disposal of the funds of the loan, the pecuniary accommodations made from these funds to his particular friends under pretence of assisting commerce and agriculture, and the glaring partiality shown by his government in the reimbursement of claims originating from bills issued by the government in payment of its creditors and returned protested, defy the refutation of this charge." Santander had so far succeeded in engineering votes of confidence by the Congress in himself, which had saved his conduct from investigation, but he was always apprehensive lest Bolivar on his return should eventually unmask him. This apprehension grew stronger when he became convinced that the Liberator had no intention of returning to Peru. Though Santander himself had summoned Bolivar to

¹ Campbell's correspondence referred to is to be found in the Record Office, Foreign Office Correspondence, Colombia, vols. liv., lxiv., lxv., lxxiii. It has not been published.

return, he began to dread the consequences of his advent as soon as he was on his way back. Yet, thinks Campbell, he would never have dared to oppose the Liberator, but for the fact that the latter's absence in Peru had undoubtedly weakened his influence in Colombia.

Before Bolivar got back to Bogotá there commenced a series of veiled attacks on him in the *Gazette* and other papers under Santander's control. To again quote Campbell, Bolivar "was represented as an angry despot coming to chastise the capital for having been more lukewarm than the other cities of Colombia in its acclamations of joy on the return of the Liberator from Peru."

Bolivar for long refused to credit what he was told about Santander, and believed him to be too timid and weak to be dangerous. Nevertheless, he treated him coldly when he met him at Bogotá.

The newspaper attacks ceased whilst Bolivar was at Bogotá, and he left for Venezuela under the salute of a flaring panegyric inserted by Santander in the *Gazette*. As soon, however, as he was well away, abusive articles again began to appear in the *Gazette*, and in *El Conductor*, a Bogotá paper controlled by Santander. There was, of course, general satisfaction when it was known that civil war had been averted, but Bolivar's words, styling Paez "Saviour of his country," afforded an excellent peg on which to hang further abuse of the Liberator.

These are the opinions regarding Santander of an Englishman, whose official position, as representative of his country, placed him beyond suspicion of prejudice in a quarrel which did not personally concern him. In another passage of his memorandum, he briefly estimates the characters of the two leaders. Bolivar, he says, "had in his favour the prestige of his military glory, as well as his generosity, his integrity, his disinterestedness, and his

frankness, which raised him far above Santander, whose avarice and duplicity contrasted with the opposite qualities of Bolivar." Santander's present professions of liberalism, Campbell declares, were belied by his despotic action when in power.

CHAPTER XIX

COLOMBIA AND THE CONVENTION OF OCAÑA,

1827-28

BOLIVAR was fully occupied for some time at Caracas in restoring order in the neglected administration, and in the finances, which Paez had thoroughly ruined.

The 2nd January 1827 had been fixed by the constitution for the assembly of the Colombian Congress, and Bolivar believed it would meet then, or a few days later.

On the 6th February, he despatched once more his resignation of the Presidency of Colombia. He had, he said, been for fourteen years at the head of the republic, a position which he had been compelled by the needs of the State to hold. There no longer existed any such dangers. "I myself do not feel myself innocent of ambition; therefore, I desire to save myself from the claws of that madness, in order to deliver my fellow-citizens from anxiety, and to assure after my death a reputation worthy of liberty."¹ Therefore, he insisted on acceptance of his resignation, in order to save him from the necessity of desertion. Santander and the Congress must have got pretty well accustomed to this sort of talk, and to putting but a small valuation on it. It was perhaps getting a little dangerous for Bolivar to tender resignations, unless they were really meant to be accepted, especially looking to the ill-concealed hostility of Santander, and the spread of a desire in New Granada for

¹ Larrazabal, ii. 395.

separation alike from Ecuador and from Venezuela. If that were to occur, Bolivar, as a Venezuelan, would be excluded from the government of New Granada. The desire for separation from New Granada was equally strong with many of the Venezuelans. The two peoples differed in many ways from one another, and from the people of Ecuador. Bolivar's dream of a perpetual union of the three territories was really impossible of realisation, as was very soon to appear by the dissolution of Colombia into its three elements of Venezuela, Colombia (corresponding to New Granada), and Ecuador. Since Bolivar's death they have remained separate states, and there seems not the slightest probability of their ever permanently coalescing again.

Whilst the Liberator was busy restoring order in Venezuela, he received bad news, not only from Bogotá, but also from Peru. A mutiny of the 3rd Colombian division, led by a Granadian named Bustamente, had broken out in Lima at the end of January. The mutineers had seized their officers, thrown them into the dungeons of Callao, and then sent them off by sea to Buenaventura. Bustamente and his followers, professing great admiration for the Colombian constitution, had based their rising on the supposed hostility to it of Lara and other officers, whom they accused of working for a dictatorship. Bustamente was joined by the Peruvian revolutionaries, and together they overthrew the government as left by Bolivar on his departure. The news of this outbreak was received with rejoicing by Santander and Bolivar's other enemies at Bogotá. As for Bolivar, when the news of the revolt reached him at Caracas, he remarked—"Colombia has lost a division of troops; but the Peruvian Republic will relapse into the anarchy from which it was rescued by me and the Colombian army." Later, on hearing of the reception of the news at Bogotá, he added—"Overwhelmed with shame, I know not which

to consider the more grievous, the crime of the revolt, or the deliberate approbation accorded to it by the government of Bogotá. How terrible! How could Santander allow himself to be drawn into such excess of passion! To ratify the violation of military discipline!"

Campbell, in his memorandum already quoted, openly accuses Santander of having fomented this revolt, and of having corresponded with Bustamente.

In Lima the enemies of Bolivar, headed by Vidaurre and Pando, poured abuse on him and on Colombia. Bustamente and his troops were sent to Guayaquil to gain over that long-disputed department to Peru. With them was sent Lopez Mendez,¹ to take over the governorship of the three southern departments as soon as they should revolt against Colombia, which it was assumed they would easily be persuaded to do. When the expedition had been ten days at sea, news of its approach was brought to Guayaquil, where T. C. Mosquera, the Intendant, Generals Perez, Valdés, and others prepared to resist it.

Early in April the invaders disembarked, part at Manta under Colonel Elizalde, the rest at Paita under Bustamente, the intention being to march by Loja into the province of Cuenca. They marched to the cry that Bolivar the tyrant had destroyed the law. They equally refused to obey Santander, and said they would desist only when Bolivar should appear as a simple citizen to defend, before the Congress, his atrocious conduct in Peru. They were presently joined by Colonel Delgado, Santander's commandant in Manabí, and the whole then started to march against Guayaquil. At that place Antonio Elizalde² and others, in the meanwhile, gained

¹ This was the man who had formerly been Venezuelan agent in London, and who is so strongly denounced as a fraudulent person by Hippisley and others.

² Brother of the Elizalde who landed at Manta.

over the garrison to the cause of revolution. At 2 a.m. on the 16th April 1827 the revolution was effected in Guayaquil, and La Mar, the former commander of the Peruvian troops at Ayacucho, was elected civil and military chief of the place, and a little later President of the Peruvian Republic. He embarked for Callao on the 24th July to take up his new office.

Though Bolivar had sent in his resignation of the Presidency, he now changed his mind, and decided to march to Bogotá and the south, in order to remedy this new disaster. In his proclamation of the 19th June, addressed from Caracas to the Colombians, he explains the necessity for his intervention, "as citizen, as Liberator, and as President." Later on he adds a significant admission in the words, "The national will is oppressed by these new prætorians, who have taken on themselves to dictate the law to the sovereign whom they ought to obey. They have assumed the sacred right of the nation, they have violated all principles; in fine, the troops which were the Colombian auxiliaries of Peru have returned to their country to establish a new and foreign government on the ruins of the Republic, which they outrage with greater insults than our oppressors."¹ The reign of prætorianism had begun before this with the revolt of Paez, perhaps even before that. Henceforth it was to be the rule, rather than the exception, in territories in which a long course of ultimately successful war had taught the soldiery to look upon themselves as arbiters of the destiny of governments.

On the 5th July Bolivar sailed from La Guaira for Cartagena, on H.B.M.S. "Druid," in company with Sir A. Cockburn, the British envoy to Caracas. On the 9th Cartagena was reached, and thence Bolivar set out, with such troops as he had collected, for Bogotá, marching by Ocaña.

¹ Larrazabal, ii. 400.

The news of Bolivar's march to Bogotá was extremely unpalatable to Santander and his partisans, who perhaps felt far from secure, seeing how Bolivar's name had hitherto carried everything before it, and feeling, as they must have, that the Liberator had a long account to settle with them. The line taken by Santander was that Bolivar's advance was a distinct threat to liberty. Santander himself was now posing, says Campbell, as the champion of the law, "el hombre de la constitucion" (the man of the constitution). His vehement messages to the Senate gave rise to a discussion in which Doctor Soto and other leaders of the Santander party denounced Bolivar in violent terms, though no definite resolution was passed.

Then there appeared an article in the *Conductor*, Santander's organ, urging separation of New Granada from Venezuela, which, of course, implied relegation of the Liberator to his own country. Bogotá was almost in a state of revolution. But for the advice of Soublette, then Minister of War, Santander would have resigned the Vice-Presidency and himself headed the revolution. His chief councillors were Soto and Azuero, the editor of the *Conductor*. Every device was employed to prevent the advance of Bolivar and the other troops which were moving from Cúcuta and Magdalena. Santander wrote that the expedition to the south was no longer necessary, because Obando had reduced Guayaquil to order; but Bolivar had later and more accurate news. Then the Vice-President urged the difficulty of supporting the troops near the capital. Then he said that Bolivar had no authority, because he had not taken the oath as President. Whatever there may have been in such a plea, Bolivar was not to be put off by it. Santander, on his part, protested to the Senate that he would not surrender power until Bolivar had taken the oath, and, in his desperation, he even proposed to address a circular

to the representatives of foreign powers, protesting against Bolivar's action !

Then he said that, as the south was for separation from the centre and north, he would go there. His secretaries told him plainly that, if he was afraid of the vengeance of the Liberator, he had much better resign the Vice-Presidency and clear out of the country till the storm had blown over. Probably Santander saw plainly that such a flight would be the end of his reputation and power, so he resolved to brazen it out.

Soublette, Mosquera, Herran, and others of the party of Bolivar now went northward to meet him, and to try to avert the reprisals which they felt he might justly wish to execute on his enemies at Bogotá. From Socorro Herran was sent back to Bogotá, whilst the others accompanied Bolivar to Cipaquirá, the site of the great salt mines, in the plain some 30 miles north of the capital. Thence Mosquera was despatched with letters from Bolivar announcing his intention of assuming the chief authority immediately on his arrival at Bogotá.

The Congress assembled in the church of San Domingo, ready to receive the President, and to administer the oath of fidelity to the constitution. On the afternoon of the 10th September, Bolivar arrived, and at once took the necessary oath. Santander, in considerable trepidation, awaited his arrival at the Presidential Palace. He found his apprehensions, natural though they were, to be unfounded ; for Bolivar greeted him in friendly terms. The two were then left alone, to confer, and to dine together !

As Bolivar entered the capital, Soto, Azuero, and some others of his chief opponents left it. Hearing of this, Bolivar merely laughed, and said they could live in peace and security, since he had no ideas of vengeance against any one.

He then arranged for a special session of Congress

to receive his account of his exercise of the supreme power. The situation towards the close of 1827 was far from being satisfactory. Guayaquil had set a bad example by breaking away and setting up as a separate republic; there was a general tendency towards disorder in Colombia; the Spanish Governor of Puerto Rico was fomenting rebellion in the province of Caracas; several leaders were trying to collect forces to proclaim the King; the Indians in the Orinoco valley were giving trouble; there were symptoms of insurrection in Coró, Guayana, and Cumaná; finally, there was the greatest hostility to Colombia on the part of La Mar and the Peruvian Congress, who were raising forces for the subjugation of the southern provinces as far as the Juanambú. Santander and his friends still secretly continued their intrigues against the President, who, however, was supported by the Congress and the more conservative section of the people. A decree was now issued convoking the General Convention of Provincial Deputies to assemble at Ocaña on the 2nd March 1828, and rules were issued for the conduct of the elections to it. This Convention, for the reform of the Constitution, had been promised by Bolivar when he marched against Paez. He laid special stress on the necessity for the persons elected being men of enlightenment and devotion to the cause of liberty.

His thoughts, meanwhile, were devoted to the problem of Guayaquil. On arriving at Bogotá he learned that J. J. Flores had already succeeded in working a counter-revolution in Guayaquil against Lopez Mendez and Bustamante. They and others had fled to Peru. Flores had also put down an attempt to proclaim the subordination of Guayaquil to Peru.

Whilst Bolivar confined himself to asking for enlightened members of the coming Convention, without otherwise interfering with the elections, Santander and the "Liberals" were actively canvassing. "Santander,"

wrote Bolivar, "has gone to the length of going out on to the highways to seek partisans, and offering board and lodging to the Deputies who come to Ocaña."¹

The press continued its campaign against Bolivar, who, however, refused to muzzle it, as was suggested by his friends. To have done so would have been to play into the hands of his opponents. Just at this moment there was a serious scare in Venezuela, owing to the appearance of a Spanish squadron off the coast. Nothing came of it, as the rebels under the guerrilla chief, Arizábalo, whom it was proposed to help, could not be found. But the appearance of possible invasion gave Bolivar an excuse for once more assuming the extraordinary powers allowed to the President in time of war. He took up these powers on the 13th March 1828, excepting only in the Canton of Ocaña, the place of meeting of the Convention.

Having prescribed orders for the trial of traitors and conspirators, and called in to his aid Urdaneta, Bolivar marched by Tunja for Cúcuta to meet the expected invasion. On the road he heard from Paez that the danger had passed; though about the same time he also heard that General Padilla had revolted at Cartagena, where he assumed control for a few days. Campbell accuses Santander of being at the bottom of this revolt also. Bolivar, who was marching for Venezuela, halted at Bucaramanga. But Padilla, on the 7th March, finding himself deserted by the garrison and the inhabitants of the fortress, had fled, and had sent from Ocaña a letter of excuses to Bolivar. The latter ordered the arrest and trial of the rebel under his recent orders for the trial of conspirators.

Early in March 67 Deputies had assembled at Ocaña,

¹ Larrazabal, ii. 417. This is confirmed by Campbell, who says Santander managed the elections, sent to voters lists of the persons they were to vote for, and arranged to pack the actual voters.

and, as they were more than half the total number of 108, the Convention began its sittings on the 9th April.

Among its members were Santander, Azuero, Soto, Gomez, and other enemies of the President. His friends were headed by J. M. del Castillo,¹ President of the Assembly, Briceño Mendez, and others.

There was a third party of "independents," whom both the parties sought to gain over, in order to turn the scale. The Convention was thus a very much divided body. As soon as it was installed, the Presidential message of the 29th February² was read. In it Bolivar once more tendered his resignation of the Presidency, and of his command-in-chief. Then he proceeded to draw a gloomy picture of the state of Colombia, and to explain what had led to the necessity of reforming the constitution, which, in 1821, and again in writing from Pasto in 1822, he had held to be unalterable for ten years. According to Campbell, Santander had by the profession of Liberal principles gained much influence amongst persons who were taught to believe that no reforms in the constitution could be made before October 1831. In Bolivar's picture of the woes of Colombia it is impossible not to see a suggestion that in himself alone lay a hope of safety. Though he himself denied this interpretation of his plea for a strong Government, the Convention saw in it clear indications of his ambition. They were bombarded with petitions from municipalities and others. Those from the centre and south of the Republic urged

¹ Jose Maria del Castillo y Rada, like his namesake Bolivar's enemy, was a native of Cartagena, where he was born in 1776. He was at Bogotá when the revolution broke out there in 1810. He succeeded in escaping Morillo in 1816. To his intercession chiefly is attributed the commutation of the death sentence on Santander in 1828. He died in poverty at Bogotá in 1835. He was a man of peace, a "Doctor," not a soldier like the other Castillo.

² Larrazabal, ii. 421.

the maintenance of Bolivar in power, and it is at least open to suspicion that his instigation had something to do with them.

The first act of the Convention was to pass a unanimous vote that the Constitution must be reformed. Then a deputy proposed the adoption of the federal system. He was supported by Santander's party, though hitherto Santander had been an advocate of a centralised republic. The Convention, however, by a majority, negatived this radical measure. The proposal was clearly aimed at discrediting Bolivar,¹ and rendering impossible his position at the head of the state, for he had throughout been a consistent advocate of a centralised republic. Though it is true that, in his letter of the 23rd December 1826, to Paez, he had said, "I will not oppose federation," yet his views were still hostile to it, as they had ever been. A committee was now appointed for the revision of the Constitution. This was to be done on lines calculated to exalt personal liberty at the expense of rendering the Government almost impotent. Hearing of this, Bolivar, abandoning all hope in the Convention, proposed to betake himself to Venezuela. His friend Castillo, the President of the Convention, proposed that the Liberator should be sent for to Ocaña to assist in the deliberations. This proposal was negatived on the 14th May by 40 votes to 28. Naturally, Santander and his friends felt that Bolivar's presence at Ocaña would make an end of their schemes for his overthrow. His personal influence was still immense. To this fact, according to Larrazabal, Santander paid the highest tribute. "Such is his (Bolivar's) influence," said the Vice-President, "and such the secret power of his will, that I myself, on many occasions, have approached him in fury, and, merely on seeing and

¹ Larrazabal (ii. 426*n.*) tells a story of a Deputy who, unable to support the case of federation by argument, clinched the matter with the words, "Anyhow it will serve to overthrow Bolivar, and the rest does not matter."

hearing him, have been disarmed and have left his presence filled with admiration.”¹

Two rival schemes of reform were now put forward for discussion—the one drawn up by Santander’s friend Azuero, the other by Castillo, the ally of Bolívar. The latter was backed by only twenty-two deputies, and it soon became clear that they had no chance of carrying their scheme. Therefore, on the 2nd June, they decided to abandon the Convention and return home. This decision was temporarily reversed, as the result of negotiations with the Santander party, but, as soon as the latter had thus got a chance of taking the initiative, they in turn proposed to secede, saying they could not abandon their liberal principles. Castillo and his friends, naturally furious at being thus jockeyed out of the position taken up on the 2nd June, took themselves off on the 10th. That left only fifty-four deputies sitting, and as the presence of at least fifty-five was necessary for amendment of the Constitution of 1821, the remainder had no course left but dissolution.

After they had left, the seceding deputies issued, from Santa Cruz, a justification of their conduct, into the details of which it is not necessary to enter. The Convention of Ocaña had ended in a ridiculous fiasco, though Santander and his party represented the result as a victory for themselves, which, indeed, it was. The means by which it was gained are quite another matter, though there seems equally little to be said in favour of the tactics of either side. Neither could have carried a reformed constitution so long as the other was prepared to render dissolution necessary by secession, rather than suffer defeat.²

¹ Larrazabal, ii. 427.

² Campbell avers that, looking to its constitution, the Convention was a mere instrument in the hands of Santander. However, looking to the end of it, it seems clear he had not sufficient control over the weapon to be able to use it effectively.

CHAPTER XX

BOLIVAR AND SANTANDER—THE CONSPIRACY OF 1828

THE continued session of a Convention, of which the majority was hostile to him, could never have suited Bolivar, and it is permissible to suspect that he was not altogether a stranger to the action of his friends in reducing it, by their secession, to impotence. It had died without having either accepted or refused his resignation. Probably Santander felt that, with a third party holding the balance between himself and Bolivar, it was not safe to press a decision on the resignation, especially after he had been defeated on the question of federation or centralisation. Even had the resignation been accepted, it was open to Bolivar, at the head of the army, to say that circumstances had changed, and to withdraw it. Looking to what happened afterwards, it is probable that that is the course he would have pursued. As it was, it can hardly be doubted that, whether the dissolution was directly due to his management of his own party or not, he rejoiced inwardly at the course of events.

Of course, in writing to the Council of Government at Bogotá from Socorro on the 12th June, Bolivar professed regret at the failure of the Convention.¹ He invited them to consider what was to be done, but he had probably already decided for himself. On the 13th June a general meeting of the principal inhabitants of

¹ Larrazabal, ii. 433.

Bogotá was convened by Bolivar's staunch friend Herran, Intendant of Cundinamarca, and by General Cordova, the hero of Ayacucho. They urged that, civil war being clearly imminent, no one but Bolivar was capable of saving the situation. A resolution was carried unanimously calling upon the Liberator to assume the Dictatorship at this critical juncture. The ministers concurred, and that very night messengers were sent to convey the decision of the capital to Bolivar. In reply, he wasted few words on this occasion, merely saying that he would hurry his march to take up the charge imposed upon him by the desire of the capital. He started from Socorro on the 17th June.

On the 24th June 1828 Bolivar again entered Bogotá, after an absence of three months. He was met outside the city by the Council of Government and the principal officials. After returning thanks in the Cathedral, he was conducted to a canopied pavilion erected for the purpose in the square outside.¹ There he received the welcome and congratulations of the Council of Government, the Judges of the High Court, and others. He addressed the Council, protesting that he was always the defender of public liberty, that the will of the nation was the real sovereign power, and that, whenever the nation should wish to withdraw his powers, he was ready to submit. These latter words were, it will be noticed, considerably different in tone from those of his accustomed resignations, in which he was wont to protest vehemently his desire to retire from public life and become a simple citizen. He had now begun to fear that he might be taken at his word. There were several more speeches, by Herran the Intendant, by the commandant-general of the department, and by the rector of the university, to all of which Bolivar replied in the same spirit. Then,

¹ Now the Plaza Bolivar, in the centre of which stands the statue of the Liberator.

amidst cheers, he proceeded to the palace close by, where dinner had been prepared by Herran. In toasting the prosperity of Colombia, the Liberator said: "That prosperity, I say, cannot consist in the odious dictatorship, but in wise laws, in public tranquillity, in the love of the citizens, and in horror of anarchy. Dictatorships are glorious when they close the abyss of revolution, but a misfortune for the people which accustoms itself to live under dictatorial domination."

On the 25th, the archbishop and clergy and other people presented their congratulations.

Bolivar was anxious to mark time for a little before fully exercising the great powers which had been conferred upon him in such a very irregular manner. He wanted some better authority than the vote of a single meeting of the heads of families of one city. Presently he found himself supported by the vote of the department of Cundinamarca, of cities like Quito, Cartagena, Caracas, Valencia, and Guayaquil, and by the adhesion of many of the military leaders, including Paez, Urdaneta, Mariño, Soublette, Arismendi, and Bermudez. Whilst he was waiting, he had ample occupation in restoring discipline in the army, in organising the defence of the Atlantic Coast, and in putting a stop to privateering, which was no longer necessary, by calling in letters of marque and stopping the issue of fresh ones.

In issuing, on the 27th August, the decree regulating his new powers,¹ he was careful to avoid the word "Dictator," and to describe himself as "Liberator-President." He constituted a fresh Council of State, ordered the preservation of all personal liberties guaranteed by the suspended constitution of 1821, and offered to convene a fresh Convention, to meet on the 2nd January 1830, for a reform of the Constitution. Baralt says that Bolivar's dictatorship of 1828 was his great mistake.

¹ Larrazabal, ii. 442.

This Larrazabal combats at considerable length, but he starts with the assumption that the Liberator was in no way responsible for the dissolution of the Convention of Ocaña. As we have already said, Bolivar was probably at the bottom of it; for, seeing its hostility to himself, he could not tolerate its probable acts. Once the Convention was dissolved, it seems certain that there must have been a "pronunciamiento" by some one, and, after all, Bolivar was a better man to have at the head of affairs than Santander or Paez, neither of whom would have tolerated the supremacy of the other.

As for Santander, Bolivar proposed to get rid of his intolerable presence at Bogotá by sending him as envoy to the United States. Santander accepted, but, as will be seen shortly, the appointment fell through, and his destination was changed.

The Council of State was appointed on the 30th August, and consisted of thirteen present, and five who were in other parts, including Bermudez and Gual.

Whilst he was busy trying to improve the administration, Bolivar received news of the invasion of Bolivia by the Peruvian Gamarra, and of La Mar's threatening attitude towards the Ecuadorian provinces.

Sucre, the President of Bolivia, soon found that his own unpopularity, as a foreigner, was used at once as an excuse for the Peruvian invasion and for opposition to him in Bolivia itself. Disgusted with his treatment, and anxious to leave no excuse for the Peruvian invasion, he resigned his Presidency and retired to join Bolivar in Colombia. He had been wounded in a military outbreak. With the history of Bolivia we need not concern ourselves further.

On the 25th September, for the second time in his life, Bolivar very narrowly escaped assassination, the first occasion being at Kingston in 1816.¹ The plot appears

¹ There were said to be other plots against his life in Peru, but nothing definite came of them.

to have originated in a society of youths, meeting nominally for study under the presidency of a Frenchman named Arganil, an *ex-sans-culotte* of Marseilles. These meetings took more or less of a political colour, and, moreover, there was another secret society under the same presidency, a sort of inner circle. Among the members of this were another Frenchman, named Horment, Pedro Carujo, an artillery officer, and Florentino Gonzales, the successor of Azuero as editor of the *Conductor*. Campbell says that Horment, though a Frenchman, was generally suspected of being a spy of the Spanish Government. It is said that Santander protected this society, which was planning the assassination of Bolivar. The first proposal was to carry out the work during a masked ball, at which Bolivar was present, on the 10th August. But the conspirators were not ready then, as they had not yet succeeded in gaining over any part of the garrison. According to Campbell, this attempt broke down because Bolivar left the ball earlier than was anticipated. The next date fixed was the 21st September, when Bolivar went out to Soacha, a town 14 or 15 miles south of Bogotá. That, too, for various reasons, was given up, and the date was deferred till the 28th October. But there were many in the conspiracy, and some hints of its existence began to leak out. It was necessary to act prematurely, rather than risk discovery and prevention. An abortive attempt to gain over a young officer newly arrived in Bogotá precipitated matters. Orders had been issued for the arrest of the captain who had approached him but found him unyielding.

As it happened, the man to whom the orders for the arrest were given was Colonel Ramon Guerra,¹ himself one of the conspirators, who promptly warned his friends that the secret was out. They at once met at the house

¹ Guerra had seen much service in New Granada, chiefly in the republican cause, and had been at Pantano de Vargas and Boyacá.

of Vargas Tejada, which was their regular rendezvous, to settle details of the revolt for that very night—25th September. No open precautions appeared to have been taken by the Government, who were naturally unwilling to alarm the conspirators until they had got hold of the man whose arrest had been ordered, and who might be expected to give valuable information. Being unaware of Guerra's connexion with the conspiracy, they had no reason to suspect him of having already given warning.

Bolívar had already been told that the "Vargas" regiment was in the plot, but he could hardly believe this of a regiment so devoted to him. He was satisfied with assurances of its loyalty given him by its commandant, and his confidence was not misplaced. It was different, however, with the artillery (about 150 strong), who had been mostly gained over by the conspirators. Their quarters were near the Palace, and it was proposed to use them to overpower the President's guard.

At 11.30 p.m. Carujo went with some artillerymen, and a few civilians collected by Horment, to the Palace. A watch had already been set on the officers of the battalion "Vargas" and the Grenadiers, who were known to be loyal. With Carujo were Horment, Zulaiver, Gonzales, and a lieutenant of artillery named Lopez, who had recently been degraded for misconduct. Some of the other conspirators were to attack the quarters of the two loyal battalions, and to set free Padilla, the leader of the late revolt at Cartagena, who was in custody awaiting trial. Carujo and his party surprised the guard at the Palace gate, killed four of them, and hurried towards the Liberator's sleeping apartments. On the way they met Andres Ibarra, a favourite aide-de-camp of Bolívar. He was so badly wounded in the right arm by Lopez that it had to be amputated next day.

Bolívar was in his bedroom with his mistress, Manuela

Saenz,¹ just going to bed, when the noise of the attack on the guard and Ibarra reached his ears. At first he was for resistance, for the cries of "Death to the tyrant!" warned him of what was happening. Manuela Saenz, however, convinced him that resistance was useless, and pointed to the open window, only a few feet above the street. The assassins were actually at the door when he dropped, half-dressed as he was, from the balcony into the street just opposite the theatre. His butler, who happened to be in the street, recognised and followed his master, as he made for the convent of El Carmen. Changing his mind, Bolivar plunged into the ravine of the San Augustin stream which flows from the mountain behind Bogotá across the city south of the Palace. Here he hid himself under a bridge.² Meanwhile, when

¹ Manuela Saenz, a Quiteña, married at Quito, in 1817, an English doctor, James Thorne. About 1822 they removed to Lima, where Manuela met Bolivar soon after his arrival in Peru. She left her husband to live with the Liberator very soon afterwards. She is said to have been very beautiful, though of somewhat masculine habits. She is said to have taken part at the head of a squadron of cavalry in putting down a disturbance in Quito. In 1822 she appears in a list of ladies decorated with San Martin's "Order of the Sun." In Lima, when living under the protection of Bolivar, she used to ride about with an escort of Colombian cavalry, herself dressed in a gold-laced scarlet dolman and white breeches. When Bolivar first met her she was about twenty-four or twenty-five years old. The latest record we have of her is Garibaldi's account of a day spent with her in 1851 at Paita, on the Peruvian coast, on his way to Lima. He says of her: "I was hospitably received in the house of a benevolent lady who had been confined to her bed for several years in consequence of a paralytic stroke, which deprived her of the use of her limbs. . . . Doña Mannelita Saenz was the most graceful and courteous matron I ever saw. Having enjoyed the friendship of Bolivar, she was acquainted with the minutest details of the life of the great Liberator of Central (*sic*) America. . . . I parted from her deeply touched." See Aristides Rojas, "Legendas historicas de Venezuela," p. 140, and Werner's translation of the "Antobiography of Guiseppe Garibaldi," p. 59.

² According to Rojas, he was about to cross by the bridge to the left bank of the stream, on his way to the barracks of the loyal battalion "Vargas," when he heard the approach of a struggling crowd of "Vargas" men, his supporters, and artillerymen, his opponents. Unable to make out which

the assassins broke into his room they saw that the bird had flown, and demanded of Manuela Saenz where he was. She said that he was in the hall of the Council of State, thus managing to throw them off the scent, and to give Bolivar time to get clear away.

The disappointed assassins, rushing hither and thither, came upon Colonel W. Fergusson, Bolivar's Irish aide-de-camp. He was shot dead by Carujo.¹

Meanwhile, the attack on the quarters of the "Vargas" battalion had been beaten off, and the rebels pursued in every direction. The party sent to release Padilla had found him in the artillery quarters, sleeping in the same room with his custodian, Colonel José Bolivar. The latter was shot, and Padilla, seizing the dead man's sword, went out to put himself at the head of the insurrection.

Urdaneta and Colonel James Whittle, of the "Rifles," now came on the scene, and the former, taking command of the "Vargas" battalion, made for the Palace. Herran, Cordova, Paris, and other loyalists also joined. There was fighting all over the city, the rebels being everywhere defeated.

Bolivar, in his hiding-place under the bridge, heard all party held the upper hand, he was persuaded by his servant to get under the bridge. After staying there for two hours or so, he sent the servant out to see what was happening. He met a party of the "Vargas" men with several loyal officers at their head. This servant was with Bolivar from about 1821 till his death in 1830.

From the description given by Cochrane (ii. 24), the President's Palace was a very poor building in Bolivar's time. The window from which Bolivar escaped is still pointed out in the street running east from the south-east corner of the "plaza." The Palace of to-day is a much better building, in a street to the south-east of the cathedral.

¹ William Fergusson, an Irishman, went to Colombia with the Irish brigade. Served in the east in 1819, when he was captured by the Spaniards, but escaped. Was with Montilla at Rio Hacha, and with Bolivar and Sucre in Pasto, Peru, and Bolivia. There he was appointed aide-de-camp to the Liberator.

this noise going on over his head, without being able to ascertain which side had the upper hand. At last he learnt, from the shouts of a detachment of "Vargas" men searching for him, that the rebels were beaten. He at once came out and joined the party, to be received with joy by the rest of the battalion and others collected in the great square.

When it was daylight he returned to the Palace, where he found much damage had been done. Manuela Saenz was safe, though she had been roughly handled by the disappointed assassins, from whom she had saved Bolivar.

Many of the rebels were arrested in the night, including Horment and Lopez. Guerra coolly appeared on the morning of the 26th, thinking his share in the affair was unknown. He also was arrested. Padilla and Santander were both thrown into prison, the name of the latter having been freely used by the rebels during the disturbance.

The trials of the rebels were commenced at once. Santander was found guilty as "an instigator and abettor of the conspiracy," and sentenced to be shot. The death sentence was commuted by Bolivar to one of exile from the republic. Several others, including, curiously enough, Carujo,¹ the murderer of Ferguson, were pardoned.

On the 30th September there were executed Horment, Zulaiver, Silva, Galindo, and Lopez.

Padilla and Guerra were tried together. Colonel Camp-

¹ According to Gutierrez Posada ("Memorias," etc., p. 124), Carujo obtained his pardon in return for a promise of valuable information. Colonel Campbell (Despatch of 12th November 1828) says he got off because, when Santander's sentence had been commuted, it became impossible to execute Carujo and others. All quotations of Campbell's views and statements regarding the conspiracy are from his despatches of 8th October and 12th November 1828. He was at Guaduas on the 25th September, but Mr Henderson, the Consul-General, was in Bogotá.

bell says that the court-martial was equally divided as to the sentence on Guerra, though they were unanimous as to a sentence of death on Padilla. In Padilla's case it was proved, by the evidence of a sergeant, that he deliberately allowed the murder of Colonel Bolivar, who was asleep, and then took his sword. As for Guerra, Paris, the president of the court-martial, gave his casting-vote in favour of a sentence of eight years' imprisonment instead of death. Bolivar thereupon dissolved the tribunal, suspended Paris, and appointed Urdaneta and Cordova to pass proper sentences on all connected with the revolt. They revised the sentence on Guerra and made it death. Guerra and Padilla¹ were shot on the 2nd October. The last batch of executions took place on the 14th October, the sufferers being P. C. Azuero, Hinistroza, lieutenant of artillery, and a sergeant and four men of the same corps.

To what extent, if at all, was Santander guilty of complicity in this plot? He himself, writing in 1837,² denies his connexion with it entirely, and says he had no fair trial. He quotes an official letter from Bogotá to the Colombian Minister in London, which says he was not found guilty of complicity in this plot, but in one which was to be carried into execution after he had left for the United States. He was certainly not convicted of being concerned in the attempt to kill Bolivar. On the other hand, he was certainly anxious for the overthrow of the Liberator, and it is by no means improbable that he should have had some knowledge of a plot directed to that end.

¹ Padilla, a "zambo" (half Indian, half negro), was chiefly employed as a naval officer. He was in the Spanish service at Trafalgar, where he was taken. He served the republican cause in many actions at sea, and on the Orinoco and the Magdalena. His last and greatest achievement was his complete defeat of Morales' squadron on the 24th July 1823 in Lake Maracaibo.

² "Apuntamientos para Memorias Sobre Colombia," pp. 15, 16.

Writing from the Boca Chica forts at Cartagena, where he was imprisoned for some months, he gratefully acknowledges the clemency of Bolivar in commuting the death sentence, which, he says, was unjustly passed upon him. But the letter contains what seems to be a damning admission. It appeals to Bolivar on several grounds to allow him to leave Colombia and go to Europe. As one of these grounds he says: "Do so, at least, as recompense for my opposition to the plan of assassinating your Excellency, and for my having, with tears in my eyes, implored Carujo not to thus vilely repay the services of your Excellency to the country."¹ That admission seems clearly to imply that Santander was cognisant of a plot to overthrow Bolivar, that he did not disapprove of it except in the matter of the assassination, and that he refused to warn the Liberator, a course which he should, considering the position he had recently held, certainly have followed. Many a man has been shot for less than that. Santander would not even warn Bolivar of his personal danger. Gutierrez Posada² considers it was clearly proved that Santander was aware of the existence of the plot, even giving advice to some of the conspirators, but not warning the authorities. He agrees with others in acquitting Santander of direct complicity in the project of assassination.

Now let us see what Colonel Campbell says on this subject. In his despatch of the 8th October, he remarks that the presumptive evidence of Santander's cognisance of the conspiracy is very strong, and he states the following points:—

(1) Both Guerra and Silva stated that Santander was aware of the plot.

(2) It was a notorious fact that all the principal leaders (except perhaps Horment) were in his confidence.

¹ Letter of 18th December 1828. O'Leary, *Docts.*, 3, p. 393.

² "Memorias," etc., p. 124.

(3) Vargas Tejada, in whose house the conspirators held their meetings and arranged their plans, had recently been appointed, at Santander's request, secretary to the mission to the United States, of which Santander himself was to be the minister. Tejada had long been in Santander's confidence, and had supported him at the Convention of Ocaña.

(4) Gonzales, another conspirator, was also a decided partisan of Santander, and had always lent his name to articles abusing Bolivar in the *Conductor* and other papers. Of these articles Santander was known to be the author.

(5) Guerra and Silva were also Santander's partisans.

In his subsequent despatch (12th November), Campbell reports the conviction and sentence on Santander, who, in addition to banishment, was prohibited from alienating his real property in Colombia. This was meant to prevent his using it to supply funds to his party. The British Minister holds that Santander "was privy to the conspiracy from first to last, if not the author of it; that strong reasons exist for supposing him to have instigated the conspiracy (Padilla's) in Cartagena, as well as the military insurrections in Lima and Bolivia." It was pretended that Santander had not been executed because "enough blood had already been shed," but Campbell points out that, excepting Guerra and Padilla, most of those who had been shot were only minor persons. He adds that Vergara, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, had incautiously divulged to him that one of the motives for clemency was Santander's connexion with Bolivar's friend Justo Briceño.¹

This evidence, which is all we have so far been able to

¹ They were brothers-in-law. See letter from Briceño, dated Cartagena, 18th December 1828, forwarding Santander's of same date from Boca Chica. O'Leary, *Docts.*, 3, p. 392.

discover, certainly seems to show that Santander had little cause to complain of his punishment.¹

¹ Mr Bingham refers to the existence in Bogotá of "a large part of the correspondence of Santander," which might quite possibly throw some light on the relations of Santander and Bolivar. The present writer was also told a short time ago that such papers existed. Whether it is possible to utilise them seems by no means certain. Mr Bingham was promised a sight of them the day before he left Bogotá, but "the committee who have them in charge were not able to meet, and the president of the bank where they are deposited was not to be found" ("Caracas to Bogotá," pp. 246, 248). There *may* have been perfect readiness to show the papers, but one cannot help remarking that untoward obstacles are apt to arise, both in South America and the East, when for any reason it is desired to avoid a particular action without deliberately refusing to perform it.

CHAPTER XXI

WAR WITH PERU—THE DISSOLUTION OF COLOMBIA—BOLIVAR'S RETIREMENT AND DEATH

AFFAIRS in the south now demanded Bolivar's earnest attention. He had sent his aide-de-camp, O'Leary, to endeavour to patch up matters with Peru, but the envoy, being refused a passport, had to return. La Mar declared a blockade of the Pacific ports of Colombia, and proceeded to Piura to place himself at the head of an expeditionary force. At the same time, the standard of revolt against Bolivar was raised in Popayan by J. M. Obando and H. Lopez, using as their battle-cry the restoration of the constitution of 1821. This is another of the revolts of which Colonel Campbell accuses Santander of being the instigator. Pasto, too, always ready for revolt, joined in. The rebels of Popayan and Pasto, standing as they did across the line of communication between Bogotá and the south, had first to be disposed of. During December 1828, Bolivar collected in Bogotá a force of 1500 men. Simultaneously, he was busy reforming the courts of justice and other matters, issuing a decree summoning a new Constituent Congress for the 2nd January 1830, and laying down rules for the elections to it. Leaving the Council of Ministers in charge of affairs at Bogotá during his absence, Bolivar started, on the 28th December, with his troops to descend into the Magdalena valley, thence to cross over the desolate "paramos" of the Central Cordilleras into the

Cauca valley. The immense labours, physical and mental, of the last eighteen years were now telling seriously on the health of the Liberator. Long marches, no longer endured with the ease of the days of 1819, left him prostrated with fatigue, and he was actually ill in body and harassed in mind.¹ The revolt of September had gone far to break his spirit, and to warn him that his personal influence was no longer what it had been. Threatened on all sides, with but few really trusty friends left, suffering in health, he was at last beginning to despair. Yet he held on gallantly. He would willingly have avoided the war with Peru, and again endeavoured to negotiate through O'Leary, but in vain. He would have been glad, as appears from Campbell's despatches, to enlist England's influence in effecting a settlement. Sucre, too, now entrusted with the command in the southern provinces, was no more successful in his endeavours to reduce La Mar to reason by pacific methods. In January 1829, La Mar, with 8400 men, occupied Guayaquil, and was well received in Loja. Sucre had not more than 6000 men in Cuenca. He had received orders from Bolivar to avoid a decisive battle, and to remain on the defensive until the road by Popayan and Pasto was again opened for the Liberator's advance to the assistance of his lieutenant. Sucre, always loyal, would have carried out his orders, but, as at Ayacucho, he found himself forced to fight. At Saraguro on the 12th February, and again at Tarqui on the 26th, he heavily defeated La Mar, who lost 2500 men, and was driven back in disorder. Sucre at once offered to accept a capitulation, under which La Mar would be allowed to withdraw the remains of his army. A Peruvian council of war, recognising defeat, urged La Mar to accept, and a treaty was signed at Jiron on the 28th February 1829, the principal terms

¹ He had been declining in health for years past, and now two hours on horseback fatigued him. Gutierrez Posada, "Memorias," etc., p. 140.

of which were limitation to 3000 men each of the frontier forces of Peru and Colombia, settlement of the frontier by commission, abstention of either State from interference in the domestic affairs of the other, surrender by Peru of the corvette "Pichincha," payment of 150,000 pesos for debts due by the Peruvian army and fleet in Colombian territory, and evacuation by the Peruvians, within twenty days, of all Colombian territory, including Guayaquil.

The relics of the Peruvian army (2500 out of 8400) began their retreat on the 2nd March.

Whilst Sucre had thus been disposing of La Mar, Bolivar had reached the Cauca valley and called on the various rebels to submit quietly. In this he was backed by a pastoral letter issued by the Bishop of Popayan, and by the influence of the clergy. Envoys were sent to Obando and Lopez, who thought it more prudent not to fight, and even the turbulent Pastusos submitted without opposition. From Popayan the Liberator moved on to Pasto. At Cumbal, on the 12th March, he received the news of Sucre's successes and of the convention of Jiron. On the 17th he was in Quito, where he was met by Sucre, who presented the trophies of his victories over La Mar.

All seemed well, especially as news arrived from Venezuela that Paez had publicly condemned the Bogotá plot of September 1828.¹ Possibly he was moved to his strong expressions of indignation largely by his personal enmity for Santander, and by satisfaction at his banishment.

But La Mar had not honestly carried out the Convention of Jiron, and more trouble was brewing in the south. He had sent secret orders that Guayaquil was not to be surrendered. For this he had no better excuse than objections to Sucre's official report of the Battle of Tarqui, which he held to be insulting to Peru,

¹ Larrazabal, ii. 474.

and to the proposed erection by the Colombians of a commemorative pillar on the battlefield.

There was some talk of getting the United States to arbitrate, but, in the end, Bolivar, deciding that there was nothing for it but to reconquer Guayaquil by force of arms, issued a proclamation, dated 3rd April 1829, announcing this.¹

On the 26th June 1829, after vainly trying to bring La Mar to reason by peaceable methods, Bolivar was close to Guayaquil when, at the last moment, a peaceful solution was arrived at. La Mar's enterprises against Colombia had never been popular in Peru, defeat had rendered them still less so. On the 3rd June, General A. G. de Lafuente, at the head of the troops at Lima, deposed the Vice-President and declared himself at the head of affairs. At the same time, at Piura, Gamarra deposed La Mar from his military command, and shipped him off to Guatemala. He died shortly afterwards in exile in Costa Rica.

With the new government of Peru, Bolivar was soon able to arrange terms. Guayaquil was reoccupied by Colombian troops, and peace was signed with Peru in October.

At Guayaquil, Bolivar was extremely ill; on the 10th August, he was almost on the brink of the grave. The horrible climate of the place in the rainy season was almost too much for the constitution of the Liberator, enfeebled as it was by years of almost superhuman exertion. At the end of August he went to the island of Santay for a few weeks to recover. Thence he issued a circular, which seems to point to the despair which was beginning to settle down on him when he considered the circumstances of the country which he had so strenuously sought to liberate and to endow with a decent government. In it he says he has no personal views as to the

¹ Larrazabal, ii., 477.

most desirable form of government, and that he is ready to receive with equal openmindedness all suggestions, however extravagant they might seem, provided only they were stated with moderation, and were not manifestly opposed to liberty and national independence. That is quite a different tone from that of the Liberator of a few years back, ever ready to tell the people that federation was ruin, and that salvation was to be found only in centralisation. The results of the circular were disastrous, as will be seen presently.

Again the Sisyphean task of controlling his subordinate commanders oppressed the Liberator with an intolerable burden. No sooner was one insurrection put down than another sprang up, often led by the last man who could be suspected of turning against the Liberator. There was no stability, but an overflowing abundance of ambition and desire of power. The revolt of Obando and Lopez had only been put down a few months before rumours reached Bolivar of the disloyal conduct of Cordova, the divisional general who had led the attack at Ayacucho. He had approached T. C. Mosquera with proposals that he himself should become Supreme Chief, with Mosquera as Secretary for War. The other chief appointments were mapped out as Cordova proposed them. New Granada was to be separated from Venezuela on the one hand and Ecuador on the other. The Liberator was getting old (in years he was only 46) and must be ousted from the command. "And when," asked Mosquera, "do you propose to assemble the national representation?" Cordova's reply showed what he was really thinking of. "What representation?" he said. "No representation for me. Such things are folly. It is decided to do away with the lawyers. Our Republic must be military." Mosquera would have nothing to do with such a scheme.

Bolivar sent for Cordova, and, though thinking his

manner rather brusque, was satisfied that he meant no harm, or pretended to be so. "What shall we do," he wrote at the end of September, "with these conspiring generals? If I suppress them, I am called a tyrant; if I wait till they rebel to punish them, I am a cruel assassin. What shall we do?" Cordova returned from his interview with Bolivar only to carry on again his conspiracy, and already, on the 12th September, had raised the standard of insurrection in Antioquia, himself taking the title of "Commander-in-Chief of the army of Liberty," demanding the constitution of 1821, and the blood of the tyrant Bolivar.

The Liberator, who had reached Quito again on the 20th October with partially restored health, had appointed Flores to the southern command, and now sent his own aide-de-camp, O'Leary, with a force for the suppression of Cordova. That general had a very poor following, the only persons of importance who joined him being, according to Campbell, his brother and his brother-in-law, the latter being governor of Antioquia.

O'Leary, marching from Bogotá across the Magdalena, met Cordova, whose forces were in every way inferior, high up in the Central Cordilleras, at El Santuario.¹ Cordova displayed very poor generalship, for he fell into the very ancient trap of a feigned retreat by the Bolivarites, and, when he had sent his last reserves in pursuit, was fallen upon and utterly routed by O'Leary. The whole rebel force was but 500 men, and O'Leary had 2000 or more. Cordova, with 20 officers and men, barricaded himself in a house, determined to fight to the death. O'Leary, who is said to have been ignorant of Cordova's presence in the house, after calling in vain on the garrison to surrender, ordered the house to be stormed. The garrison was destroyed, and Cordova him-

¹ El Santuario is not marked on the map. It is a little east by south of the Antioquian capital, Medellin, close to Marmilla.

self, mortally wounded, died a few minutes after the fall of the house.¹

Thus perished miserably, the victim of his own treachery, a man who had shown himself, at Ayacucho and elsewhere, to be a brave soldier, and who, only so recently as September 1828, had been supposed to be a staunch supporter of Bolivar. At the time of the conspiracy of 1828 he was believed to be quite loyal to Bolivar, but Campbell, writing after his defeat, says it was then well known he had been concerned in the conspiracy.

About this time, the idea of creating a constitutional monarchy with Bolivar at its head was again broached as the only means of preserving the state. The proposal was fostered by De Bresson, the agent of Charles X. of France, and met with support in many quarters, even as high as the Council of Ministers in Bogotá. When, at last, Bolivar was informed of what was going on, he wrote a sharp reprimand, dated Japio, 18th December 1829, to his ministers, in which he said plainly he would not be false to his republican principles, and that, if it suited Colombia to set up a throne, the Liberator was not the man who would occupy it. In consequence of this, Castillo, Restrepo, Urdaneta, and Vergara resigned their portfolios, and were succeeded in the Ministry by Caicedo, Márques, Herran, and Osorio. The new Ministry posed as opponents of the monarchical scheme.

That is Larrazabal's account of this affair. Mitre's is very different. According to him, Bolivar, before leaving for the south, had suggested confidentially to some of his friends, "that Colombia and the whole of Spanish

¹ According to Restrepo, Cordova's insurrection was the result of Bolivar's leanings towards a constitutional monarchy, to be mentioned just now. He also says Cordova was assassinated after he had surrendered, covered with wounds.

Campbell, on the other hand, says: "General Cordova, when prisoner, after receiving his mortal wound, expressed to General O'Leary his regret," etc.

America had no means of escape from the anarchy which was devouring her but the establishment of constitutional monarchies, and that, if Colombia decided for this form of government, and called to the throne a foreign prince, he himself would be the first to submit to the prince's authority and to support him with his influence."¹

He was still more explicit with Colonel P. Campbell, the British Minister at Bogotá, to whom he wrote regarding the project of monarchy in Colombia, that, "given the very grave difficulties in the way of organising a republic, perhaps the only means would be the establishment of a monarchy, calling in a foreign prince professing the Catholic religion; but for this it was necessary to be able to reckon on the aid of a great power, such as France or England, which would defend Colombia against the attacks of the other American republics."² This letter, Campbell was told, he might use as he thought best. It was in consequence of these expressions of opinion that Bolivar's ministers, in his absence, entered upon negotiations with Campbell and De Bresson. They kept the Liberator informed of what was going on, but he maintained silence for six months. At last, on the 3rd September 1829, he wrote scouting the idea of a monarchy, and revealing what he called his secret. He proposed to keep New Granada and Quito united, but entirely separate from Venezuela. For the two united provinces there should be "the best government, which would be a President for life with a hereditary Senate, as he had proposed in Guayana in 1819."³ As usual,

¹ Restrepo, iv. 207.

² *Ibid.*, p. 228. Mitre, in a note, says the letter reached Campbell in September 1829. Clearly, from the context and the sequence of events, he meant 1828. The references to Restrepo are those of Mitre. I have unfortunately been unable to find a copy of vol. iv. of Restrepo (1858). The 1858 edition is not in the British Museum at all, and the copy which I was able to borrow was short of vol. iv.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 229.

Bolivar proclaimed his earnest desire to surrender authority, and to act merely as mediator between the two states. When the Council of Ministers received Bolivar's letter of reproach for their conduct in negotiating for a monarchy, Restrepo, himself one of those ministers, says : "When the Liberator's letter had been read through, there was only one sentiment amongst the Council of Ministers—indignation. They believed themselves sacrificed to the popularity of Bolivar, and that, regardless of their great and faithful services to the government of Colombia and the independence of the country, he had left them to tread a dangerous path."¹

We have carefully perused Colonel Campbell's despatches with a view to checking this story. In the long memorandum enclosed in the despatch of the 4th June 1829, the question of Bolivar's views on a monarchy is fully gone into. "I shall," says Campbell, "now proceed to detail what I have been able to ascertain regarding the ideas of General Bolivar as to the form of government judged by him to be the best for the country." Bolivar's views as to the form of government had never really varied. "He has ever felt and expressed the difficulties which attended the task of giving a stable and good form of government to his country, and which arose as well from the habits under which this people had been brought up under the Spanish colonial system, as from the heterogeneous mass of which the population of the country is composed." Bolivar was always a believer in British institutions and an opponent of Federal government as in the United States. He could not, indeed, understand how that form of government had lasted so long even in North America.

"I cannot," says the memorandum, "therefore suppose that he (Bolivar) would be an obstacle to the erection of Colombia into a constitutional monarchy ; but I do not

¹ Restrepo, iv. pp. 244-45.

think that he would himself, under any circumstances, accept the crown. He has ever been most susceptible, and even over-sensitive, in regard to public opinion in Europe, and the fear that, should Colombia be erected into a monarchy, it might be supposed to have been from his influence, and from personal ambition, would, of itself alone, prevent his accepting the crown. . . . From the opinions of General Bolivar it may, therefore, fairly be inferred that the active part taken by him in the late war of this revolution, and his increasing efforts during the whole course of it, were chiefly directed to obtain the independence of his country by throwing off the yoke of Spain ; and the only form of government which could, at that moment, and for that purpose, be adopted was that of a republic. But the wishes and opinions of Bolivar have ever been opposed to pure republicanism, conceiving that it would only lead to anarchy, and that its lasting adoption was impossible in this country, where the only established religion was the Roman Catholic, existing with all the pomp of a rich and powerful hierarchy. . . . The existence of the Liberator is the only present guarantee to the peace and tranquillity of Colombia, . . . nothing will probably transpire respecting Bolivar's sentiments or views until after his arrival here." There is throughout this long memorandum no allusion whatever to the letter Bolivar is supposed by Mitre to have written to Campbell before he started for the south in the end of 1828. If Campbell had ever received such a letter, with permission to use it, he would undoubtedly have quoted it straight off, instead of exercising his ingenuity in inferring what Bolivar's views were. Nor would he have said Bolivar's ideas would not be known till he returned to Bogotá. He had no objection to quoting Bolivar's private letters to him, for he does quote a passage from one dated Quito, 27th April 1829, though it does not refer directly to the question of monarchy. We may take it

then as proved that, if ever the letter quoted by Mitre was written, it certainly never reached Campbell.

A later despatch (7th September 1829) says that Vergara (Minister for Foreign Affairs), after approaching the British Minister through a subordinate, had officially broached the subject of monarchy. When asked what Bolivar's opinions were, Vergara had replied that the Liberator's admiration for the British Constitution as a model were well known, but that, on the present occasion, he had declined to give an opinion, merely stating his willingness to follow the national will. Vergara's official letter to the British Minister (dated 6th September) states the proposal thus: Bolivar to remain in power for his life, with the title of "Liberator," not of "monarch," which neither would the Congress grant him, nor would he accept. After his death, whoever was chosen as his successor, and a European prince was indicated, might have the title of "monarch."

In his earlier despatch Campbell had said that the vague discussions of the last six months regarding monarchy had crystallised on the arrival of De Bresson, which was supposed to point to the idea of a French prince. Also, that the feeling in favour of monarchy was stronger in the south than in New Granada, and that Sucre was in favour of monarchy as the only remedy for anarchy. The members of the government were strongly monarchical. Soublotte, whose father was French, had told De Bresson that even Paez would support a monarchy; and that Montilla, in Cartagena, was of the same way of thinking.

Bolivar, hastening back from Quito, in order to be at Bogotá for the opening of Congress on the 2nd January 1830, was only able to arrive there on the 15th, when he found that a quorum of the Congress was not yet assembled. The total number of members being sixty-seven, the session could only open when forty-five (two-thirds) were

present. On the 20th January, a bare quorum of forty-seven being got together, the session opened in presence of Bolivar. Sucre was elected President of the Assembly, J. M. Esteves, Bishop of Santa Marta, Vice-President. Bolivar withdrew after a brief address, in which he told the Congress that the nation looked to them for the preparation of a good fundamental law.

Once more he tendered his written resignation of the Presidency, inviting the Assembly to appoint some one else to the office. In a proclamation to the Colombians, also dated the 20th January, he said that he resigned in order that none might be able to point to him as an obstacle to the constitution of the republic on a sound basis. He protested vigorously against the calumniators who had represented him as even desiring a crown. He had no such aspirations. Colombia must now look to the Constituent Congress. He ended with the words: "Compatriots! hear my last word on the termination of my political career. In the name of Colombia I beg, I pray you to remain united, in order not to become the assassins of your country, and your own executioners."¹

Meanwhile, Bolivar's circular of the 31st August 1829, inviting suggestions for the future government of the country, had reached Paez at Valencia. That chief at once seized upon it as an excellent opportunity for urging his views in favour of the separation of Venezuela from New Granada. He incited Caracas and other cities, by circular, to pronounce in favour of separation and the ostracism of Bolivar. The movement began in Valencia, where Paez's influence was supreme. That city was followed by Calabozo and Puerto Cabello. Caracas was easily persuaded

¹ Bolivar's message, dated 20th January 1830 (as published in Bogotá in that year), concludes thus:—

"Fellow Citizens! I blush to say it, independence is the only benefit we have gained, at the cost of everything else. But it opens the gate to us for the re-conquest of the rest under your sovereign auspices, with all the splendour of glory and liberty." This passage is not quoted by Larrazabal.

to fall in with Paez's desires, to resolve that he himself should be head of the seceding departments, and that Bolivar's authority should no longer be recognised. Thereupon Paez went to Caracas, approved the resolution, and offered to maintain by arms the separation from New Granada of Venezuela, which was henceforth to become a sovereign and independent state. He appointed ministers, convoked a Congress to meet in Valencia, and demanded the means necessary for the war against Bolivar, to whom he wrote affirming the final decision of Venezuela in favour of separation, and warning him that he would be destroyed if he attempted to attack the new state.

Thus was an end finally put to Bolivar's dream of a united republic embracing an area (Venezuela, New Granada, Ecuador) about twice the size of France, Germany, and Spain combined, with a population less than half that of Belgium of the present day. Nor was there any homogeneity of populations. The Venezuelans and the New Granadians especially were always antagonistic and jealous of one another, and, if the separation had not come before Bolivar's death, it must inevitably have come immediately after it. It was only his own great personal influence that had held the states together, after a fashion, so far. As for the south, there had all along been a tendency to go over to Peru rather than to New Granada, especially in Guayaquil. The latter years of Bolivar's life had been spent mainly in New Granada and Quito, except when he was in Peru. But for this, New Granada would probably have separated sooner, for Santander was as eager for separation as Paez, and the mutual hatred of these two was great. Bolivar's influence in Venezuela, as a native of Caracas, was great even in his absence. In Colombia, his influence was diminished by his foreign origin. It was only the fact of his presence in the country, or within reach of it, that enabled him to maintain himself there. He now found himself bitterly opposed by the

parties of Paez in Venezuela and of the banished Santander in New Granada.

Congress, on receiving Bolivar's resignation, refused it, saying that, if it were accepted, the State would be left without a head, whilst the new fundamental law and the new institutions were being worked out, with the result that anarchy would be inevitable. Bolivar was reminded that he had promised to retain power till the constitution was promulgated and the new magistrates appointed.

Without making much difficulty, he agreed to remain on, on these grounds, temporarily, vowing that, whatever happened, nothing would induce him to remain in power, even as constitutional President, once the constitution was settled.

On the 27th January, he informed the Congress that he proposed, with their consent, to go to Venezuela, in the hope of arranging matters there, and that he had already invited Paez to meet him with this object. He proposed to leave Castillo in charge during his absence.

The proposal was discussed by the Congress, who finally replied that such a matter was beyond their jurisdiction, that they would endeavour to frame a constitution maintaining the integrity of the Republic, but that they deprecated the Liberator's absence at this juncture. On receiving this answer, and on hearing further of the progress of events in Venezuela, Bolivar abandoned the proposed journey. He was convinced by this time that it would be futile, and that Paez was not in the least likely to respond to the invitation to an interview.

The Congress had at once appointed a committee for the preparation of a draft constitution, and the general bases had been fixed. They now proposed to send two members on a mission of peace to Venezuela, bearing with them this outline, by way of reassurance to the Venezuelans. Sucre and Esteves were selected for the

mission. The former, after reading his instructions, said plainly that, looking to the proposed basis of negotiation and the condition of affairs in Venezuela, he had little or no hope of success (17th February). However, the Congress insisted that he and Esteves must go, and elected a new President and Vice-President of the Assembly in their place.

The Congress had now definitely adopted the following principles for the new Constitution :—

1. The Republic to be single, with a popular elective representative Government, holding office for eight years.
2. The legislative power to be divided between the Senate, the Chamber of Representatives, and the Executive.
3. The President, responsible only in the case of treason, to be assisted by a Council of State. Responsibility to devolve on his secretaries.
4. Creation of local chambers for local affairs.
5. Securities for personal liberty.
6. The Roman Catholic Church to be that of the State, the patronage being exercised by the President, who was to allow no other public form of worship !

These bases were published, with an address to the Colombians, by order of the Congress, on the 20th February 1830.

About this time, also, Bolivar saw fit to exercise clemency in the case of the conspirators of September 1828. Those who had been banished were allowed to return, and those in prison were let out, and ordered to go abroad, or allowed to return to their families, according as their guilt was greater or less.

Having done this, Bolivar sent a fresh message to the Congress, announcing that, in the weak state of his health, it was no longer possible for him to retain the

executive power. As Castillo, who, being President of the Council of Ministers, would in ordinary course succeed him *ad interim*, was a member of the Congress, they were requested to elect someone else. They decided that that was Bolivar's function, not theirs, and accordingly the Liberator, on the 1st March 1830, appointed General Domingo Caicedo to be temporary President of the Council of Ministers, in place of Castillo. Making over to Caicedo the charge of the executive, Bolivar withdrew to his country villa, near Bogotá, to recruit his health.

Sucre and Esteves had gone on their mission as far as Cúcuta, and had started for Merida, when they were met by the commandant of La Grita, who informed them that Paez had issued orders forbidding the entry into Venezuelan territory of any mission from Bogotá. Protesting against such orders, the envoys pushed on to La Grita, where, on the 20th March, they received orders so peremptory as to leave them no option but return to Cúcuta. On their way they received a copy of Paez's proclamation of the 2nd March, in which he expressed his determination to maintain the separation of Venezuela from New Granada, and that any attempt to reverse it by force should be resisted. Paez was already on the march, not only to sustain Venezuela, but also, as he said, to liberate New Granada from the dominion of Bolivar. The envoys naturally saw that that made an end of all negotiations. Bolivar's distress, on hearing this news at his villa, was augmented by a report of an insurrection in Casanare, fomented by the Venezuelans.

When he returned to Bogotá, his friends were anxious that he should resume the supreme authority, which seemed to them the only remedy for the ills of Colombia. But the Liberator, fast declining in health, saw death approaching. He felt he had no longer the strength left to comply, and, moreover, he had lost spirit in the hopeless struggle. He summoned his ministers to a con-

sultation, but nothing was decided. The city was now torn by factions. A few of the deputies wished to elect Bolivar to the constitutional Presidency, but the opposition was too strong. Many of his friends, Caicedo included, deserted the Liberator, who felt that nothing was left for him but to finally resign and quit the country. It is hardly possible to doubt that he knew a vote for his re-election would be lost. In his proclamation of the 27th April to his fellow-citizens, he says: "Venezuela, in order to effect her separation, has alleged ambitious views on my part; presently she will allege that my re-election is an obstacle to reconciliation and, finally, the Republic would have to suffer either dismemberment or civil war. On the day of its installation, I laid other considerations before the Congress, and these, joined to many others, should contribute to persuade the Congress that its most urgent obligation is to give to the people of Colombia new magistrates, possessed of the high qualifications demanded by the law and by the public welfare. I pray you, fellow-citizens, to receive this message as a proof of my most ardent patriotism, and of the love which I have always borne towards the Colombians."

The Congress, now satisfied that they were quit of the Liberator, did not stint their compliments. In their answer to him, they lauded his patriotism, and said: "Whatever lot Providence may prepare for the nation and for yourself, Sir, the Congress hopes that every Colombian sensible of honour and a lover of his country will look upon you with the consideration and respect due to the services which you have performed for America, and will take care that your name shall pass to posterity with all the *éclat* due to the founder of the independence of Colombia."

To his resolve to quit Colombia he still adhered, notwithstanding a flattering invitation, signed by the bishops and many of the principal inhabitants of Quito, begging

him to take up his residence there. The 4th May was fixed for the election of the chief magistrates, and on that day Joaquin Mosquera became President and Domingo Caicedo Vice-President. Not a vote was cast for Bolivar. As Mosquera was absent in Popayan, the Presidential duties were taken over, for the time being, by Caicedo.

Bolivar was then politely informed of the election, and that his organic decree of the 27th August 1828,¹ under which he exercised his powers, had ceased to be operative. To the deputation which made this announcement he said, after congratulating the Congress: "I am now reduced to the private life I have so greatly desired, and if the Congress asks any special proof of my blind obedience to the constitution and the laws, I am ready to give whatever it demands."²

Bolivar, now nothing but a simple citizen, left the Palace, and went to stay with his friend Herran. On the 8th May the Liberator, escorted beyond the city by the ministers and many others, left Bogotá for the last time to retrace the well-known road to Cartagena. He left the capital, which he had liberated, with all outward signs of respect, but from all sides of the vast but now dissolving Republic there resounded the imprecations of his enemies, of the few who honestly believed him to be a danger to his country, or too worn out to control it longer, of the many more hungry office-seekers, who saw in the fall of Bolivar, and the dissolution of the Republic, a chance of advancing their own claims to a power which in him they reprobated. It was in this month (May 1830) that Quito and Guayaquil broke away from Colombia and set up as the separate Republic of Ecuador, with Flores as first President.

Bermudez had styled Bolivar "a despot, a faithless idolater of republican principles, an aspirant for monarchy, a man of criminal designs and of the vilest ambition."

¹ *Supra*, p. 388.

² Larrazabal, ii. 539.

Arismendi hurled at him the epithets of "tyrant of Colombia, ungrateful Caraqueño, man of iniquitous designs," whilst Paez said that "the existence of Bolivar is ominous for the Republic, and his name should be condemned to oblivion." These utterances were of a time when Bolivar's continuation in power was still possible, if not probable. Now that he really seemed to be gone for good, the Congress, on the day after his departure, proceeded to pass a decree of which the articles provided for, (1) the tribute of the gratitude and thanks of the nation, (2) the rendering to Bolivar, wherever he might be within the Republic, of the consideration and respect due to "the first and best citizen of Colombia," (3) the assignment to him of a pension of 30,000 pesos per annum.¹

The last clause was unfortunately very necessary to Bolivar, though it would very probably have proved a disappointment to him had he lived, unless, indeed, he were very much more fortunate than the other creditors of the Republic. He had begun life in the service of his country as a rich man, now he was a poor one. He had already had to raise money by the sale of his silver dinner service for about £500.² He had tried to sell his copper mines at Aroa, but an interminable lawsuit was not likely to leave much out of their price for him. Regarding this suit he wrote, amongst other things, to his nephew by marriage, Gabriel Camacho, from Guaduas on the road from Bogotá.³ Though he begs his correspondent to plead his claim for justice only with Paez, he clearly has not much hope of it. Nor does he trust much in the pension voted by Congress, for he writes: "I cannot reckon on this favour, for no one knows what may happen hereafter, or who will take command."

The whole of this long letter breathes despair and dis-

¹ Larrazabal, ii. 541.

² *Ibid.*, 541.

³ *Ibid.*, 542.

trust. Speaking of his demand of ordinary justice from Paez, he writes: "I have served Venezuela well, and am owed much by all her children, still more by the head of her Government. Consequently, it would be the greatest and most scandalous wickedness if I am to be persecuted as a public enemy." Later, he writes that he knows not whither he will go, whether to Curaçao to await the result of his lawsuit, or to Jamaica. Europe was too expensive at present, but he was determined to leave Colombia. "Anyhow," he writes, "I am determined never to return, nor to again serve my ungrateful countrymen. Nothing short of desperation can make me change this resolve. I say desperation at seeing myself detested, persecuted, and robbed by the very people for whom I have devoted myself to twenty years of sacrifices and dangers. Nevertheless, I say that I do not hate them, I am far from feeling the desire for vengeance; my heart has pardoned them, for they are my beloved compatriots, and above all, Caraqueños."

It was the 25th May 1830 when Bolivar reached Turbaco in the low hills, a few miles south of Cartagena, where the heat is a little less oppressive than on the sea coast. Staying there a month, he went down to Cartagena on the 24th June, with the intention of embarking on an English passenger vessel. But there was no room available on the boat. His small funds soon began to run out, for he was as generous as ever. At last the British frigate "Shannon" appeared in the harbour, and it was proposed he should get a passage to Jamaica in her; but she was under orders to do some surveying on the Venezuelan coast, and Bolivar had to await her return from La Guaira. That was about the last place he wished to go to, and probably the captain of the "Shannon" would have felt it very inconvenient to have him on board in a Venezuelan port. By her, however, the Liberator sent renewed demands to

Camacho for the remittance of a part of the price of his estates.

The "Shannon" was away longer than was expected, and Bolivar began almost to suffer want. He knew not where to go, for he did not wish to land in Europe or North America as a pauper. South American presidents of our own times have a habit of laying up a nest-egg in the Old World against the day when revolution may drive them from their own country. All honour to Bolivar that it was not he who set the example in this respect.

Whilst he was still in Cartagena he received letters from Venezuela informing him of a rising in the central provinces in favour of re-union with Colombia, acknowledgment of the Constituent Congress of Bogotá, and of Bolivar as head of the State. On the 29th June he passed on the information to the Bogotá Government, and, at the same time, warned his Venezuelan friends against the evils which must inevitably result from civil war. It is clear that before this he had recognised that the separation of Venezuela from New Granada was irrevocable.

On the 1st July he was living in a little house half a mile from the walls of Cartagena, at the foot of La Popa, the isolated hill which towers 500 feet above the city. Here there fell upon him another heavy blow in the news of the assassination of his old friend and most faithful supporter, Sucre, Grand Marshal of Ayacucho. "Good God!" he cried, "they have shed the blood of Abel!"¹

¹ Sucre had been sent to the south to try and arrange affairs there, which were in a critical condition. On the 4th June 1830 he had sent forward most of his companions, and was himself following them, with only a single servant, into the gloomy mountains of Pasto. In the narrow pass of Beruecos lay waiting for him a party of assassins. As he arrived within point-blank range of them, the cowards fired a volley. He had hardly time to utter an exclamation when he fell dead. The body was found by a sergeant who ran up on hearing the shots.

That the crime had been pre-arranged by his enemies is proved by *El*

Meanwhile affairs had been going badly between Venezuela and New Granada. The Congress of Venezuela, which Paez had assembled at Valencia, was bitterly hostile to Bolivar. After the proposal of resolutions which went so far as to contemplate his outlawry, it was finally resolved that "Venezuela ought not to enter into relations of any sort with Bogotá, so long as General Bolivar was on her (New Granada's) territory."¹ When this resolution was received by President Mosquera at Bogotá he transmitted a copy to Bolivar at Cartagena. It was yet another stab in the heart of the unfortunate Liberator.

Mosquera's government had been injudicious, and was daily falling into greater disrepute in Bogotá. The President himself was not strong enough for his place, and presently, feeling the burden to be beyond his powers, he betook himself to Anolaima, on the slope of the mountains between Bogotá and the Magdalena. Caicedo took over his work, but a military revolution broke out against him and Mosquera. They attempted

Democrata, a Bogotá newspaper, which, on the 1st June, three days before the assassination, wrote: "It may be that Obando will do with Sucre what we did not do with Bolivar."

Thus perished miserably perhaps the best, most upright, and most honest of the Colombian patriots, certainly the only man among them who had any pretensions to the name of general. To him alone was due the victory of Ayacucho, which not only ended the struggle in Peru for emancipation from Spain, but finally put an end to all hope of recovery of her dominion by the mother country.

That Bolivar felt his death deeply, and regarded with dread the probability of more such assassinations, is shown by a letter which he addressed, on receiving the news, to Flores, then commanding in Quito. He had really become the first President of Ecuador, but that item of news had not yet reached Bolivar. In 1842 Colonel Apolinar Morillo was executed as the actual perpetrator of this crime, of which he confessed his guilt, and accused J. M. Obando of being the instigator of the conspiracy. The three soldiers who were with Morillo are said to have died of poison. Obando, whether guilty or not, was never punished. (Dr J. Gutierrez Ponce, "Vida de Don Ignacio Gutierrez Vergara," pp. 313, 314, 373, 374.)

¹ Larrazabal, ii. 551.

resistance, but their troops were defeated by Florencio Jimenez, and Mosquera and Caicedo, throwing up the sponge, fled—the former to the United States, the latter to his farm.

The “pronunciamiento” of the prætorians had declared Bolivar Head of the Republic, with Urdaneta as *locum tenens* during his absence. On the 5th September Urdaneta assumed office as “charged provisionally with the Executive Power.” He organised a ministry, and sent envoys to Cartagena to fetch Bolivar, if he would accept office in response to the general demand.

The news of events in Bogotá and its neighbourhood gave rise to a similar movement in Cartagena, where Montilla assembled the military leaders. Their resolution in favour of Bolivar’s assumption of command of the army was followed, next day, by the assent of the principal inhabitants.

Bolivar resisted for a time the request both of the Cartagenians and of Urdaneta’s emissaries, but finally consented to return to power, provided he was assured of a majority in the country generally. To Urdaneta he wrote privately that the vote of two municipalities (Bogotá and Cartagena) was not sufficient guarantee. What security was there that Mosquera might not find supporters elsewhere and raise a civil war? What about Lopez and Obando in Popayan?¹

From another letter, written to Vergara a week later (25th September 1830),² it appears that Bolivar had the gravest doubts as to the stability of the new régime. He had heard bad accounts of its prospects, even from Santamaria, one of Urdaneta’s envoys. He had no desire, he said, to return to the Presidency, certainly none in the present insecurity of affairs, and with the possibility of another military revolt, which was not improbable, if he was rightly informed as to the doubtful

¹ Larrazabal, ii. 556.

² *Ibid.*, 557.

steadfastness of some of the new troops and their officers. Finally, he was ill, and was going in a few days to Santa Marta, in the hopes of improvement in a better climate. From all this Larrazabal infers that Bolivar was steadfast in his resolution never to return to power. To us it seems to point rather to the desire to return, provided he could be sure of full support, and to his hesitation being due chiefly to fear that the recent "pronunciamiento" was purely prætorian, and liable to reversal at any moment.

He would have done better to have refused absolutely, for he was fast descending into the grave, and there could be little hope of his ever reaching Bogotá alive. Leaving Cartagena, as he had said he intended, he spent the months of October and November at Baranquilla, then but a small place near the mouth of the Magdalena, now the principal business centre of the Atlantic coast of Colombia.

He was borne down by sickness, by disappointment, and by the frequent blows inflicted on his pride by the news of the general hatred of him in Venezuela.¹ He

¹ The author has been lent a little book, entitled, "Proclamations of Bolivar." Unfortunately it has neither the name of an editor, nor even of a printer, or the place of publication. Undoubtedly most of the proclamations are genuine, but, under the circumstances, it is hardly safe to quote the book as authoritative. At the end of the proclamations are given two "prognostications" of Bolivar, which, if genuine, throw a terrible light on his views of the state of South America. The first purports to be taken from "A View of Spanish America," by Bolivar, published in Cuenca in 1828. It begins thus: "There is no good faith in America, whether between individuals or between nations. Treaties are mere papers, constitutions nothing but books, elections are combats, liberty is anarchy, and life is a torment."

The second, which we give in full, bears date the 9th November 1830, thirty-eight days before Bolivar's death. It runs thus: "America is ungovernable. Those who have served the revolution have ploughed the sea. The only thing to be done in America is to emigrate. These countries will inevitably fall into the hands of an uncurbed multitude, to pass later into those of petty tyrants of all colours and all races. Devoured by every crime and extinguished by ferocity, they will not be worthy of conquest by

had caught a bad cold on the night of the 1st July, which, being neglected and acting on an enfeebled constitution, had ended in consumption. At the end of November he writes to a friend: "I have scarce breath enough left to carry me through the last days which remain to me for my mortification." He was referring to the insults to his name which reached him from Venezuela.

As he felt his strength failing at Baranquilla, he decided to move to Santa Marta, where were his friends Montilla, Esteves, the bishop, and others. He reached Santa Marta by sea on the 1st December, suffering much, and so weak that he had to be carried ashore. There he was visited by the French Doctor Révérend, who was able to give some relief to his cough and the pain in his chest. There was also there the surgeon of a U.S.A. gunboat.¹

It was too late really for doctors to do anything more than render the end as easy as possible. Bolivar, stifled by the close air of the town, begged to be taken to the country. On the night of the 6th December he was moved to the villa Pedro Alejandrino, the property of Señor Joaquin de Mier, two or three miles out in the country. Here he gradually became worse, and his brain began to be affected, though, on the 8th, he dictated a letter to Bogotá, saying he felt better, and added a postscript with his own hand. On the 10th the last rites of the Catholic Church were administered to him

Europeans. Were it possible that a part of the world should lapse into primeval chaos, that would be the last state of America."

This is also quoted by Gutierrez Posada ("Memorias Historico-Políticas," p. 287). Both papers are printed as bearing the signature of Bolivar.

¹ For most of this account of Bolivar's last illness and death, see A. P. Révérend, "La ultima enfermedad, etc., de Simon Bolivar." Révérend, a Frenchman, born in 1796, served in Napoleon's army of 1815. In 1824 he went to Santa Marta, where Montilla found him installed as medical officer of the municipality.

by his friend the bishop. He was still sensible, able to dictate his will and his last farewell to Colombia. The last words of it were: "Colombians! my last wishes are for the welfare of the Fatherland. If my death contributes to the cessation of party strife, and to the consolidation of the Union, I shall descend in peace to the grave."¹ Immediately afterwards he dictated one more letter to Justo Briceño. That was his last rational act, for he soon began to wander. So he lingered on till the 17th, when the early advent of death was clear. At 1 p.m. on the 17th December 1830 the troubled soul of the Liberator passed away.

He died aged a few days short of 47½, young in years, but worn out by a life of almost constant and most strenuous exertion, both physical and mental, a disappointed, miserable wreck.

Four hours after death a post-mortem examination of the body was made by Dr Révérend, who reported that the illness, commencing with a chill on the lungs, had developed into tubercular phthisis. In the last stages there were many complications, perhaps the most painful being neurosis of the digestive organs, evidenced by an almost continuous hiccough.

Of the proclamations of Montilla, Urdaneta, and others of the Liberator's friends, announcing to Colombia the death of the man who had played so great a part in her liberation, it is unnecessary to speak.

His remains were buried, for the time being, at Santa Marta; the time had not yet come for the fulfilment of his desire that they should rest in his native city. Twelve years later, his enemy Paez, then at the head of affairs in Venezuela, attempted to atone for his treatment of

¹ According to Mitre, when the words were read over to him he added in a hoarse voice, "Yes! to the tomb, to which I am sent by my fellow-citizens; but I forgive them. Oh! that I could take with me the consolation of knowing that they will keep united." The farewell is given in full in Larrazabal, ii. 564.

Bolívar by causing the body to be removed to Caracas and buried with great honour in the Cathedral there¹; but the heart was left, preserved in an urn, in the Cathedral at Santa Marta. In 1852 the body was once more removed, to be finally deposited in the National Pantheon² in a tomb surmounted by a statue of the Liberator, erected by Guzmán Blanco, the Venezuelan President, the man who, with boundless vanity, placarded himself on every possible occasion as the "Illustrious American, Regenerator of the Republic."

Bolívar's will, dictated a few days before his death, may be briefly referred to. He notes that his wife brought him no property on his marriage. Of all his great wealth and possessions he had nothing left but his lands and mines at Aroa, and a little personal property. His debts were mainly to Messrs Martin and Powles, whom he desired to be reimbursed, as far as possible, from his property. To the University of Caracas he bequeathed two books, formerly the property of Napoleon, the "Contrat Social" of Rousseau, and Montecuculi's "Art of War." He desired that his remains should be buried in his native city, Caracas. His thanks he desired to be conveyed to Sir Robert Wilson, in acknowledgment of the services of his son, Colonel Belford Wilson. There were a few more bequests; 8000 pesos to his servant José Palacio³; the sword presented to him by Sucre was to go to that general's widow, in token of the Liberator's affection for her husband; the medal pre-

¹ Paez gives an account of this translation of the remains in his "Autobiography," vol. ii., p. 370, etc. Also Dr Réverénd in his "Ultima enfermedad, etc."

² The Pantheon, built on the model of that in Paris, covers the bodies of many of the heroes of Bolívar's time. Miranda, who died in prison in Cadiz, is not there; nor is Sucre, who was murdered near Pasto (not, as Professor Bingham erroneously says, in Bolivia). "Caracas to Bogotá," p. 14.

³ The man whom he had met in the street at Bogotá when he jumped from the Palace window to escape the assassins in 1828.

sented to him by the Congress of Bolivia to return to that State.

As residuary legatees he named his two sisters, and the children of his deceased brother, Juan Vicente Bolivar.

CHAPTER XXII

AN ESTIMATE OF BOLIVAR

WITH the main facts of the Liberator's career before us, we are now in a position to attempt an estimate of the man, the soldier, and the statesman. The task is peculiarly difficult, for the strong personality of Bolivar has, as in the case of Napoleon, given rise to the most opposite estimates of him by his friends and his enemies. On the one hand, he has inspired the deepest affection and the highest admiration ; on the other, there are those of his contemporaries to whom he stands for all that is mean and contemptible. The one side look upon him as the purest of patriots, who had no thought but for the welfare of his country ; the other sees in him an ambitious self-seeker, looking upon the liberation of South America merely as the stepping-stone to his own glory. On the whole, his admirers, both his contemporaries and those who wrote after his death, predominate over his detractors. Larrazabal is perhaps his most fanatical adulator. In his eyes, Bolivar was incapable of wrong, and no action of his is indefensible. Ducoudray-Holstein, on the other hand, has hardly a good word to say of him, nor has Hippisley. Both, however, had causes of personal resentment against him which warped their judgment, and in the case of Ducoudray-Holstein, it is impossible not to feel a great contempt for the writer himself, or to think of him as anything but a vain and incompetent adventurer, whose main object is self-glorification.

O'Leary, an Irishman who came into contact with Bolivar under circumstances somewhat similar to Hippisley's, undoubtedly tries to hold the balance fairly, but is sometimes carried away by his personal affection and admiration for his master. There are a few, but very few, of the Liberator's acts for which he is obliged to admit that there is no defence. Of Bolivar's own countrymen, Restrepo is perhaps the fairest ; of the Englishmen who came under his command, the most moderate judgment of him is that of Miller. Amongst the later writers, Mitre sees much that is great in him, but is inclined to be prejudiced against him by admiration for the rival hero, San Martin, and by sympathy with the opposition to Bolivar of Argentina and Chile. Between all these conflicting opinions let us try to steer a middle course, rejecting, on the one hand, the extravagant panegyrics of Larrazabal, and, on the other, the obvious prejudices of Ducoudray-Holstein.

There is one point on which all are agreed—the generosity of Bolivar, his carelessness of money and his financial uprightness. Few men ever had greater opportunities of enriching themselves ; still fewer more honestly refused to take advantage of their opportunities. He commenced life as a rich man, he died almost a pauper. Peru offered him a million of “pesos,” which he refused for himself, though he accepted it for the benefit of his native city. He renounced the endowments which his country proposed to confer on him. Perhaps they were not worth very much in hard cash ; still he refused to accept them or to burden the impecunious State with obligations in his own favour, until absolute want compelled his acceptance of the pension of 1830.

Unlike the South American President of modern days, he laid up no nest-egg in the Old World to provide for the time when his position in his own country should be no longer tenable. Avarice may at once

be disregarded as one of the spurs which stimulated Bolivar.

Vanity and ambition are alleged as his chief motives by his enemies. Vain he certainly was, like all his race; the complacency and avidity with which he absorbed all the flattery which was offered to him is enough to prove that. From the earliest days of his successes, in 1813, he was eager for compliments and demonstrations of every sort. His power of swallowing flattery in its most shamelessly open form reached its maximum in Peru, and in the progress through that country and Bolivia. This inhalation of the incense of flattery had long ere that become a regular habit with the Liberator, so much so, that he probably encouraged the similar demonstrations at Guayaquil towards San Martin, believing that they would be as acceptable to that leader as to himself. But in the Protector of Peru the grossness of the flattery produced a feeling of disgust which, perhaps, helped to increase the repulsion which he felt for the person of the Liberator when he first met him. It would be absurd to deny that ambition had a great influence on Bolivar's career. Yet it seems to us that a great injustice is done to him by those who assert that personal ambition was the sole, or even the chief, motive power which drove him forward in his great task of liberating South America from Spanish rule. The idea of the struggle for the liberation of a down-trodden people seems to have grown in the mind of the young Bolivar quite independently of any thoughts of his own personal advancement. It was implanted in him by the teachings and companionship of a dreamer, Simon Rodriguez, and what he saw in Europe seems to have convinced him that South America, free of Spain and endowed with a republican government, must follow the example of France. What he did not altogether realise then was the immense difference between the homogeneous, civilised, and cultivated people of

France, and the backward, almost uncivilised, and heterogeneous peoples of South America, whose education had been for centuries carefully repressed by the governing power.

Bolívar certainly started as an ardent and whole-hearted republican, whose conscience was shocked by the ambition of Napoleon, overturning the French Republic and raising himself to supreme power on its ruins. Yet it may be noted, with reference to Bolívar's later ideas, that it was not the Consulate but only the Empire which turned him against Napoleon.

That he placed the good of his country and its liberation far in advance of his own ambition is shown by the very fact of his importation of Miranda in 1810. That leader had already acquired a European reputation which, if not very high in itself, promised to place him on a pedestal in South America, where there was certainly no one who had had his experience of war or of republican government, both in North America and in Europe. Had Napoleon been in Bolívar's position, the last thing he would have thought of would have been to call in a man to whom he must, for the moment at least, play second fiddle.

Miranda, it is true, belied his reputation. He was worn out, and broke down completely in every way. But Bolívar had no reason to anticipate that, and there is no ground for believing that he hoped to play the leading part when Miranda was in Venezuela. Nor did he attempt to do so.

The rapid growth of Bolívar's ambition may be dated from the fall of Miranda. He had by this time gauged the weakness of the leading men in his own country, and realised his own superiority to the rest. His observations in Europe and the United States had shown him the unsuitability to the circumstances of his own countrymen of the Federal form of republic which had been set up in

Caracas, against the opinion of Miranda and himself. He had seen that, in a country like Venezuela, where all political energy was centred in a few towns, federalism must inevitably lead to speedy disruption of the union. New Granada had tried the same plan, and was already involved in civil war and dissolution into weak states. The United States of North America¹ had been taken as a model by the South American republicans, who failed to perceive the vast differences between the circumstances and character of the British American colonists and those of the subjects of the Spanish oversea dominions. Bolivar saw that possible safety lay only in centralised republics, in which the "sovereign and independent state" did not hold out a perpetual threat of separation from the union. Miranda had failed, and had disappeared from the scene to languish in the dungeons of Cadiz. Bolivar, no doubt, saw in himself the one man fit to carry through the part which he had formerly marked out for Miranda. He began to look upon himself as the predestined saviour of his country, the one man on whom everything depended. He had weighed his countrymen and found them wanting as leaders, in political as well as in administrative knowledge and capacity. As time went on, he appears to have become more and more impressed with the belief that he, and he alone, was absolutely essential to the liberation of South America, and his ambition for supreme power grew accordingly. That he was ambitious he himself admitted.²

Though we believe that a genuine love of his country, and a desire for her freedom and prosperity, were the original mainsprings actuating Bolivar, there were cer-

¹ Even there the War of Secession has shown what dangers threaten a Federal Republic. Only recently the difficulty of controlling the Anti-Asiatic legislation of the Western States has brought a new danger into prominence.

² In his letter tendering his resignation on the 6th February 1827. *Supra*, p. 375.

tainly occasions when he allowed personal considerations to take precedence of a whole-hearted patriotism.

The first of these was when, in 1815, he persisted in pursuing his quarrel with Castillo at Cartagena, and setting the terrible example of civil war, when the safety of New Granada was menaced by the approach of Morillo. There seems to be no possible defence for either Castillo or Bolivar in this shocking affair of the first siege of Cartagena. Had they united to defend the place against Morillo, it seems by no means impossible that his army might have been wrecked in its attempt to capture it.

When the Liberator came into contact with San Martin, his determination to assert his own superiority, and his practical refusal to aid Peru against Spain, except on his own terms, threatened disaster. Fortunately, San Martin was a more genuine patriot than Castillo, and effaced himself for the benefit of his country, when he saw that Bolivar was determined not to do so, and would see Peru perish, rather than act under, or in concurrence with the Protector.

The successes in Peru and Bolivia mark the point at which Bolivar's schemes and aspirations began to exceed the bounds of reason. The Liberator, at this period, suffered from megalomania of a very pronounced type. He had already undertaken what was really impracticable in his decision to unite Venezuela, New Granada, and Quito in one vast republic of Colombia; he now contemplated a close federation including Colombia, Peru, and Bolivia. He had wanted to sweep Chile and Argentina into the sphere of his own supreme influence, but those countries were determined not to take the same position as Peru, and the Liberator had to abandon these schemes. His still greater idea of the Congress of Panama was hopelessly premature and incapable of execution. If a Pan-American Congress is ever to become a reality, the prevailing influence must be that of

the North, not of the divided South. What was thought of Bolivar's schemes in Colombia, at any rate by some of the more important leaders, is shown by the passage we have quoted from Santander's letter of the 6th July 1826.¹

This letter gives an idea of the opposition that his supposed schemes were likely to encounter. From others, such as Paez, the opposition would probably have been cruder and more decided. Santander's subsequent conduct showed that he was not likely to give even the limited acquiescence he promises in Bolivar's supremacy.

The title of Emperor was probably not sought by the Liberator; but, nevertheless, he aimed at what was Empire in all but name. Mitre has coined the term "monocracy" for his aspirations. Nor is it to be believed that in his later days, when he realised the hopelessness of a union of Colombia, Peru, and Bolivia, he contemplated a Colombian crown for himself. When San Martin proposed the erection of South American monarchies under princes of the royal families of Europe, Bolivar nailed his republican colours to the mast. When he returned to Colombia in 1826, to find even that comparatively moderate-sized republic on the point of dissolution, owing to Paez's revolt, he seems to have reluctantly begun to modify his views on this subject. The question of the monarchical movement of 1829 has been fully discussed already. Bolivar may be acquitted of designs for a crown for himself, designs which he had persistently disavowed throughout his career. He probably saw clearly that his assumption of a royal or imperial title would be such a flagrant violation of all his past professions of republicanism as to be certain to discredit him for ever in the eyes of his countrymen, and to be destructive of his real power.

There were two alternatives open to him. He might aim at the retention for his lifetime of actual supreme

Supra, p. 359.

power under some such title as Liberator-President, or President for life. In such a position he would have been a king to all intents, but without, as he himself expressed it, "a seat on the four crimson covered planks which are styled a throne." In that case, what was to happen on his death, which he must have felt to be a not very remote contingency? He had no heirs, and no understudy fit to take his place.

On the other hand, he might elect to play for an immediate constitutional monarchy, the sovereign being selected from one of the reigning houses of Europe, other than that of Spain. In that case, he must himself retire, or, at the most, remain as the power behind the throne—an impossible position for such a man.

The scheme propounded by Vergara to Campbell was a sort of compromise. Bolivar was to remain in power for life, with a constitutional monarch in the background ready to succeed him. Even the monarchical party did not venture to suggest the title of King for Bolivar.

As for the Liberator himself, he was always alive to the great difficulties of a European prince, or indeed of anyone, in accepting such a throne as could be offered him. The country, whatever its natural wealth, must remain for many years poverty-stricken, until its natural resources could be developed. A century has not sufficed to attain that end, hardly even to make a commencement. The sovereign's court, consisting as it must of paupers, would be a mockery, and his own position, surrounded by intriguers of the type of Santander, Paez, and many others, would be almost impossible. He would have neither the means nor the surroundings to establish any real influence or prestige.

The whole of Bolivar's career was a gradual disillusionment. Year after year he became more and more convinced of the utter unreliability of the men and the machinery for administration. None of his subordinates

was a trained administrator, nor was he one himself. His attempts at administrative improvement were mere make-shifts, which broke down in the hands of others, the moment his back was turned. Campbell draws a wretched picture of the corruption and abuses of Santander's rule during Bolivar's absence in Peru. He gives instances of jobbery and fraud committed with the knowledge and connivance of Santander himself, and the judicial officers were as bad as the financiers. As for Paez, he was so totally uneducated as to be entirely in the hands of the intriguers who surrounded him. It is impossible to be serious when one reads some of the letters appearing over his signature, full of learned references to the heroes of Greece and Rome, of whom we may be quite certain Paez had never heard.

All through the Liberator's later correspondence there resounds the bitter cry of the disillusioned man, despairing of his country's future. We have already quoted his two so-called "prognostications" without attributing authenticity to them. But there are many letters of Bolivar of undoubted authenticity which are very nearly as strongly expressed. We will only add to the quotations already given, one from a letter written by Bolivar to Campbell on the 27th April 1829, and transcribed in the despatch of the 4th June 1829. Bolivar says: "I believe that, without much exaggeration, this hemisphere may be called that of anarchy. . . . I have no doubt but this mass of disorders will contribute to open the eyes of the incredulous (*ilusos*), and give cause to our friends in Europe to see all clearly, convincing them at the same time that my conduct and principles are too moderate to be able to govern this country."

Perhaps the most remarkable characteristics of Bolivar are the immense personal influence he succeeded in establishing over every one he came in contact with, and the indomitable courage and hopefulness which he displayed,

almost to the end of his career, even in the most apparently desperate circumstances.

Personally he was not popular. His manners were often harsh and unpleasant, and his language violent. His irascible temper was not in his favour, though, according to Miller, it appears to have been superficial and to have calmed down when he was not irritated by opposition. Yet he clearly had a wonderful power, when he chose to exert it, of overcoming opposition and winning over even those who entered his presence in the most hostile frame of mind. We have seen what Santander said on this subject, and Santander was certainly not prejudiced in his favour. Men who were very brave in their actions, and still more so in their professions, when the Liberator was far away, collapsed ignominiously when he appeared in person on the scene. In his earlier days he was sometimes resisted to his face by men like Arismendi, Mariño, or Bermudez, but, as time went on, his influence increased. When Paez had allowed himself to be set up by Wilson as supreme chief on the Apure, he gave in at once on the approach of Bolivar. It was the same on Bolivar's arrival at Maracaibo in 1827. Santander, as he himself confesses, could not resist the Liberator to his face, however bold he might be when he was far away. Even then, a firm letter from Bolivar was sometimes sufficient to bring him to heel, as in 1823. San Martin himself could not stand against the masterful personality of Bolivar, and it was he who had to give way after the Guayaquil interview. In his later years the Liberator's nerve seems to have failed to some extent. That was the cause of his treatment of Paez in the beginning of 1827, when, had he been the Bolivar of former days, he would probably have completely suppressed the Llanero leader, instead of granting an amnesty, and eventually even praising Paez's rebellious attitude, and calling him the "saviour of his country." Perhaps that was the most

remarkable exhibition of weakness he ever displayed. No misfortune, however great, seemed to daunt Bolivar in his early days. It is hardly possible to conceive any situation more desperate than his position after his defeat at La Puerta in 1814, or in Jamaica in 1815-16. All seemed lost after the defeat of El Semen in 1818, yet very soon after this Bolivar was writing and talking as if victory was assured. The buoyancy of his spirit is illustrated by his proclamations before and during the passage of the Andes in 1819. His situation was depressing enough after his Pyrrhic victory of Bomboná, and in the struggle against Peruvian apathy in 1824. Yet he never for a moment lost hope, or the confidence of eventual success. It was only after he left Peru that despair of his countrymen, and of the future of South America, settled on his spirit like a gloomy cloud. He saw all his visions of a great confederacy melting away; his back was hardly turned when both Peruvians and Bolivians rejected his favourite Bolivian constitution, which they had accepted when he was still amongst them to enforce his wishes. He saw Sucre forced to leave Bolivia, and Peru preparing for war against himself. Then the revolt of Paez clearly foreshadowed the dissolution of the greater Colombia, which, at least, he had hoped to preserve intact. All his later correspondence is tinged with the melancholy of a profound despair. His circular inviting suggestions for the constitution of the government shows that he had lost confidence in himself and his power. His letter about the rebellious generals furnishes yet further evidence of his abandonment of hope. Yet, even to the very last, he still, at times, hoped for a revival of his prospects. Mitre says that a very few days before the acceptance of his final resignation, in May 1830, he still had hopes of re-election. The fall of Mosquera and Caicedo, before the military revolution of Urdaneta and Jimenez, once more revived the hopes of the dying man, and, had he but felt that

there was any real stability in the troops, he might still have tried to return to Bogotá and power.

Bolivar has been compared to Washington and to Napoleon ; indeed Larrazabal would have us put him above the North American hero. Any such comparisons seem to us inappropriate. If it be said that Bolivar was as far above the men amongst whom he worked as Napoleon was above his surroundings, there may be some sense in the comparison. But then we must remember the enormous gulf between South America and Europe, in civilisation, in education, and in almost every other quality. The Liberator certainly had neither the military nor the administrative ability of the great Corsican, and on moral grounds, as well as others, he cannot be compared to Washington. Is it possible to imagine Washington declaring the war to the death, or massacring the 800 prisoners of Caracas and La Guaira ? What would he have said to the fulsome adulation of Peru and Bolivia ? Such things are not conceivable even in the case of Napoleon. Bolivar had not the chances of either of these two ; for, if ever a man had to face the problem of making bricks without straw, that man was the Liberator. Not only had he to drive out the Spaniards with very insufficient means, but, when he had destroyed the old government, he was faced by the task of reconstructing an administration for peoples whose past had fitted them for nothing but despotic rule. He had no one to help him in this, for he was surrounded by men whose practical acquaintance with the art of government was even less than his own.

Had he succeeded, in the face of all these difficulties, in leaving behind him a South America, or even a Colombia, united and well-governed, no name in history would have been too great to compare him with. But he failed, and left, as he foresaw must be the case, a century of revolution and misrule to follow him.

He was perpetually reforming or reconstructing the administration, but nothing stable ever came of it. Nothing more could be expected from one who had had no administrative training and no reliable tools with which to work. All who might have been able to help him had necessarily disappeared with the rule which they represented. The Spaniards alone were acquainted with the machinery of their government, such as it was, and, from the very nature of the case, it was impossible for them to serve on under the revolutionary government. Even Napoleon, administering a conquered country, largely employed the former functionaries, and he had always at hand an excellent staff of trained administrators to supervise them.

In the drafting of constitutions Bolivar displayed a curious energy, and, all things considered, it is wonderful that he, devoid as he was of legal education, should have been able to turn out two such productions as the Constitutions of Cúcuta and of Bolivia, which were apparently entirely his own handiwork. The latter was a somewhat strange piece of patchwork, made up from the British Constitution, tempered by that of the United States, and with an admixture of ancient Greek and Roman ideas. The whole thing, with its Presidency for life and its hereditary Senate, certainly smacked more of a constitutional monarchy than of a republic.

The comparison of Bolivar with Napoleon as a military genius is absurd. He had no military education, either practical or theoretical, and if we may infer, from his special bequest of Montecuculi's "Art of War," that he pinned his military faith on it, it may be remarked that it was hardly the best course of study for the waging of war in the days of Napoleon. Mitre has characterised his system of warfare as a sort of mixture of the warlike propensities of the indigenous races with European discipline. Knowing little of tactics and less of strategy, he gained

his victories by audacity, by impetuosity in attack, and by unfailing constancy in defeat. With this estimate of the Liberator's military qualifications there is not much fault to be found. In the domain of strategy he did well in 1813 when, dropping from the mountains of Merida into the very midst of the scattered Spanish forces, he defeated them in detail. But there seems no reason to suppose that his finding himself in a position to do so was due to anything but chance. The way in which he soon afterwards scattered his own army in different directions, instead of keeping the main body together to be hurled alternately against Boves, Ceballos, Monteverde, and Yañez, is certainly not indicative of any high strategical conception. He never seems to have realised that in war it is impossible to be too strong at the decisive point. Bolivar's first really good strategical move was his transfer of the base of operations from Northern Venezuela to Guayana, but it was Piar's idea rather than the Liberator's. Even when he decided on it, he committed the grave blunder of leaving the unfortunate Freites to certain destruction at Barcelona. When he found himself in possession of Guayana, his letter to the Marquis de Toro shows that he appreciated its advantages, but, as we have said, the credit for initiation of the movement must go to Piar.

The one great strategical idea for which the credit is solely due to Bolivar is the march to Bogotá in 1819, which resulted in the liberation of New Granada. Its execution was admirable, and it may safely be said that few other leaders would have dared to attempt it. The passage of the Andes has been compared to the passages of the Alps by Hannibal and Napoleon. Its actual physical difficulties were probably greater than either of these encountered, but it must be remembered that, whilst they carried with them large armies of disciplined troops, Bolivar's force was not more than about 2500 half-disciplined men at the

outside. He reached the highlands without a single horse or gun and with his troops in a state of dissolution which would have rendered them an easy prey to the Spaniards, had they been within reach during the first few days. Bolivar's achievement was certainly a great one, but hardly greater than San Martin's in the Chilian Andes. His concentration on the Cerro de Pasco before Junin was also admirable in its execution.

Turn now to Bolivar's tactics. We have seen the class of troops he had to lead, often men whose want of training rendered manœuvring out of the question. Most of the Liberator's battles were mere hammer - and - tongs affairs, decided by a bayonet charge, and they rarely amounted to anything greater than a combat between the equivalent in numbers of a European brigade on either side. As an instance of Bolivar's tactical incapacity, take Carabobo. He decided, correctly enough, to turn the Spanish right flank; but when it came to execution, he carried out the whole of his turning movement in full view of the enemy, whom he made no effort to hold in front during its execution. Consequently, the Spaniards were able to send reinforcements to the threatened wing without any hindrance, and two-thirds of Bolivar's little army idly watched the struggle of the rest against greatly superior numbers. The eventual victory was due to the dogged valour of the British troops, holding on without reinforcements, and almost without ammunition for a long time.

At Bomboná Bolivar seems to have appreciated the necessity of a frontal attack, in order to save the flank attack on the slopes of Pasto from annihilation by superior forces. Junin was a purely cavalry action, for the initiation of which Bolivar was personally responsible. With the whole field spread out under his eyes, the Liberator deliberately sent his cavalry to pass through a dangerous defile and to deploy beyond it, with the

Spanish cavalry so close as to be able to fall upon the republicans as they debouched. The result must have been defeat, but for the happy accident of Suarez's squadron being in reserve, and the mismanagement of the Spanish cavalry in the pursuit. Bolivar himself clearly thought the day was lost when he galloped off to draw up his infantry in rear.

Such instances as these suffice to show that Bolivar's military notions were excessively crude. The fact is, the whole struggle rarely rose above the level of guerrilla warfare, and it is ridiculous to compare the leader of guerrillas with Napoleon, or even with Washington. Bolivar was never opposed to a commander of the second, or even of the third rank. Monteverde, Boves, Morales, and Yañez were amateurs in the art of war like himself; Morillo, Canterac, La Torre, and the other professional soldiers on the Spanish side were men who had gained no reputation worthy of mention, and never displayed any remarkable military talent in South America. Of the commanders on both sides Sucre was perhaps the only one who showed signs of real military aptitude.

Wellington is said to have spoken of Bolivar as a "remarkable commander," which is just the cautious sort of remark which might have been expected from the Duke in regard to a man as to the details of whose military conduct he probably did not know very much. Bolivar's great merit as a leader, under the peculiar circumstances in which he commanded, lies in his firmness and constancy in defeat, which never allowed him to despair, and which inspired him with ideas of such boldness as the march on Bogotá, and the advance into the Andes of Peru against the superior forces of La Serna. Napoleon himself was hardly more successful in exacting from his men the uttermost farthing of exertion and devotion.

Bolivar may fairly enough be styled a Napoleon or a Washington when judged by South American standards

only, but there is nothing whatever to show that he was capable of playing the part of either of those great men in the surroundings in which they lived and acted.

From beginning to end his career was one long struggle, not only against the Spaniards, but also against the disloyalty and the incompetence of the men who professed to work with him. Of all the leaders, Sucre, Urdaneta, Salom, and Mariano Montilla, after the reconciliation, were almost the only ones on whom he could really rely. Mariño, Bermudez, Paez, Piar, Arismendi, Ribas—all, at one time or another, turned against him; some of them were in revolt on several occasions. Cordova, Padilla, Santander, Obando, and Lopez all conspired against him. Paez and Santander were his bitterest enemies, though each of them publicly testified to the merits of the Liberator. Nothing can show more clearly how far above them he admittedly stood than some of the letters and proclamations of these two.

Paez was perhaps more a tool in the hands of cleverer men, and was personally a less dangerous enemy than Santander. The latter, when Bolivar went to Peru, was virtually President of Colombia, and it became his interest to keep the Liberator from returning to supersede him. It would have suited him perfectly if Bolivar had abandoned Colombia for good, and set himself up as President of Peru and Bolivia, an office to which he was elected for life, and could perhaps have held so long as he remained in the country, backed by his Colombian troops. It was on them really that he had to rely, a fact which was emphasised by Sucre's acceptance of the Bolivian Presidency, only on condition of his being allowed to retain 2000 Colombian soldiers.

Washington's character is stained by no such dark blots as disfigure the career of Bolivar. We have already discussed his action in the arrest of Miranda in 1812. Notwithstanding his profession of purely patriotic motives

in this matter, it is difficult to doubt that the fate of the unfortunate old man, which was due to Bolivar's action, should have weighed heavily on his conscience.

The declaration of war to the death was a piece of barbarism which, however much in accord with the spirit of both sides in this fierce war, can only reflect discredit on a man who, at least, had had opportunities of knowing how war is conducted amongst civilised peoples. Such a declaration Washington could never have made, and even Napoleon's bitterest enemies would hardly accuse him of contemplating such atrocities. Though, as we have said, Bolivar showed symptoms, very soon after the declaration, of regret for it, he undoubtedly enforced it on many occasions with the utmost rigour. His own report on the massacres during his advance on Caracas in 1813, and the horrible slaughter of prisoners in February 1814, are enough to prove this. The declaration has not even the excuse of referring to combatants only, for it was levelled at every Spaniard, combatant and non-combatant alike, and was actually executed against innocent persons who had taken no part in military operations. The whole spirit of the revolutionary armies favoured merciless massacres, and, up to 1820, Bolivar did nothing to check it. The murder of the missionaries in Guayana was unpunished, so was the massacre of the exhausted prisoners on the road from Bogotá to the Magdalena in 1815. Bolivar was not responsible for the murder of Barreyro and his companions in 1819, and he expressed horror at it. But he did nothing to punish Santander. Indeed, looking to his own past record, he could not consistently do so. His admirers produce in his defence certificates of his general humanity. If he was as humane by nature as they represent him, the obvious reply is that he sacrificed his principles for what he considered to be expediency.

In blaming Bolivar for sanctioning such barbarities

there is no excuse to be made for his opponents. Men like Boves, Morales, Yañez, Rosete, and innumerable others were at least as atrocious savages as their republican opponents. All that can be said is that one party was as bad as the other, and perhaps the example was originally set by the royalists. The methods of the war on both sides, up to 1820, relegate it to a level with the combats of uncivilised savages.

The execution of the unfortunate Piar is a favourite charge of the enemies of Bolivar. The mulatto was certainly a dangerous intriguer, and, as we have said, perhaps the most alarming feature in his insurrection was his attempt to work upon race feeling. Had he succeeded in introducing that element into the war, it might possibly have taken an even more sanguinary aspect. Still, there is always a suspicion that Bolivar was anxious to get rid of one whom he felt to be a more dangerous rival than men of the stamp of Mariño and Bermudez. Of Bolivar's conduct in his siege of Cartagena, and in his dealings with San Martin, enough has already been said. It is curious how differently he has been estimated in the matter of frankness—San Martin thought him cold and calculating, the very reverse of frank; Colonel Campbell, not to mention the Liberator's avowed admirers, attributes frankness to him as one of his virtues.

Of his conduct in Peru, and in his dealings with Chile and Buenos Aires, it is difficult to speak with certainty. There is another side to the story which, from the point of view of those countries, throws a less favourable light on Bolivar's actions than is reflected in the writings of the Colombian authors. It would appear that he had by this time become so puffed up with his successes that he looked upon himself as the predestined arbiter of the destinies of all Spanish America. He was checked in some of his wildest schemes by the clearly expressed refusal of Buenos Aires and Chile to submit to his

domination. He saved Peru and Bolivia from the continued rule of Spain, but the hollowness of his power in those countries was shown by the collapse of his institutions almost immediately after his departure. Yet his services to the cause of independence are acknowledged to this day in Peru and Bolivia. For his own sake, for the sake of Peru, and for that of Colombia, the Liberator would have done far better to have left Peru immediately after the destruction of the Spanish power at Ayacucho. Sucre could have settled affairs in Upper Peru, as he actually did, and Callao might safely have been left to fall, as it was bound to do when hope of relief from outside was gone.

It seems strange that Bolivar, who was always alluding to the heterogeneous character of the peoples of the Spanish colonies, should have failed to see the great differences between the Venezuelans, the Granadians, the Ecuadorians, and the Peruvians, and the impracticability of a federation of all these countries. If federation for Venezuela alone implied dissolution, still more did it imply the same for the larger federation. He apparently looked upon himself as capable of holding the whole together from above. Had that been possible, the state of affairs would, in many ways, have resembled what it was in the colonial days. Bolivar himself would have occupied a position analogous to that of the King of Spain in former days. At Panama or Caracas he would have been in touch with Venezuela and New Granada, but he would have been almost as far in time from Buenos Aires or Chile as Spain. Success seems to have turned his head, and it was only when he got back to Colombia that he began to realise that his vast schemes were chimeras. For a time he still hoped to hold together the greater Colombia, but, at the end, he realised the impossibility even of this.

On the whole, the revolting colonies were inclined to

maintain the long-recognised divisions of Spanish rule, and to create new nations, each covering what had formerly been a Spanish Viceroyalty or Captain-Generalcy, an area the inhabitants of which had long been accustomed to look for government from a common centre. Bolivar's attempt to obliterate the old Spanish frontiers was bound to be the failure it proved to be.

In contemplating Bolivar personally, one cannot help looking upon him as in a perpetual state of isolation, with no real ties binding him to anyone. After his wife's death he had practically no family life. His brother and sisters never appear on the scene, nor even do his mistresses. The only substitute for a family was his personal staff, for several of whom, notably Belford Wilson, O'Leary, Moore, and Andres Ibarra, he seems to have entertained feelings of friendship which were fully reciprocated. He could never really trust men like Santander, Paez, Mariño, or Bermudez. Of his colleagues and subordinates few indeed were trustworthy or constant. Urdaneta, Mariano, Montilla, Salom, and Sucre were almost the only exceptions amongst the principal leaders.

Amongst the many accusations levelled at him was one of personal cowardice. That we cannot believe to have been well-founded. When men of the stamp of Bermudez hurled at him the epithet of coward, the case seems to be that of the little boy who shouts the term at another as a term of vulgar abuse, rather than as a deliberate accusation. As for Ducoudray-Holstein's stories, we believe them to be the fabrications of a malevolent enemy. Perhaps the action which lends most colour to the charge was Bolivar's flight from Ocumare, when he left MacGregor and the rest of the troops to their fate, in circumstances which subsequent events proved to be by no means desperate. The facts, however, are somewhat obscure, and MacGregor himself does not appear to have impugned the Liberator's courage. There certainly is some resem-

blance between his conduct on that occasion and that of Napoleon in quitting the shattered army of Russia. In both cases the leader could do better elsewhere than with the remnants of an army. Bolivar's flight before the assassins of September 1828 seems to have been the only course open to him. To stay and face them would have been to sacrifice his life uselessly. His whole conduct, throughout his career, seems to us to belie the charge.

The enormous physical energy of the man cannot fail to command admiration. Napoleon in his best days never showed greater activity than did Bolívar in the campaign which ended with Boyacá, or in the rapid journeys which he made from Bogotá to Angostura, from Angostura to Cúcuta, from Bogotá again to Popayan, to Quito, and to Guayaquil. Towards the end the feeble body was fast failing, yet the Liberator carried out marches which would have tried most men.

The figure of the worn-out Liberator, suffering in mind and body, deserted by all but a few, reviled by the majority of those who owed everything to him, is one of the most pathetic in history.

His life is the history of a great success and a great failure. He succeeded in throwing off for ever the yoke of Spain, which had pressed for three centuries on the shoulders of South America; he failed to set up, in place of Spanish dominion, anything resembling a stable, free, and popular government. Bolivar's success marks him out as the greatest man South America has produced, one to whom the title of "El Ilustre Americano" might have been more properly given than to Guzman Blanco, whose vanity prompted him to assume it. His failure hardly detracts from his greatness, for the task of making a great nation out of the materials he had to work with was an impossible one. He had to deal with peoples depraved by centuries of bad government. The mass of the popula-

tion, sunk in superstition, servility, and ignorance, was without initiative or capacity. The majority of its leaders were either as ignorant as the rest, or else had been endowed by the Spanish system with a narrow literary and legal education, which turned them into professional intriguers, and fostered their innate vanity.

With such materials Washington could never have evolved the United States, and Napoleon could never have conquered the greater part of Europe.

Bolivar, looking to his opportunities, his upbringing, and the people he had to work with, was, we think, a very remarkable man. What he might have attained to in Europe or North America, had his lot been cast there, it is as idle to consider as it would be to speculate as to the part Cæsar would have played had he been in the place of Napoleon.

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
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

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
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


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